Concept
Causation Requirements
Justifiable reliance, materiality, and causation
Causation Requirements
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 546 states the liability rule in a single sentence: the maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability for pecuniary loss suffered by one who justifiably relies upon the truth of the matter misrepresented, if the reliance is a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct that results in the loss.1 The earlier sections of this chapter worked on the first half of that sentence. They asked whether the plaintiff actually relied and whether the law will protect the reliance, a protection that does not always demand reasonable care, since negligent reliance sometimes is justifiable and sometimes is not.2 The closing clause poses a different question: whether that reliance connects to the loss the plaintiff is suing over.
Labels vary from court to court. Some courts condense the elements of deceit into three, four, five, or six, combining two separate elements into one called “justifiable reliance,” while others splinter them into as many as eleven.3 The screens in this section apply wherever a court places them in its list.
In the ordinary case, reliance is how a lie becomes a loss. A misrepresentation normally must induce the plaintiff to enter a transaction, or sometimes to avoid one, as where it induces the plaintiff to keep shares of stock rather than sell them.4 That is why proof of reliance so often settles causation too. But the link can break. A long-time smoker keeps smoking because he believes a manufacturer’s fraudulent advertisements, and he dies of lung cancer soon after first seeing them. He relied, and he was harmed, yet the cancer reflects years of smoking that came before the advertisements, so his reliance probably did not produce his death.
Three rules test the link between lie and loss at three points. Section 546 asks how much the statement moved the plaintiff’s decision, and a statement that played only a trivial part does not carry the liability. Section 548 asks what the plaintiff relied on, and it excuses the maker when the plaintiff acted on the expectation of collecting damages for the falsity rather than on the truth of the statement.5 Section 548A asks where the loss came from, and it limits recovery to losses that might reasonably be expected to result from the reliance.6 Each rule closes a different gap: the lie never moved the decision, the plaintiff was positioned for litigation and was not deceived, or the harm arrived by a route that reliance could not reasonably be expected to open.
Reliance as Substantial Factor
The substantial-factor requirement measures how heavily a false statement must weigh in the plaintiff’s decision. A plaintiff can hold a justified belief and still lose here, because a belief that never moved the decision does not explain the loss.
The Restatement’s commentary on § 546 sets a generous standard. The plaintiff’s reliance need not be the sole factor in the decision, or even the predominant or decisive one, and the plaintiff need not show that he would have acted differently had he not relied. It is enough that the representation played a substantial part in influencing his decision.7
People rarely act on one piece of information. A buyer weighs price, appearance, a friend’s advice, and the seller’s assurances together, and a rule that demanded the lie be the only reason would let every defendant escape by pointing to a second one. So the commentary treats it as immaterial that the plaintiff was also influenced by other considerations, such as similar misrepresentations from third persons, if he was also substantially influenced by the misrepresentation in question.8 The defendant gains nothing by showing that the plaintiff had other reasons. The question is whether the statement was among the reasons that mattered.
“Substantial” also sets a floor. The working question is whether the plaintiff accorded the defendant’s statement any substantial weight in arriving at a decision, and that question is ordinarily for the jury.9 A misrepresentation about an unimportant aspect of a transaction is less likely to have induced the decision, which is why materiality and this requirement travel together.10 A plaintiff who admits that nearly the whole decision rested on his own research, and that the defendant’s remark carried only trivial weight, has not shown that the remark played a substantial part. Nor does a plaintiff do better when he had settled on the course before hearing the statement. A buyer who planned to demolish a warehouse whatever its condition cannot say the seller’s false assurance about the foundation influenced the purchase, because the statement induced nothing.11
Contract law offers a different tool for escaping a commitment: it lets parties avoid even bargained-for commitments by manifesting an intention not to be legally bound.12 That doctrine concerns intent to be bound, so it does not measure how much a false statement weighed in a decision and does not substitute for the inquiry here.
The plaintiff’s own investigation is the most common competing influence. Section 547 states the basic proposition: a plaintiff who relied solely on his own investigation and not on the defendant’s representation has not relied in fact on the statement, and without actual reliance the plaintiff loses.13 The commentary draws the line carefully. Only the plaintiff who relies upon his investigation and does not rely upon the false statement is barred. Whether he relied on one, the other, or both in substantial part is a question of fact for the jury unless the evidence clearly indicates one conclusion, and an investigation whose results tend to confirm the representation but remain somewhat inconclusive may leave the plaintiff relying on both.14
Judge Learned Hand’s remark that “reliance and verification are incompatible” marks the clear end of the range.15 A plaintiff who tests a claim and acts on what the test showed has replaced the statement with the verification. The remark fits an investigation that settles the question. It fits poorly when the investigation leaves doubt, because the statement then still helps close the gap. Some authorities go further and would bar a plaintiff who made any investigation at all, even one that appeared to confirm the defendant’s statements.16 A jurisdiction’s treatment of confirming investigations is therefore worth checking before an answer commits to the Restatement position.
Reliance on Expected Liability
Section 548 addresses a plaintiff whose decision rested on something other than belief. The maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is not liable to one who does not rely upon its truth but upon the expectation that the maker will be held liable in damages for its falsity.18 Where § 546 asks how much weight the statement carried in the decision, this rule asks what that weight consisted of. A statement can enter a decision as a reason to think the facts are so, which is reliance on its truth, or as a ticket to a lawsuit, which is reliance on the prospect of collecting from the speaker once the falsity is proved. Only the first connects the lie to the loss the way the tort requires.
The rule follows from the reliance element itself. The plaintiff must rely on the misrepresentation in acting or refraining from action,19 and a plaintiff who knows the statement is false has no belief for the lie to have produced. His decision to go ahead rests on a forecast about litigation, so the loss comes from his own wager and not from the lie. Without the rule, a false statement would become a free option: a buyer who recognized a bad deal could take it anyway, hold the seller’s falsehood in reserve, and collect whenever the deal soured. The defendant would insure a risk the plaintiff knowingly accepted.
The two buyers heard the same words, bought the same van, and sued over the same damage. What separates them is what each believed when buying. The second buyer must still clear the other elements, including justifiable reliance, materiality, and the substantial-factor test of § 546.
The first buyer’s facts also show how this rule works alongside the known-falsity rule: a recipient who knows that a statement is false, or to whom its falsity is obvious, is not justified in relying on its truth.20 Section 548 reaches the plaintiff who goes ahead anyway in the hope of damages.
Students most often misapply this rule by reading it too broadly. A plaintiff who later sues has not thereby relied on expected liability, because nearly every plaintiff expects to recover once suing. A plaintiff who could have discovered the falsity but believed the statement did not rely on expected liability either. The rule applies only on facts showing that the plaintiff did not believe the statement when acting, such as the first buyer’s discovery of the welds, his conclusion that the dealer had lied, and his decision to buy with a lawsuit in mind.
Foreseeable Loss as Legal Cause
Section 548A supplies the last causal screen: a fraudulent misrepresentation is a legal cause of a pecuniary loss resulting from action or inaction in reliance upon it if, but only if, the loss might reasonably be expected to result from the reliance.22 Legal cause is the connection the law treats as close enough to hold a defendant answerable, a stricter idea than the bare fact that one event came before another. The first two rules checked earlier links in the chain. Section 546 asked whether the statement was a substantial factor in the plaintiff’s decision, and § 548 asked whether the plaintiff acted on the statement’s truth or on the prospect of a lawsuit. Section 548A looks at the far end, where the decision produced a loss, and asks whether that loss may be charged to the maker. Because the rule says “if, but only if,” a plaintiff who has proved reliance in fact, justifiability, and substantial influence still recovers only for losses that the reliance might reasonably be expected to bring about.
The limit is needed because reliance, once proved, can lead almost anywhere. Every decision sets off further events, and without a stopping point the maker of a lie would answer for every consequence that followed, however remote from anything the lie concerned. Courts sometimes describe the same limit as proximate cause measured by reasonable foreseeability, as the Oregon Supreme Court did in Knepper v. Brown.
The screen turns on the risk the lie created. A false statement about an engine’s condition creates a risk that the hearer will buy and drive an engine that fails. Losses that grow out of that risk fall within it, and losses that merely coincide with the purchase do not.
The smoker from the opening of this section shows the gap between reliance and legal cause. He believed the advertisements and kept smoking because of them, yet the illness had been building through years of smoking before he saw them, so the loss did not come by a route his reliance opened. Reliance shows that the statement moved a decision. Section 548A asks whether the plaintiff can tie the particular loss to that decision.
The two losses in that scene share a plaintiff, a lie, and an act of reliance. They separate on whether the loss grew out of the risk the statement created. A loss can follow the purchase in time and still fall outside this screen.
Students commonly treat proof of reliance as proof that every later loss belongs to the defendant, which skips § 548A altogether.