Concept
Pecuniary Harm and Causation
Intentional interference with prospective contractual relations
Pecuniary Harm and Causation
Section 766B closes with its damages rule: the defendant answers "for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation."1 Two requirements sit inside that phrase. The plaintiff must have lost something measurable in money, and the loss must result from the interference rather than from some other reason the relation failed.
Pecuniary harm means financial loss. Most of the cases concern future contract relations, such as the prospect of obtaining employment or hiring employees, or the opportunity of attracting customers or purchasing property, and in each the harm is the money value of what the plaintiff did not get. Courts can put a number on that value because a background of business experience lets them estimate both what was lost and the likelihood that the plaintiff would have received it had the defendant not interfered.2 The measure is the plaintiff's loss, not the defendant's gain. A damages claim in tort compensates the loss the wrong caused, which may exceed what the defendant took.3
Compensation for purely financial loss sets this tort apart from the economic-loss rule, which generally denies recovery in tort for such losses. The rule operates between contracting parties: if a seller delivers a truck that does not work and the buyer therefore cannot deliver goods to a customer, the buyer's lost profit on that sale is not recoverable from the seller in tort, and the buyer is left to its remedies under the contract.4 It also operates between strangers. In Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, a charterer could not recover the profits it lost while a ship was repaired after the defendant negligently damaged the ship's propeller.
Section 766B stands outside that bar because it demands more of the defendant. It reaches only one who interferes "intentionally and improperly," so a defendant who merely negligently disrupts a prospective relation is not within it.5 The intent requirement also supplies the limit that a rule against open-ended liability for pure financial loss calls for. A defendant who knows of a relationship and acts to disrupt it has chosen whose loss will follow, so liability does not spread to an unbounded class of strangers.
Injury has been part of the claim from the beginning. The First Restatement required neither improper motive nor improper means, and proof of intentional interference made the plaintiff's prima facie case.6 That initial burden was so slender, critics complained, that it amounted to little more than the defendant's conscious act and the plaintiff's economic injury, and it exposed ordinary competition to costly suits. Many high courts have since required the plaintiff to plead and prove that the interference was wrongful, improper, illegal, or independently tortious.7 The plaintiff's economic injury remains part of its case under § 766B.
Causation connects the loss to the defendant: the plaintiff must show that it likely would have received the benefits of the relation had the defendant not interfered.8 The kind of relation changes how that showing begins. Intentionally inducing or causing a breach of an existing contract is a wrong in and of itself,9 so the plaintiff starts with a promise that was broken. A prospective relation carries no promise, and the plaintiff must prove from the surrounding business facts what it would have received.
Both plaintiffs lost something real, and both defendants acted wrongfully. What separates them is what each can prove about the world in which the defendant stayed out of the way: the chain's six-year history of renewals makes the lost order likely, and a seat in a crowded field does not.