Concept
Improper Interference
Intentional interference with an existing contract
Improper Interference
Section 766 does not make every intentional interference with a contract a tort. It reaches only a person who “intentionally and improperly” causes a third person not to perform another's contract.1 Most courts that list the elements of the claim accordingly require a valid contract, the defendant's knowledge of it, intentional and improper interference that induces or causes a breach, and resulting damage.2 A defendant can know of a contract, intend to disrupt it, and cause a loss while acting for entirely legitimate reasons. The word improperly separates that defendant from the one who owes a remedy.
That requirement is newer than the tort. Under the traditional view, intentional interference with an existing, enforceable contract was itself a wrong whenever damages followed, and the plaintiff did not have to prove improper means or improper purpose.3 Courts now more commonly require the plaintiff to show that the interference was carried out by improper means, from improper motive, or both.4 The Second Restatement wrote the requirement into the definition of the tort, so the claim turns on the quality of the defendant's conduct and not merely on whether the defendant can find an excuse in a recognized privilege.5 A list of privileges covers only the situations its authors foresaw. A requirement of impropriety lets a court weigh the means, purpose, and interests in the case before it.
Ordinary commerce supplies the reason. Hiring away an employee, courting a customer, and bargaining hard can all cause another's contract to go unperformed, and the person doing them often knows exactly what will follow. If intent plus harm were enough, the tort would reach conduct that society wants to encourage. Requiring impropriety screens that conduct out and leaves the tort available against wrongful means and wrongful purposes.
The companion provision uses the same word. Section 766A reaches a defendant who intentionally and improperly prevents the plaintiff from performing, or makes performance more expensive or burdensome, so what follows applies to both variants.6 An existing contract still receives more protection than a mere prospect, and that difference governs how much latitude a defendant has. The subsections below take impropriety apart in five steps: the balancing test, wrongful means, wrongful motive, the burden of proof, and the limited cover that competition gives against a claim on an existing contract. Privileges and justifications receive fuller treatment with the defenses.
The Section 767 Factors
Section 766 makes liability depend on interference that is both intentional and improper, and § 767 tells a court how to decide the second word. The same list of considerations applies to interference with an existing contract and to interference with a prospective relation.8 In Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Manufacturing Corp., the New York Court of Appeals called the adverb “improperly” the keystone of the § 766 formula.9 The Restatement chose that word over the phrase “without justification,” which judicial decisions used often and which raised questions of burden of proof.10
The choice changes the question a court asks. Whether the defendant acted without justification casts the defendant as someone who must produce an excuse, and it sends the court to a list of recognized privileges. Whether the interference was improper makes the quality of the conduct part of the plaintiff's claim and lets the court weigh the circumstances before it. The price is that the word has no fixed content; the New York court called its definition “inconstant and mutable,” drawing its substance from the particular situation.11 A word that elastic needs guidance, and § 767 supplies it with considerations in place of a rule.
The Restatement says plainly that the inquiry is a balance. The question in each case is whether, after weighing the relative significance of the factors, the conduct should be permitted without liability despite its harm to another, so the decision depends on “a judgment and choice of values in each situation.”12 Section 767 puts seven factors on the scale:13
- The nature of the actor's conduct.
- The actor's motive.
- The interests of the other party with which the actor's conduct interferes.
- The interests the actor seeks to advance.
- The social interests in protecting the actor's freedom of action and the other party's contractual interests.
- The proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference.
- The relations between the parties.
The seven do not do the same work. The first two describe what the defendant did and why, and they supply most of the material from which wrongfulness is judged. The next three put competing interests on the scale: the plaintiff's contractual interest, the interest the defendant pursues, and society's stake in both contractual security and freedom of action. The last two ask how directly the defendant's act produced the loss and how the parties stand toward one another. A defendant whose words reached the third person only through that person's own independent choice therefore tends to have a stronger claim of propriety than one who personally urged the breach.
Courts treat the first factor as the heavy one. The New York court called the nature of the actor's conduct “a chief factor in determining whether conduct is improper.”14 A court that imposes liability has to point to something the defendant did, such as a lie, a threat, or a payment, because the interests on each side are present in nearly every dispute and show only that both parties stood to gain or lose. In discussing competitors, Guard-Life listed the recognized wrongful means: physical violence, fraud or misrepresentation, civil suits and criminal prosecutions, and some degrees of economic pressure. It excluded persuasion alone, even when knowingly directed at the interference.15 The next subsection takes up those means in detail.
Two other factors tie back to earlier material. The Massachusetts high court, in United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, suggested that the existence of a contract, and not just a prospective relationship, might be a factor in deciding whether conduct was improper.16 The parties' relationship matters most when they compete: competitor status does not protect an interferer who disturbs an existing contract, though it may excuse interference with a prospective relation when the means are not wrongful and no unlawful restraint of trade results.17 The last subsection returns to that contrast.
Winternitz v. Summit Hills Joint Venture shows the factors lining up on one side. A tenant's sale to buyers depended on a renewed lease that he could assign to them. The landlord had agreed to renew the lease and permit the assignment, then breached both agreements through its agent, Mr. Frank, and the evidence, taken most favorably to the tenant, would support a finding that it acted maliciously and with intent to injure.18 The facts also fit § 766A, because the landlord's refusal took away the lease the tenant needed to perform his own contract with the buyers.19
The bank, the loan, and the breach stay constant across the two scenes, so the contrast shows how much work the conduct factor does. The openness of the test is also its weakness. Courts find the factors useful for structuring discussion, and many use them to decide whether interference was culpable enough for liability, but the list is nonexclusive and gives little direction. Most courts still decide what is improper by applying what the judge thinks is “good sense,” and the absence of any firm concept of the required misconduct continues to plague these decisions.20 The case law has responded by treating improper motive and improper means as the working grounds of liability, alone or in combination, and the factors help identify them.21 The next two subsections take those grounds in turn.
Improper Means
Wrongful means are the most direct proof that interference was improper. The nature of the actor's conduct is the chief § 767 factor, so conduct that is wrongful in itself usually settles the balance before motive and competing interests come into play.23 Two reasons support the rule. Other bodies of law have already condemned conduct of this kind, so treating it as improper gives the element content that does not depend on a judge's unguided sense of fairness. And requiring means that are wrong in themselves keeps the tort away from ordinary persuasion and competition.
Courts recite a familiar catalog of wrongful means, and it falls into four families that are easier to remember than one long list.24
- Coercion: violence, threats or intimidation, duress, and undue influence.
- Deception: fraud, misrepresentation or deceit, defamation, and injurious falsehood.
- Abuse of position or process: bribery, unfounded litigation, misuse of insider or confidential information, and breach of a fiduciary relationship.
- Anticompetitive conduct: restraint of trade.
Decided cases supply the facts behind the categories. A defendant who intentionally prevents performance of a contract by fraudulent misrepresentation is liable, as in Glover v. Lee, Higginson Corp.25 Physical obstruction works the same way. In Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc. v. South Douglas Highway Water & Sewer Dist., the defendant physically blocked the plaintiff's road and disrupted work under the plaintiff's contracts, and the court held the interference actionable because the blockage was vigilante activity.26
When the defendant's means amount to another tort, the plaintiff need not prove that tort in full. In Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Oregon Supreme Court, drawing on the Restatement commentary, explained that a plaintiff claiming improper interference with contractual relations need not establish every element of the other tort so long as the elements concerning the defendant's conduct are present. Its example was fraud: misrepresentations to the third party are improper means whether or not that party can show injurious reliance.27 The reason follows from what each tort protects. Reliance and injury protect the deceived person's own interest in not being cheated, while the interference claim belongs to the plaintiff, whose injury is the lost contract. What makes the defendant's act wrongful toward that plaintiff is the dishonest conduct itself.
The conduct elements of the other wrong still have to be present, which is why a harsh statement is not automatically improper. Many cases hold that a false statement protected under the rules of the specific tort cannot supply improper means, so an interference claim cannot be used to get around a protection that would defeat a defamation suit.28 A time bar is different. It says nothing about whether the conduct was wrongful, so some courts have found improper means even though the limitations period on the specific tort had run, as in Kraemer v. Harding.29
Conduct need not be a tort to qualify. Unlawful means include intentional wrongs that support civil liability and also conduct that is criminal or unlawful under legislation.30
The same catalog applies when the defendant acts on the plaintiff and not on the third party. Section 766A uses the same word, improperly, for a defendant who prevents the plaintiff from performing or makes performance more expensive or burdensome.31 The road blockage in Sunshine fits that pattern, because the defendant aimed its act at the plaintiff's access and persuaded no one. In contemporary law, the principal basis of liability for intentionally preventing performance is unlawful means.32 The structure of the claim explains the emphasis. When the defendant acts directly on the plaintiff, no third party's persuaded choice stands in the chain of events, and unless the means are wrongful nothing separates the defendant's act from ordinary conduct that happens to hamper someone's business. A later section takes up the § 766A claim in full.
Persuasion alone is the harder case, because the defendant has done nothing that another body of law condemns. Section 766 speaks of inducing a third person not to perform, so an offer or an argument is the very conduct the rule addresses, and the question becomes whether that inducement was wrongful in the circumstances.33 The tort began this way. In Lumley v. Gye, a rival opera manager offered the performer Johanna Wagner much more money to sing for him, and knowingly procuring the breach was enough for liability, with no requirement that he act maliciously or aim to harm Lumley.34 Current authority likewise finds liability where a defendant offers the contracting party benefits for not performing, such as employment, sales, investment, or better terms, where a defendant threatens negative consequences if the contract is performed, and where a defendant simply persuades the party that the contract should not be continued.35
Under the Restatement approach, then, an offer of better terms or a threat that knowingly induces breach of an existing contract can be improper, and the § 767 factors decide whether it is. Some courts add a wrongful-means requirement, so that persuasion alone does not support liability without something more, such as fraud or an unlawful threat. The Third Restatement comes closer to that stricter position. It lists conduct that is an independent and intentional legal wrong, and conduct engaged in solely to injure the plaintiff or to appropriate the benefits of its contract, as bases of liability.36
The recurring exam question is what follows when the defendant's only act was an honest offer. The answer states both rules and applies each.
Which camp a jurisdiction belongs to depends on its own cases. Where a stem leaves the jurisdiction open, an answer should first look for an independent wrong in the facts, because that satisfies both views, and should treat persuasion alone as the contestable case. The next subsections ask whether motive can make interference improper without wrongful means, and how far competition protects a defendant whose target is an existing contract.
Improper Motive
The second reason interference can be improper is the defendant's purpose. Section 767 lists the actor's motive among the factors, and the question here is whether the defendant acted from spite or a wish to injure.38 Purpose can taint conduct that would otherwise be lawful because of what sits on the other side of the scale. A defendant who interferes to win business, protect a loan, or secure supplies pursues an interest the law respects, and a court weighs that interest against the plaintiff's loss. A defendant whose only aim is the plaintiff's injury has no such interest to put on the scale, so nothing offsets the harm.
The classic American illustration is Tuttle v. Buck. The plaintiff alleged that a wealthy banker opened a rival barber shop, hired a barber to run it, and used his influence in the community to draw away customers, all without any aim of profit and solely to ruin the plaintiff's business. The Minnesota Supreme Court let the claim go forward and said that a person who starts a competing business “for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business” is guilty of “a wanton wrong and an actionable tort.”39 Such a person is not exercising a legal right or doing an act that can be judged apart from the motive that prompted it. Tuttle involved lost customers and no signed contract, so it shows the principle in its purest form and does not set out the elements of the contract tort. What carries over is the idea that an act the law usually leaves alone can become wrongful when injury is its only object.
The law reached its present position in stages, and the stages explain why courts state the rule differently. At the first stage, intentional interference with an existing contract was itself a wrong, and the plaintiff did not have to prove improper means, improper purpose, or ill will.40 Lumley v. Gye shows that stage: Gye was held liable for offering Johanna Wagner more money without any requirement that he act maliciously or mean to harm Lumley.41
The second stage began when courts recognized that some intended interference is justified. The Restatement and most courts then required interference that was improper, either because the defendant's purpose was improper or because the defendant used tortious or otherwise improper means.42 Motive and means became alternative grounds, and a plaintiff can win on either or on both, as when a defendant who hates the plaintiff also lies to the third party.43 At this stage the defendant's motive stops being a label for intent and becomes part of what the plaintiff must prove.
A third stage appears in a number of jurisdictions, where motive alone no longer carries the claim and the plaintiff must also show improper means. These courts have confined the tort to unlawful or independently wrongful means, mostly in claims about prospective relations, where liability is already narrower. A few have applied the restriction to existing contracts, as in Kirkland v. Tamplin, which held that persuading a party to breach is not enough without improper means such as fraud or defamation.44 The worry behind these rulings is practical. A rule that lets a factfinder punish improper purpose supplies no standard for telling spite from hard bargaining. Which stage a jurisdiction occupies decides whether motive can carry a claim at all, and the cases below assume that it can.
Winternitz shows liability resting on motive in an existing-contract case. The tenant's sale to buyers depended on a renewed lease he could assign, and the landlord had agreed to renew it and then reneged.45 The broker who negotiated the sale testified that the landlord's Mr. Frank said he wanted the tenant to “walk out of that store without a dime.”46 The Maryland court held that, taking the evidence most favorably to the tenant, it supported a finding that the landlord acted maliciously and with intent to injure. On that testimony the tenant's loss was the objective of the refusal, and no other purpose appears.
The standard for the other side of the line appears in Lake Panorama Servicing Corp. v. Central Iowa Energy Coop., which holds that a defendant's conduct is improper only if it is undertaken with the sole or predominant purpose to injure or financially destroy another. When interference is a necessary consequence of actions taken for a different purpose, the acts may be intentional but are not improper.47 The Restatement commentary says much the same. The actor's purpose is of substantial significance, and if he did not want to interfere but knew interference would be a mere incidental result of conduct pursued for another purpose, the interference may be found not improper, although other factors, especially the nature of the conduct, come into play.48 The Third Restatement frames purpose-based liability just as narrowly, listing conduct engaged in for the sole purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of appropriating the benefits of its contract, as a basis of liability.49 What separates Winternitz from Lake Panorama is the relation between the injury and the defendant's reason. In Winternitz the injury was what the landlord wanted. Under the Lake Panorama formulation, the injury is a side effect of a goal the defendant would pursue anyway.
The sole-or-predominant requirement exists because ill will and self-interest coexist in nearly every contested business relationship. Rivals, former partners, and parties to a dispute often dislike one another, and if any trace of hostility made interference improper, a plaintiff could reach a jury in almost every case by producing one angry email. Requiring that the improper purpose dominate asks the question that matters, which is whether the injury was the point of the defendant's act or a byproduct of a legitimate aim. Some courts protect defendants further and reject liability when the justifiable motive would have produced the same conduct whatever the defendant's feelings.50 Ill will that made no difference to what the defendant did plays no causal role. A legitimate motive closes off this route to impropriety but does not end the analysis, because the defendant's means may still be wrongful, and the competition subsection explains that a business reason gives much less protection when the target is an existing contract.
Step two does most of the work in fact patterns, since a hostile statement by the defendant proves a feeling, and the question is whether that feeling drove the decision.
Burden of Proof
Section 766 requires interference that is improper but does not say who must prove it.52 The rule describes what the claim consists of without saying whether the plaintiff must offer evidence of wrongful means or motive in its own case, or whether the defendant must come forward with a justification once intent and injury are shown. Courts have answered in different ways, and the answer controls what the complaint must allege, who loses when the evidence on wrongfulness is thin or evenly balanced, and whether a plaintiff can reach a jury by proving a deliberate interference alone. The positions form a spectrum, and the clearest way to learn it is in the order in which the law developed.
The oldest position puts the burden on the defendant. Under the traditional view, intentional interference with an existing, enforceable contract was itself a wrong when damages followed, and the plaintiff did not have to prove improper means or purpose.53 The burden of proof under that older rule fell clearly on the defendant to justify the interference.54 The first Restatement followed the same design. It reached one who, “without a privilege to do so,” induces or purposely causes a third person not to perform a contract.55
That allocation survives in decisions about existing contracts. The opinion of the Massachusetts high court in United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman quotes an Appeals Court statement that a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case with evidence warranting findings that the defendant intentionally interfered with an existing contract to the plaintiff's damage. Justification and privilege are affirmative defenses, and the defendant must plead and prove them.56 On that rule, a plaintiff who shows intent, interference, and damage need say nothing about the defendant's means or motive. The high court itself, though, observed that a contract's existence might be a factor in judging whether conduct was improper, and it described the seven § 767 factors as useful in deciding whether a defendant's motive or means were improper.57 A single state's opinions can therefore carry both framings, so an answer should rest on the controlling jurisdiction's latest statement of the rule.
Courts moved away from the defendant-burden rule because of what it does to competition. Acknowledging criticism, the American Law Institute discarded the first Restatement's prima facie tort requirement, required that the defendant's conduct be “improper,” and adopted a multifactor balancing approach with seven factors.58 The competition problem explains the urgency. With a prospective contract, proof of intent, interference, and injury should be insufficient to make a prima facie case, because it would ensnare legitimate persuasion and competition, so something more must be added to the plaintiff's case.59
Most contemporary courts now put the burden on the plaintiff to show improper purpose or improper means in order to establish a prima facie case.60 Issues once tried as questions of justification or privilege now go to the question of improper interference, and the affirmative defense of privilege matters, if at all, only after the plaintiff has proved wrongful interference.61 Courts that list the elements of the claim now include improper motive or improper means among them.62 The Oregon Supreme Court stated the position in Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co.: a claim of interference with economic relations “is made out when interference resulting in injury to another is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself,” and no question of privilege arises unless the interference would be wrongful but for the privilege.63 Close to a majority of state high courts have adopted a variation of that reasoning for the economic-relations tort, requiring the plaintiff to plead and prove that the interference was wrongful, improper, illegal, or independently tortious.64 In Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, the California Supreme Court reached the same position for prospective relations, holding that the plaintiff must plead and prove wrongful conduct beyond the interference itself.65
The last position sits at the plaintiff-friendly end of the spectrum and applies to existing contracts in particular. Some courts appear to put the burden on the plaintiff when the claim concerns only economic relations, but on the defendant when it concerns an actual existing contract.66 The argument for the split rests on the value of what is protected. An existing contract is a legal right that the law already treats as worthy of protection from a stranger, so an outsider's intentional interference with it is improper in and of itself. The plaintiff need prove only intent, interference, and injury, and liability follows unless the defendant offers a compelling justification.67 A prospective relationship is a hope that has not yet matured into a right, so the plaintiff must add proof of wrongful conduct.
The Third Restatement reaches a similar practical result by a different route. It reads as placing on the plaintiff the burden of proving wrongful conduct in both torts, but that burden is much lighter for an existing contract. There the plaintiff may show that the defendant acted to appropriate the benefits of the plaintiff's contract, committed an independent and intentional legal wrong, or acted for the sole purpose of harming the plaintiff, while for a prospective contract only an independent and intentional legal wrong will do.68 Because most efforts to interfere with an existing contract are efforts to appropriate its benefits, proving wrongful conduct in that setting is often little burden at all.
The allocation of the burden therefore matters most where the record is thin or balanced, and there the same evidence produces opposite judgments in different states. It also shapes the pleadings from the start. Where justification is an affirmative defense, the defendant must plead and prove it, while where wrongfulness is part of the claim, the plaintiff must plead and prove improper means or motive in its own case.69
Step two produces the usual losing answer for plaintiffs in majority jurisdictions, because a fact pattern that gives only knowledge, intent, and a lost contract supplies no wrongful means or motive. Step three matters only where the existing-contract tort is treated as a wrong in itself, so a fact pattern that does not signal that rule is best analyzed first under the plaintiff-burden approach and second under the alternative.
Competition Is Not a Shield
Section 766 asks whether a stranger improperly caused a contract not to be performed, and a rival who lures a bound customer away is a stranger with an obvious reason to do so.71 The Restatement answers whether competition supplies a defense in § 768, which separates interference with an existing contract from interference with a prospective one. The competition privilege does not reach an existing contract that is not terminable at will. It applies to prospective contracts and to contracts terminable at will, which the Restatement likens to prospects.72 The commentary says that the rule that competition is not an improper interference with prospective relations “does not apply to inducement of breach of contract.”73 Even a truthful offer of better terms does not escape. The Second Restatement suggests that such an offer is impermissible when the contract already exists, and § 768(2) does not excuse the competitor who makes it.74
The New York Court of Appeals worked through the distinction in Guard-Life, a suit between business competitors. It held that a competitor's status does not protect it from the consequences of interfering with an existing contract, but may excuse interference with prospective relationships when the interference is intended at least in part to advance the competitor's own interest, no unlawful restraint of trade results, and the means are not wrongful.75
An existing contract tips the balance because of what competition is meant to do. Rivalry benefits the public because buyers choose among sellers. A customer with no contract is still free to choose, so a rival that offers better terms presents an option the customer can take without wronging anyone. A bound customer has already chosen and has promised to stay. The rival's better offer can succeed only if the customer breaks that promise, so the rival's gain comes out of a legal right the plaintiff holds. Guard-Life put the point this way: an interest in an existing contract receives greater protection because “respect for individual contract rights outweighs the public benefit to be derived from unfettered competition,” while the less substantive, more speculative interest in a prospective relationship supports liability only on proof of more culpable conduct.76
On the prospective side of the line, the rule favors the competitor. It is emphatically not a tort to engage in fair economic competition designed to win a prospective contract for oneself, and ordinary competition is proper absent an existing contract that will be interfered with.77 A plaintiff suing over a prospect must plead and prove conduct that is wrongful by some legal measure beyond the interference itself.78 A competitor may therefore solicit customers who are not bound by contract and induce them to buy elsewhere. An exam stem in which one business undercuts another invites the competition defense, and the first question is whether the customer who left was bound.
The brochure in the second scene would not become tortious just because a customer under contract happened to read it. Section 766 reaches the inducement of a particular contract's breach by one who knows of that contract, and a general appeal addresses no particular contract. The privilege for prospects has a boundary too. A rival who also dislikes the plaintiff stays protected so long as its conduct is directed at least in part at advancing its competitive interests, but one whose conduct serves solely spite or ill will, and not at all its competitive position, interferes improperly.79 The banker in Tuttle v. Buck, who opened a barber shop only to ruin a rival, is the classic illustration.80
A contract that either party may end at will gets different treatment. An interest in such a contract is primarily an interest in future relations with no legal assurance that they will continue, so interference with it is closely analogous to interference with a prospect, and a competitor's interference may be not improper. By contrast, an existing contract that is not terminable at will involves established interests that are not subject to interference on the basis of competition alone.81 That is why the earlier classification of at-will contracts matters here: the competition privilege applies to claims about at-will contracts as it does to prospective ones.82 A competitor who persuades a customer to end an arrangement that either side may end at any time is therefore in a far safer position than one who persuades a customer to abandon a signed multiyear term, although a court that protects at-will contracts fully as existing contracts may reach a different result.
Some courts treat a competitive interest as justification even for an existing contract, so an answer should not overstate the Restatement line. In M&M Rental Tools, Inc. v. Milchem, Inc., the court held competition a sufficient interest to justify interference with a prospective contract but not with an existing one, which tracks the Restatement. By contrast, in Johnson & Johnson v. Guidant Corp., a federal district court in New York treated a competitive business interest as sufficient justification for interference with an existing contract.83 The comparison arises in the setting of burden allocation. Where the plaintiff must show that the interference was otherwise improper or malicious, a defendant can argue that an honest competitive offer falls short of that showing, while other courts require the defendant to prove that the interference was justified.84 Competition is one recognized justification among several, and the others are covered with the defenses.