Concept
Elements of Malicious Prosecution
Wrongful criminal proceedings (malicious prosecution) and related defenses
Malicious Prosecution and Defenses
Elements of Malicious Prosecution
A person prosecuted for a crime that person did not commit can sue the private individual who caused the prosecution only by clearing a demanding set of elements, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653 states them. Under § 653, a private person who initiates or procures criminal proceedings against another who is not guilty of the offense charged is subject to liability for malicious prosecution if two conditions are met.1 The first is that the defendant initiated or procured the proceedings without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice.2 The second is that the proceedings terminated in favor of the accused.3 Because the first condition joins two showings, the claim has four elements: initiation or procurement of a criminal proceeding, absence of probable cause, improper purpose, and favorable termination.
Actual damage is also an element in principle, but it is seldom the obstacle. A wrongful prosecution readily produces emotional distress, injury to reputation, legal expenses, and economic loss, so a plaintiff who clears the other elements will usually find harm to prove.4 The difficulty lies in the four elements above. A plaintiff who was charged and then acquitted has established favorable termination and nothing more; the plaintiff must still show that the defendant caused the prosecution, lacked probable cause, and acted for an improper purpose.
The law sets the bar this high on purpose. Together, the elements and the immunities of prosecutors and police officers deny the action to most people who were prosecuted but not convicted.5 The usual defense is that society's interest in enforcing the criminal law requires protecting those who assist from the risk of suit whenever a prosecution fails to end in a conviction.6 Even a person exonerated after years in prison for a crime that person did not commit generally cannot use this tort, although a federal or state statute may provide compensation for wrongful conviction and imprisonment.7
A hot-check prosecution supplies a running example in the sections below. In Texas Skaggs, Inc. v. Graves, Sharon Graves had given a Skaggs store checks that the store treated as “hot,” and she agreed to pay “as soon as she could get the money from the Skaggs’ credit union.” More than two weeks later, when the credit union paid her, she bought a money order and mailed it to Skaggs to cover the checks. The next day a Skaggs manager, Bill Pennington, reported her to the Texarkana, Arkansas, police under the Arkansas Hot Check Law, and four days after that he filed an affidavit for a warrant for her arrest. More than a week later, a manager summoned police while she was shopping in the store. She tried to explain to Sergeant Larry Arnold that she had paid, but he took her to the station and she was booked; only then did he telephone Skaggs and learn that the checks had in fact been paid.8 The sections below return to those facts where they bear on an element.
Initiating or Procuring Prosecution
Two threshold questions come before probable cause and purpose: whether a criminal proceeding was commenced at all, and whether the defendant is responsible for it.9
The tort arises only from a criminal proceeding, and the seriousness of the crime does not matter; a petty offense punishable by a small fine will do.10 What matters is that formal process began. A criminal proceeding commences when a judicial official or tribunal issues an arrest warrant or a summons requiring a person to appear in court or respond to criminal charges, when a grand jury issues an indictment, or when a prosecutor files an information. Filing a complaint or affidavit does not commence one.11
Warrantless arrests sit at the uncertain edge of this rule. The Restatements treat a valid warrantless arrest as initiating a criminal proceeding, but that position is doubtful, and in Van Audenhove v. Perry a California appellate court held that no malicious prosecution action lies when a warrantless arrest produced no charges against the plaintiff.12 When a warrantless arrest is unlawful, the remedy is an action for false imprisonment.13
Once a proceeding exists, the question becomes who answers for it. A private party or law enforcement official is responsible for a prosecution that a public prosecutor or other official commenced in two situations. In the first, the prosecution began because the defendant urged or pressured the official to act. In the second, the defendant caused it by providing information the defendant knew to be false or misleading, or at least did not honestly believe to be true. In both, the prosecution was not the product of the official's independent judgment.14
Honest reporting is therefore not enough. A citizen who merely states facts to an officer or prosecutor, and honestly believes them, leaves the whole matter to the prosecutor and is not an instigator at all.15 That rule keeps the tort away from ordinary cooperation with the police, in keeping with the policy of protecting those who assist in enforcing the criminal law.16 For an application, see State Farm Bureau v. Cully's Motorcross Park.
A stem that says only that the defendant reported the plaintiff to the police has not yet told you whether this element is met. The stem must supply the pressure or the falsehood, and if it supplies neither, the honest informant is outside the tort.
Responsibility lasts as long as the prosecution does. A defendant can be responsible for continuing a prosecution by urging that it go on, or by causing it to continue through out-of-court information the defendant knew to be false or did not genuinely believe. A defendant who initiated or procured the prosecution in good faith may also become responsible by withholding from the public prosecutor information indicating the plaintiff's innocence.17 In Texas Skaggs, the sergeant who arrested Sharon Graves telephoned the store afterward and learned that the checks had been paid, and the court called the evidence clear and undisputed that Skaggs initiated and continued the prosecution.18
Some participants stand outside the tort because of their roles. Witnesses who support a prosecution by testifying are generally not responsible for its continuance, even when the testimony is knowingly false, because witnesses do not control a prosecution and have an absolute privilege as to their testimony; perjury combined with other conduct has occasionally supported responsibility.19 Prosecutors and police officers hold immunities of their own, which the later subsection on immunities and policy limits examines.20
Absence of Probable Cause
Section 653's first condition splits into two showings, and the first is that the defendant initiated or procured the proceedings without probable cause.22 Most jurisdictions define probable cause as an actual and reasonable belief that the accused is guilty of the offense charged; a small minority ask only whether the facts would make guilt reasonable to believe, without also requiring that the defendant actually believe it.23
The majority definition has two components that do different work. The honest-belief component asks what the accuser really thought, and the accuser's own honest belief in guilt is not enough by itself. The objective component asks whether the facts warrant a reasonable person's belief in guilt.24 An accuser who did not believe the charge fails the first component; an accuser whose belief no reasonable person would share fails the second. Probable cause depends on the reasonableness of the accusation, so hostility toward the accused does not establish its absence.25
Texas Skaggs shows both components at work. The Arkansas court treated belief in guilt as a defense on which Skaggs carried the burden of persuasion: Skaggs had to show that the complaining manager, Pennington, believed Graves guilty when the proceeding began, that the belief rested on facts that would lead a reasonable, cautious, or prudent person to the same conclusion, and that those facts in fact led Pennington to it.26 The statute invoked required a check made with intent to defraud, knowing that the maker lacked sufficient funds, so a belief in guilt had to be a belief in that intent.27 Graves had said she would pay when the credit union funds arrived, and she mailed Skaggs a money order the day before the manager's report.28 From those facts and the inferences they allowed, the jury could reasonably conclude that she did not intend to defraud and that no probable cause existed to institute or continue the prosecution.29
A reasonable mistake about the facts does not destroy probable cause.30 The protection reaches only reasonable mistakes, however, because the test is objective.31 An accuser who ignores an obvious record at hand, one that would have shown the suspect had paid, will have trouble calling the resulting mistake reasonable. Store accusations are a frequent battleground for this very point: probable cause is often hotly contested, including in many cases in which the plaintiff was arrested for theft after walking out of a store with goods that had not been paid for.32
Mistakes about the law receive less indulgence than mistakes about the facts, and jurisdictions vary in how they treat them. The variation matters less than it might, because when an attorney advised that there was probable cause for a criminal proceeding, the recipient of the advice is often deemed to have probable cause, and it is usually not unreasonable for a layperson to be faulted for starting a criminal proceeding without being informed of the relevant law.33 The later subsection on advice of counsel develops that defense. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers states a parallel idea for civil claims: lack of probable cause means no reasonable basis, in law and in fact, for believing the claim could succeed, and a decision by a competent tribunal upholding the claim on the merits is ordinarily conclusive evidence of probable cause, even if later reversed.34
In most jurisdictions, the court rather than the jury decides whether the defendant had probable cause. The jury's role is limited to the relevant factual questions, including what information the defendant possessed when initiating or procuring the prosecution.35 The prevailing rule is sometimes attributed to a concern that juries would too readily find no probable cause because of the plaintiff's innocence, and in some jurisdictions the jury decides the question when the evidence would permit but not compel a finding that the defendant lacked it.36 In Texas Skaggs, the question reached the jury, which could reasonably conclude that no probable cause existed.37
Earlier outcomes in the criminal case bear on probable cause, though not in the direction a plaintiff would hope. Because the criminal trial turns on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, an acquittal at trial does not tend to prove that the accuser lacked probable cause.38 Some courts have said that a rebuttable presumption or inference of no probable cause arises when an examining magistrate finds no probable cause or a grand jury rejects an indictment, and some have said so even when the public prosecutor enters a nolle prosequi or abandons the prosecution; other courts reject such presumptions.39
Improper Purpose
Section 653 pairs the absence of probable cause with a second showing: the defendant must have acted primarily for a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice.43 The tort's name suggests that malice is an element, and so it is, but malice in this tort has come to mean improper purpose: prosecuting a person for a purpose other than bringing to justice someone believed to have committed a criminal offense.44
Spite is therefore not itself the element, but it can satisfy it. Malice in the sense of hostility, spite, or a desire to cause harm is not the element of liability; if it was the primary reason for the prosecution, however, the defendant acted primarily for a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice and can be held liable.45
A defendant who acts primarily for private gain, such as inducing the plaintiff to pay money or hand over property, also acts with an improper purpose, even when the defendant was legally entitled to the payment or the property.46 The word primarily carries weight. When a complainant wanted both to see the plaintiff prosecuted and to obtain payment or property, it can be difficult to tell whether the private object was the primary purpose,47 and the element is met only if the improper purpose was.48
Improper purpose can also be found when the defendant did not actually believe the accused was guilty. A defendant who did not believe the accused guilty, or at least probably guilty, could not have initiated or continued the prosecution primarily to bring an offender to justice.49
Evidence of purpose can be circumstantial. In South Arkansas Petroleum Co. v. Schiesser, ill will could be inferred from the defendant's failure to give exculpatory information to the police and the county prosecutor, and in Royal Oil Co. v. Wells, a false charge of embezzlement from a cash register may have been motivated by hostility toward the plaintiff's interracial marriage.50
The inference between this element and probable cause runs one way. Improper purpose can usually be inferred from lack of probable cause, so evidence leading to a finding that the defendant lacked probable cause can support a finding of improper purpose; but absence of probable cause is not inferred from improper purpose.51 An accuser may dislike the accused and still have had good grounds for the charge. A stem that describes an angry complainant has not yet shown this element, so ask which purpose was primary.
Favorable Termination
The last element in § 653 requires that the proceedings have terminated in favor of the accused.54 The element bars an action while the criminal proceedings are pending and after a conviction that has not been reversed, and allegations that the conviction was obtained by fraud or perjury cannot impeach it.55
Acquittal is not required. Any action by a judge, magistrate, public prosecutor, or grand jury that ends the proceedings without a conviction can potentially count as a favorable termination, even if new charges based on the same alleged misconduct would not be barred by double jeopardy. That includes a grand jury's refusal to indict and a prosecutor's formal abandonment of the case, as by a nolle prosequi.56 The Prosser formulation that the Texas Skaggs opinion sets out explains the logic: it is enough that the proceeding ended in a manner that cannot be revived, so that a prosecutor who proceeds further must start anew. An acquittal, a nolle prosequi, a dismissal, or abandonment by the prosecutor or the complaining witness qualifies when it ends the particular proceeding and requires new process or other official action to commence another prosecution, and the same is generally true whenever the charges are withdrawn on the prosecution's initiative.57
A termination does not qualify when the accused had a hand in producing it. Prosser draws the line this way: where charges are withdrawn, or the prosecution ends, at the instigation of the accused, or by reason of a compromise the accused entered into voluntarily, there is no sufficient termination in the accused's favor.58 The same is true of an act of mercy by the prosecutor that the accused accepted, and of an ending caused by the accused's own misconduct, such as interference with witnesses or evidence, or by leaving the jurisdiction.59
Authority divides on what qualifies as a termination in the plaintiff's favor.60 Courts disagree, for example, when the accused was acquitted or the charge was dismissed but the accused was convicted on a charge arising from substantially the same facts. Some decisions deny favorable termination in that situation, as in Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2009), and Neff v. Neff, 247 P.3d 380 (Utah 2011); others treat an acquittal as favorable even when the accused was convicted on related charges.61
The element also marks where pleading and proof come apart. Suppose Berlin sues Porter for malicious prosecution and the complaint does not allege that the criminal case ended in Berlin's favor. Porter may move to dismiss for failure to state a claim, because Berlin has failed to allege all the necessary elements.62 If the complaint does allege favorable termination and Porter challenges it with an adequately supported summary judgment motion, Berlin must respond with admissible evidence tending to prove that element. He might show that there were two charges and one was continued but the one on which he relies was dismissed, or that the continuance only postponed the hearing and the case was later dismissed. Such evidence would create a genuine dispute of material fact on whether the prior proceeding ended in his favor.63
Damages
Actual damage is an element of malicious prosecution, but a plaintiff who clears the other elements seldom struggles to prove it. Damage is readily found in the emotional distress and injury to reputation that a wrongful prosecution causes, and in the legal expenses and economic losses it causes as well.66
The cost of defending the criminal case deserves emphasis because it is one of the main items of pecuniary harm that wrongful litigation causes. To recognize malicious prosecution is to recognize a claim for the attorney fees reasonably incurred in the original litigation as damages.67 A plaintiff who paid a defense lawyer to answer a baseless charge therefore recovers that expense from the accuser who set the charge in motion.
Emotional distress caused by a prosecution is part of this recovery. A plaintiff who sues instead for intentional infliction of emotional distress must satisfy three requirements: the conduct must be truly extreme and outrageous, the actor must intend to inflict severe emotional distress or know there is at least a high probability the conduct will cause it, and the conduct must in fact cause severe emotional distress.68 This unit treats compensatory recovery only; for punitive damages in a malicious prosecution action, see Montgomery Ward v. Wilson.