Concept
Duties From Trust and Prior Statements
Fraudulent concealment, nondisclosure, and damages
Duties From Trust and Prior Statements
Silence is not a misrepresentation. Fraud rests on an affirmative act of communicating information, so proof that a defendant merely failed to supply information does not ordinarily satisfy the representation element.1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(1) makes nondisclosure actionable on a single condition: a person who fails to disclose a fact he knows may justifiably induce another to act in a business transaction is liable as though he had represented that the fact did not exist, if, but only if, he is under a duty to disclose it.2 Section 551(2) lists the situations that carry the duty, and in each the disclosure is owed before the transaction is consummated.3
The list has five entries. A party must disclose matters the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence;4 matters needed to keep a partial or ambiguous statement from misleading;5 subsequently acquired information that makes an earlier true statement untrue or misleading;6 the falsity of a statement made without expectation of reliance, once the speaker learns the other is about to act on it;7 and facts basic to the transaction, when the other is about to act under a mistake about them and would reasonably expect disclosure.8 This unit takes the first four. Each rests on something already in place between the parties: the listener’s trust in the speaker, or the speaker’s own earlier words. The fifth, facts basic to the transaction, is the broadest and comes next.
Those four settings give the law a reason to treat quiet as an assertion. In the first, the listener has stopped looking out for himself because he trusts the speaker. In the other three, the speaker’s own words have already told the listener what to believe, and the listener has no reason to check. The four duties differ in what triggers them and in what the speaker must then supply:
| Duty | Trigger | What the speaker must disclose |
|---|---|---|
| § 551(2)(a) | A fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence | Matters the other is entitled to know |
| § 551(2)(b) | A partial or ambiguous statement of the facts | Matters needed to keep the statement from misleading |
| § 551(2)(c) | New information that makes an earlier statement untrue or misleading | That new information |
| § 551(2)(d) | Learning that the other is about to rely on a statement made without expectation of reliance | The statement’s falsity |
Fiduciary and Confidential Relationships
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(a) supplies the first duty to speak: a party must disclose matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.9 The duty fills a gap the no-duty baseline leaves. The baseline pictures two parties who look after themselves, each free to inspect and to ask. Parties in a fiduciary or confidential relation are not true antagonists,10 and a person who has handed a matter to a trusted adviser has stopped checking, deliberately and for good reason. The duty to disclose replaces the self-help the dependent party gave up. Breach of fiduciary obligation has long stood beside deceit and breach of contract as a ground of liability; an older English formulation confined liability to those three until the House of Lords decided Hedley Byrne in 1964.11
The law recognizes two routes into the category. A fiduciary relationship is one imposed by law as automatically requiring trust and protection, such as lawyer to client or guardian to ward. A confidential relationship arises as a matter of fact when one person does not look out for her own interests because she justifiably places trust and confidence in the other’s judgment, and close family relations are the most common example.12 The traditional list of fiduciary and confidential relations includes principal and agent, guardian and ward, executor and beneficiary, bank and investing depositor, trustee and cestui que trust, attorney and client, physician and patient, and majority and minority stockholder; contracts of suretyship, guaranty, insurance, partnership, and joint venture carry the same duty.13 The category also reaches past its labels: whenever one party to a transaction justifiably believes the other is looking out for his or her interests, a duty of disclosure arises.14 When the duty is breached, the protected party has a defense to enforcement of the disadvantageous contract.15
Chiarella v. United States shows where a relationship duty comes from and where it does not. Chiarella, an employee of a financial printer working for investment bankers, deciphered the identities of takeover targets before the offers were announced, when the targets’ stock would rise, and was criminally prosecuted for the insider trading that followed. His employer had no direct relationship with the targets; it served the offeror.16 The Court could not affirm his conviction without recognizing a general duty among all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information, and it refused to do so because such a duty departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties.17 Failing to disclose material information before a transaction is fraud only when the person is under a duty to do so, and that duty arises when one party has information the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence, the formulation § 551(2)(a) uses.18
Corporate insiders stand on the other side of that line. The Securities and Exchange Commission recognized a relationship of trust and confidence between a corporation’s shareholders and the insiders who obtain confidential information by reason of their position, and that relationship gives rise to a duty to disclose.19 Because insiders are obliged to place the shareholder’s welfare before their own, a duty to disclose before trading keeps them from profiting through material, nonpublic information.20 The classical theory reaches beyond officers, directors, and other permanent insiders to attorneys, accountants, consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a corporation.21 Chiarella fit none of these categories as to the shareholders he bought from, and the Court would not substitute his superior knowledge for the relationship that was missing. Knowing more than the other side is the situation the baseline already tolerates, so it cannot also be the reason the baseline gives way. An answer that moves from “one side knew more” to “fairness demands disclosure” skips the element this category requires: a relationship that puts the silent party in a position of trust.
Individual shareholders are protected by the same idea. In Strong v. Repide, a majority shareholder secretly bought another shareholder’s stock without revealing that the corporation, under his direction, was about to sell corporate assets at a price that would greatly enhance the value of the stock, and the decision rested on the fiduciary duty between the corporate insider and the shareholder.22 Strong is the leading “special facts” case: some courts take a position between the Kansas rule and the traditional common-law approach and require insiders to disclose special facts, sometimes called special circumstances.23 State courts still conflict on how far and when directors and officers must disclose inside information to individual shareholders before buying their shares, though there is a growing tendency to hold officials responsible for exploiting the ignorance of selling shareholders. The common law has found it harder to impose liability on insiders who deal in a faceless market behind the screen of a stock exchange.24
The duty is not confined to commerce. In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the court concluded that a physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or economic, that may affect the physician’s professional judgment, and that failing to disclose them may support a claim for performing medical procedures without informed consent or for breach of fiduciary duty.25 Canterbury v. Spence rests the physician’s duty on the relationship itself: a patient’s reliance on a physician is a trust of the kind that has traditionally exacted obligations beyond those of arm’s-length dealing, and the patient’s dependence on the physician for information about contemplated treatment is well-nigh abject.26 A patient cannot ask about an interest the patient does not know exists, so a duty that waited for a question would defeat its own purpose.
Because the duty depends on trust between these two parties, ordinary commerce falls outside it. A federal court held that no fiduciary relationship existed between a smoker and a tobacco company, because commercial, arm’s-length relationships are not fiduciary relationships.27 Arm’s-length dealing is the setting in which each side is expected to look after itself, so treating every seller as a fiduciary would erase the baseline. Friendship alone does not suffice either. Arko v. Cirou illustrates that a close personal relationship between a lender and the borrowers did not by itself make their dealings confidential, because what matters is whether one side actually placed the other in charge of protecting its interests.28
Half-Truths and Partial Statements
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(b) names the first duty that grows out of the speaker’s own words: a party must disclose matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading.30 A statement communicates what it fairly implies, so a sentence true word for word can still assert something false. Ambiguous statements reasonably capable of both a true and a false meaning are misrepresentations if the false meaning is reasonably understood, as when a land’s yield is stated as “5,000” and the buyer takes that to mean bushels when it means dollars, and even a literally true statement may be actionable if it is phrased so as to mislead under the circumstances.31 The baseline would let the speaker stay silent on the topic. The speaker chose to address it, and that choice makes the speaker answerable for the impression the words leave.
A used-car sale shows the mechanism. A buyer asks how the brakes are, and a seller whose technician reported last week that the brakes were very dangerous and in urgent need of repair answers, “I just had them checked last week.” The statement is factually correct, yet it is more misleading and potentially dangerous than the outright lie “I don’t know,” which might at least induce the buyer to investigate further.32 The half-truth sounds like a reassuring reply to the very question the buyer asked, so the buyer stops looking. It defeats the buyer’s self-help from inside the buyer’s own question, which is why the law treats it as misrepresentation and not as candor about a single fact.
The duty reaches only as far as the correction requires. The speaker must supply the known matter necessary to keep the statement from misleading, not the whole history of the thing sold.33 In Junius Construction Co. v. Cohen, a seller’s disclosure of a lesser risk tacitly implied that no greater risk of the same kind existed: the seller had told the buyer that the city might widen a street bounding the lot, but not that the city had an equal right to open a street that would divide the lot in half.34
Statements need not be spoken. A seller may be liable in deceit for showing a picture of the product performing tasks it cannot safely perform, or for covering a defect with paint or grease so that the product looks safer than it is.35 Accurate words can mislead in the same way. In the situation illustrated by St. Joseph Hospital v. Corbetta Construction Co., paneling had been tested for flammability by Underwriters Laboratories and had failed so badly that it received no flame-spread rating at all. A manufacturer who then tells a prospective buyer that the paneling is “not flame-spread rated” speaks falsely and fraudulently, because the phrase suggests that the paneling has not yet been flame-tested, not that it was tested and failed.36 The buyer needed the test result, and the phrase pointed the buyer away from it.
Residential sales produce the same dispute. In Hill v. Jones, the buyers noticed shortly after the close of escrow that the wood on the steps down to the sunken living room was crumbling. An exterminator confirmed termite damage to the floor, steps, and wood columns, and repairing the floor alone was estimated at about $5,000.37 The question for the court was whether the buyers should have been permitted to present to the jury their claim that the sellers were under a duty to disclose their knowledge of the termite infestation, a question that breaks into two inquiries.38 What the sellers said about the house helps decide which category the claim falls into. Bare silence about termites sits in the baseline, while an answer to a question about the condition of the house can fall here.
An answer can carry liability even where the underlying fact need not be volunteered. In Lerner v. DMB Realty, LLC, a sex offender lived next door to the sellers’ house. When the buyers asked why the sellers were moving, the sellers answered that they wanted to be closer to friends. The court of appeals reversed the dismissal of the buyers’ claim; it noted that the sellers would have had no duty to disclose the neighboring offender, but the answer to the buyers’ question stood differently.39 The duty that bound the sellers came from their decision to answer, not from the fact they left unmentioned.
Conduct and advertising can speak as well. In Kannavos v. Annino, the sellers never disclosed that the building’s multi-family use violated the zoning ordinance.40 The court found that the advertising and the vendors’ conduct and statements in effect represented the property as multi-family housing suitable for investment and continued use as such. Because the vendors did as much as they did, they were bound to do more, and failing to do so made them responsible for misrepresentation.41 A New York court took a comparable view of a seller who had widely publicized his house as haunted: it did not decide whether the ghosts were real, but focused on the seller’s own activities in creating that perception, which impaired the house’s value as an ordinary residence, and on his failure to disclose it to the purchaser, and it permitted rescission.42 The stigma cases below return to this idea.
The two scenes mark the edge of the rule. A “no comment” is the functional equivalent of silence, and silence is not unlawful absent an affirmative duty to disclose.43 The second seller made a partial statement, but about the roof, so the half-truth category supplies no duty to mention the foundation. Any such duty would have to come from another category, most likely facts basic to the transaction, which the next section takes up.
A single principle runs through these settings: a party who owes no duty to volunteer a fact must still tell the whole truth once the party chooses to speak. Absent a duty to speak there is no liability for silence, but one who speaks has a duty to tell the truth and the whole truth.44 In Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., a dance student’s complaint had been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. She alleged that the studio’s praise of her progress led her to buy many further lessons while she in fact progressed little, and the District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed.45
The doctrine also reaches employment references. In Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District, former employers wrote letters praising a vice-principal candidate as dependable and reliable, with a pleasant personality, an administrator who relates well to his students. They did not disclose that he had resigned under pressure over charges of sexual misconduct involving several incidents of touching or molesting female students. After he was hired and committed further misconduct, a victim sued the former employers, and the California Supreme Court held that they owed a duty to the plaintiff and could be liable for misrepresentation.46 The same rule reaches applicants: in Sarvis v. Vermont State Colleges, a résumé that omitted the applicant’s prison term was analyzed as a half-truth.47
Later-Acquired Information
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(c) requires a party to disclose, before the transaction is consummated, subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a previous representation that was true, or believed true, when made.51 The half-truth duty asks what a statement implied when spoken. This duty starts where that inquiry ends: nothing was wrong with the statement when spoken, and something has changed since. The change takes one of two forms. Events may overtake an accurate statement, or the speaker may learn that a statement honestly made was untrue when made.52 Either way, the speaker may be the only person who knows the facts have moved, while the listener, holding a statement that sounded settled, has no reason to ask again.
A dog sale shows the same structure. A seller who tells a prospective buyer that the dog ate well last night has said something accurate. If the dog becomes so sick before the sale that a veterinarian must pump its stomach, the change in circumstances creates a duty to disclose it. Had the dog already been sick when the seller spoke, the same sentence would have been a half-truth from the start, and the duty would have come from the previous category.53
The duty exists because of what the earlier statement did to the listener’s own protection. A buyer who has received the information he sought has no reason to ask a second time, so the earlier statement works as a standing assurance that keeps the buyer’s self-help switched off. Only the speaker knows the assurance has expired, and correcting it costs one sentence, while continued reliance may cost the listener the whole bargain. Silence in that position lets an honest statement operate as a continuing misrepresentation, which is why the duty attaches to the statement itself.
Two kinds of knowledge confine the duty. The clause asks whether the speaker knows that the new information makes the earlier statement untrue or misleading, so a speaker who has not yet learned the new fact, or who does not see how it bears on what was said, has nothing to disclose.54 The usual statements of the rule add a second kind: the speaker must know or believe that the other is still acting on the basis of the original statement.55 One modern formulation puts the duty as arising when the actor has made a prior statement and knows that it will likely mislead another if not amended, even though it was not misleading when made.56 Tying the duty to continuing reliance fits its purpose, which is to stop a stale statement from doing harm. A speaker who knows the other side is still counting on the statement and stays quiet has chosen to let a known false impression continue.
The new fact has to bear on what the speaker said, because a duty to correct is anchored to the speaker’s own earlier words. A general duty to pass along every material fact learned since the last conversation would be the open-ended duty to volunteer that the baseline rejects. The clause reaches only facts that falsify or distort the prior statement. The other duties in this part of the Restatement rest on a relationship or on the nature of the fact; this one rests on what the speaker chose to say, so it can bind two strangers bargaining at arm’s length.
The duty also has an end date. Section 551(2) frames every duty it lists as one owed before the transaction is consummated.57 Disclosure before closing lets the listener renegotiate or walk away. Disclosure after closing cannot undo the decision the stale statement induced, and extending the duty past that point would make every speaker answerable indefinitely for updating every past counterparty. In a home sale, consummation comes at the conveyance, so signing an executory contract does not end the window. One court held that false statements about a roof, made after the purchase agreement was signed but before the deed passed, were still actionable, because the representations came before the conveyance.58 That ruling concerned affirmative misstatements, but it shows that reliance is measured through the conveyance. A speaker who learns the new fact after closing falls outside this clause.
Insurance cases mark the same boundary under another label. Courts sometimes treat an applicant as making a “continuing” representation of the facts submitted until a policy issues. The label is a fiction, because after an application is submitted the applicant usually does no act and makes no communication that can fairly be read as a representation.59
Clause (c) concerns a statement that was true, or believed true, when made. The next duty covers a statement that was false and that the speaker did not expect anyone to act on, where the duty arises only when the speaker later learns that the other side is about to rely on it.60
Imminent Reliance on Old Statements
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(d) addresses a false statement that nobody expected to matter when it was made. A party must disclose the falsity of a representation not made with the expectation that it would be acted upon, if he later learns that the other is about to act in reliance on it in a transaction with him.62 The clause has four working parts: the statement was false, the speaker did not expect reliance when speaking, the speaker afterward learns that the other is about to act on it, and the action in prospect is a transaction with the speaker. The third part carries the most weight, because it is the trigger.
The clause exists to close a gap. Actual fraud reaches anyone whose reliance was highly foreseeable.63 A knowingly false remark made with no expectation that the other would rely on it supports no deceit action when made.64 The baseline would then leave the speaker free to stay silent, since no relationship of trust binds the speaker to the listener. Clause (d) reverses that result at a single moment: when the speaker learns that the old remark has become the foundation for a deal with the speaker.
The parts rest on different reasons. When the speaker made the remark, nothing the speaker knew called for correction, because no one was about to act, and a duty to chase down every careless remark that some listener might someday rely on would have no limit and could not be met. Once the speaker learns that a deal is imminent, the position changes: the speaker is watching a loss that the speaker’s own false words are about to cause, and one sentence of correction prevents it. The duty therefore attaches only when the speaker can prevent the harm and cannot claim surprise at it. The requirement that the reliance occur in a transaction with the speaker describes the speaker who would otherwise close the deal knowingly, on the strength of a belief that the speaker’s own false words planted.
The clause is easiest to keep straight against clause (c). In (c), the speaker made a statement that was true, or believed true, when made, and what the speaker learns later is a new fact about the subject matter, so that an accurate statement goes stale. In (d), the statement was false from the start and the speaker expected no one to act on it, and what the speaker learns later is a fact about the listener: reliance is about to happen. The standard list keeps the two apart. One item covers new information that makes an original statement untrue or misleading; the other covers a knowingly false statement made without expectation of reliance, where the speaker later discovers that the other is about to act on it in a transaction with the speaker.65
The usual error is to treat the listener’s actual reliance as the trigger. The clause is keyed to what the speaker learns, and a duty that turned on facts the speaker had no way to see could never be obeyed.
Timing limits the duty from the other side. Every duty in § 551(2) runs until the transaction is consummated, so the correction must come before closing, while the listener can still renegotiate or walk away.66 The duty also supplies only the representation element of deceit, because a person who stays silent in the face of it is liable as though he had represented the nonexistence of the matter he failed to disclose.67 The plaintiff must still prove every other element of fraudulent misrepresentation.68