Concept
Choosing the Right Theory
Negligent misrepresentation and strict liability misrepresentation
Choosing the Right Theory
A false statement can support liability under several rules, and each rule fits a different set of facts. The common starting point is that a misrepresentation of fact or law may be negligent conduct,1 but that premise does not say which rule governs a particular statement. The tort candidates are fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and strict liability for public misrepresentation, a rule the Restatement formulates in terms of public statements and courts have applied only to public statements.2 Contract remedies sit beside them. Three questions, asked in order, choose among these options, and each answer removes some of them before the next question arises: what the statement cost the plaintiff, what the speaker knew, and how the speaker and the plaintiff were related.
First question: bodily injury or financial loss
When a careless statement causes physical harm, courts agree that ordinary negligence principles apply, and the plaintiff must establish the usual elements of a negligence case.3 Section 311 states the rule for carelessly given false information, and § 310 states the rule for knowing misstatements.4 A financial loss starts from the opposite default. A lie that causes economic harm to its intended recipient is actionable almost without regard to the business setting, but liability for merely negligent misrepresentation is not imposed in ordinary commercial settings. It is reserved mainly for professional and fiduciary relationships, where the parties expect reasonable care to ensure that statements are accurate.5 The usual exam error carries the limits of one claim into the facts of the other, by running a bodily-injury stem through the business-setting rule or an overpayment stem through § 311.
Second question: what the speaker knew
A speaker who knows the statement is false, or who knows that the speaker lacks the knowledge professed, falls within § 310 when the statement is likely to induce action that carries an unreasonable risk of physical harm and that harm results.6 A speaker who believed the statement but did not take reasonable care is negligent, and the negligence may consist of failing to use reasonable care in checking the information or in communicating it.7 That is § 311 territory when the harm is physical and negligent misrepresentation territory when only money is lost. A speaker who was neither deceitful nor careless usually escapes tort liability. Tort damages for innocent misrepresentation are generally imposed only when the speaker warranted the truth of the statement, although the injured party may still have a right to rescind a contract based on it.8 The other exception is strict liability for public misrepresentation, in the jurisdictions that adopt it.9
Crossing the first answer with the second yields six combinations, and each selects a different rule:
- Pecuniary loss from a knowing falsehood is fraud, available almost without regard to the business setting.10
- Pecuniary loss from a careless statement is negligent misrepresentation, which requires a speaker with a pecuniary interest in the transaction and is compensated under § 552B.11
- Pecuniary loss from an innocent statement supports a tort claim only if the speaker warranted its truth. Otherwise the plaintiff is left to rescission or a contract-based claim.12
- Physical harm from a knowing falsehood falls under § 310.13
- Physical harm from a careless statement falls under § 311.14
- Physical harm from an innocent public statement by a seller of chattels falls under § 402B where a state has adopted it, with warranty as an alternative.15
Third question: who spoke, and who was hurt
Every rule limits both the speaker and the plaintiff, so the third question tests the facts against the limits of the rule the first two questions selected. Negligent misrepresentation for pecuniary loss requires a speaker with a pecuniary interest in the transaction. A statement made in the course of the speaker's business satisfies that requirement even if the speaker gains nothing from the particular transaction, but a gratuitous or 'curbstone' remark does not.16 Earlier sections add the limit that the claim reaches only a limited group of recipients.
Section 402B asks for a seller engaged in the business of selling chattels who makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact about the character or quality of the chattel.17 Newspaper or television advertising, literature distributed through dealers, labels, leaflets, and other public means all qualify.18 The rule protects a consumer harmed by justifiable reliance, even though the consumer neither bought the chattel from the seller nor had any contract with the seller.19 The products setting is easy to picture. A manufacturer's plaque says its crane is 'rated to 20,000 lbs.' The crane cannot lift that much, and an 18,000-pound load falls on a worker beneath the boom when it collapses. The worker may have a misrepresentation claim against the manufacturer for its false statement about the crane's capacity.20 Because that claim rests on a person's reasonable reliance on the statement, it may not support recovery by third parties such as bystanders.21
Sections 310 and 311 reach people who never relied on the statement themselves. Section 310 covers harm that results from an act done by the other person or by a third person in reliance on the statement,22 and § 311 covers third persons whom the speaker should expect to be put in peril by the action taken.23 Tennessee shows how a court can narrow even a no-fault claim. It limited its innocent misrepresentation cause of action to cases involving personal injury or property damage and left plaintiffs with only economic loss to contract theories.24
Contract theories fill much of the space the tort rules leave. When the representation is an express or implied term of the contract, the plaintiff may sue for breach of contract or, on the sale of a chattel, for breach of warranty. That liability is strict and requires no intent to deceive, no negligence, and no fault other than the breach itself.25 Warranty's old defenses of privity and disclaimer weakened in the early 1960s. Henningsen allowed a non-purchaser to sue in warranty despite both,26 and Greenman then treated strict liability for defective products as a tort claim, so privity was not required.27
Applying the three questions
The inspector's carelessness is identical in both versions, and the harm decides the rule. The scalded employee suffered bodily injury, so the claim runs under § 311: false information negligently given, action taken in reasonable reliance by the buyer, and physical harm to a third person whom the inspector should expect to be put in peril when a boiler is installed and run.28 No business-setting or limited-group inquiry is needed, because those limits belong to the economic-loss claim. The buyer who lost only money must instead fit negligent misrepresentation for pecuniary loss. The inspector supplied the report in the course of the inspector's business, and the buyer was the recipient the inspector knew would rely on it.29 The buyer recovers the difference between the price paid and the boiler's actual value, plus any other pecuniary loss that the reliance caused, such as the cost of installing the boiler.30 Had the inspector seen the crack and written 'sound' anyway, the employee's claim would move to § 310 and the buyer's claim to fraud.
The choice of theory also fixes the measure of recovery. Damages for negligent misrepresentation do not include the benefit of the plaintiff's contract with the defendant.31 Suppose a buyer pays $90,000 for a business described as worth $100,000 and actually worth $85,000. The negligence measure gives $5,000, the difference between price and value received. The $15,000 that would leave the buyer where a true statement would have left the buyer is the benefit of the bargain, which this claim excludes. An answer that identifies the right theory still has to apply that theory's own damages rule.
On an exam, fraud comes first whenever the facts suggest knowledge, because a plaintiff who proves a lie escapes the business-setting limit that confines the careless-speaker claim.32 Negligent misrepresentation comes second. When the facts show bodily injury, frame the claim as ordinary negligence or § 311, because many familiar forms of negligent conduct that invade person or property are in essence misrepresentation, from a misleading turn signal to an assurance that a danger does not exist.33 Section 402B belongs in the answer only when the facts supply a public statement by a seller of chattels, a consumer who relied on it, and a state that follows the section. Where the jurisdiction is unstated, note both § 402B and the warranty alternative.34
Step two carries the most weight, because it decides whether fraud is analyzed at all and which limits the claim must satisfy.