Concept
Defenses and Limits
Wrongful criminal proceedings (malicious prosecution) and related defenses
Defenses and Limits
A plaintiff who proves every element of malicious prosecution can still lose. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653 makes a private person liable for initiating or procuring criminal proceedings against an accused who is not guilty of the offense charged, but only if the proceedings began without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice, and only if they ended in the accused's favor.1 The tort thus pictures an innocent accused and a reckless or abusive accuser. Three defenses test that picture from different angles, and a set of immunities and policy limits protects defendants whose roles the law shields from suit.
Guilt in fact attacks the premise that the accused is innocent. Advice of counsel attacks the probable cause element, because a person who laid the whole case before a lawyer and followed the advice acted reasonably. Release works outside the elements altogether: the accused traded the civil claim for the dismissal of the charges. The immunities and limits protect prosecutors, judges, and witnesses, and they keep a plaintiff from reaching other defendants by relabeling the claim. The subsections below take these in that order.
Actual Guilt
Section 653 reaches only an accused who is not guilty of the offense charged, and that limit supports a defense that works even when the plaintiff has satisfied every other element.2 A plaintiff may show no probable cause, an improper purpose, and a favorable termination, and still lose if the defendant proves that the plaintiff in fact committed the offense.3 The defendant bears that burden, and the standard is the civil one: a preponderance of the evidence, or the balance of probabilities.4 The defense matters most when the criminal case ended in an acquittal or dismissal, because either outcome satisfies the favorable-termination element and leaves the plaintiff with a claim the defendant must answer.5
An acquittal does not close the question. It signifies only that the prosecution did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, while the defense asks a civil factfinder whether guilt is more likely than not.6 The two verdicts answer different questions, so letting the defendant prove guilt is neither inconsistent with the acquittal nor a collateral attack on it. The criminal judgment stands untouched, and the civil verdict decides only whether the plaintiff may recover damages. The same gap explains why an acquittal does not tend to prove that the accuser lacked probable cause: probable cause asks whether the facts warrant a reasonable person's belief in guilt, and an acquittal reflects only a failure to meet the criminal standard.7
The defense also ignores what the accuser knew when the charge was filed. A defendant who instigated the prosecution without probable cause and with malice still escapes liability if the plaintiff turns out to have been guilty, because the defense looks to what the plaintiff did, not to what the accuser believed.8 Probable cause asks what the accuser reasonably believed at the moment of charging, while actual guilt asks what happened, so evidence developed later can support the second even when it could not have supported the first. A fact pattern that stresses an acquittal and an accuser's flimsy grounds has not yet decided the case; look for civil-trial evidence that the plaintiff committed the offense.
Advice of Counsel
Section 653(a) requires proof that the defendant initiated or procured the proceedings without probable cause and primarily for an improper purpose.11 Advice of counsel is a defense to the first of those showings. A defendant who gives a lawyer a full account of the facts and then acts on the lawyer's advice to proceed is treated as having probable cause, and the claim fails even if the advice later proves wrong.12 The defense applies in criminal malicious prosecution and in wrongful civil litigation alike, so a merchant who charged a customer with passing a bad check and a landowner who sued a neighbor invoke it on the same terms.13
The defense follows from what probable cause measures. The test is objective: the accuser's honest belief in guilt is not enough, and the facts must warrant a reasonable person's belief in guilt.14 A layperson cannot be expected to know where the criminal law's boundaries lie, and it is usually not reasonable for a lay person to start a criminal proceeding without being informed of the relevant law.15 A lawyer's advice supplies that information. When an attorney has advised that probable cause exists, the recipient is often deemed to have it for that reason, so differences among jurisdictions in how they treat mistakes of law may not change the outcome.16 The inquiry therefore examines what the defendant knew, disclosed, and believed, and it leaves aside whether the lawyer turned out to be right.
LoBiondo v. Schwartz states the conditions most fully. The defendant must prove that it relied on counsel's advice and that the advice followed a full and fair presentation to counsel of all the relevant facts. "Full and fair" means disclosure of all information the defendant knew that could justify or militate against filing the proposed claim, and if the defendant knew any fact reported to counsel to be false, the defense gives no protection.17 Each condition has a reason. Advice is a judgment about a set of facts, and when the set has been trimmed, the judgment says nothing about the real case. Without a full-disclosure requirement, an accuser who knew of an exonerating fact could hand a lawyer a one-sided account, collect a favorable opinion, and wave it as a shield against the very suit the missing fact would support. Requiring the facts that cut against the charge forces the accuser to put the weak points before the lawyer before the lawyer decides.
A stem that says only that the defendant consulted a lawyer before filing has not yet established the defense. Ask what the defendant told the lawyer, whether that account included the facts pointing away from guilt, and whether the defendant knew any reported fact to be untrue. The facts of Texas Skaggs, Inc. v. Graves show the point. The customer there mailed a money order to cover her bad checks, and the store manager reported her to the police the next day; officers later learned that the checks had been paid.18 Suppose the store knew of the payment but told its lawyer only that two checks had been returned. Repayment is exactly the kind of fact that militates against a hot-check charge, so the lawyer would have advised on a different case from the one the store actually had.
The adviser must also be a lawyer. The weight of authority holds that reliance on people who might be thought to know the law, such as lay magistrates, court clerks, and police officers, does not supply probable cause.19 The defense rests on the assurance that someone trained to judge whether the facts amount to a prosecutable offense reviewed the whole case, and an informal opinion from a clerk or an officer carries no such assurance. A defendant whose only comfort came from such a person gets the ordinary probable cause analysis, with no shortcut.
The defense carries a consequence for the lawyer as well. In LoBiondo, the court reviewed the settled rules that lawyers answer to ethical rules and penalties for frivolous litigation and rarely owe a legal duty to nonclients. It then held that if, and only if, a client sued for malicious use of process raises the advice-of-counsel defense, the client's lawyer can be sued on the same grounds.20 The decision to rely on counsel therefore matters to the lawyer as well as to the client.
Release Agreements
Public prosecutors not uncommonly agree to drop criminal charges in exchange for the accused's release of all claims against the prosecutor and others who took part in the case, and a valid release forecloses a legitimate complaint of malicious prosecution, or of an analogous civil rights violation, as completely as it forecloses a frivolous one.23 The accused who signs has traded a civil claim for the end of the criminal case, so a plaintiff may be able to prove every element of § 653 and still lose because the claim was given away. That sets the release apart from advice of counsel, which attacks probable cause, and from actual guilt, which attacks the premise that the plaintiff was innocent. A plaintiff who signed a release may also face a separate obstacle: a prosecution that ends at the accused's own instigation, or through a compromise the accused entered voluntarily, is not a termination in the accused's favor.24 The release defense does not depend on that element and applies whether or not it is met.
The law scrutinizes these bargains because the feature that makes them useful also makes them dangerous. A release lets the prosecutor and the accused close a case without litigation, but it also invites officials to file or maintain charges as bargaining chips, most obviously when their own misconduct is what the accused would otherwise complain about.25 State courts divide on whether such releases are invalid per se, as decisions from New York, in Cowles v. Brownell, and from California, in Hoines v. Barney's Club, illustrate.26 A categorical ban removes the bargaining chip entirely, because no release could be enforced. The case-by-case approach keeps legitimate settlements available and relies on an inquiry into the facts to catch abuse.
For federal civil rights claims of malicious prosecution, the Supreme Court's decision in Town of Newton v. Rumery supplies the approach: such a release is not necessarily invalid but may be held invalid in a particular case, as where there is prosecutorial misconduct.27 Federal courts applying it ask two questions. The first concerns public interest. The prosecutor must show a public interest favoring the release in the particular case, so a blanket policy of obtaining releases whenever a prosecution is abandoned would not be valid.28 The rule follows from the bargaining-chip danger. A prosecutor who demands a release in every dismissed case is selling dismissals, and the decision to drop a charge then reflects the value of the waiver instead of a judgment about the accused or the evidence.
The second question is voluntariness: did the accused understand what was being given up and remain free to refuse? A release is less likely to be voluntary if the accused signed it while in custody, had no lawyer, is unsophisticated, or was not fully informed about its effects.29 Each factor measures a different weakness in the bargain, since someone alone in a cell with no adviser is poorly placed to weigh a civil claim against immediate freedom. Several courts place the burden of proving the release's validity on the prosecutor, who proposed the bargain and knows why it was sought.30 Where police misconduct is part of the underlying civil rights claim, the release may deserve special scrutiny, since police might file charges as bargaining chips when their own misconduct is called into question.31
A stem that mentions a signed release has not yet decided the claim, because the signature only opens the inquiry. The stem must say where and with what advice the signing occurred, whether the accused understood the effect of the paper, whether the prosecutor had a reason tied to the case, and whether officer misconduct lies behind the civil claim. When it supplies the circumstances of the first scene above, treat the release as suspect; when it supplies those of the second, treat it as likely to bar the suit. In a state that follows the per se rule, the answer changes at the outset, so identify the governing law before weighing any facts.
Immunities and Policy Limits
Section 653 imposes liability on a private person, and that wording shows where the tort is aimed.35 The officials who actually run a prosecution are usually public, and absolute immunity removes most of them from the tort's reach. Other rules then stop a plaintiff from reaching private defendants by a route that skips the elements. The policy behind both moves is that people who help enforce the criminal law should be protected from the risk of suit whenever a prosecution ends without a conviction.36 Courts carry out that policy by granting privileges and immunities to those who work inside the legal process and by requiring the plaintiff to prove a series of demanding elements.37 The elements were covered earlier; this subsection covers the immunities and the limits that keep the elements from being sidestepped.
Public prosecutors acting in an official capacity hold an absolute privilege against liability for initiating or continuing criminal proceedings, which is why the only possible malicious prosecution defendant is someone else who can be held responsible for the case.38 Grand juries and others in similar roles share the protection, and it covers the decision to prosecute as well as conduct at trial. Judges are likewise immune for rulings in cases within their jurisdiction, even when a ruling is erroneous or malicious.39 The word absolute matters. The immunity attaches to the role of deciding, so it survives proof that the official acted in bad faith and without probable cause. A decision-maker who could be sued after every failed case would weigh the risk of a lawsuit alongside the evidence, and a rule that lifted the immunity on proof of bad faith would force the inquiry into motive that the immunity exists to prevent.
Witnesses stand under a similar shield. Almost everyone directly involved in litigation has an absolute immunity for communications made in the case or in preparing for it, so that honest voices are not silenced by fear of liability.40 A witness who testifies to a knowing falsehood therefore escapes liability to the person harmed, either because perjury is not a tort or because the witness is absolutely immune.41 For malicious prosecution, a person who supports a prosecution by testifying is generally not responsible for its continuance, since a witness does not control the prosecution and the testimony itself is privileged, although perjured testimony combined with other conduct has occasionally supported responsibility for continuing a prosecution.42 The rule has a visible cost, because a false witness injures the accused and pays nothing. Its justification is that a privilege covering only truthful testimony could be tested only by relitigating the testimony, and a witness who feared a later finding of falsity would have reason to hedge or hold back.
The litigation privilege protects what happens inside a case, and it does not protect the act of starting one. Private persons and police officers who wrongfully institute legal actions cannot invoke it against a malicious prosecution claim, because courts tend to limit liability for conduct after suit is brought while permitting liability for wrongfully bringing it.43 The reason follows from the tort's own structure. Every malicious prosecution begins with an accuser's communication to officials, such as a complaint, an affidavit, or a report, and if a privilege for communications made in preparation for litigation covered that communication, it would absorb the tort. Lawyers fall with other accusers: a lawyer is not vicariously liable for a client's acts, but a lawyer who decides to sue on known facts showing no probable cause, or who abuses process, enjoys no greater immunity than anyone else.44
A private defendant who loses on immunity keeps the protection the elements supply. A person who honestly provides information to the police, a prosecutor, or a court and leaves the charging decision to the public prosecutor is usually not considered responsible for the prosecution in the sense the tort requires.45 That protection comes from the responsibility element and not from any immunity, and it does not shelter someone who is not honest about the facts, since an accuser who only states facts to an officer and honestly believes them is not an instigator at all.46 The prosecutor's protection survives bad faith; the honest informant's lasts only as long as the informant stays honest.
Because the plaintiff must prove every element, there is no valid claim for negligent prosecution.47 A claim built on carelessness alone skips the improper-purpose element, and it skips the requirement that the defendant be responsible for the charge. The difficulty is deliberate, since people who report a perception of crime should not be led by fear of liability to withhold information from police and prosecutors.48
The same logic stops a plaintiff from relabeling the claim. If the elements could be avoided by choosing a different caption, the protection they give accusers would vanish whenever a plaintiff picked another tort. Courts accordingly reject attempts to proceed on negligence, defamation, invasion of privacy, outrage, interference with contract, or professional negligence of lawyers, and they have turned those claims away under the rules for those torts.49 Defamation is the clearest illustration. A criminal charge always defames the accused, yet a defamation action as such would be defeated by the privilege to report suspected crimes to appropriate authorities.50 A lawyer owes a duty of care only to the client, so an adversary may sue the lawyer for malicious prosecution or abuse of process but not for negligence.51
The elements and the immunities together deny a tort remedy to most people who were prosecuted but not convicted.52 Malicious prosecution is generally not a viable cause of action even for people exonerated after years of imprisonment for a crime they did not commit, because the officials who chose to charge and the witnesses who supported the case are shielded, and the plaintiff must still show that a defendant outside the shield procured the case without probable cause and for an improper purpose.53 Compensation for wrongful conviction and imprisonment may instead be available under a federal or state statute.54