Concept
Opinion and Puffery
Justifiable reliance, materiality, and causation
Opinion and Puffery
A plaintiff who believed a seller’s opinion and acted on it has shown reliance in fact. The harder question is whether the law will call that reliance justifiable. Section 542 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts answers with a presumption against the plaintiff and a short list of exceptions. The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation solely of the maker’s opinion is not justified in relying on it in a transaction with the maker, unless the fact to which the opinion relates is material and the maker falls into one of four situations that give the recipient special reason to trust the maker’s judgment.1
Courts often compress this structure into a slogan: opinions are not actionable. On that view a misrepresentation claim lies only for a misstatement of past or existing fact, and opinion, prediction, and puffery (exaggerated sales praise that no one is expected to take literally) fall outside it. The slogan misleads, because the recognized exceptions swallow much of it. Courts impose liability for false and material opinions given by fiduciaries, by experts or disinterested persons on whom the plaintiff can justifiably rely, and by those with special knowledge, and also when the opinion implies material facts.2 The Restatement writes the same exceptions into its text. An opinion about facts the recipient does not know may reasonably be read as implying that the maker knows facts sufficient to justify it.3 A recipient may justifiably rely on an opinion from a maker who holds one of the four positions of special trust,4 or from a person the recipient reasonably believes to be disinterested.5
The exceptions make sense once the opinion rule is seen as shorthand for three separate ideas. First, reliance on an opinion is often unjustified, because a listener who knows that the speaker is giving a view, not reporting a fact, has little reason to treat it as settled. Second, the speaker may not have broken the rules of the bargaining game: a buyer who announces that $250 is his top price is understood to be taking a step toward $300, not asserting a literal fact. Third, most opinions cannot be proved false except in extreme cases, so a speaker who set out to persuade has not necessarily set out to deceive about anything checkable.6 Each idea depends on how much each party knows and how the parties stand toward each other. Those facts vary from case to case, so the rule works as a guide to justifiable reliance and culpability, and it fails as a bright line except in extreme cases.7
Work every opinion problem through three questions, in this order:
- Is the statement opinion at all, and if so, is it puffery, the extreme of opinion on which no one may justifiably rely? A statement that asserts a fact never meets the opinion rule.
- Does an opinion that survives classification imply a fact the recipient could not see?
- Does the maker’s position—special knowledge, a relation of trust, or apparent disinterest—make reliance on the pure opinion justifiable?
The subsections below take the questions in that order.
Defining Opinion
Section 538A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the category on which the rest of this part depends. A representation is one of opinion if it expresses only the maker’s belief, without certainty, about the existence of a fact, or the maker’s judgment about quality, value, authenticity, or other matters of judgment.8 Two kinds of statement qualify. One is a hedged claim about a fact, in which the speaker thinks something is so but does not vouch for it. The other is an evaluation, in which the speaker reports no fact and instead rates something: how good it is, what it is worth, whether it is genuine. The definition turns on the word only. A statement that does more than voice a belief or a judgment, such as one that also asserts or implies something checkable, is not pure opinion, and § 542 likewise governs a misrepresentation that is solely of the maker’s opinion.9
The label matters because relief is usually withheld once it applies. Opinions can be true or false, and a speaker who claims a belief he does not hold lies as surely as any other liar. But reliance on another party’s opinion is usually regarded as unjustifiable as a matter of law, and commercial custom favors relying on the other side’s statements of fact while forming one’s own opinions from them.10 That is the justifiable-reliance requirement of § 537(b) applied to one kind of statement. It fits the three reasons given above: a listener who knows a view is only a view has little right to treat it as settled, bargaining talk runs ahead of literal truth, and most opinions can be proved false only in extreme cases.11 Each reason assumes that the statement really is opinion, which is why classification comes first.
In Byers v. Federal Land Co., real estate brokers told a buyer that grazing land was worth $35 an acre and was cheap at that price.12 Nothing suggested that the brokers had seen the land or had special knowledge of it, the buyer had announced no special reliance on their statement, and no one tried to prove that the brokers did not honestly believe their figure. The court treated the statement as opinion and held that the buyer could not be heard to say he had relied on it. The reasoning turned on the kind of property. Land in a grazing region, unreliable for crops without irrigation, had a speculative value that no definite figure could capture, and a purchaser of such land understands that a statement of its value is an opinion even when the speaker does not call it one. A statement of value for property with a generally accepted market price, such as government bonds, grain, or cattle, may by contrast be a statement of fact, because the figure can be checked against the market.13
A firm statement about a home’s square footage sits at the other pole. In Bowman v. Presley the Oklahoma court recognized that such a statement can serve as a positive assurance on which a buyer may rely without independently determining whether the figure is true.14 A square-footage figure reports a measurement that can be verified, so it asserts a fact in a way that a rating or an estimate does not. Generalized praise falls on the Byers side of the line: a seller who calls a house a great house expresses a judgment about quality, which § 538A(b) treats as opinion.15 Courts can carry that label a long way. In Ray v. Montgomery, the Alabama Supreme Court held that statements that a house was supported by hewn pine timbers, had good support, was solid, and was in good condition were opinion and could not be fraud, even though the seller knew of termite damage.16 The result is open to question, and a later Alabama decision, Cooper & Co. v. Lester, allowed an opinion to support a fraud claim when actual fraudulent intent was proven, a point the discussion of state of mind below explains.17
Because the question is what a statement conveys in context, the speaker’s phrasing does not settle it. The brokers in Byers gave their figure with no phrase marking it as a personal view, and the court still read it as opinion because of the kind of property involved.18 The reverse also happens: a statement framed as a view can carry an implied claim of fact. An opinion about facts the listener does not know may reasonably be read as implying that the speaker knows facts sufficient to justify it, or that the facts the speaker knows are not incompatible with it, a point developed below.19 An opinion is shorthand that sums up underlying facts, so a speaker who has access to those facts and sums them up for a listener who lacks that access may convey more than a view.20 Courts therefore decide the label by asking what the words convey in the circumstances, and when reasonable people could read the statement either way, the question goes to the jury.21 The usual exam error is to let a phrase such as I think or in my opinion decide the issue, or to stop at the label opinion without asking whether the statement implies a fact.
The definition also keeps the opinion label from shielding dishonesty. An opinion is itself a fact about what the speaker believes, so a speaker who professes a view he does not hold misstates his own state of mind. Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, a statement of opinion amounts to a misrepresentation of fact when the speaker misrepresented his state of mind by claiming an opinion he did not hold.22 The Byers court said the same: an opinion stated as such may be a misrepresentation if it is not the speaker’s real opinion, and the buyer lost in part because no one tried to prove that the brokers did not honestly believe their figure.23 A false professed belief does not win the case by itself, however, because the plaintiff must still show justifiable reliance on a statement that most buyers may not treat as a basis for action. The routes to that justification run through implied facts, special knowledge, and disinterested opinion.
Puffery and Sales Talk
Puffery is the loose, favorable talk a seller uses to commend what he sells. The comment to § 542 describes it as praise offered in general terms, “without specific content or reference to facts,” which buyers are expected to understand they may not take literally.25 The Third Restatement gives a compact definition: a seller’s broad and predictably exaggerated statements about the quality of an item, as distinct from particular claims of fact.26 Puffery is the judgment-about-quality kind of opinion, pushed to the point where nobody means it as a report of anything. Section 542 therefore supplies the baseline for puffery as for any opinion: a recipient defrauded solely by the maker’s opinion is not justified in relying on it unless the matter is material and the maker stands in one of the four positions of special trust.27
The law withholds relief because of how bargaining works. Every buyer knows that a seller will speak well of what he sells, so a buyer who hears “best value in town” has learned nothing checkable about the goods and has no ground for treating the words as a commitment. Because the discounting is built into the transaction, the consequences fall on the reliance side of the tort. A reasonable person gives no weight to predictable exaggeration when deciding what to do, so the matter is not material, and a listener who is expected to discount such talk has no right to credit it, so reliance is not justifiable.28 The seller’s state of mind is beside the point. A seller who knows the house is falling apart and calls it magnificent has lied, but the lie lands where no one was entitled to believe it. The practical effect is a limited privilege to be extravagant, so long as the seller says nothing specific.29 The privilege ends where specificity begins, because a buyer can credit a concrete claim that can be checked, and the convention of discounting no longer explains it away.
The sorting question follows directly from that reason: could the words be proved true or false? In American Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co. the Eighth Circuit treated puffery and statements of fact as mutually exclusive. A statement that is a specific, measurable claim, or that can reasonably be read as a factual claim capable of verification, is fact; a statement that is neither specific nor measurable and supplies no benchmark for judging its truth is puffery.30 The test works from the words themselves, which spares the court from deciding how credulous the particular plaintiff was. Two contrasting examples show it at work. A seller who tells a buyer that a fifty-year-old house is in perfect condition and strong enough to stand up in a tornado is engaged in the kind of puffing that people in negotiation learn to discount. A credit applicant who overstates the money in his bank account stands elsewhere on the line, because a precise assertion made where exaggeration is not to be expected is not mere puffing and may be relied upon.31
The presence of a benchmark decided the two scenes. “Gem” and “fortress” invite no measurement; a replacement date can be checked against records, just as the credit applicant’s balance could be checked against the bank’s.
The line is hardest to hold when praise and checkable claims arrive together, and Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America shows why courts do not apply the puffery label by reflex. A leasing agent negotiating a restaurant lease told the prospective tenants that they were lucky to get the space because the building was practically new and problem-free, that the prior tenant had experienced no problems with it, and that it was a perfect restaurant site. The tenants later ended the lease because of a persistent sewer gas odor that had also troubled the previous tenant.32 The landlord argued that the statements were opinion. The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that they were actionable material misrepresentations as a matter of law and that legally sufficient evidence showed they were known to be false when made.33 The word “perfect” is the same vocabulary as the tornado-proof house, and a mechanical use of the label could have swallowed it. What the case puts beside the adjectives is the landlord’s own agent, positioned to know, asserting that the prior tenant had experienced no problems. Those assertions concern particular facts about the premises that a trial can test, so the usual error of stopping at the label “sales talk” overlooks the checkable claims inside the pitch.
Special knowledge does not rescue puffery. The special-knowledge exception exists because a buyer who lacks the competence to judge a matter may rely on the honest judgment of a speaker who has it, but that reasoning has nothing to work on when the statement is general praise that even an informed listener discounts. The Fifth Circuit in Presidio read the Restatement comments to mean that the exception does not apply where the opinion relied on is clearly a salesman’s puffery.34 The comment’s own jeweler illustration carries the same limit. A customer who cannot judge gems may rely on a jeweler’s statement of a diamond’s value, but only after making allowance for the natural tendency of a vendor to praise his wares.35 The sections below take up when a speaker’s expertise or position of trust does support reliance on an opinion that is not mere sales talk.
Opinions That Imply Facts
Section 539(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts qualifies the opinion rule developed in the last two sections. A statement of opinion about facts that have not been disclosed to the recipient, and that the recipient does not otherwise know, may, if it is reasonable to do so, be taken as an implied statement of one of two things: that the facts known to the maker are not incompatible with the opinion, or that the maker knows facts sufficient to justify forming it.37 The statement is still opinion in form, and § 538A still classifies it that way. What changes is where the falsehood sits: the claim rests on the message the opinion carries about the speaker’s knowledge, not on the opinion as such. The Third Restatement says the same. An opinion may falsely imply that its holder knows of no material facts to the contrary, and liability attaches to that false implication, not to the opinion or prediction in itself.38
The reason for the rule lies in what an opinion is. An opinion is a compressed summary of underlying facts, and a listener who hears only the conclusion cannot see the facts it compresses. A buyer discounts a seller’s enthusiasm, since vendors are known to exaggerate, but the buyer is still entitled to assume that even a vendor’s opinion has some basis in fact and that the vendor knows nothing that would make it fantastic.39 That assumption is the unspoken message, and it is a fact about what the maker knows, which can be true or false like any other. A seller who knows the roof is rotted and calls it sound has told the buyer something false about the seller’s own knowledge, whatever phrase introduced the sentence. The usual grounds for the general opinion rule are that listeners discount views, that bargaining talk runs ahead of literal truth, and that most opinions cannot be proved false. Those grounds lose force against a hidden message that is specific and checkable, which is why courts count opinions that imply material facts among the recognized exceptions.40
The two implied messages differ in strength. The first, that the maker knows nothing incompatible with the opinion, is the thinner one, because it asserts only the absence of known contrary facts. The second, that the maker knows facts sufficient to justify the opinion, asserts a positive basis. Which message a listener may take depends on the words and the setting, and the phrase “if it is reasonable to do so” writes that limit into § 539(1).41 A recipient cannot attribute just any message to the speaker. The reading has to be one that a person in the recipient’s position would sensibly draw, given the subject, the speaker’s role, and what the recipient already knew.
In Briggs v. Carol Cars, Inc. an uninformed buyer purchased a used Plymouth from a dealer in used vehicles, and the dealer represented that the car was in good condition. The Massachusetts court recognized that a statement that is opinion in form may in some circumstances reasonably be understood to imply that its maker knows facts justifying the opinion, and it found those circumstances present. A dealer’s assurance of good condition, given to a buyer with no knowledge of cars, reasonably implied that the vehicle was safe and operable and that its oil requirements would be far lower than they turned out to be, so the court rejected the argument that the statement was not one of fact.42 Two circumstances carried the result: the buyer lacked the information to judge the car, and the dealer was in the business of selling such vehicles. “Good condition” expresses a judgment about quality, which § 538A(b) treats as opinion, so the case marks the difference from the puffery cases above. Praise such as “a real gem” implies nothing a buyer could check, while a dealer’s report of good condition implies concrete things about whether the car will run.
The qualifying language of § 539(1) marks the boundary of the doctrine, because the opinion must concern facts “not disclosed and not otherwise known to the recipient.”43 The implied message exists to fill a gap in what the recipient knows, so a recipient who already holds the facts leaves nothing for the opinion to imply.
The words were identical in the two scenes. The answers differ because of what each buyer already knew, and a plaintiff in the second buyer’s position has no hidden message to rely on, so any claim would have to rest on some other statement.
Section 539(2) adds a factor that bears on whether the implied-fact reading is reasonable: the recipient’s belief about whether the maker has an adverse interest in the transaction is important.44 An interested speaker has a reason to color what is said, while a disinterested speaker has no apparent reason to exaggerate the facts on which the opinion rests and of which the recipient knows nothing.45 A recipient who regards the speaker as an independent appraiser can therefore more readily take the opinion as backed by facts, while a recipient who regards the speaker as the other side of the bargain reads the opinion with more caution. The factor is one input into reasonableness and does not bar the implication. The dealer in Briggs was selling the car, yet the implication of good condition was still reasonable, and the thin message that the vendor knows nothing making the opinion fantastic survives even against an adverse speaker. A recipient may also justifiably rely on a misrepresentation of fact although believing the maker to have an adverse interest, a rule that a later section on adverse parties develops.46
Showing an implied fact does not finish the claim, because the implied fact must itself be false, and for fraud the maker must have known it was false.47 The implied fact must also concern a material matter, and the recipient’s reliance on it must be actual and justifiable. The usual exam error is to stop at the label opinion and conclude that no claim exists, or to stop at the observation that the opinion was untrue and conclude that one does. The analysis has to run through the implication.
Special Knowledge and Trust
Section 542 supplies a second route to liability for false opinion, and it works differently from the implied-fact route. The statement stays a pure opinion; the inquiry shifts to who gave it and what position that person held. A recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation solely of the maker’s opinion is not justified in relying on it in a transaction with the maker, unless the fact to which the opinion relates is material and the maker occupies one of four positions that give the recipient special reason for trust.49 The default is the arm’s-length rule applied in the earlier sections, and the four positions are the circumstances in which it gives way.
The default makes sense because of how an arm’s-length bargain is structured. Each side is expected to form its own judgment from the facts the other supplies, so an opposing party’s view of quality or value is one more bargaining position, to be weighed and discounted. The comment to § 542 carries that expectation to its limit: a party who is less astute than the other has no claim to rely on the other’s judgment, even when the less astute party knows that the other is somewhat more conversant with the value and quality of the thing being bargained over.50 The default yields where its premise fails. An opinion condenses a group of underlying facts into a conclusion, and when the maker holds those facts and the recipient cannot readily get them, relying on the conclusion is cheaper and more sensible than rebuilding it from scratch.51 For the expert case, the Third Restatement explains that the law protects such reliance by imposing liability when the opinion is falsely stated and offered to give the recipient a basis for reliance.52 The four routes in § 542 therefore describe one situation seen from different angles: a recipient who cannot readily verify the matter and who has reason to defer to the maker.
The four positions are these, as § 542 states them:53
- The maker purports to have special knowledge of the matter that the recipient does not have.
- The maker stands in a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence to the recipient.
- The maker has successfully endeavored to secure the confidence of the recipient.
- The maker has some other special reason to expect that the recipient will rely on the opinion.
The first route applies when the maker claims command of a subject that the recipient lacks. The comment to § 542 observes that modern commercial and financial life has created many situations in which special experience and training are needed to form a valuable judgment, and that a party without them may rely on the honesty of the opinion of one who has them or purports to have them, giving the opinion the weight that superior competence warrants.54 Its illustration is the jeweler. An ordinary customer cannot judge the quality or value of gems, so the customer may rely on the jeweler’s statement that a diamond is of the first water and, after allowing for a vendor’s natural tendency to praise his wares, on the jeweler’s statement of its value.55 The word purports matters, because the maker’s own claim of competence invites the deference, and a seller who holds himself out as knowing a subject cannot then argue that the recipient should have checked it. The same reasoning reaches a mechanic who sells a car to his sister-in-law and tells her it has a good engine. His trade supplies the knowledge and the family tie supplies the trust, so she may justifiably credit the opinion if it is false.56 Expertise has a ceiling, however. The allowance for a vendor’s tendency to praise means that special knowledge does not turn sales talk into something reliable, and the Fifth Circuit in Presidio read the comments to make the special-knowledge exception inapplicable where the opinion relied on is clearly a salesman’s puffery.57
The second route covers relationships in which one party is entitled to depend on the other. Courts have found such trust between attorney and client, principal and agent, insurer and insured, partners, and members of the same family, among others, the same relationships that support a duty to disclose.58 The Third Restatement separates the formal fiduciary, who has a legal obligation to act for another’s benefit, from the confidential relationship, which is less formal and arises when the parties are not on equal footing, one has influence over the other, and the stronger party is trusted to act for the weaker; in either, it may be appropriate for the dependent party to rely on the other’s opinions.59 The mechanism is that the dependent party has handed the task of checking to the other, who has accepted a role in which honest judgment is part of the job. The label cannot be assumed, though. In Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District a California appellate court, examining a constructive fraud claim, held that no presumption of a confidential relationship arises from the bare fact that the parties are employer and employee, and that the lack of such a relationship is especially apparent when they are negotiating to end their relationship, since each is then expected to look after his own interests.60 A tie that exists for another purpose therefore does not by itself make a counterparty’s opinion one to be trusted. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts follows parallel lines, allowing an opinion to support a misrepresentation claim when the maker is in a relationship of trust, is an expert, or speaks to someone peculiarly susceptible because of age or other factors.61
The third route covers trust that did not exist beforehand and that the maker built. The comment describes the usual case as one in which the maker gains the recipient’s confidence by stressing common membership in a religious denomination, a fraternal order, or a social group, or the fact that both were born in the same locality.62 The source of the trust distinguishes this route from the fiduciary one, because no relationship obliged the maker to look after the recipient, and the maker manufactured the sense of kinship as an instrument of the sale. A recipient who has been courted into lowering the usual bargaining guard cannot be faulted for lowering it, and the maker who did the courting has no ground to object.
The fourth route is a residual clause, and its chief application is to recipients whose limitations the maker knows about. The comment gives as examples a lack of intelligence, illiteracy, and unusual credulity or gullibility, each of which gives the maker special reason to expect that the opinion will be believed, and it adds that one who deliberately practices on such a characteristic cannot say that the reliance he sought to induce was unjustified because his statement was only opinion.63 The logic that makes a known idiosyncrasy material under § 538(2)(b) operates here as well: a maker who aims a statement at a recipient’s known weakness has chosen the statement because it will work on that person. The route also reaches a maker with no expertise who knows that the recipient cannot get at the underlying facts, for example because the subject of the sale lies at a distance, because the recipient is ignorant or illiterate, or because the maker uses concealment or trickery to block access.64
Without one of the four positions the default holds, and the ordinary vendor falls on that side of the line. The comment’s own example is the purchaser of an ordinary commodity, who is not justified in relying on the vendor’s opinion of its quality or worth, because the buyer’s lesser astuteness does not by itself create a right to defer.65 In Byers, real estate brokers who lived in the buyer’s own city told him that grazing land was worth $35 an acre; nothing suggested that they had seen the land or had special knowledge of it, and the buyer had announced no special reliance on their statement, so he could not be heard to say that he relied on their opinion.66 A private owner who has no direct knowledge of who made a painting, and who says that from all he can tell it is authentic, is giving an honest opinion as an interested seller. The buyer cannot justify relying on it unless the relationship is one of special trust and confidence or the buyer reasonably believes the seller has special skill, judgment, or objectivity about the work.67 Each outcome follows from what the maker was positioned to know and what the maker had led the recipient to expect. A buyer’s inexperience alone does not satisfy the fourth route, which requires that the maker know of a characteristic that makes reliance expectable. Even when a route is satisfied, it settles only whether reliance on the opinion was justifiable, so the plaintiff must still show that the opinion was fraudulently given, that the fact to which it relates is material, and that reliance in fact occurred.
A recipient who reasonably believes the speaker has no stake in the transaction stands in a different position from one dealing with the maker as the other side of the bargain, and the next section takes up that situation.
Disinterested Opinion
Section 543 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the counterpart to the arm’s-length rule. The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation of opinion is justified in relying on it if the opinion is that of a person whom the recipient reasonably believes to be disinterested (having no personal stake in how the transaction turns out), and if the fact that this person holds the opinion is material.69 The preceding sections showed that reliance on a pure opinion is ordinarily unjustified when the maker is the other party to the transaction, unless the maker occupies one of four positions of special trust.70 Apparent disinterest is a separate way to reach justified reliance. The recipient need not show that the speaker was an expert, a fiduciary, or someone who courted the recipient’s confidence. It is enough that the recipient reasonably believed the speaker had no stake in the outcome and that the speaker’s view mattered to the decision.
An opinion from the other side of a bargain gets discounted because of the speaker’s stake. Vendors are known to exaggerate the advantages of what they sell, and a buyer is not justified in treating a vendor’s praise as assurance that the thing deserves it.71 A listener therefore allows for shading whenever the speaker profits if the listener believes. Remove that apparent profit and the ground for discounting largely disappears. An opinion is a compressed summary of underlying facts, and a recipient who cannot see those facts must take the conclusion on faith from someone.72 When the speaker appears to have nothing to gain, there is no apparent reason for the speaker to exaggerate the facts on which the opinion presumably rests and of which the recipient knows nothing.73 The recipient who accepts such an opinion has behaved as people ordinarily behave toward an honest-seeming outsider, and a speaker who lies from that position has exploited the voice the recipient had the least reason to doubt.
The rule has two conditions, and they do different work. The first asks what the recipient reasonably believed about the speaker’s stake, and it looks to that belief and not to the speaker’s actual position. A speaker who is secretly on the seller’s payroll still falls within the rule when nothing the recipient knew or saw would have revealed it. A speaker whose tie to the other side the recipient knew about, or had reason to know about, cannot reasonably be believed disinterested, whatever the recipient may have felt. The reason follows from the purpose of the rule: the recipient’s decision to skip the usual discount depends on what the recipient thought about the speaker’s stake, and the law protects that decision only when the thought was sensible. The second condition ties the rule to the decision actually made. The fact that the speaker holds the opinion must be material, which means a reasonable person deciding what to do in the transaction would attach importance to it, the same measure that § 538(2)(a) uses.74 An independent valuation is something a buyer weighs in deciding whether to pay the asking price, while a stranger’s offhand view on a point that bears little on the decision is not. Without that limit, any casual remark from a bystander could support a fraud claim.
What separates the two buyers is what each knew about the appraiser’s stake, since the false valuation and each buyer’s actual reliance are the same. An answer that asks only whether the appraiser really was independent misses the hinge. A buyer who was never told of a secret fee arrangement still holds a justified belief in the appraiser’s independence, and a buyer who was told of it cannot claim one.
Three provisions in this part of the chapter turn on how the recipient sees the speaker’s stake, and each does separate work:
- Section 542 sets the baseline for an opinion from the other side of the bargain: reliance is unjustified unless the maker occupies one of the four positions of special trust.75
- Section 539(2) makes the recipient’s belief about whether the maker has an adverse interest important in deciding whether an opinion may reasonably be read as implying undisclosed facts.76
- Section 543 stands on its own footing: a recipient who reasonably believes the speaker disinterested may rely on the opinion itself, with no need to show expertise, a relationship of trust, or an implied fact.77
A recipient facing an openly self-interested seller therefore reasons through §§ 542 and 539, while one who consulted what looked like an independent voice starts with § 543. Satisfying § 543 settles only justifiability. The plaintiff must still prove that the opinion was fraudulently given, as when the speaker professed a belief he did not hold, and that the plaintiff actually relied on it.