Concept
Law, Prediction, and Intention
Justifiable reliance, materiality, and causation
Law, Prediction, and Intention
Statements of law, predictions of the future, and statements of the speaker's own intention each look, at first, as though they fall outside the category of fact. A rule of law is not something anyone can observe, the future has not yet happened, and an intention lives inside the speaker's head. Statements of law were once commonly dismissed as mere opinion, and predictions of the future are notoriously unreliable.1
The modern analysis asks what the statement actually asserts. A misrepresentation is an assertion that is not in accord with the facts; it may be intentional, negligent, or wholly innocent, and fraud usually adds scienter, an intention to deceive and induce reliance.2 For statements of law and for predictions, the question is therefore whether the statement asserts, expressly or by implication, a fact that can be out of accord with reality. Section 539(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts supplies the mechanism: an opinion about facts the recipient has not been told and does not otherwise know may reasonably be read as implying either that the facts known to the maker are not incompatible with the opinion or that the maker knows facts sufficient to justify it.3 Statements of intention follow a rule of their own, § 544, which the last subsection takes up.
Statements of Law
Courts once held that a statement about the law, made by someone other than a lawyer, was mere opinion on which no reliance could be placed; only representations about the law of a foreign state were treated as statements of fact.4 Some courts defended the rule with the fiction that everyone is presumed to know the law. The working rationale was different: each party must determine the law for himself as best he can and may not rely on what the other party to the transaction says it is.5
Courts now treat statements of law like other assertions, so that a statement may be opinion or fact depending on its form and circumstances.6 A statement that a statute has been repealed, for example, may be deemed a statement of fact.7 The old rationale also fits poorly when the speaker knows more law than the listener. A lawyer speaking to a client or an insurance agent speaking to a customer is frequently better placed to know the law, and that inequality of competence is a ground for giving relief, even though some decisions have held a misrepresentation of law innocuous.8
The opinion rules supply the working vocabulary for what remains. Section 538A treats a representation as one of opinion when it expresses only the maker's belief, without certainty, as to the existence of a fact,9 or the maker's judgment as to quality, value, authenticity, or another matter of judgment.10 The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation solely of the maker's opinion is not justified in relying on it in a transaction with the maker unless the fact is material and the maker purports to have special knowledge the recipient lacks, stands in a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence to the recipient, has successfully endeavored to secure the recipient's confidence, or has some other special reason to expect reliance (§ 542).11 A legal statement that is pure opinion therefore meets the same hurdle as any other opinion.
Most legal statements, however, are not pure opinion, because they carry facts with them. A statement of law may expressly or impliedly contain representations of fact on which the listener may rely.12 An assertion that a corporation has the legal right to do business in a state may in a proper case be taken as a representation that all necessary steps have been taken to qualify it there, and reliance on that fact may be justified.13 The mechanism is the one in § 539(1). A listener who cannot see the qualification papers takes the legal conclusion as a summary of facts the speaker knows, and a speaker who lacks those facts, or knows facts incompatible with the conclusion, has misreported something that can be checked.14
The two buyers part ways at the limit § 539(1) places on the implication, which reaches only facts “not disclosed and not otherwise known to the recipient.”15 The first buyer's gap in knowledge gave the statement something to fill, and the second buyer's survey closed it. Her survey also raises a reliance question that the investigation sections develop. A plaintiff who relies on her own investigation and not on the false statement cannot recover, but whether she relied on one, on the other, or substantially on both is a question of fact for the jury unless the evidence clearly indicates only one conclusion.16 An investigation whose results tend to confirm the statement without settling the matter may support a finding that she relied on both.17
Reliance on a legal opinion can be justified without any implied fact when the speaker purports to have superior knowledge of the law. That is the special-knowledge route of § 542 applied to legal subject matter, and the relationship-of-trust route applies the same way.18 A client who relies on a lawyer's account of what a contract clause requires has handed the checking to someone better equipped to do it, and the inequality of competence is what justifies relief.19 Attorney-client, principal-agent, insurer-insured, and similar relationships of trust and confidence are among those that support reliance on an opinion, as they do in the law of nondisclosure.20
At the other pole stands the speaker with no claim to special knowledge who offers a bare legal conclusion that implies no fact. The old rationale retains its force there: the listener must determine the law for himself as best he can and may not rely on what the other party says it is.21 Nothing in § 542 helps the listener, because the speaker claims no special knowledge, owes no trust, and has no other special reason to expect reliance.22 A counterparty without legal training who predicts that a court will hold a statute unenforceable is in this position. The statement forecasts what judges will do, so it is a prediction, and the next subsection treats predictions the same way.
Justifiable reliance is not a negligence test. The plaintiff's conduct need not conform to the standard of the reasonable person, and some negligent reliance will be justified although some will not.23 A listener who might have looked up the statute is therefore not barred for that reason alone; the question remains whether reliance on these words from this speaker was justifiable. The usual exam error is to recite that no one may rely on a statement of law, or to assume that the label law makes a statement fact. The answer depends on what the words assert, what facts they imply, and who said them.
Predictions of the Future
Predictions of the future are notoriously unreliable, and they will not support an action for misrepresentation even when the speaker made them disingenuously.25 The rule rests on that unreliability, which is why a speaker's private doubt does not change the result. A forecast that fails shows only that it was wrong, and a forecast the speaker never believed was still only a forecast.
A prediction nonetheless carries an implied representation that the speaker knows no facts presently existing that are inconsistent with the predicted fact. As with other opinions, that implied representation, if false, may be actionable when the speaker purports to have special knowledge of, or access to, those present facts.26 The mechanism is the one in § 539(1), under which a listener who cannot see the facts behind an opinion may read it as a report about what the speaker knows.27 The special-knowledge qualifier comes from § 542, which permits reliance on an opinion when the maker purports to have special knowledge the recipient lacks.28
The words “bound to rise” appear in both pitches. What differs is the second dealer's claim to know the present facts behind the forecast, which turned a guess into a false statement about what stood behind it. Even the second client has not yet proved a complete case. Fraud usually requires scienter, an intention to deceive and induce reliance,29 and the misrepresentation must induce the client to act, which may mean buying or may mean retaining shares rather than selling them.30 The usual exam error is to stop at the label prediction and deny the claim, or to ask only whether the speaker believed her own forecast. The better inquiry is what present facts the forecast impliedly asserted and whether the speaker held herself out as knowing them.
Statements of Intention
A speaker's statement about what he himself intends to do differs from a forecast of events he cannot control, because it describes something he holds at the moment he speaks. Section 544 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts treats a fraudulent misrepresentation of intention as one on which the recipient may justifiably rely if two conditions hold: the existence of the intention is material, and the recipient has reason to believe that it will be carried out.32
Each condition screens out a different case. Materiality asks whether the intention could have figured in this recipient's decision, as the earlier materiality sections explain. The second condition asks whether anything the recipient knew or saw should have undercut the speaker's word. A recipient who satisfies both conditions relies justifiably, though the plaintiff must still prove that the reliance occurred in fact.33
The buyer's words and the buyer's plan are identical for both sellers. What differs is what each seller knew, which is exactly what the second condition asks. Meeting § 544 settles only whether reliance on the statement was justifiable. The traditional tort of deceit required an intentional misrepresentation as well as certain other elements,34 so the plaintiff still has the remaining elements to prove. The usual exam error is to treat every false statement of purpose as actionable, when the first questions are whether the intention mattered to this recipient and whether anything gave her reason to doubt it.