Concept
Measuring Recoverable Damages
Fraudulent concealment, nondisclosure, and damages
Measuring Recoverable Damages
A plaintiff who proves fraud recovers the pecuniary loss that the misrepresentation legally caused. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 549(1) says so directly: the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation may recover from the maker, in an action of deceit, the pecuniary loss to him of which the misrepresentation is a legal cause.1 Two limits sit inside that sentence. Pecuniary loss means loss that can be counted in money, and legal cause ties the award to the lie, so a buyer whose investment fell with the economy or after a new regulation recovers only the part of the decline attributable to the fraud.2 The plaintiff must also prove actual damages, because a tort action for misrepresentation requires them even when the misrepresentation was fraudulent.3
The measure stays the same whichever route led to liability. Section 550 makes a party who intentionally prevents the other from acquiring material information liable for pecuniary loss as though that party had stated the nonexistence of the matter,4 and § 551(1) imposes the same liability on a party who knew of a fact, was under a duty to disclose it, and stayed silent.5 A party who has no duty to volunteer a fact but answers a direct question about it falsely commits affirmative fraud.6 In Zanakis-Pico v. Cutter Dodge, Inc., the Hawaii Supreme Court listed the Restatement's concealment, nondisclosure, and misrepresentation torts and observed that each allows recovery of “pecuniary loss,” unmodified by “substantial” or “actual.”7 Even an opinion can supply the misrepresentation, because § 539 reads into it an implied assertion that the speaker knows facts sufficient to justify the opinion.8 The manner of deception changes the liability analysis and leaves the damages analysis alone.
Section 549 builds the recovery in three parts. Clause (1)(a) awards the difference between the value of what the plaintiff received and the price or other value the plaintiff gave for it.9 Clause (1)(b) adds any other pecuniary loss the plaintiff suffered as a consequence of relying on the misrepresentation.10 Subsection (2) allows, in a business transaction, additional damages sufficient to give the plaintiff the benefit of the contract with the maker, if proved with reasonable certainty.11 Each part answers a separate question: what the plaintiff overpaid, what else the reliance cost, and what the plaintiff would have gained had the statement been true.
The parts reflect two ways of fixing the position the plaintiff would have held but for the wrong. Both ways aim at that position; they define the wrong a little differently.12 The reliance view puts the plaintiff back where she stood before the transaction, and the expectation view gives her the benefit of her deal. In loan cases the two views often land on the same figure, because the lender wants repayment with interest either way, and that is why subsection (2) is rarely invoked. In sales they can diverge, because the profit from the deal can exceed the amount invested plus interest.13
The Restatement widens the measure as the misstatement grows more culpable. Liability for actual fraud extends to anyone whose reliance was highly foreseeable,14 and only fraud carries the bargain measure: damages for negligent misrepresentation do not include the benefit of the plaintiff's contract with the defendant,15 and innocent misrepresentation is confined to out-of-pocket loss.16 The four subsections that follow take the measures in turn and end with the victim's choice between suing for damages and rescinding.
Out-of-Pocket Loss
Out-of-pocket loss is the value the plaintiff gave minus the value the plaintiff received. Section 549(1)(a) states the rule: the difference between the value of what the plaintiff has received in the transaction and its purchase price or other value given for it.17 In Trytko v. Hubbell, Inc., a negligent misrepresentation case applying the parallel § 552B(1)(a), the Seventh Circuit described the rule as one that “looks to the loss which the plaintiff has suffered in the transaction, and gives him the difference between the value of what he has parted with and the value of what he has received.”18 The figure is called out-of-pocket because it counts only what the transaction took from the plaintiff without returning value.
The formula fits the way fraud injures. A lie works through an exchange: had the plaintiff known the truth, the plaintiff would have declined the deal or struck it on other terms, so the harm sits inside the transaction itself. Awarding value given minus value received puts the plaintiff back where she stood before the deal while she keeps the property.19 The award takes back only what the lie took, and it adds no profit the plaintiff never held.
A house sale shows the arithmetic. A seller says the house has copper plumbing and new wiring, when it has neither. Had the statements been true the house would be worth $100,000; in its real condition it is worth $85,000; and the buyer pays $90,000. The out-of-pocket loss is $90,000 minus $85,000, or $5,000.20 Three numbers appear, and only two enter the formula. The $100,000 value as represented drops out, because the formula asks what the buyer gave and what the buyer got, and the house as promised is neither. Subtracting the $90,000 price from the $100,000 represented value yields $10,000, a different figure: the bargain the buyer thought was struck, which belongs to the benefit-of-the-bargain measure. A false statement that a leaky roof was recently repaired works the same way, since the buyer recovers the difference between the contract price and the value of the defective house.21
The same lie yields nothing to a buyer who paid $85,000, because price equals actual value and the exchange took no value from that buyer. Whether such a buyer has another route to recovery is a question for the benefit-of-the-bargain measure. At the other extreme, the formula gives full recovery to a buyer who overpaid on any view of the facts. Had the buyer paid $110,000, the loss would be $25,000, although the house would have been worth only $100,000 had the statements been true and the buyer would have lost money on the deal anyway. The formula has no step that discounts for a poor bargain: it asks only what the buyer gave and what the buyer received.
Securities fraud makes the valuation step hardest, because a market price that already reflects the false statement shows what the stock is worth if the statement had been true. A purchaser in a well-developed market who paid that price paid the represented value, and the out-of-pocket and benefit-of-the-bargain measures come out the same. To learn what the stock really was worth at the time of the fraud, courts look to the market price after the true facts became public.22
Nondisclosure supports the same arithmetic. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the distributor's practice was not to advise its dealers, and hence their customers, of predelivery damage to new cars when the cost of repair came to less than 3 percent of the car's suggested retail price.23 Dr. Gore paid $40,750.88 for a black sports sedan and learned about nine months later, from an independent detailer, that the car had been repainted at a cost of $601.37. He sued on the theory that the nondisclosure suppressed a material fact, and he proved $4,000 in actual damages through a former BMW dealer's testimony that a repainted car is worth about ten percent less than a new car that has not been damaged and repaired. Ten percent of the price is roughly $4,000, so the proof compared the value of the car received with the value given for it, and the jury returned $4,000 in compensatory damages. The award tracked the market value the car lost, so the $601.37 repair cost set no ceiling on it. The Supreme Court took the case to decide whether the $2 million punitive award was constitutionally excessive, a question the last subsection takes up.24
Out-of-pocket loss fixes the overpayment inside the transaction. The plaintiff's reliance may also have cost money outside it, and § 549(1)(b) reaches that spending next.
Consequential Reliance Losses
Section 549(1)(b) adds a second component to the price-and-value comparison: the recipient may recover “pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of the recipient's reliance upon the misrepresentation.”26 The word “otherwise” divides the two clauses. Clause (a) measures the wrong inside the exchange, the gap between price and actual value. Clause (b) collects what the false belief led the plaintiff to do around the exchange: use the thing, build on it, or arrange other affairs on the assumption that it was what the seller said. Reliance connects the two, because the lie moved the plaintiff to act and the clause makes the defendant answer for what the acting cost.
The Restatement's comment names two typical situations, and the Seventh Circuit quoted both in Trytko. In the first, a buyer relying on the misrepresentation uses the subject matter of the sale in the belief that it is appropriate for a use for which it is harmfully inappropriate. In the second, the buyer incurs expenses in preparation for a use of the article for which it would have been appropriate if the representation had been true.27 Trytko treats clause (b) as a second description of out-of-pocket damages, in contrast to benefit of the bargain, so an answer should name the clause that supplies each dollar and not rely on labels alone.28
A purchase of factory equipment shows both situations at once. A buyer who buys a machine in reliance on the seller's misrepresentations may recover, in addition to the loss on the purchase price, the shipping and installation costs, the expense that followed from the machine's failure to do the job, and the value of raw materials the machine destroyed while the buyer tried to make it work, subject to the usual scope-of-liability rules.29 Shipping and installation are preparation expenses, and the spoiled materials are the harm from using the machine in the belief that it was fit for the work. Clause (a) alone would return the overpayment and leave all of that spending uncompensated, although the buyer spent it only because the lie made the machine look sound. Clause (b) closes the gap.
What does a borrower recover who builds on a loan officer's false assurance? In Federal Land Bank Association v. Sloane, the Sloanes could win a contract to raise chickens for Pilgrim's Pride if they built new chicken houses, and a loan officer told them that the bank's board had approved their $141,000 loan and that they could begin site preparation, a message the officer also relayed to their contractor. The bank later denied the loan for valid reasons, the Sloanes found no other financing, and they sued for their construction expenses, the lost Pilgrim's Pride contract, and mental anguish. Sloane is a negligent misrepresentation case decided under § 552B, whose clause (1)(b) parallels § 549(1)(b), so it shows how the reliance clause works without stating the rule for fraud. The Sloanes recovered damages for past pecuniary losses other than lost profits, which presumably included the construction money they had already spent. Clause (1)(a) could not have supplied those sums, because the Sloanes gave nothing and received nothing in a transaction with the bank, so the reliance clause did the work alone. The lost profits failed for a different reason: the Sloanes would not have received the poultry contract whether or not the misstatement had been made, since the bank never supplied the loan money, and awarding them would have given the Sloanes the benefit of the loan. Whether a fraud plaintiff in a business transaction can reach profits that a true representation would have generated is a question for § 549(2), which the next subsection takes up.
The first limit on clause (b) comes from the opening words of § 549(1): the loss must be one of which the misrepresentation is a legal cause.30 Causation principles much like those in negligence require a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the harm, and they require the harm to be a foreseeable result of relying on the false statement.31 A buyer induced to purchase stock by false statements cannot charge the seller with the loss when the corporation goes bankrupt because of later, unforeseeable events unrelated to the falsity. Recovery is available, however, if the corporation probably would have weathered the misfortune had it been as represented, or if the later events were foreseeable.32 The Oregon Supreme Court in Knepper v. Brown treated proximate cause in fraud as reasonable foreseeability and added that the reach of liability depends on the nature of the misrepresentation, the audience it was directed to, and the action it justifiably induced. The same idea limits who may recover as well as what: fraud liability extends to anyone whose reliance was highly foreseeable, and no further.33
Two further limits concern proof and counting. The plaintiff must prove the spending and its link to the lie, because the actual-damages requirement applies to reliance losses as it does to the price gap.34 And each dollar counts once: “otherwise” in clause (b) means it picks up only loss that clause (a) has not already counted. In Hill v. Jones, the buyers called an exterminator who confirmed termite damage to the floor and steps and to wood columns in the house, and the estimated cost of repairing the wood floor alone was about $5,000.35 The Hill buyers sued to rescind, but a buyer who kept such a house could offer a repair estimate as evidence of how far its value fell short of its price, which is a clause (a) loss. Collecting the same $5,000 again as a reliance expense would pay twice for one defect. What clause (b) would add is money spent for a different reason, such as the cost of living elsewhere while the floor is rebuilt, if the buyer proves it.
The last limit sits in the clause itself, which compensates pecuniary loss, meaning loss counted in money. Sloane applied that limit under § 552B and set aside the mental anguish award because the section provides damages only for pecuniary losses. Courts deciding fraud claims divide on the point. The Iowa Supreme Court in Cornell v. Wunschel reasoned that a defrauder must be able to contemplate the claimed damage when the misrepresentation is made, and that mental distress is not ordinarily contemplated in a business transaction. Connecticut in Kilduff v. Adams, Inc. and the District of Columbia in Osbourne v. Capital City Mortgage Corp. allow emotional damages that are the natural and proximate result of fraud, and the D.C. court reasoned that proof of an intentional misrepresentation suffices even when the underlying dispute is contractual. An answer should state the Restatement's pecuniary limit as the default and flag that some courts open the door to emotional damages when the fraud is intentional.
The label “consequential” should not carry contract vocabulary into this clause. Clause (b) asks one question: did the plaintiff lose money as a consequence of relying on the misrepresentation? The performance a true statement would have delivered is the business of § 549(2).
Benefit of the Bargain
Section 549(2) adds a second layer to the price-and-value comparison: in a business transaction, the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation may also recover “additional damages sufficient to give him the benefit of his contract with the maker, if these damages are proved with reasonable certainty.”37 The benefit of the bargain is the position the plaintiff would have occupied had the representation been true. Out-of-pocket loss asks what the deal took from the plaintiff; this measure asks what the deal promised and failed to deliver. It follows the logic of contract expectation, which compares what the victim had a right to expect with what the victim actually got.38 The extra recovery reaches the profit side of the exchange, which the out-of-pocket formula leaves out because the plaintiff never held it.
The house numbers show both layers. The seller described the house as worth $100,000, it is actually worth $85,000, and the buyer paid $90,000. The out-of-pocket loss is the $5,000 by which the price exceeds actual value. The buyer also lost the bargain the false description promised, a $100,000 house for $90,000, which is a $10,000 gain that never arrived. Adding the layers gives $15,000, the same figure that results from subtracting actual value from value as represented ($100,000 minus $85,000), and the same comparison the benefit-of-the-bargain method makes between the property as received and the property as represented.39 The vocabulary needs care: the statute's “additional damages” are the $10,000 layer, while the combined $15,000 is the figure the benefit-of-the-bargain method produces, so an answer should say which figure it means.
Which measure is larger depends on the bargain the plaintiff struck. A buyer who paid $10,000 for property worth $10,000 that had been represented as worth $12,000 has no out-of-pocket loss, since price equals actual value, yet the lie cost the buyer the $2,000 by which the property fell short of its description, and subsection (2) reaches that sum.40 A buyer who paid $10,000 for property worth $5,000 and represented as worth $8,000 stands on the other side of the line. The out-of-pocket loss is $5,000, while value as represented minus value received is only $3,000, because the buyer overpaid by more than the description exaggerated. Subsection (2) speaks of additional damages, so it adds to clause (1)(a) and does not subtract from it, and this buyer keeps the $5,000. In a jurisdiction that lets the plaintiff choose, the method is simple: compute both figures and claim the larger.
Courts divide on whether a tort plaintiff may have the bargain measure at all. Some limit the plaintiff to out-of-pocket loss on the theory that compensatory damages in tort are measured by and limited to what makes the plaintiff whole, so a plaintiff who wants the benefit of the bargain must sue in contract. The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions apply the benefit-of-the-bargain rule, reasoning that the form of action should make no difference where the only difference between contract and deceit is the added element of fraud. The majority adds that confining the plaintiff to out-of-pocket loss would let a defendant induce a sale by lies and escape liability whenever the price approximated the actual value of what was sold, perhaps leaving the buyer with something far different from what he thought he was getting. The source cautions that these arguments appear to minimize the other remedies available.41 Where the representation was unrelated to any contract between the parties, the measure must be out-of-pocket loss, since no bargain exists whose benefit can be awarded.42
The measure matters most in sales. In loan cases like Pasley and Edgington the creditor wants repayment with interest, so the expectation and reliance measures are often the same, while in a sale the profit from the deal can exceed the amount invested plus interest.44 In Selman v. Shirley, the buyers of land were entitled not only to recoup the purchase price paid but also to the increment in value they would have enjoyed if the land had contained, as represented, 4,000 cords of wood worth $2,000 and had been crossed by a stream that supplied enough water to irrigate ten acres.45 Each represented feature could be priced, which made the lost bargain provable.
Concealment and nondisclosure carry the same measure, because those theories impose liability as though the matter had been stated. In Artilla Cove Resort, Inc. v. Hartley, the building sold to the plaintiffs lacked the structural strength that had been represented, through concealment or nondisclosure, and extensive repairs would be needed. The buyers had neither resold at a loss nor yet paid for repairs, and the court allowed them to recover the difference between the building as represented and the unsound building they received.46
The reasonable-certainty requirement is the second limit on subsection (2). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving loss, and the standard asks two questions: whether the plaintiff has proved injury at all, and if so, whether the evidence lets the factfinder fix the amount.47 The benefit-of-the-bargain layer is exposed to this requirement because its upper figure is hypothetical: it is the value the thing would have had if the statement were true. When that value turns on estimating the worth of something that never existed, the award becomes speculation.
Securities litigation presses the certainty concern hardest. Many courts refuse benefit-of-the-bargain damages in Rule 10b-5 cases, in part because the measure requires a comparison of two disputable values, what the stock was really worth and what it would have been worth had the statement been true, where the out-of-pocket measure compares one disputable value with a known price. Some courts also read § 28 of the Securities Exchange Act, which bars recovery in excess of actual damages, to conflict with the measure.48
The bargain measure is also reserved for fraud. The Restatement excludes it from the damages for negligent misrepresentation,49 and it confines innocent misrepresentation to out-of-pocket loss, excluding consequential damages as well and creating, in the source's phrase, a restitutionary remedy in tort law clothing.50 A plaintiff who cannot prove scienter may still reach damages if the representation can be characterized as a warranty, because damages for breach of warranty do not depend on the defendant's fault.51 A warranty must actually exist, however: a developer who subdivides and offers lots as choice homesites does not by implication warrant the fertility of the soil.52 Whichever measure applies, it governs the plaintiff who keeps the contract and sues for damages. A plaintiff who prefers to unwind the deal turns to rescission, the subject of the next subsection.
Damages Versus Rescission
A defrauded party chooses between two routes: keep the transaction and recover damages, or undo it and seek restitution. Section 549(1) serves the first route; the victim leaves the contract standing and asks only for the pecuniary loss the misrepresentation caused.54 The tort route grew from the common law's response to fraud. Early English courts generally did not recognize fraud as a defense to an action in assumpsit, but they allowed recovery for damages flowing from fraud in a separate action, which came to be known as the tort of deceit, and the modern tort action for misrepresentation descends from it.55
Rescission returns the parties to their earlier positions, with each side giving back what it received, a result the source calls mutual restoration of benefits transferred.56 The buyers in Hill v. Jones, who found termite damage after closing, sued to rescind their purchase of the house.57 Rescission asks more of the victim than damages do, because the victim must be able to return what was received, and the remedy may be refused if the property has passed to a third person.58 In return for that burden, the victim gets relief on lighter proof: a party seeking rescission of a transfer induced by fraud need not show that the transferee profited or that the deceit caused economic loss.59
Damages become the better route when the victim wants to keep what was bought. If the buyer does not want to give up the home, a tort action for money damages to compensate for the termite problem is more attractive than rescission.60 The Restatement comment lists the other situations in which damages hold a definite advantage: the plaintiff cannot restore what was received in its original condition, has made improvements, is barred from rescission by delay or has lost the remedy by an election, or cannot obtain restitution because the defendant's position has changed. The comment adds that leaving the transaction standing may even suit the defendant better than upsetting it later.61
Rescission does not turn on the defendant's fault. The law of restitution lets a plaintiff rescind a transfer induced by a material misrepresentation even if the misrepresentation was innocently made,62 and in some states consumer protection or related statutes also give relief for innocent misrepresentation.63 A victim who cannot prove scienter therefore has a route that a deceit action would close.
The routes differ in other ways that bear on the choice. Attorneys' fees generally are not awarded on claims sounding in tort, although some restitutionary remedies are classified as contract claims that allow fee-shifting. A court may award punitive damages on a tort claim for fraudulent inducement but generally cannot do so in equity through restitution, and a tort claim for fraud may face a shorter statute of limitations than a quasi-contract claim in restitution.64
Whichever route the victim takes, the victim is paid once. The choice is an election, and a victim who has committed himself too far may lose rescission by it.65 A buyer who rescinds and recovers the price has no overpayment left for § 549(1)(a) to measure, so claiming both would count the same loss twice.
The victim's own carelessness gives the defendant no discount under either route. In Seeger v. Odell, Justice Traynor noted that “[n]egligence on the part of the plaintiff in failing to discover the falsity of a statement is no defense when the misrepresentation was intentional rather than negligent.” In Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, Judge Easterbrook applied the rule in holding that a pension trustee's failure to investigate did not relieve the defendant of liability for securities fraud.66 The plaintiff's care still counts at one point, which the discussion of reliance identified earlier: the reliance must be justifiable. A buyer who skipped an inspection may find that justification weakened, and the weakness goes to whether the buyer recovers at all, not to a proportional reduction of the award.
Deliberate deceit also opens a remedy that neither measure in § 549 supplies. If a fraudulent misrepresentation was calculated to cause harm, punitive damages may be sought.67 Due process limits the amount, and one measure of the limit is how reprehensible the conduct was. In BMW v. Gore, the Supreme Court agreed that the nondisclosure was sufficiently reprehensible to give rise to tort liability, but it held the conduct not reprehensible enough to warrant a $2 million exemplary award. The Court observed that “the omission of a material fact may be less reprehensible than a deliberate false statement, particularly when there is a good-faith basis for believing that no duty to disclose exists.”68 That gradation tracks the structure of this chapter: an act of concealment is treated as a lie, bare silence needs a duty, and even a silence that creates liability may draw a lighter penalty than a spoken falsehood.