Concept
The Section 766A Variant
Intentional interference with an existing contract
The Section 766A Variant
A defendant can wreck a contract without ever speaking to the party on the other side of it. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766A reaches that defendant. One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person, by preventing the other from performing it or by making the other's performance more expensive or burdensome, is liable to the other for the resulting pecuniary loss.1
Section 766 supplies the familiar counterpart, in which the defendant interferes by “inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract.”2 The two sections share a frame. Both exclude contracts to marry, both require interference that is intentional and improper, and both measure recovery by pecuniary loss, so the intent and impropriety analysis taught earlier in this chapter carries over. Only the defendant's target moves, from the plaintiff's counterparty to the plaintiff.
Three questions organize what follows. What does targeting the plaintiff change, and what does it leave alone? How does liability arise on facts, by prevention or by burdening? And which courts have accepted the section? The last matters as much as the first two, because § 766A is a Restatement rule and not every state has adopted it.
Targeting the Plaintiff
The two sections differ in one respect: the party toward whom the defendant's conduct is directed. In Wilspec Technologies, Inc. v. Dunan Holding Group Co. the Oklahoma court explained that § 766 focuses on conduct directed at a third party that induces the third party to breach its contract with the plaintiff, while § 766A concerns conduct targeted at the plaintiff that hinders the plaintiff's own performance or renders it more burdensome or costly.3 The Iowa Supreme Court, in Nesler v. Fisher and Co., Inc., quoted the Restatement's own contrast: § 766A “is concerned only with the actor’s intentional interference with the plaintiff’s performance of his own contract, either by preventing that performance or making it more expensive or burdensome,” while § 766 states the rule for interference with a third person's performance of his existing contract with the plaintiff.4 A concurring opinion in Price v. Sorrell, a Wyoming decision, likewise located the substantial difference in the identity of the party to the contract toward whom the interfering acts are directed.5
Section 766 cannot reach a defendant who never approached the third person. Its question is whether the defendant induced someone else not to perform, and when the defendant never approached the third person the answer is no, however badly the plaintiff was hurt. A defendant who shuts down the plaintiff's operations or cuts off its financing can leave the third person entirely willing to perform and the plaintiff entirely unable to. Section 766A closes that gap by moving the inquiry to the plaintiff's performance while keeping the intentional-and-improper filter, so the wider coverage does not reach ordinary business pressure.
Moving the target has three consequences. First, no breach or nonperformance by anyone is required for liability.6 That sets § 766A apart from the general formulation, in which most courts list breach of the contract among the elements the plaintiff must prove.7
Second, the counterparty's continued willingness to perform is beside the point. The claim concerns the plaintiff's own prevented performance, which the Iowa Supreme Court called “the gist of an action under section 766A,” adding that “[i]t is immaterial in a claim under section 766A whether other parties were prevented from performance.”8
Third, the defendant must still intend to interfere with the plaintiff's contract, at least to the extent of knowing that the contract would be interfered with. Intending only the underlying wrong is not enough.9
Impropriety remains the filter that separates sabotage from ordinary business pressure. In contemporary law the principal basis of liability for intentionally preventing performance of a contract is that the defendant employed unlawful means, which include intentional wrongs that can be grounds for civil liability and conduct that is criminal or unlawful under legislation; some modern cases, Nesler among them, rest liability instead on improper motive or conduct that was not itself unlawful.10 In Winternitz v. Summit Hills Joint Venture, a tenant claimed that his landlord, by reneging on an agreement to renew a lease and permit its assignment, deliberately and wrongfully precluded him from satisfying a contingency in his own contract, and the court found §§ 766A and 767 “particularly instructive.”11 Section 767, the factors section covered earlier, is the natural companion for judging impropriety here.
Competition does not excuse the interference. Comment a to § 768 groups §§ 766 and 766A as the existing-contract provisions, sets them apart from § 766B's prospective relations, and explains that an existing contract, “if not terminable at will,” involves established interests that are not subject to interference on the basis of competition alone.12 A rival that hobbles the plaintiff's performance of a signed contract that is not terminable at will cannot defend by saying it was only competing. The comment's qualifier leaves open that competition may matter when the contract is terminable at will.
Deliberately invented complaints supply the improper element in the second town, because intentional wrongs that can themselves ground civil liability count as unlawful means.13
Preventing or Burdening Performance
Section 766A names two ways to interfere with the plaintiff's own performance, and they sit at opposite ends of one scale.15 Prevention makes performance impossible, so the plaintiff loses the contract's whole benefit. Burdening leaves performance possible but raises its price, so the plaintiff loses the added cost. Both modes carry the requirements of intent and impropriety. The decided cases develop prevention far more fully than burdening.
Nesler is the clearest prevention case. The Iowa Supreme Court observed that the trial court apparently had § 766A in mind when it told the jury that the interference “prevented Nesler from performing the contract to buy the Nesler Centre and caused Nesler to lose the benefit of the leases of space in the Nesler Centre.”16 Nothing in that theory required the defendants to approach the other contracting parties. Interference with the plaintiff's own ability to perform was the whole claim, and the court said it was immaterial whether other parties were prevented from performing.
Winternitz shows prevention by withholding. The tenant there alleged that, by reneging on its agreement to renew his lease and permit assignment of it to the Suhs, the landlord deliberately and wrongfully precluded him from satisfying the contingency in his own contract with the Suhs.17 The court said the tort so described is not substantially different from the Restatement's §§ 766–767 and called §§ 766A and 767 particularly instructive.18 That makes the case a useful § 766A pattern without making it a holding on the section's two modes. In both cases the plaintiff's side of the bargain failed because of the defendant's conduct and not the counterparty's.
The burden mode has far less case support. The Second Restatement's text covers it,19 and the Oklahoma court described § 766A as reaching conduct that renders the plaintiff's performance more burdensome or costly.20 But liability for preventing or disrupting a plaintiff's performance is accepted only in some cases, and Price v. Sorrell rejected liability for making performance more expensive or burdensome.21 Physical obstruction is the closest illustration. Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc. v. South Douglas Highway Water & Sewer Dist. is a road-blockage dispute. Whether a blocked road prevents performance or only burdens it depends on whether the plaintiff has another way in, and the material here does not say which mode the court applied, so the case illustrates the pattern and supports neither mode.
Prevention cases show most plainly why the tort exists. Interference with performance emerged as a basis of liability some decades after Lumley v. Gye, once courts recognized that a party's performance could be intentionally prevented or hindered by means other than inducing breach. In some circumstances the party prevented from performing would not be liable for breach of contract, so there would be no remedy.23 Contract law runs between the parties, and a counterparty that stays willing has done nothing wrong, while the stranger who caused the failure owes the plaintiff no contractual duty. Section 766A supplies the claim against that stranger.
Judicial Acceptance of Section 766A
Section 766A is a Restatement rule, and a Restatement binds no court until a court adopts it. Reception has been uneven. Iowa applied the section, the Winternitz court called it instructive, an Oklahoma court described its status in that state as unclear, and a Wyoming majority rejected it. A § 766A answer must therefore establish two things: that the facts fit the section, and that the controlling jurisdiction recognizes it.
Iowa supplies the clearest application. In Nesler the Iowa Supreme Court read the trial court's jury charge as reflecting § 766A, identified the plaintiff's own prevented performance as the gist of a § 766A action, and said it is immaterial whether other parties were prevented from performing.25 The result follows from the section's focus. Because § 766A looks at the plaintiff's own performance, the other contracting parties' readiness to perform answers a question the section never asks.
Winternitz is weaker support. The court called §§ 766A and 767 “particularly instructive” in describing a tenant's claim that a landlord had precluded him from satisfying a contingency in his own contract.26 Calling a section instructive is weaker than adopting it as the rule of decision, because a court can borrow a section's reasoning to resolve one dispute without announcing that the section is now the state's law. A plaintiff can cite the case as persuasive support, but it does not settle how the court would rule on a claim that fits § 766A and nothing else.
The Oklahoma court in Wilspec said it remained unclear whether Oklahoma has recognized a cause of action under § 766A.27 It nonetheless described the core distinction as the target of the defendant's conduct, noted that § 766A, unlike § 766, requires no breach or nonperformance, and observed that under either section the defendant prevents or hinders performance of a valid contract to which it is not a party.28 In a state in that posture, § 766A cannot be treated as settled law. The practical course is to plead it in the alternative and argue from that parallel to § 766.
The argument for recognition is parity. Both sections require intentional and improper interference, both compensate pecuniary loss, and under either the defendant is an outsider who destroys the value of a valid contract.29 The natural objection concerns structure. Section 766 is anchored to a discrete event, the third person's failure to perform,30 while § 766A dispenses with any breach, so impropriety alone must separate sabotage from ordinary business friction. Neither point is a holding. Both are reasons a court might give.
Wyoming took the opposite course. The majority in Price v. Sorrell rejected § 766A as an appropriate rule of law for Wyoming, even though the court had already embraced §§ 766 and 766B.31 A concurring justice objected that the rejection “seems whimsical and capricious,” that the case was “not a § 766A case at all,” and that the majority had promulgated an advisory opinion contrary to a well-established principle.32 A standard account describes the holding more narrowly, as rejecting liability for making the plaintiff's performance more expensive or burdensome.33 On either description § 766A is unavailable in Wyoming, and an answer should report that result without speculating about the rationale. A concurrence records disagreement. It does not change what the majority decided.
The Third Restatement points the other way. Like the Second, it extends liability to cases in which the plaintiff was a party to the contract and the defendant intentionally prevented or disrupted the plaintiff's performance (§ 17, comment i), and a standard account reports that this liability is accepted in some cases.34 A plaintiff in an open jurisdiction can therefore cite two Restatements, Iowa's application, and the Winternitz court's approving reference, while an adversary in Wyoming can cite the Wyoming court's rejection.
Step two decides most answers, because the same facts can produce liability in Iowa and none in Wyoming. Before relying on § 766A, check whether your own jurisdiction has adopted it, rejected it, or never addressed it.