Concept
The No-Duty Baseline
Fraudulent concealment, nondisclosure, and damages
The No-Duty Baseline
Active concealment treats hiding as lying. A seller who merely keeps quiet has hidden nothing, and the law meets silence with a different starting rule. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(1), a person who fails to disclose a fact he knows may justifiably induce another to act in a business transaction is liable as though he had represented that the fact did not exist, "if, but only if," he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose it.1 The rule does two things. It lets silence satisfy the representation element of deceit, so that nondisclosure can be treated like a spoken falsehood. It also confines that extension to cases in which a recognized duty exists, so that knowing a fact the other side lacks creates no liability by itself. Duty is therefore the first question on any nondisclosure problem, and the sections that follow catalog the situations in which a duty exists.
The baseline descends from caveat emptor. Traditionally, parties on opposite sides of a business deal owed each other no duty to disclose even essential facts: so long as no one made a statement or assertion, one party could stand silent, knowing the other was ignorant of facts that would significantly alter the bargain, and consciously take advantage of that ignorance.2 Laidlaw v. Organ is the classic illustration: a buyer who knew news that would raise the value of the goods was not required to share it with the seller. Courts trace the rule to the old distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. The individualistic common law punished affirmative acts of harm but shrank from converting the courts into an institution for forcing people to help one another, and liability for inaction was slow to win recognition.3
The baseline turns on the difference between honesty and candor: the law requires the first but not necessarily the second. A misrepresentation is an assertion that does not accord with the facts, and nondisclosure amounts to one only when some legal basis imposes a duty to disclose the fact in question.4 A party who answers a question must therefore answer truthfully, while a party who stays silent or declines to answer has asserted nothing false. A false answer is the stuff of actual fraud, where liability extends to anyone whose reliance was highly foreseeable.5
Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank carried the baseline into an ordinary home sale. The complaint alleged no false statement and no half-truth tantamount to a falsehood. It did not claim that the seller kept the buyer from learning the condition of the house, or that any fiduciary relation or position of confidence and dependence tied the parties together. The parties had made a business deal at arm's length, and the charge was concealment "in the simple sense of mere failure to reveal," with nothing to show "any peculiar duty to speak."6 The case is the mirror image of the active-concealment cases. Because the seller did nothing to hide the defect, the buyer had only the silence to point to, and silence alone did not suffice.
The court's reasoning cuts both ways. If this seller were liable, every seller would be liable for failing to disclose a nonapparent defect, and every buyer would be liable for failing to disclose a nonapparent virtue of which the seller was ignorant. The law, the court believed, had not yet reached the point of imposing on the frailties of human nature "a standard so idealistic as this."7
Other justifications are practical. One dissenting judge warned that liability for a seller's nondisclosure of a property's condition is the first step toward making the seller a guarantor of that condition, and called the change unnecessary: prudent purchasers inspect with expert advice, prudent lenders require inspections, and a buyer can make an earnest-money deposit conditional on favorable inspection results.8 A further reason is economic. Knowledge gained through research, training, and experience pays off only if its owner may profit from it. Dealers in antiques and rare coins, for example, trade on their expertise and are not expected to disclose every element of their evaluations, and the expense of acquiring that expertise would not be justified if it yielded no bargaining advantage.9 The incentive rationale protects knowledge bought with effort; it does less work for a defect a seller learned simply by owning the house.
The same baseline protects buyers who hold information. In Guaranty Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Liebold, a trust company procured an option on land to provide a site for a steel mill, and the court held that it had no duty to disclose.10 Outside property law, Chiarella v. United States rests on the same principle. Section 10(b) is a catchall provision, the Court explained, but what it catches must be fraud, and when an allegation of fraud rests on nondisclosure "there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak." A duty to disclose does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information.11
Step three is where the exceptions live, and they sort cases by relationship and circumstance. A duty to disclose is recognized where the parties stand in a relationship of trust and confidence. It also arises when a statement made in good faith stops being true because of supervening events, or when the speaker later learns it was untrue when made, and the speaker knows the other is relying on it. A party who becomes aware that the other is operating under a mistake about a basic assumption of the negotiations must correct it even if that party did not cause it, and numerous cases hold that sellers of goods, lands, or securities must disclose latent defects.13 Supervening change is a particular risk in long-term contracts, where circumstances can shift after signing in ways the parties did not anticipate.14 Tort law elsewhere also ties the existence and degree of a duty to the character of the relationship: California held a roller-coaster operator to the higher duty of a common carrier but not a bumper-car operator, whose patrons keep independent control of the cars.15
Home sales show how far those exceptions have reached. A court asked whether buyers could put to a jury their claim that sellers owed a duty to disclose known termite infestation treated the dispute, first of all, as a question about duty.16 In Johnson v. Davis, the Florida Supreme Court held that a home seller who knows of facts materially affecting value that are not readily observable and are unknown to the buyer must disclose them, and that the duty applies to all forms of real property, new and used.17 Only a minority of jurisdictions still follow caveat emptor, under which a seller owes no duty to disclose either patent or latent defects absent a special fiduciary relationship. Even there, a seller who affirmatively misrepresents or actively conceals remains liable, so the buyer may still sue for fraudulent misrepresentation.18 These developments are exceptions built on the baseline, and the next sections take them up one category at a time. A student who jumps straight to whether the silence was unfair has skipped the element on which the claim depends.