Concept
Damages Under Section 552B
Negligent misrepresentation and strict liability misrepresentation
Damages Under Section 552B
A plaintiff who proves a negligent misrepresentation must still prove what it cost. Section 552B(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts supplies the starting point: the plaintiff recovers the damages necessary to compensate for the pecuniary loss of which the misrepresentation is a legal cause.1 Two words in that sentence carry the weight. Pecuniary confines the claim to economic harm, as it has been confined throughout this tort. Legal cause confines recovery to losses the law attributes to the false statement, which excludes losses that merely follow it in time.
The subsection names two components of the general measure. The first is the difference between the value of what the plaintiff received in the transaction and the price or other value the plaintiff gave for it.2 The second is any other pecuniary loss the plaintiff suffered as a consequence of relying on the misrepresentation.3 Subsection (2) closes the measure from the other side: the damages do not include the benefit of the plaintiff's contract with the defendant.4
One question sorts every item that follows: where would the plaintiff stand had the defendant spoken carefully? The Third Restatement frames the goal in just those terms and calls the resulting measure out of pocket.5 The question is not where the plaintiff would stand if the statement had been true. That is the expectation, or loss-of-bargain, measure of contract law, which some fraud cases allow and which fits a promise better than a careless statement.6 The four subsections below follow the order of the text: the out-of-pocket difference, the other reliance losses, the exclusion of the contract benefit, and the legal-cause limit that governs all of it.
Out-of-Pocket Loss
The first component of § 552B(1) is the difference between the value of what the plaintiff received in the transaction and the price or other value the plaintiff gave for it.7 Two numbers drive the calculation. One is what the plaintiff gave, usually a price but sometimes other value, such as goods or services. The other is what the item was actually worth. When the plaintiff paid more than the thing was worth, the excess is the loss, and the name out of pocket describes how much poorer the plaintiff is after the exchange. A buyer induced to pay $5,000 for a chattel worth $4,000 recovers $1,000.
The careful-speaker test produces that figure directly. Had the speaker taken care, the buyer would have learned the chattel's true worth and either paid that amount or declined to buy. The overpayment is the distance between those two worlds, so it measures the cost of the speaker's mistake.8 It does not measure what the chattel would have been worth had the careless statement been true, because that would protect an expectation the speaker never promised to meet. The exclusion has its own subsection below.
The date on which value is fixed matters as much as the subtraction. The Third Restatement measures the loss as of the time of the transaction, without regard to how the purchase later turned out, so that the harm the misstatement caused stays apart from forces that act on an investment afterward.9 A familiar illustration shows the effect. A seller carelessly tells a buyer that a company holds an important contract to build rockets, and the buyer pays $10,000 for shares. The shares were worth $8,000 on the day of purchase, so the out-of-pocket loss then was $2,000. A factory explosion later destroys the company and leaves the shares worthless, yet the recovery remains $2,000, the sum the buyer would have collected by suing before the explosion.10 The explosion is a risk the statement said nothing about, and anyone who buys property accepts the ordinary risk that it may be destroyed. Measuring at the transaction date repairs the losses tied to the risk the statement created and leaves extraneous losses where they fell, which is why this measure should probably serve as the ceiling on liability for a merely careless speaker in the ordinary case.11
A measure that tracked the market until judgment would give a different answer. Take a buyer who pays $100,000 for shares then worth $80,000 and who wins judgment a year later, when the shares trade at $50,000. The out-of-pocket measure awards $20,000. A measure recalculated at the time of judgment would award $50,000, and the extra $30,000 would reflect the market's decline after the purchase. Charging that decline to the speaker would make a careless speaker the insurer of the plaintiff's investment. An exam answer that subtracts the trial-date value, or the value the speaker described, from the price paid therefore applies the wrong measure.
The fifth step matters because the price-versus-value formula applies when a misrepresentation about an item shapes a bargain about that item, and not every negligent-misrepresentation case involves one.12 Consider a borrower who spends money preparing a construction site after a loan officer carelessly reports that the loan is approved. The borrower neither received nor gave anything in an exchange with the bank, so there is no price to set against a value. That is the situation in Federal Land Bank Association v. Sloane, which the next subsection takes up because its money falls under § 552B(1)(b). The Third Restatement adds that its measures are guides to decision, so when out-of-pocket recovery fits unusual facts awkwardly, a court looks to the underlying goal and seeks the measure that restores the position the plaintiff would have occupied had the tort not occurred.13
Other Reliance Losses
Section 552B(1)(b) completes the formula by adding recovery for "pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of the plaintiff's reliance upon the misrepresentation."15 The word otherwise marks the hand-off. Subsection (1)(a) prices the exchange itself, and subsection (1)(b) reaches the money a plaintiff loses anywhere else because the plaintiff acted on the false statement. The Third Restatement calls these losses consequential damages, or, preferably, special damages, to distinguish the immediate loss a plaintiff takes on in a transaction from the less direct losses that reliance also produces.16
The subsection is needed because a careless statement does more than distort a price. A plaintiff who relied on it has often spent money that a careful statement would have saved, and the goal of restoring the plaintiff to the position the plaintiff would have held had the defendant spoken carefully reaches that spending.17 A formula confined to price and value would miss it, and in some cases would miss everything, because the plaintiff may never have completed an exchange. The Third Restatement accordingly allows a plaintiff to collect for certain losses beyond the out-of-pocket measure, including wasted expenditures made in reliance on expectations the defendant created.18
In Federal Land Bank Association v. Sloane, a loan officer told a couple that the bank's board had approved their loan and that they could begin preparing the site for new chicken houses. The couple spent thousands of dollars on that work before the bank denied the application.19 Subsection (1)(a) has nothing to work on in these facts, because the couple received no value from the bank and gave it none. Subsection (1)(b) fits exactly, because the site-preparation money was spent in reliance on the officer's report that the loan would be made.20 The Texas Supreme Court left in place the award for past pecuniary losses other than lost profits, which presumably included those construction expenses.21
Reliance losses take more than one form. In Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., false claims about an architect's skill induced the plaintiff to hire the architect, and the plaintiff recovered the extra expense of completing the building. In Sampson v. Penney, a buyer of bees misrepresented as healthy recovered for the infection that spread to the buyer's other bees.22 In each, the loss flowed from what the plaintiff did next because of the statement. Those decisions concern misrepresentation damages generally, and in a negligence claim the same categories stay available only to the extent they do not amount to benefit-of-the-bargain damages.23
The couple's other two claims show where subsection (1)(b) stops. They also sought the profit they would have earned under a chicken-raising contract and damages for mental anguish, and the court rejected both.24 Mental anguish failed because § 552B compensates only pecuniary loss, which matches the general rule that emotional harm is not ordinarily recoverable in misrepresentation claims arising from commercial dealings.25 The lost profits failed because they would give the couple the benefit of a loan that was never made, an exclusion the next subsection explains.26
Two further conditions govern everything claimed under subsection (1)(b). The loss must be proven to a reasonable degree of certainty, and recovery remains subject to the scope-of-liability rules developed in the legal-cause discussion below.27 Consequential damages also may not duplicate an out-of-pocket award, and they must be realized already or more likely than not to be realized in the future.28 The causal link is the demanding part, because only money spent or lost on account of the statement counts.
No Benefit of the Bargain
Section 552B(2) sets the outer limit on the formula: the damages recoverable for a negligent misrepresentation do not include the benefit of the plaintiff's contract with the defendant.30 The benefit of the bargain is the gain the plaintiff expected from the deal, measured against a world in which the speaker's statement had been true. Subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) compensate what the plaintiff lost by acting on the statement, such as an overpayment or money spent in preparation. Subsection (2) forbids adding the profit the deal would have produced had the statement been accurate. The line separates recovering what the statement cost from recovering what the statement described.
Numbers show where the line falls. A buyer pays $90,000 for a house the seller described as worth $100,000, and the house is actually worth $85,000.31 The buyer has an out-of-pocket loss of $5,000, because the price exceeded the value received by that amount. The buyer has also lost a $10,000 bargain, because the house as described would have been worth $10,000 more than the price.32 Writers sometimes apply the label benefit of the bargain to the whole $15,000 gap between the described value and the actual value and sometimes to the $10,000 portion alone.33 Under either usage, a plaintiff proceeding on negligent misrepresentation recovers the $5,000 and nothing for the lost bargain.34
A stem that supplies a price, a stated value, and an actual value invites a subtraction, and the real task is choosing the two figures. For a careless statement, use the price paid and the actual value; the stated value drops out, and $90,000 less $85,000 is $5,000. The same buyer suing on a warranty written into the sale would subtract the actual value from the warranted value, because contract law awards expectation damages, the difference between what was promised and what was delivered, and would recover $15,000.35 That award leaves the buyer better off than if the misstatement had never been made, which tort law does not ordinarily do and contract law does deliberately, because the seller made a promise.36 The same numbers thus yield $5,000 in one claim and $15,000 in the other, and the difference traces to what the defendant did wrong in each.
A court reaches an as-represented measure when it treats a statement as a promise or as something worse than careless. In Richard v. Waldman, a developer gave buyers a survey and plot plan showing a southerly sideyard of twenty feet, and the house had been built in violation of the zoning ordinance. The court found the representations reckless rather than innocent, called the misrepresentation "in the nature of a warranty," and approved damages measured by the difference between the property's actual value and its value had it been as represented.37 That measure compares what the buyer received with what the speaker said, which enforces the statement. Because the court treated the statements as reckless and warranty-like, the decision sits nearer the fraud and warranty side of the line than the careless-speaker side that § 552B(2) governs.
The exclusion follows from what a careless speaker did wrong. Expectation damages enforce a promise, and a speaker who was merely careless promised nothing; the wrong lies in handling information badly and thereby leading the plaintiff to act on it. The remedy that matches that wrong restores the plaintiff to the position the plaintiff would have held had the speaker spoken carefully.38 In the house illustration, a careful seller would have reported the true value of $85,000, and the buyer would have paid less or walked away, so the $100,000-house-for-$90,000 deal never existed in the careful world. Awarding the $10,000 bargain would pay the buyer for an opportunity that care would have revealed was not there. The Third Restatement says damages in this setting are meant to "bring home to defendants the costs of their mistakes, not to hold them to what they negligently said."39 Sloane applies the same reasoning to a transaction that never closed: the Texas Supreme Court refused the couple profits from a chicken-raising contract because those profits depended on a loan the bank never made.40
The exclusion is tied to the speaker's low level of fault, and a comparison with fraud shows how. Section 549 lets a fraud plaintiff choose between out-of-pocket and benefit-of-the-bargain damages and also allows consequential damages, while § 552B gives the negligent-misrepresentation plaintiff out-of-pocket and consequential damages but withholds the benefit of the bargain.41 The gap tracks fault: a misrepresentation made with scienter is more wrongful than a careless one, and the more wrongful the conduct, the more expansive the damages the law allows.42 Most courts now allow a plaintiff who proves intentional fraud to recover the loss of bargain, including some that formerly confined fraud plaintiffs to out-of-pocket recovery.43 Many courts also restrict the negligent-misrepresentation plaintiff to out-of-pocket loss alone, which is narrower than the Second Restatement rule that adds consequential damages.44
The Third Restatement narrows the gap from the other side. It has no stand-alone provision on fraud damages, but a comment to § 9 shows a preference for out-of-pocket recovery, and comment l to § 5 adopts that measure for negligent misrepresentation, so compensatory damages for the two torts will often come out the same.45 Under the Second Restatement, then, the label of fraud or negligence changes the measure, while under the Third it frequently does not.
Legal Cause Limits
Section 552B(1) compensates only pecuniary loss "of which the misrepresentation is a legal cause."47 That phrase governs both components of the measure, so every dollar claimed, whether as a price-versus-value difference or as another reliance loss, must be a loss the misrepresentation legally caused. A loss that merely follows the statement in time does not qualify. It must also fall within the scope of the risk the speaker's carelessness created, a boundary of the kind tort law draws whenever it defines how far a defendant answers for what follows from careless conduct.48 A careless statement about a business's earnings creates the risk that the buyer will overpay and will decide on false figures. It creates no risk that a market decline or a fire will strike the business next year, and a loss from those events lies outside the risk.
Cause in fact cannot do this work alone. If the buyer would have declined the deal on an accurate disclosure, the buyer would never have owned the building that later burned, so the loss of the building passes a but-for test. Only the scope-of-risk limit keeps the fire out of the award.
The limit rests on the fact that every purchase carries risks the buyer bears whether or not anyone speaks carelessly: property can be destroyed and markets can fall. A careless speaker adds one distinct risk, that the buyer will misjudge what the thing is worth or can do. If the speaker also had to pay for hazards the buyer would have borne anyway, a duty of care in speaking would become insurance on the buyer's entire investment.49 Courts have worried about just that result, a catastrophic loss out of all proportion to the speaker's fault.50 The speaker therefore answers for the risk the statement hid or understated, and the buyer keeps the risks the buyer would have run had the statement been accurate.51
Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP shows the limit working against a plaintiff. Accountants negligently prepared incorrect consolidated financial statements, which postponed the company's public offering of shares by two months, from April to June 1996, and in the interval the market moved so that the shares sold for $2.50 less per share than they would have in April.52 The Oregon Supreme Court sustained summary judgment for the accountants on causation, reasoning that the intervention of unrelated market forces was not a reasonably foreseeable result of their wrongful conduct.53 The accountants' error made the offering late; it had no bearing on whether the market would rise or fall during the delay. A delay can cut either way, because a later sale may land in a rising market as easily as a falling one, so the only loss delay produces in a systematic way is interest on money received late.54 Charging the accountants with every decline would give the plaintiff a free option: keep the gain if the market rose, and collect from the accountants if it fell. The same analysis governs late delivery of nonperishable goods or a late building permit caused by a negligent application.55 Losses driven by events unrelated to the misrepresentation, in short, generally fall outside what the speaker owes.
The transaction-date rule carries this limit into the arithmetic. In the rocket-contract illustration, fixing general damages at the date of sale screens out the later explosion and leaves the $2,000 overpayment.56 Timing alone does not decide every case, though, because the test asks what the statement was about.
The roof loss can be recovered despite arriving months after the sale because the sorting method looks to the risk and not to the calendar. General damages are calculated as of the date of sale, which screens out later extraneous forces, while consequential damages the misrepresentation specifically risked remain recoverable beside them.57 The sorting still depends on proof, since a plaintiff who cannot separate the losses the misrepresentation caused from those other forces caused may be denied relief.58
Courts have not all handled the extraneous-force problem the same way. When a buyer relies on a misrepresentation and an unrelated event later destroys the value of the purchase, four approaches appear in the cases:
- Full recovery lets the buyer collect the entire later drop, as in Fottler v. Moseley, where a stock buyer told that the shares had an active market recovered for the loss caused by a corporate officer's embezzlement even though the representation concerned another matter.59
- Denial of all recovery is possible as a rule, but it seems insupportable unless the plaintiff would have suffered the same loss without the misrepresentation, although a failure to separate the losses can defeat relief in practice.60
- A broad reading of the representation treats the statement as covering a wide range of risks, as in Hotaling v. A.B. Leach & Co., where a broker's assurance that a company was financially sound supported recovery when an industry-wide depression later hit the company's bond, though few statements can be read so broadly.61
- The proximate cause approach, followed by perhaps most courts with the support of the Restatement, limits damages to those foreseeable as a result of the misrepresentation, or to those whose risk the misrepresentation hid or falsely minimized.62
Most courts apparently reject the Fottler result, though a plaintiff who sues for rescission and obtains restitution gets the price back and so can avoid the intervening loss.63 For a merely careless speaker, the fourth approach, with general damages fixed at the transaction date, should probably serve as the ceiling on liability in the ordinary case, and it is the approach this chapter applies to § 552B(1).64 It is at least arguable that liability should reach further when the speaker committed actual fraud.65