Concept
Elements of the Claim
Intentional interference with an existing contract
Elements of the Claim
Section 766 states the tort in a single sentence, and courts that apply it unpack that sentence into a list of elements.1 Asahi Kasei Pharma Corp. v. Actelion Ltd. offers a representative list. Actelion, a Swiss drug maker with the dominant share of the relevant market for a PAH treatment, acquired all the stock of CoTherix, the California company licensed to develop Asahi’s drug Fasudil, and told Asahi that CoTherix would discontinue development for “business and commercial reasons.”2 A jury awarded Asahi nearly $550 million in compensatory damages, and the court of appeal affirmed. The court stated five requirements: a valid contract between the plaintiff and another party, the defendant’s knowledge of it, intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship, an actual breach or disruption, and resulting damage. These requirements protect the expectation that the parties will honor their contract against “officious intermeddlers.”3
Other courts state the claim at different lengths. Most courts that work from the Restatement definition recite four elements: a valid contract subject to interference, the interferor’s knowledge of the contractual relationship, intentional and improper interference that induces or causes a breach or termination, and resulting damages.4 A longer list divides the same ground more finely. It requires an enforceable contract, the defendant’s knowledge of it, intentional interference with the contract of specific persons, improper motive or means, a resulting breach, and damage to the plaintiff.5
The lists mostly bundle the same ideas differently, and the one difference of substance is impropriety. Asahi’s list has no impropriety element. Wrongfulness reached the jury instead as a justification defense, which the trial court told the jury would not apply to a defendant who used unlawful means, a term that “includes intentional misrepresentation, concealment, and extortion.”6 Some other courts omit impropriety as well, although the omission sometimes appears to result from oversight, so a state’s formula can be hard to pin down without reviewing its cases.7
The lists reflect a change in the tort itself. Under the traditional view, intentional interference with an existing, enforceable contract was a wrong in itself if damages flowed from it, and the plaintiff did not have to prove improper means, improper purpose, or ill will.8 Courts now more commonly require the plaintiff to show improper means or motive, and, perhaps because of that shift, they now often list elements.9 The elements therefore do unequal work. Notice of the contract, though necessary, may not suffice, because the interference must also be improper in some way.10 Impropriety gets its own section later in this chapter. The subsections below take the other elements in order, beginning with the contract itself.
A Valid Existing Contract
The first element requires that the plaintiff and a third person hold a contract that is in force when the defendant acts.12 The tort protects an expectation that a promise will be kept, and only an enforceable promise creates that expectation. A plaintiff who holds only a hope can lose it to ordinary competition; a plaintiff who holds a contract generally cannot. Four questions test the element. Is the plaintiff’s relationship an existing contract or only a prospect? Is it a kind of contract the law protects? Did the parties ever reach a binding agreement? And is the defendant a stranger to it?
The first question matters because the law protects an existing contract more than a prospect. Income expected under a contract already in effect when the defendant interferes falls under this tort, while income the plaintiff merely hoped to earn from future dealings with customers, suppliers, or employers falls under the separate tort of interference with prospective advantage.13 In Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Manufacturing Corp., the New York Court of Appeals explained the difference for a competitor. With an existing contract, respect for individual contract rights outweighs the public benefit of unfettered competition. A prospective relationship is a less substantive and more speculative interest, and liability attaches only on proof of more culpable conduct by the interferer.14 The Restatement commentary draws the same line. Under the conditions it states, competition is not an improper basis for interfering with a prospective relation, yet an existing contract that is not terminable at will “involves established interests that are not subject to interference on the basis of competition alone.”15 Causation points the same way, because the plaintiff must show that it would have received the contract’s benefits without the interference, and for that reason some courts protect an existing contract more than a speculative relationship.16
Two cases mark the line. Johanna Wagner had agreed to sing in Lumley’s operas for three months and not to perform elsewhere without his written authorization. Gye, a rival opera manager who knew she was unhappy with that agreement, induced her to sing for him instead, and her contract was the legal right he interfered with.17 Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales involved a claim for interference with prospective contractual or economic relations, and the California Supreme Court held that such a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant knowingly interfered with the plaintiff’s expectancy and also engaged in conduct wrongful by some legal measure other than the interference itself.18 A plaintiff who holds a contract with the third party sues instead for interference with an existing contract, where the traditional rule treated intentional interference as a wrong in itself if damages followed.19
Contracts that either party may end at will present the hardest classification question. Employment contracts for a definite term and other for-cause arrangements are clearly protected, and virtually all states protect at-will employment contracts too, including some that are generally hostile to wrongful discharge claims.20 The Restatement commentary explains the tension. A party’s interest in a contract terminable at will is primarily an interest in future relations, which the party has no legal assurance of keeping, so interference with it closely resembles interference with prospective relations.21 The Third Restatement goes further and applies prospective-advantage principles to a termination that involves no breach, as when the contract is terminable at will.22 Decisions reflect the split. Roy v. Woonsocket Institution for Saving treated a bank’s at-will employee as having at best an action for interference with prospective advantage, and Duggin v. Adams required an at-will plaintiff to prove improper conduct as well as knowledge of the contract, although knowledge alone would suffice for a contract of definite term.23 Most courts therefore protect at-will contracts as existing contracts, while some courts and the Third Restatement route them to the weaker prospective rules.
Some contracts receive no protection at all. Contracts that are illegal, in restraint of trade, or against public policy, such as agreements meant to stifle competition, are not protected from interference, as in Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Texas Electric Service Co.24 Section 766 itself excludes contracts to marry.25 Courts have almost without exception refused to treat the inducement of a broken engagement as a tort, usually because a promise of marriage is a highly personal agreement and anyone should be free to advise the parties to change their minds.26 A friend who persuades a fiancé to call off a wedding therefore stays outside the tort even if the friend knew of the engagement and acted deliberately. A rival who persuades a party to abandon a signed supply contract does not.
A third group of failures turns on whether the parties ever formed a contract. Negotiations, such as those to buy a house, must reach some state of finality before the relationship counts as a contract, and in MacNaughton v. Cossin a Maine court affirmed summary judgment against a plaintiff who could not show that a contract to buy a house existed.27 Until the parties are bound, neither can demand performance, so what the plaintiff lost when a rival stepped in was a chance at a deal. That chance is the interest the prospective-relations tort addresses, where the plaintiff carries the heavier burden on wrongfulness described above. In a fact pattern, find the moment an offer was accepted or a document signed, then ask whether the interference came before or after it.
The last requirement concerns the defendant. Section 766 speaks of a contract between the plaintiff and a third person, so the defendant must be neither of them, and a person cannot be liable for interfering with its own contract.28 Asahi shows how the argument arises. Actelion was not a party to the license, but it bought the licensee, CoTherix, and announced that the development program would end.29 Actelion contended that once it owned the licensee it had a direct interest in the contractual relationship and could not be liable for inducing a breach after the acquisition. The trial court refused that proposed instruction and told the jury that a party to the contract cannot be liable for interfering with it. The jury found that all the defendants intentionally interfered with the license agreement, and the court of appeal affirmed the judgment for Asahi.30
The same logic governs the workplace. An employer cannot interfere with its own employment contract, and under McGanty v. Staudenraus a supervisor acting within the scope of employment is treated as the employer and not as a separate third party.31 A supervisor who makes or recommends a firing for personal reasons can be liable, as can a firm that threatens the employer with lost business unless the employee is dismissed. A current employer that improperly induces an employee to revoke or reject an offer of new employment may be liable for interfering with that prospective relationship.32
Step one produces most of the failures in deal-making fact patterns, and step three decides which standard governs in at-will employment fact patterns. A claim that fails at the existing-contract stage is often a prospective-advantage claim waiting to be analyzed, with its heavier requirement of wrongful conduct.
Defendant’s Knowledge
Section 766 makes a stranger liable for inducing or otherwise causing a contracting party not to perform, and its commentary adds a mental requirement that precedes every other: the actor “must have knowledge of the contract with which he is interfering.”34 Knowledge has two layers. The defendant must know the contract exists, and must know enough of its terms to understand that what the defendant is inducing is a breach.35 Each layer screens out a different kind of innocent dealing. A defendant who has never heard of the contract cannot have chosen to take something another person already holds, and a defendant who knows of a contract but not of the term that governs the proposed conduct cannot tell whether the inducement asks for a breach or for a change the contract allows.
The second layer matters because a contract is a bundle of terms, and a defendant can learn that a contract exists without learning the clause that makes the proposed conduct wrongful. Awareness that a counterparty has a written agreement does not tell the defendant whether an offer for the counterparty’s output asks it to breach, since the answer depends on provisions about exclusivity, duration, and notice.
Knowledge differs from intent, which the next section takes up. Knowledge is awareness of the commitment; intent is the aim, or the near-certainty, that the commitment will not be performed. A defendant can know of a contract without any purpose to disturb it, and cannot have such a purpose toward a contract it has never heard of. The claim requires both, so the defendant must act with knowledge of the contract and for the purpose of interfering with it.36 Even notice of the relationship does not finish the analysis, because the interference must also be improper.37
A harder question arises when the defendant knew of the contract and its terms but believed the contract was invalid or would never be violated. The commentary to § 766 supports the argument that this belief does not defeat liability, so that a defendant who knew of a contract is liable even though it wrongly thought the contract would not be violated or could not be enforced.38 The decisions do not all follow that argument. In American Cyanamid Co. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. the defendant knew of the plaintiff’s agreement to purchase a corporation and avoided liability for inducing its breach, because the court found it reasonable to believe the agreement was not binding.39 In Robey v. Sun Record Co. the defendant was held liable despite its alleged belief that the contract was invalid. In State of Minnesota by Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Big Stone-Grant Industrial Development and Transportation, L.L.C. the defendant was held liable even though the party it induced had obtained a legal opinion stating that there would be no breach.40
The cases differ in the kind of belief they describe: reasonable in Cyanamid, merely alleged in Robey, and in Big Stone-Grant held by the induced party and backed by a legal opinion. A reasonable belief that no binding agreement existed comes closest to negating knowledge, because a defendant who reasonably saw only an unfinished negotiation did not know of a binding commitment to double-deal against. An asserted belief in invalidity, or a legal opinion obtained by the party who broke the contract, does little by comparison. In a fact pattern where the defendant held a sincere but unreasonable belief in the contract’s invalidity, treat knowledge as satisfied and note the belief as a weak argument.
The requirement follows from the tort’s purpose. The tort has been described as “a restriction against double-dealing,” and so the plaintiff may maintain the action only against one who knows of the contract, as the words “with notice” in Lumley v. Gye imply.41 Land and valuable chattels such as airplanes and cars have recording systems that let anyone discover competing interests, but personal-service contracts do not, so liability for them typically depends on actual notice. A performer’s best protection may therefore be to announce the signing publicly, which puts the world on notice without revealing confidential terms.
Intentional Interference
Section 766 reaches a stranger who intentionally and improperly interferes with another’s contract by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform it.43 The knowledge element asked what the defendant knew about the contract; this element asks what the defendant meant to accomplish. The defendant must have intended to interfere with the plaintiff’s contract, at least to the extent of knowing that the contract would be interfered with. Interference is therefore intentional when the defendant acts with the purpose of bringing it about or with knowledge that it is certain or substantially certain to result.44 The second branch closes an obvious escape route. A defendant pursuing its own profit can nearly always say it did not want the plaintiff’s contract to fail, and if only desire counted, that statement would end the case. A defendant who proceeds knowing the contract will fall has chosen the loss as surely as one who aimed at it.
The intent must also be aimed at the plaintiff’s contract. It is not enough that the defendant intended to commit the wrong that interfered with the contract’s performance, and the usual list requires intentional interference with the contract “of specific persons.”45 A speaker who praises job opportunities in another region, knowing that some listeners are bound by employment contracts they will break to relocate, foresees breaches in the aggregate but intends none in particular. Without an aim at a particular contract, the speaker is not liable to the employers who lose workers.
Intent in this sense concerns purpose and knowledge, so ill will toward the plaintiff is unnecessary. The claimant must show that the defendant acted with knowledge of the contract and for the purpose of interfering with it, and spite forms no part of that showing.46 The tort has worked this way from the start. Gye knew Wagner was unhappy with her contract and induced her to sing for him, and knowingly procuring a breach sufficed for liability without proof that the defendant acted maliciously or meant to cause the plaintiff loss.47 Purpose still matters in the impropriety analysis. The Restatement commentary observes that the actor’s purpose is of substantial significance, and that a defendant who had no desire to bring about the interference but knew it would be a mere incidental result of conduct pursued for another purpose may be found to have acted without impropriety.48
Intent must be paired with conduct that actually procures the breach, because § 766 requires the defendant to induce or otherwise cause the nonperformance, and the tort of inducing breach calls for some active inducement or persuasion.49 That conduct takes one of three forms. The defendant may offer the contracting party a benefit that depends on the contract going unperformed, such as employment, sales, investment, or better terms. The defendant may threaten a negative consequence if the contract is performed, such as the loss of a transaction or of business relations with the defendant. Or the defendant may simply persuade the party that the contract should not be performed or continued.50
Decided cases show each form. A competing business induced a customer to break an exclusive-provider contract in White Plains Coat & Apron Co. v. Cintas Corp., and in Daugherty v. Kessler the defendant induced the plaintiff’s tenant to break a lease and move to the defendant’s property. Temperton v. Russell and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co. illustrate the threat form, because the defendant caused a third party to break its contract with the plaintiff by threatening to withdraw labor or cut off a supply of products. In Lee v. Silver the defendant persuaded the plaintiff’s client to break an exclusive management contract.51 In each of these the contract failed because of something the defendant offered, threatened, or said, and that conduct also shows the defendant’s aim at the contract.
Passive involvement marks the edge of the tort. A defendant who can be shown only to have made an agreement with a contracting party, knowing that the party would break its contract with the plaintiff, is not liable for inducing the breach, as in Lamport v. 4175 Broadway, Inc.52 That result can look inconsistent with the substantial-certainty branch of intent, since the defendant knew the breach was coming. The inconsistency disappears once intent and procurement are kept apart. Intent describes the defendant’s state of mind, while § 766 separately requires that the defendant induce or otherwise cause the nonperformance.53 A party that had already decided to break its contract was not caused to do so by the defendant’s agreement to deal with it.
A refusal to deal is the companion case. A defendant who declines to transact business with the plaintiff or a third party, knowing that the refusal will lead a contracting party to break a contract with the plaintiff, is not treated as having induced the breach.54 The law has long allowed a person to withhold goods or services with that knowledge, subject to the qualification that a refusal actuated by a purpose to cause harm or by some other improper objective can be actionable.55 That qualification belongs to the impropriety discussion. The point here is that a refusal standing alone is not procurement.
Negligence cannot supply the intent element. Courts list intentional interference as an element of the claim, and the Restatement’s separate section on negligent interference confirms that the tort cannot be negligently induced, because it consists only of intentional conduct.56
Causation and Breach
Section 766 reaches a stranger who intentionally and improperly interferes “by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract,” and it measures recovery by the loss “resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform.”58 Those phrases describe a chain with two links. The defendant’s conduct must produce the third person’s nonperformance, and the nonperformance must produce the plaintiff’s loss. This section teaches the first link and the kind of nonperformance the plaintiff must show, and the next section takes up the loss. Causation differs from knowledge and intent, which ask what the defendant knew and aimed at, because it asks what the defendant’s conduct actually accomplished. If the third person would have left the contract anyway, the defendant took nothing from the plaintiff that the plaintiff would otherwise have had.
Courts write the causal link into their lists of elements. The formulation quoted in Asahi requires intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption, followed by an “actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship” and “resulting damage.”59 The nonperformance there was a licensee’s discontinuation of a drug development program after Actelion bought all of the licensee’s stock, and the jury found that the defendants had intentionally interfered with the license agreement.60 The word disruption in that formulation matters, because it signals that the plaintiff does not always have to point to a clause the third party violated.
Formulations differ on how much the third person’s conduct must amount to. Asahi accepts an “actual breach or disruption”; the longer list requires that the interference cause “breach of the contract”; and § 766’s text asks only whether the defendant caused the third person not to perform.61 The difference matters when the third party leaves by a route the contract allows, such as a termination on notice or a decision not to renew. A party that exercises a right to end the contract has not breached it, so a jurisdiction that demands an actual breach turns the plaintiff away. The same pressure explains why some authority treats a termination without breach as a prospective-advantage claim.62 When a fact pattern has the third party exit by notice, by nonrenewal, or by mutual agreement, state which view the jurisdiction takes and, if the stem does not say, analyze the claim under both.
Even where a breach or disruption is plain, the plaintiff must show that the interference caused it. The plaintiff must prove that without the interference it would have received the contract’s benefits.63 Some jurisdictions write that point into the elements as a separate requirement of resulting damage, which California and others have described as a clarifying factor of proximate cause, and the Sixth Circuit applied the same but-for threshold in Technology for Energy Corp. v. Scandpower, A/S.64 A fact pattern tests this requirement by asking whether the defendant’s conduct made any difference to the outcome, and the answer usually turns on timing and on what the third party had already decided.
This requirement overlaps with the active-inducement requirement from the previous section but is a different inquiry. In the passive-involvement cases, such as Lamport, the defendant’s only act was to make an agreement with a party already bound for breach, so the question was whether the defendant did anything that could count as a cause. Here the defendant did act, and the question is whether the act mattered. A plaintiff typically has to clear both hurdles, because an inducement that arrives after the third party has settled its course leaves the defendant with conduct but without causation.
Section 766 is not the only Restatement route to liability for an existing contract. Section 766A reaches a defendant who intentionally and improperly interferes by preventing the plaintiff from performing the contract or by making the plaintiff’s performance more expensive or burdensome, and it makes the defendant liable for the plaintiff’s resulting pecuniary loss.65 The two sections differ in the party toward whom the defendant’s acts are directed.66 Because a § 766A defendant works on the plaintiff and not on the third person, nothing in the claim depends on the third person’s failure to perform, and an Oklahoma court observed in Wilspec Technologies, Inc. v. Dunan Holding Group Co. that, unlike § 766, § 766A does not require a breach or nonperformance for liability to attach.67 Causation does not disappear under § 766A. The plaintiff must still trace its loss to the defendant, but the link runs from the defendant’s conduct to the plaintiff’s own prevented or burdened performance, without passing through any decision by the third party. A later section develops that variant in full.
Pecuniary Loss
Section 766 ends its statement of the tort with a measure of recovery: the interferer is liable for the pecuniary loss that results to the plaintiff from the third person’s failure to perform the contract.69 Pecuniary loss is loss measured in money, such as the profits the contract would have produced or the extra expense the plaintiff bears because performance never arrived. The word resulting picks up the causal chain from the previous section. The defendant’s conduct must produce the nonperformance, and the nonperformance must in turn produce the plaintiff’s loss. The economic measure fits the character of the tort, because what the plaintiff has lost is an expected benefit, with no bodily injury or property damage involved.
Asahi shows how large that loss can be. Actelion, the dominant seller of a PAH treatment, acquired all the stock of the licensee developing Asahi’s Fasudil and announced that development would stop. The jury awarded nearly $550 million in compensatory damages, and the court of appeal affirmed the judgment.70
The loss element therefore stands apart from the others, because a plaintiff can satisfy every earlier element and still recover no compensation if the nonperformance cost the plaintiff nothing in money. How such losses are measured, and how certain they must be, belongs to the remedies unit. Here it is enough to see that the tort’s economic character is why the plaintiff has to show an economic loss.
Courts do not limit the remedy to compensation for loss. The usual list of elements ends with resulting damage to the plaintiff, unjust enrichment to the defendant, the prospect of injury that warrants an injunction against interference, or, possibly, the threat of public harm when the interference is anticompetitive.71 Each addition responds to a case in which compensatory damages fit poorly. Unjust enrichment looks to the defendant’s gain, which may be clear when the plaintiff’s own loss is hard to prove. An injunction serves the plaintiff whose contract is threatened or is being disrupted, since money paid afterward cannot preserve the performance itself.
Punitive damages are the remaining possibility. In Asahi the jury found that all the defendants acted “with malice, oppression or fraud,” and it awarded $30 million in punitive damages on top of the compensatory award.72 Whether punitive damages are available, and on what showing, depends on each jurisdiction’s own rule, and the remedies unit covers the details.