Concept
Pecuniary Loss in Business Dealings
Negligent misrepresentation and strict liability misrepresentation
Pecuniary Loss in Business Dealings
A plaintiff who loses only money from a careless statement must clear hurdles that a plaintiff who suffers physical harm does not face. Section 552B(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts compensates the pecuniary loss, meaning loss measured in money, of which the misrepresentation is a legal cause.1 Section 311 governs the other category: one who negligently gives false information is subject to liability for physical harm caused by action the recipient takes in reasonable reliance on it.2 A shopper hurt after relying on a careless assurance that a ladder is safe may recover under § 311, but a buyer who relied on the same assurance and lost only money must fit the claim inside the narrower conditions this section describes.
Those conditions follow from the kind of defendant involved. Fraud requires scienter, and a speaker who deceives knowingly has given the law ample reason to impose liability for the resulting loss. A merely careless speaker has given a weaker reason, so the law accepts a lower fault requirement and narrows the setting and the audience in exchange. Economic loss, moreover, does not stay put the way physical damage does: a collision injures those on the road at that moment, but a single inaccurate report can be copied, forwarded, and relied on by many readers, each losing a different amount. If foreseeability of loss were the only limit, an inattentive speaker would face liability of unknown size to an unknown number of people, with no way to price the risk. Courts therefore tie liability to settings where care is genuinely expected and to audiences the speaker can identify in advance.
Four limits do this work. The first concerns the speaker: the false information must be supplied in the course of a business or profession, or in another transaction in which the speaker has a pecuniary interest, meaning a financial stake in how the listener’s dealings turn out. The second concerns the statement and the speaker’s fault: the statement must be a false representation of material fact, and the plaintiff must show a failure to use reasonable care in obtaining or communicating it, which takes the place of scienter. The third concerns the audience, because liability runs only to a limited group of recipients the speaker meant to reach. The fourth concerns the plaintiff, who must actually rely on the statement, and whose reliance must be justifiable, meaning reasonable for someone in the plaintiff’s position. The business setting comes first, because without it no duty of care exists at all.
Business Setting and Pecuniary Interest
The threshold sits in the opening words of § 552(1): the speaker must supply the false information “in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest.”3 A California appellate court in Friedman v. Merck & Co. described the general rule the same way, confining liability for negligent misrepresentation to those who supply information for business purposes in the course of a business or profession, and it set the Restatement text beside that rule.4 The phrase offers two routes in. The occupation route covers a statement made while doing one’s work, as owner, professional, or employee. The transaction route covers a speaker with a financial stake in how the listener’s dealings turn out, even when the speaker is acting outside any regular occupation.
Each route rests on a different reason. The occupation route tracks what listeners can fairly expect from a speaker. In virtually every setting people expect that one party will not lie to another, but business people have no firm expectation that the statements they exchange while transacting have been checked with reasonable care.5 Such an expectation is common only where information is transferred as part of a purchased service, as with legal or accounting advice.6 The transaction route reaches a speaker outside any regular occupation whose financial stake puts the statement in a commercial setting.
Professionals paid to supply information are the clearest members of the covered group. Accountants, attorneys, weighers, surveyors, real estate agents, and similar experts are expected to follow the standards of their callings, and their negligence usually takes the form of advice, an opinion, or a report that turns out to be inaccurate.7 A surveyor whose written report misstates a boundary therefore answers to the client who buys the lot in reliance on it, because the report is the very product the client paid for.
Easton v. Strassburger shows the same logic reaching a seller’s real estate brokerage. The agents knew of warning signs on a hillside house, including netting on a slope that had been placed there to repair an earlier slide and an uneven guest-house floor, yet they made only a casual visual inspection and a general inquiry of the owners, and the buyer purchased without learning of the property’s history of slides.8 The court upheld a negligence verdict against the broker, reasoning that real estate agents hold themselves out as professionals and must make reasonable use of the superior knowledge and skill for which they are engaged.9 The agents’ work was presenting the house to buyers, and that business setting supplied the expectation of care.
The pecuniary interest need not be tied to the particular statement. A speaker acting in the course of business can meet the requirement even though the speaker earns nothing from the specific transaction the statement concerns.10 A leading decision on a careless insurance answer shows how far the idea stretches. A party about to take custody of an owner’s goods was asked whether they were insured, knew the owner was asking in order to arrange coverage, and answered carelessly and wrongly. The court held it liable and treated as immaterial that the answer served none of the defendant’s own purposes.11 The court also marked the outer edge of the duty: it exists only where the speaker knows the information is wanted for a serious purpose, knows the recipient intends to rely and act on it, and stands in a relationship, arising from contract or otherwise, in which the recipient has a right to rely on the speaker for accurate information.12 Courts do not agree on how wide the threshold runs. The Restatement reaches any speaker acting in the course of business, whatever that business is, while some courts confine the duty to those in the business of supplying information.13
Where neither the occupation nor the stake fits, a special relationship can still carry the claim. Fiduciary and confidential relationships can imply that the recipient may expect reasonable care, particularly when the speaker holds knowledge the recipient cannot check.14 Hiring negotiations are a common setting. An employer recruiting a candidate may owe reasonable care in what it says about the job, while a company president’s statements to individual employees about the company’s profitability and long-term prospects may carry no such duty. In Varnum v. Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., the plaintiff invested $60,000 of his own money in equipment to become a truck driver for the defendant after its representative told him that the dispatch system ran on a first-in, first-out basis and that drivers had recently grossed an average of $7,000 per month.15 Courts divide on how far this reasoning goes, and one court found no duty in a university’s statements about tenure when nothing beyond the employment relationship connected the parties.16 A final variant, § 552(3), extends the liability of a person under a public duty to give information to the class of persons the duty was created to protect.17
Statements that fit neither route fall outside the doctrine. Friedman recognized that the rule excludes casual statements or opinions given in private conversation or at social meetings, because the listener cannot expect the care that business or professional work would bring.18 Suppose an attorney gives unpaid advice to a friend at a party and carelessly misstates a filing deadline. On the usual analysis the attorney’s expertise does not change the result, because the advice was not supplied in the course of the profession or in a transaction in which the attorney had a stake, which leaves the listener with only the ordinary expectation that a speaker will not lie.19
One more limit applies when the speaker and the plaintiff have contracted with each other. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm § 5(5) forecloses claims of negligent misrepresentation made in negotiating or performing a contract between the parties, a restriction that does not appear in § 552, and some courts have extended the reasoning to third-party cases.20 The rationale is that a tort suit should not disrupt the allocation of risk the parties bargained for. Most courts nonetheless treat negligent misrepresentation as an exception to the economic loss rule and allow a claim for a statement that induced a contract, although some bar a sophisticated plaintiff’s claim against its contracting counterparty on the theory that the contract should control and that an important point would have been written into it.21 Even where that bar exists it does not reach every agreement, since a client’s contract with a lawyer does not prevent recovery for a negligent misrepresentation the client relied on to the client’s detriment.22
Falsity and Reasonable Care
Once the business-setting threshold is met, the claim turns on two further questions: what was wrong with the statement, and what was wrong with the speaker’s conduct in making it. The Restatement (Second) of Torts answers the second most directly in § 311(2), which provides that negligence in giving false information may consist of a failure to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the accuracy of the information or in the manner in which it is communicated.24 Section 311 itself governs physical harm, but a plaintiff who has lost only money proves the same two failures, together with a third that the professions add: the speaker may have lacked, or failed to apply, the skill and competence that the speaker’s business or calling requires.25 Scienter, the knowledge of falsity that fraud demands, drops out of the case. In its place the plaintiff must prove that the statement was a false representation of material fact and that the speaker’s care fell short in one of those three ways.
Failure to ascertain the facts is the most familiar of the three, and Federal Land Bank Association v. Sloane shows it at work. A bank’s loan officer told a couple that the bank’s board had approved their loan and that they could begin preparing a site for new chicken houses, and the officer passed the same word to their contractor.26 Construction began, and the bank then sent a letter denying the application. The Sloanes sued on the theory that the officer had negligently misrepresented that the loan was approved, and a jury awarded them damages; the Supreme Court of Texas rejected the mental-anguish award and otherwise affirmed.27 A report that a board has acted states a present fact, and it is exactly the kind of fact the speaker can confirm before speaking, which is why the law asks whether the speaker did.
The second failure arises when a speaker’s calling demands skill that the speaker does not apply, and Easton v. Strassburger shows it combined with the first. The seller’s real estate agents had seen netting on a slope, placed there to repair an earlier slide, and had observed an uneven guest-house floor, a red-flag sign of soils problems by the agents’ own testimony, yet they conducted only a casual visual inspection and a general inquiry of the owners.28 Actual knowledge of the slide history was unnecessary to liability, because the jury needed only to conclude that a reasonably competent and diligent inspection would have uncovered it, and agents who hold themselves out as professionals must make reasonable use of the superior knowledge and skill for which they are engaged.29 The same reasoning reaches certifiers of products. In Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., a shopper who slipped on new shoes sued the publisher of a magazine whose consumer guaranty seal had been awarded to them.30 The complaint alleged that the publisher gave its certification without testing the shoes or tested them carelessly. The court, reversing a dismissal, held that on either allegation the certification would amount to a negligent misrepresentation, because a publisher presenting itself as a disinterested examiner represents that it has superior knowledge and may answer for careless statements of fact or opinion.31
Negligent misrepresentation requires proof only that the defendant was negligent in not knowing the falsity of a representation or, less commonly, that the defendant communicated it in a negligent manner.32 Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc. illustrates the first form. A car buyer told the dealer’s service manager three times about a clicking sensation in the steering, and each time the manager, without checking, reassured the buyer that a new car would wear the problem out. A jury could find negligent misrepresentation because the manager made positive assertions without a reasonable basis to know them true.33 Careless communication, the second form, covers a speaker who has the facts but states them in a way a reasonable listener would misread.34
Negligence in these senses stops short of fraud, which explains why the plaintiff’s burden here is lighter. Fraud requires scienter, which the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm § 10 describes as including knowing or believing that the matter is not as represented, knowing that one lacks the confidence in its accuracy that the statement conveys, or knowing that one lacks the basis the statement implies.35 English law drew the line between fraud and carelessness in Derry v. Peek. The directors of a tram company issued a prospectus stating that the company was authorized to run its trams by steam power, though its charter limited that authority, and an investor who bought shares on the strength of the statement sued the directors in deceit.36 The House of Lords reversed a judgment for the investor. Lord Herschell reasoned that “[t]o make a statement careless whether it be true or false, and therefore without any real belief in its truth, appears to me to be an essentially different thing from making, through want of care, a false statement, which is nevertheless honestly believed to be true.”37
Derry left investors with a gap, and the law filled it from two directions. Parliament responded with the Director’s Liability Act, 1890, which made a director or promoter liable for damages to purchasers of stocks and bonds unless he could show that he had reasonable ground to believe, and at all material times did believe, his statements to be true.38 The common law moved later: not until 1964 did the House of Lords, in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., extend liability to information negligently supplied in a special relationship.39 Most American courts followed Derry in refusing to stretch deceit to cover merely negligent statements, yet most jurisdictions also allow a separate negligence action, in defined circumstances, for a negligent misrepresentation that causes only pecuniary harm.40 The two claims therefore carry different proof. A fraud plaintiff must establish what the speaker believed; a negligent misrepresentation plaintiff establishes what a reasonable speaker would have done, ordinarily by showing that the defendant communicated the matter without a reasonable basis to ascertain its truth or falsity.41
The boundary between the two claims is porous, because carelessness can become evidence of fraud. Negligence, even gross negligence, does not satisfy the knowledge element of fraud, yet it may be evidence from which a jury infers that the speaker had no genuine belief in what was said.42 In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Cardozo wrote that accountants who certified that a balance sheet matched the books, as true to their own knowledge, could be found to have had no knowledge on the subject, and so no sincere belief, particularly after suspicions about the accounts receivable had been awakened and the accountants closed their eyes to the obvious.43 An honest blunder, with neither reckless misstatement nor insincere profession of opinion, remains negligence.44
Whatever form the speaker’s carelessness takes, the plaintiff must also prove the remaining elements of deceit, including a false representation of material fact on which the plaintiff justifiably relied.45 The claim therefore fails if no representation was made, if the words cannot fairly be read as an affirmation of fact, if the matter is immaterial, or if the statement predicts future performance instead of representing existing fact.46 Each requirement keeps the reasonable-care inquiry anchored to something checkable. Care is measured by what the speaker did to find out whether a statement was true, and that measure has nothing to work on when the statement is a loose remark, a forecast, or a trivial detail. A fact is material when a reasonable person would consider it important or the speaker expects the listener to, so a misstatement on a point unrelated to the transaction cannot have shaped the listener’s decision.47
Statements that are not plain assertions of present fact produce three unsettled corners of this tort, and opinion is the first of them. The comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 and to Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm § 5 treat opinions as covered, and the many suits against accountants over audit opinions point the same way, at least for speakers who purport to have special knowledge. Yet the Second Restatement’s provisions on opinion address only fraud, and some courts hold flatly that opinion cannot ground the claim.48 The cases that allow recovery share a feature: the speaker’s position implies knowledge the listener lacks, as with the seal publisher in Hanberry. Ordinary sales praise fares worse. In a fraud suit over a house sale, Ray v. Montgomery treated statements that the house was solid, had good support, and was in good condition as opinion, even though the seller knew of termite damage.49 In the art market, a seller with no direct knowledge of authorship who calls a work authentic is really expressing a judgment, and a negligence claim on such a statement is usually extremely difficult to prove because even experts struggle to detect a forgery.50
Silence is the second unsettled corner. Section 552(1) of the Second Restatement imposes liability on one who supplies false information, wording that suggests an affirmative act, and the Third Restatement states that a failure to speak, by itself, does not support liability for negligent misrepresentation while recognizing liability for half-truths.51 Courts remain divided, and those that refuse to recognize silence-based claims seem motivated by reluctance to expand the tort. The half-truth exception follows from the same logic as the rule for affirmative statements: a speaker who tells part of the story has made a representation, and that representation misleads when the omitted part changes its meaning.
Statements of intention are the least secure of all. Nothing in § 552 itself bars them, but the Second Restatement’s provision on misrepresented intention speaks only to fraud, and some courts have held that negligent misrepresentation does not reach intentions, reasoning that otherwise every breach of contract would carry a potential tort claim for negligent promise.52
Limited Group of Recipients
A negligent misrepresentation claim needs more than a careless speaker acting in a business setting, because the plaintiff must also belong to the audience the law protects. Section 552(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts draws that boundary. It confines the speaker’s liability to loss suffered, first, by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance the speaker intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it, and second, through reliance on the information in a transaction that the speaker intends it to influence, or knows the recipient so intends, or in a substantially similar transaction.54 The rule therefore asks two questions about every plaintiff: whether the plaintiff sits among the people the speaker was supplying the information for, and whether the plaintiff acted in the deal the speaker had in view.
The rule grew out of a contrast between two New York decisions. In Glanzer v. Shepard a public weigher certified the weight of a quantity of beans, knowing the certificate was meant for the buyer, and the buyer recovered for the weigher’s mistake.55 In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, accountants certified the balance sheet of a rubber importer, knowing that the importer borrowed heavily and would show the statement to banks, creditors, and buyers as the basis of its dealings, and they delivered thirty-two certified copies without being told who would see them or in how many transactions.56 The plaintiff, a factor that had never before lent to the importer, advanced money on the strength of the certificate and was left with unpaid loans when the importer collapsed.57 Cardozo refused to extend the accountants’ duty to that lender, because the accountants could anticipate that some third person would see and rely on the certificate but did not know who it would be.58 What troubled him was the prospect of “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”59
The line Cardozo drew turns on who can plan for the risk. A speaker who knows that a particular recipient will rely on a report for a particular purpose can decide whether to proceed with the engagement and what price to charge in order to assume the known risk. A speaker who knows only that the report may travel anywhere has no such choice, and a single careless audit could then cost far more than the speaker’s fault warrants.60
Courts have not left the line where Cardozo drew it. Four approaches to a professional’s liability to third parties for negligent misrepresentation have developed, and they run from the narrowest to the broadest:
- Strict privity or its near equivalent allows negligence actions only to parties in privity of contract or in a relationship so close as to approach it, which is the position of Ultramares.61
- Near-privity under Credit Alliance relaxed that position in New York to reach a known party or parties of whom the speaker was aware, to whom the report was supplied for a particular purpose.62
- The Restatement limited-group rule lets the person or limited group the speaker intends to reach, or knows the recipient intends to reach, recover, and most courts follow this position or something close to it.63
- Open foreseeability, adopted in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, gives an unrestricted audit opinion a duty to all reasonably foreseeable recipients who receive the statements from the company for proper business purposes and rely on them.64
The courts that chose between the last two did so with Cardozo’s worry in view. Rosenblum reasoned that the auditor’s role had grown from a watchdog for management into an independent evaluator for stockholders, creditors, and others, so foreseeable business users deserved protection.65 Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. rejected that test because it could impose “a potential liability far out of proportion to its fault,” and because sophisticated investors could have bought protection from the auditor by contract, so the court followed the Restatement and confined liability to intended beneficiaries known to the auditor.66 The Restatement chose a limited group rather than strict privity because its rule tracks an assumption-of-risk idea. When a speaker knows that a third party will rely in a particular transaction and goes forward anyway, holding the speaker liable is fair, since the speaker knew of the risk, could guard against it, and chose to bear it.67
Because the test looks to a limited group and not to a named person, the speaker need not know the plaintiff’s identity. It is enough that the speaker knew the plaintiff belonged to a small, bounded class that would receive and rely on the information, and the particulars of the transaction need not be known either.68 White v. Guarente shows a plaintiff inside the line. Accountants retained by a limited partnership negligently missed improper withdrawals by the general partners, and the New York court let the limited partners sue, because they were a known group with a definable limit rather than “the extensive and indeterminable investing public-at-large,” and the accountants must have been aware that a limited partner would use the audit and tax returns to prepare his or her own returns.69
The second half of § 552(2) fixes the transaction. Reliance must occur in the deal the speaker intended the information to influence, or knew the recipient intended it to influence, or in a substantially similar one, and the comment to § 552 treats the question as how large a departure the speaker should have expected, judged by ordinary business practice. An accountant told that a summary will support an application to a particular bank for a $10,000 loan is not necessarily facing a different transaction if that bank lends $15,000, but a $500,000 loan would strike lender and borrower alike as a different kind of transaction.70
A plaintiff outside the group appears in Ellis v. Grant Thornton LLP. First National Bank of Keystone recruited Gary Ellis to be its president, and while deciding whether to accept he heard representatives of the accounting firm Grant Thornton say that the bank would receive a clean audit opinion.71 The firm had been hired to supply the audit to the bank and to the federal regulator that ordered it, so it neither intended to supply the audit to a prospective employee nor knew that the bank meant to do so, and the audit report itself said it was intended for the bank and its regulatory agencies and should not be used by third parties for other purposes.72 The Fourth Circuit reversed an award of nearly $2.5 million, holding that Ellis was not within any limited group for whose benefit the audit was prepared and that a banker as experienced as he could not justifiably rely on statements the report itself disclaimed.73 Prospective employees were simply not the audience the firm or its client had in mind, and a plaintiff who is not in the audience has no claim however real the loss.
Fraud reaches further than negligent misrepresentation. It extends to persons whom the maker intends, or has reason to expect, will act in reliance, and the comment to § 552 says the negligent supplier of information is restricted somewhat more narrowly than the maker of a fraudulent representation.74 The phrase reason to expect is objective: the maker has information from which a reasonable person would conclude that reliance would follow. Section 552 asks only what the speaker intended or knew, and it speaks of a limited group where the fraud rule speaks of a class.75 The difference tracks fault, since a careless speaker can fairly ask for shelter from unforeseen readers, while an intentional deceiver has no comparable claim against foreseeable victims. The fraud rule was once narrower. In Peek v. Gurney directors issued a prospectus to induce the public to buy shares, and no liability attached to persons who bought from a stockholder, but courts have since widened the range, and the issuer of a letter of credit contemplated for a third party’s use may be sued in fraud as well as negligence.76 In Griffith v. Byers Construction Co. of Kansas, Inc., buyers of residential lots with an undisclosed soil defect could pursue fraud against the developer even though title first passed through builders acting as conduits, because the buyers belonged to the class the developer intended and had reason to expect would purchase and build.77
A different pattern appears when the speaker’s information will pass through a succession of users, as with surveyors and title abstractors. A survey of a lot will serve the owner, then later buyers and lenders, yet in all probability only the person holding the property when the error comes to light will suffer a loss. Because that exposure stays bounded, courts tend to extend liability to all foreseeable users, in contrast to an audit that many lenders and investors may rely on at the same time and lose on separately.78
Section 552(3) adds one extension. A person under a public duty to give information is liable to any member of the class the duty was created to protect, in any transaction the duty was meant to protect them in, which is how statutes requiring filings or published notices for a protected class can support a suit by a member of that class.79
Reliance and Plaintiff Fault
Every misrepresentation theory in the Restatement (Second) of Torts asks something of the plaintiff as well as the speaker: the plaintiff must have acted on the statement, and the reliance must have been reasonable. Section 311(1) reaches physical harm caused by action the recipient takes in reasonable reliance on negligently given false information.81 Section 402B conditions its public-misrepresentation claim on justifiable reliance.82 The pecuniary-loss rule in § 552 likewise required justifiable reliance, a requirement the Third Restatement later reworked, as discussed below.83 Because reliance of that kind is an element of each theory, the plaintiff carries the burden of pleading and proving it, and unjustified reliance is a gap in the plaintiff’s own case rather than an affirmative defense the speaker must establish.84 Two questions follow: whether the plaintiff actually relied, and whether the reliance deserves the law’s protection.
Actual reliance is the first question, and it is a question of causation. The plaintiff, or someone acting for the plaintiff, must in fact learn of the statement and then act on it, whether by buying the product, entering the deal, or skipping a precaution that the statement made seem unnecessary. A person who takes no action on account of a false statement usually has not been harmed by it, so reliance supplies the causal link between the speaker’s carelessness and the loss.85 Reliance is necessary but not sufficient, because the plaintiff must also prove pecuniary harm, and a plaintiff who relied and lost nothing has no cognizable damages.86 The requirement also screens out plaintiffs whose injury was principally caused by their own careless decision, not by a misstatement that played little or no role in it.87
Reliance that occurred must still be justified, and whether it was depends on the nature of the representation and all the circumstances of the transaction. A listener may reasonably credit an explicit assurance that a golfing practice device is completely safe, while a person who ignores widespread publicity about the dangers of smoking cannot justifiably treat a cigarette advertisement as proof that heavy use is harmless.88 Reliance on a material representation is ordinarily justified unless the plaintiff is on notice that the statement is not to be trusted or knows it to be false.89 The requirement also overlaps with the elements covered earlier: reliance is ordinarily unjustified when the statement is immaterial, is puffery or an opinion implying no assertion of fact, or predicts events the speaker does not control.90
The standard applied to the plaintiff shifts with the speaker’s fault, and fraud shows the contrast most plainly. When the speaker acted with scienter, most courts let the plaintiff rely on a material representation without any investigation, even when the speaker is an adverse bargainer and the truth could be confirmed in courthouse records.91 The reason is cost: telling the truth is cheap while uncovering deceit is expensive, and a rule requiring every lender and buyer to verify every statement would add delay and expense to ordinary commerce. Fairness points the same way, since the justifiability requirement gives a deliberate deceiver no shield for exploiting a trusting victim.92 In Adan v. Steinbrecher, a gullible young man who had just inherited $40,000 was offered a roadhouse said to be worth $35,000 and was told not to ask anyone else about it, because other buyers might snatch the bargain. He made no inquiry, bought the place, found it nearly worthless, and recovered from the seller.93 Contributory negligence likewise does not bar recovery when the misrepresentation is intentional.94
A merely careless speaker stands in a different position. For negligent misrepresentation the plaintiff’s conduct is measured by the ordinary objective standard of a person exercising due regard for his or her own welfare.95 Liability under this tort is a species of negligence, so the plaintiff’s share of blame for the loss is analyzed as it would be in any other negligence case.96 The law has less reason to excuse a plaintiff’s imprudence when the speaker was careless than when the speaker set out to deceive, because the deceiver chose to exploit the plaintiff’s trust and the careless speaker did not. That is why a failure to take reasonable precautions, which rarely matters in fraud, can matter a great deal here.
The precautions the law expects are those a prudent plaintiff would take independently, not a repeat of the speaker’s own work. Due care does not normally require a plaintiff to duplicate the checks the speaker should have made before speaking, so a plaintiff is negligent only by omitting precautions that due care would call for even if the speaker had spoken carefully. A plaintiff may nevertheless owe an independent duty to investigate, even redundantly, when the stakes are high or the speaker’s assumption of responsibility is unclear enough to make exclusive reliance imprudent. Information in the plaintiff’s own hands counts too: a writing that contradicts what the speaker said, or that disclaims its own reliability, is a reason to doubt the oral statement.97 In the leading insurance-answer decision discussed earlier, the court declined to hold the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to catch the error by inspecting the bill of lading it later received, and treated whether it should have done so as a question of fact.98
A plaintiff whose own knowledge undercuts the statement appears in Ellis, the decision on the limited group in the previous section. Ellis heard accountants say during recruiting talks that the bank would receive a clean audit opinion, and he joined the bank, allegedly in reliance. The court held that he could not have justifiably relied, because he knew the audit report said it was not intended for use by third parties and he was sophisticated enough to understand that the audit was meant for the bank and its regulator, not for prospective employees.99 Sophistication matters because it raises the precautions that due care expects. A listener who lacked both the disclaiming report and the experience to read it would present a different picture. The case also shows that reliance is a hurdle separate from the question of who may sue: under the broader near-privity and foreseeability approaches to duty, a plaintiff in Ellis’s position would still have to show justifiable reliance and would meet the same difficulties.100
The all-or-nothing flavor of the word justifiable has come under pressure from comparative responsibility. When § 552 was adopted, the Second Restatement treated the plaintiff’s contributory negligence as a complete defense, so a justifiable-reliance requirement fit a regime in which the plaintiff recovered everything or nothing. Comparative responsibility has since become a standard principle in negligence cases and courts have extended it to negligent misrepresentation, which made the two inquiries hard to keep apart, because the same plaintiff conduct can be described as imprudent reliance or as negligence of another kind. The Third Restatement’s counterpart to § 552, § 5 of its volume on economic harm, therefore drops the word justifiable, asks whether the plaintiff’s reliance was reasonable, and treats the plaintiff’s responsibility for the loss as a matter of comparative fault.101
Courts have moved in that direction without moving uniformly. Connecticut and Washington apply comparative fault to negligent misrepresentation even though their comparative fault statutes covered only personal injury and property damage, while a small minority of courts refuse to apportion fault even in negligent misrepresentation cases.102 Many courts keep justifiable reliance as an element and add comparative fault as a separate issue that bars or reduces damages when the speaker was merely negligent, and they have generally not applied comparative fault to intentional fraud. Professionals such as accountants can invoke the client’s fault only when that fault contributed to the failure of the work the professional was hired to do.103
Disclaimers bear on the same question from another direction. In Hedley Byrne, an advertising firm extended more than £15,000 of credit to Easipower after Heller supplied a credit report that allegedly overstated Easipower’s creditworthiness, and Lord Devlin ruled for Heller on the strength of its disclaimer: “A man cannot be said voluntarily to be undertaking a responsibility if at the very moment when he is said to be accepting it he declares that in fact he is not.”104 Between parties who have no contract, a disclaimer may therefore bear significantly on liability, since it can show that supplying a basis for the plaintiff’s reliance was no part of the speaker’s purpose, or make the reliance unreasonable in other respects.105 Between contracting parties the contract’s terms generally decide the dispute, and exculpatory clauses are usually enforced against negligent misrepresentation claims.106 Depending on the jurisdiction, a plaintiff who can prove fraud may fare better on both the effect of a disclaimer and the effect of the plaintiff’s own negligence.107