Concept
A Probable Relationship
Intentional interference with prospective contractual relations
A Probable Relationship
A plaintiff suing under Section 766B must first prove that something protectable was there to be interfered with: a prospective contractual relation, or an opportunity close enough to one to qualify.1 Courts call the element a relationship or opportunity carrying a reasonable probability of economic benefit, one the plaintiff would likely have captured but for the defendant’s interference.2 The word probability works in both directions. A hope or a bare chance of gain falls below the line. Certainty and a signed agreement sit above it, and the plaintiff need prove neither.
Many kinds of relations can meet the standard. The opportunity to buy or sell goods or land, to hire others, or to work at will all qualify, and the tort is not confined to merchants or to employment.3 A physician’s hospital staff privileges show how far the idea reaches. The hospital’s contract does not guarantee renewal, but if the hospital has long renewed privileges as a matter of policy, a defendant who persuades it to break that pattern may have interfered with a relationship worth protecting, provided the conduct was also improper.4 Nor must the plaintiff have been headed toward a contract as such. A probable prospect of economic gain, with provable losses resulting from the interference, is enough so long as the opportunity was sufficiently definite to warrant protection.5
Most prospective-advantage claims arise in commercial dealings, such as hiring employees, attracting customers, or buying property. When plaintiffs try to stretch the tort to other expectancies, courts have found themselves on unfamiliar ground and have frequently refused the claim. The reason usually given is that there is no sufficient degree of certainty that the plaintiff would ever have received the benefit. States that recognize the tort at all sometimes do so only in limited circumstances.6
Probability is one gate among several, and it does different work than impropriety, which later sections take up. Impropriety asks whether the defendant behaved wrongly; probability asks whether the plaintiff lost anything it would likely have received. The gate matters because the First Restatement left it nearly open: proof of intentional interference made a prima facie case, with neither improper motive nor improper means required.7 Critics objected that so slender a burden could expose a rival to time-consuming and expensive suits over conduct the commercial world regarded as commonplace and appropriate.8 The Second Restatement, by contrast, reaches only interference that is both intentional and improper.9 Justification is a further, separate screen. Some courts treat a defendant as justified when it acts in a bona fide exercise of its own rights, but the defense is lost if the defendant goes beyond what is necessary to protect its legitimate interests or uses improper means.10
The clearest protectable example is Buckaloo v. Johnson. A broker had discussed the sale of beach property with buyers and sent them to the defendant, who then refused to pay the broker’s commission. The California Supreme Court held that the broker’s complaint stated a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic relations.11 The court’s elements for the brokerage setting begin with an economic relationship between broker and vendor or vendee “containing the probability of future economic benefit to the broker.”12 What made the benefit probable was work the broker had already done. The discussions and the referral had put the commission in motion, and the law did not demand a promise that the sale would close.
Decisions denying recovery mark the other edge. In Santana Products, Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equipment, Inc. the plaintiff was excluded from bidding, but several other firms were bidding and nothing showed that the plaintiff was likely to have won the contract.13 The exclusion destroyed a chance, and a chance in a field of several bidders is not a probable benefit. Employment cases draw the same line. In Stehno v. Sprint Spectrum the Missouri Supreme Court said that a valid business expectancy is more than a subjective expectancy, that it must be a reasonable expectancy of continued employment, and that the plaintiff needs more than a “mere hope.”14
Read together, the cases show which facts carry the element. The broker in Buckaloo had buyers in hand and a transaction moving toward closing, so the odds rested on what had actually passed between the parties. The bidder in Santana held a seat in a contest with no showing of favorable odds. Stehno asks that an employee’s expectation rest on something in the relationship, like the settled pattern of renewal behind the physician’s privileges. The test is objective: a reasonable expectancy counts, and a hope the plaintiff happens to feel does not.
Jurisdictions disagree about whether the plaintiff must identify the third party who would have dealt with it. Some demand a specific, identifiable opportunity. South Dakota requires a relationship with an identifiable third person, and a North Carolina court held that communications to a large number of people suggesting they had potential lawsuits against a vehicle manufacturer did not interfere with anyone’s prospect of a contract.15 Other courts do not insist on a name. A federal district court in Delaware allowed a claim about prospective pharmaceutical sales without requiring the plaintiff to identify specific relationships that had been disrupted, and Hawaii’s supreme court held that plaintiffs need not allege an actual or potential contract or name the third party if they allege a relationship or potential relationship that would have inured to their economic benefit.16 The dispute concerns how a plaintiff shows definiteness, not whether definiteness is required. Both camps still ask that the opportunity be sufficiently definite to warrant protection, and some courts add that negotiations of certain kinds, such as for the purchase of a house, must have reached some state of finality.17