Concept
The Basic Claim
Intentional interference with prospective contractual relations
Interference With Prospective Contracts
The Basic Claim
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B makes a defendant liable for the pecuniary harm that results when the defendant intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective contractual relation (a contract to marry excepted) and so costs the other the relation's benefits. The interference takes one of two forms: inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the relation, or preventing the plaintiff from acquiring or continuing it.1
Four limits in that rule do most of the work. The requirement of intent excludes carelessness that happens to cost a rival a sale. The tort has always been intentional, although courts have never agreed whether the required intent is a purpose to interfere, knowledge that interference will result, or knowledge joined with other wrongful or improper conduct.2 The requirement of impropriety separates actionable interference from ordinary business, because knowing interference with another's prospects of income is extremely common in normal business, property, and employment transactions and creates no liability without impropriety.3 The word prospective tells you that the relation need not have ripened into a contract. The pecuniary-harm limit confines recovery to the money lost when the relation's benefits fail to arrive.
The tort travels under many names, and a student who meets them in a casebook or on an exam should know they describe one claim. Interference with prospective advantage, with prospective economic advantage, with trade, and with business relations all refer to it, as does interference with prospective contractual relations, the Second Restatement's name. The Third Restatement calls it interference with economic expectation.4 Under each label the central concept is wrongful conduct that interferes with the plaintiff's ability to receive income expected from business, employment, or other sources, or valuable property, and so causes the loss of that expected income or property.5
The Second Restatement's title can mislead, because the plaintiff protected by this tort holds a prospect of economic benefit, not a contract. Most of the cases have concerned future contract relations: the prospect of obtaining employment or hiring employees, or the opportunity of attracting customers or purchasing property.6 A shop's hope that its regular customers will return and an employer's hope of hiring a particular worker are both expectations of this kind.
A business setting also makes such losses compensable. Where the cases concern future contracts, background business experience lets a court estimate with fair success both the value of what the plaintiff lost and the likelihood that the plaintiff would have received it had the defendant not interfered.7
The First Restatement shows what happens without the impropriety limit. Section 766 of the 1939 Restatement required neither improper motive nor improper means; on proof of intentional interference, the plaintiff made a prima facie case.8 The plaintiff's initial burden therefore amounted to no more than showing the defendant's conscious act and the plaintiff's economic injury. Critics argued that legitimate competition could expose a business to time-consuming and expensive suits, and to potential liability, over conduct the commercial world regarded as commonplace and appropriate. Some complained that foreign lawyers reading the Restatement as an original matter might conclude that “the whole competitive order of American industry is prima facie illegal.”9 The Second Restatement's rule, by contrast, makes impropriety an element of the claim.10
The prospective setting raises the bar for another reason. As one court put it, an interest in an existing contract receives greater protection than “the less substantive, more speculative interests in a prospective relationship,” where liability attaches only on proof of more culpable conduct by the interferer.11
The history explains how the claim took this shape. Early liability for interference with a plaintiff's trade turned on physical interference, as in Garret v. Taylor and Keeble v. Hickeringill. Only in the last half of the nineteenth century did liability expand beyond physical interference and become a major field of tort law. Commercial activity grew, large-scale industry arrived, and labor unions gained members and militancy; the resulting disputes among businesses, and between business owners and unions or their members, ended in lawsuits over interference.12
A parallel line of cases protected existing contracts. The principle of liability for tortious interference with contract was at first received with hesitation and disapproval, but Bowen v. Hall reaffirmed it in 1881. In the United States, malice became the touchstone for liability. By degrees the principle spread, first to contracts other than those for personal services, and then to a holding that the defendant's ill will was not essential. Temperton v. Russell, decided in 1893, took the next step and extended liability to prospective relations that had not yet produced a contract.13
The sections that follow work through the claim piece by piece: the two forms of interference, the line between prospective and existing contracts, the requirement of a probable relationship, knowledge and intent, impropriety, harm and causation, and competition as a justification.