Concept
Related Misuse-of-Process Torts
Wrongful criminal proceedings (malicious prosecution) and related defenses
Related Misuse-of-Process Torts
Malicious prosecution answers one wrong: a private person sets a criminal case in motion against someone who is not guilty, without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice, and the case ends in the accused's favor.1 Misconduct around litigation takes other forms that this rule does not reach, so the law keeps two companion torts beside it. Together the three cover the wrongful initiation or use of legal process: malicious prosecution, for wrongfully starting or continuing criminal proceedings; an analogous tort for wrongfully starting or continuing civil proceedings; and abuse of process, for the wrongful use of either criminal or civil process.2
The vocabulary needs care before the doctrine does, because the same label means different things in different places. Some jurisdictions reserve malicious prosecution for misuse of criminal process and call misuse of civil litigation malicious use of process, while others use malicious prosecution for both.3 The civil tort also appears as wrongful civil proceedings, malicious prosecution of civil proceedings, and wrongful use of civil proceedings, and none of these should be confused with abuse of process.4 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm § 24 titles the civil tort wrongful use of civil proceedings.5 Identify the tort by the elements the plaintiff must prove and the misconduct the facts describe, and treat the name as secondary.
Abuse of process exists because malicious prosecution is hard to prove. Its requirements of want of probable cause, favorable termination, and, in many jurisdictions, special injury leave some misuse of legal process without a remedy, and abuse of process supplies one.6 The civil analogue comes first below because it is built from the criminal tort's elements, so its departures show most clearly by comparison. Abuse of process follows, and a short comparison with false imprisonment closes the unit.
Wrongful Civil Proceedings
Most jurisdictions now recognize a tort for wrongfully initiating or continuing civil proceedings, and its elements are those of malicious criminal prosecution adapted to civil litigation.7 The defendant must have initiated or continued a civil proceeding with malice and without probable cause, the proceeding must have terminated in the plaintiff's favor, and the proceeding must have caused the plaintiff damage.8 The malice element is really improper purpose, as it is in the criminal tort.9 Many jurisdictions, though not a majority, add a requirement of special damage or special injury.10
The elements are demanding on purpose, and together they mean that most people who have been sued without being held liable cannot win an action for malicious prosecution.11 Courts have often resisted expanding the tort, reasoning that excessive litigation is better addressed by speeding resolution and authorizing sanctions for abuses than by a second round of litigation.12 In Friedman v. Dozorc, a malicious prosecution claim over an earlier civil action failed on summary judgment, because such an action may not be brought without special injury and the plaintiff had not pleaded any.13
Liability falls on people who took the role of plaintiff in the original litigation. A defendant in the first case who raises malicious defenses without any colorable grounds is not liable in these common-law torts, and the torts have so far been committed by people who were plaintiffs.14 New Hampshire departed from that view when its court created a cause of action for malicious defense, with requirements parallel to those of the malicious prosecution tort, in Aranson v. Schroeder.15
Probable cause is where the civil tort works most differently from its criminal parent. In the criminal tort the standard is objective: an accuser's honest belief in the accused's guilt is not enough, because the facts must warrant a reasonable person's belief in guilt.16 For a civil proceeding, lack of probable cause means the defendant had no reasonable basis, in law and in fact, to believe the claim could succeed.17 The test tends to be defined in substance as a reasonable belief that the claim may be held valid, which calls for judgments about both the relevant law and the prospects of proving the necessary facts.18 The legal side is met when there is a reasonable chance the claim will be held valid under applicable law, or when the claim rests on a good-faith argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law.19 A claimant whose theory needs a change in the law therefore keeps probable cause on the strength of a good-faith argument, even if the argument loses.
Whether probable cause has any subjective component is contested. The Restatement (Third), following Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, treats it as purely objective. Even on that view, what the defendant actually knows bears on the question, because a person who knows that the factual assertions in a claim are untrue does not have probable cause.20
The result of the first case bears on probable cause in one direction with real force. A decision by a competent tribunal upholding the claim on the merits is ordinarily conclusive evidence of probable cause, even if the decision is later reversed on appeal.21 A loss in the first case proves less. In the criminal tort, because guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, an acquittal at trial does not tend to prove that the accuser lacked probable cause.22 Courts divide over whether a magistrate's finding of no probable cause or a grand jury's refusal to indict raises a rebuttable presumption that the accuser lacked it, and some say the same when the prosecutor abandons the case, while others reject such presumptions.23 Advice of counsel supplies probable cause here as well: a client who brought or continued the proceeding on a lawyer's advice has probable cause, provided the client made full disclosure of the relevant facts and had no reason to doubt the lawyer's impartiality or competence.24
Lawyers who press a client's claim receive added protection. A lawyer may proceed in the good-faith belief that the proofs will establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice without expert testimony, only to find that the court disagrees, and that is not the equivalent of proceeding without probable cause.25 Courts disagree about facts the lawyer could have learned by diligent effort before filing. One decision found probable cause whenever the claim was legally tenable on what the client told the attorney, and another looks to what diligence would have revealed.26
Improper purpose is the civil tort's version of malice. A defendant who initiated, procured, or continued the proceeding is liable only if the primary purpose was something other than securing the proper adjudication of the lawsuit.27 Spite, hostility, harassment, or a wish to cause embarrassment qualify when they are the primary reason for the suit.28 In Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enterprises, Inc., the defendant obtained a temporary injunction restraining the plaintiffs from cutting off the defendant's water supply and dismissed the case a few days later, and it was found that the suit was brought solely to use the plaintiffs' water without right until another water system could be installed.29
A hope of payment is not improper in itself. A lawyer's object of receiving a contingency fee from a settlement or judgment is generally not an improper purpose, though it becomes one when the anticipated settlement rests on a claim known to have no merit or unrelated to the merits.30
A diner who honestly believes the screw was in the burger also wants money, but his primary purpose is to have his claim adjudicated, and he has probable cause as well. His loss at trial changes neither point.
Proof of purpose usually comes by inference. Improper purpose may be inferred from a finding that the defendant knew the claim had no merit, and it may also be inferred from the absence of probable cause, which provides an evidentiary basis for the finding.31 For a lawyer, the second inference is not enough: a finding of improper purpose against an unsuccessful attorney must rest on evidence independent of the evidence that the action was brought without probable cause.32 The reason lies in the lawyer's position. A client's total lack of belief that the action can succeed is persuasive evidence of intent to harass, but a lawyer who is unaware of the client's improper purpose may see the client and the claim through to an appropriate conclusion, despite doubting its prospects, without risking liability.33
The first proceeding must have terminated in the plaintiff's favor, and no claim exists if the termination was unfavorable or the proceeding has not ended.34 That rule also bars counterclaims in the main action alleging that it was brought without probable cause and for an improper purpose, because the main action has not yet terminated.35 Favorable termination is not required when the plaintiff had no opportunity to be heard in the prior proceeding, as with an ex parte attachment, and related claims in the prior proceeding may be considered together in deciding whether success on one was a favorable termination.36 A dismissal as part of a compromise or settlement generally does not qualify, though it may be shown that a particular claim was dropped because it lacked merit.37 Courts also disagree about whether the ending must reflect on the merits, with Lackner v. LaCroix requiring it and Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology International rejecting the requirement.38
The criminal tort recognizes a defense that the plaintiff was in fact guilty, and the civil tort has no analogous defense. A defendant cannot argue that the plaintiff actually was liable and relitigate the first claim, because termination of the prior proceeding in the plaintiff's favor is conclusive.39 The first case has already decided the claim, so reopening it would simply rerun that case.
Many jurisdictions, though not a majority, require special damage or special injury before the plaintiff can recover.40 Some courts call the requirement a special grievance, meant to stand in for the injurious effects that ordinarily flow from a wrongful criminal charge, such as arrest, restraint, and the humiliation of being held on bail, fingerprinted, and photographed.41 Friedman v. Dozorc enforced the requirement and ended the claim because the plaintiff had not pleaded special injury.42 Where the requirement does not apply, the cost of litigating the first suit becomes a central item of recoverable loss, because recognizing these torts means recognizing a claim for reasonably incurred attorney fees as damages.43
Abuse of Process
Malicious prosecution attacks how a case got started, while abuse of process attacks what a litigant does with process once it is running. The distinction is one of timing and target: malicious prosecution consists in maliciously causing process to be issued, whereas abuse of process is the employment of legal process for some purpose other than the one the law intended it to effect, the improper use of a regularly issued process.47 A corollary follows: starting vexatious civil proceedings known to be groundless is not abuse of process, and it is governed by substantially the same rules as malicious prosecution of criminal proceedings.48
Historically, litigants have found abuse of process easier to establish because it evolved as a catch-all for improper uses of the judicial machinery that did not fit the narrowly drawn action for malicious prosecution.49 The elements explain the difference. Abuse of process supplies a remedy that malicious prosecution withholds because of the latter's requirements of want of probable cause, favorable termination, and, in many jurisdictions, special injury, so the plaintiff need not show that the underlying claim was baseless or that it failed.50
Courts state the elements in two ways. One requires the plaintiff to plead that the defendant had an ulterior motive in using the process and that a willful act was committed in the use of the process that was not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding, so that the process was used for a purpose other than the one it was designed for.51 McNeil v. Jordan states the claim in three parts: the defendant used a legal process against the plaintiff, primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed, and the plaintiff was harmed.52 The two statements overlap, since the ulterior motive of the first is the improper primary purpose of the second. The act requirement does separate work. A litigant with a bad motive who takes only ordinary steps in the ordinary way has done nothing but litigate, so liability attaches to conduct that actually turned the process toward the collateral end.
The failing side of the line shows the act requirement most clearly. In Ghrist v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., a man whose name resembled that of a convicted drug dealer sued a television network for wrongly identifying him and using his likeness in an Internet news story about the convict, and one of his claims was abuse of process, based on the network's motion to dismiss.53 The court found the allegation insufficient, because nothing showed the motion was being used for an unlawful purpose that harmed the plaintiff, and a plaintiff cannot base an abuse claim on a defendant's efforts under Rule 12 to defend itself.54 A motion to dismiss is designed to obtain dismissal, so the network used the process for its intended end. The same reasoning keeps ordinary defensive steps outside the tort.
Both scenes involve a litigation tool that a court authorizes, and the difference lies in what the step was for. The motion in Ghrist was used to ask for dismissal, while the supplier's subpoenas were used to apply pressure, which is not what subpoena power is for.
A further case shows how one episode can support related claims. In Butler v. Flo-Ron Vending Co., a corporation was held liable for the acts of its employees, sons of the firm's owner, who planted a ring in a former employee's truck and falsely reported to the police that he had stolen property from the employer.55 The conduct also resembles the wrongful starting of a criminal case, so an answer to a pattern like this should say which wrong the facts emphasize and address the alternative where both fit.
The labels sit close together and invite error. Malicious use of process is another name for malicious prosecution of civil proceedings, while malicious abuse of process and malicious abuse of legal process are only other names for abuse of process.56 The word malicious in the second set does not import the elements of the first, so match the facts to the elements before trusting a label.
False Imprisonment Distinguished
False imprisonment protects freedom from unlawful confinement, so it asks whether the arrest or detention was itself lawful, while malicious prosecution asks whether valid legal process was wrongfully set in motion. The two are easily confused because a wrongful prosecution often begins with an arrest, but the elements of malicious prosecution show the difference. They require that the defendant initiate or procure criminal proceedings against an innocent person without probable cause and primarily for an improper purpose, and that the proceedings end in the accused's favor, and they say nothing about confinement.59 A plaintiff can therefore satisfy every element without having spent a minute in custody.
The dividing rule governs the case in which an arrest does occur. When the defendant complies with the proper formal requirements in procuring the plaintiff's arrest and confinement, the defendant is liable, if at all, only in malicious prosecution for using valid legal process to effect an arrest for an improper purpose, and not in false imprisonment.60 An arrest under properly issued process is lawful as a detention, so the false imprisonment inquiry finds nothing unauthorized about the confinement itself. Whatever went wrong lies upstream, in the decision to seek the process without probable cause and for a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice. The label therefore follows the location of the defect: a defect in the detention points to false imprisonment, and a defect in the accusation behind regular process points to malicious prosecution.
Malicious prosecution also reaches only those who actually set the prosecution in motion. A citizen who merely states facts to an officer or prosecutor, and honestly believes them, leaves the whole matter to the prosecutor and is not an instigator at all.61 Where an accuser does instigate a prosecution, the accuser's honest belief in guilt is still not enough to supply probable cause, because the facts must warrant a reasonable person's belief in guilt.62
Where no process issued, the analysis changes. When a warrantless arrest is unlawful, the remedy is an action for false imprisonment, and a warrantless arrest that produced no charges may not support malicious prosecution at all: in Van Audenhove v. Perry, a California appellate court held that no malicious prosecution action lies in that situation.63 With no warrant and no charge, there is no process to have been misused and no prosecution to call wrongful, and the only wrong left is the detention itself.
A fact pattern that mentions an arrest has therefore not yet chosen the tort. The facts must say whether the arrest rested on a warrant or other regular process and whether any charge followed, because those facts decide whether the complaint is about the detention or about the accusation.