Concept
Materiality
Justifiable reliance, materiality, and causation
Materiality
A plaintiff can believe a lie, act on it, and still lose. Section 538(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes reliance on a fraudulent misrepresentation unjustifiable unless the matter misrepresented is material.1 The earlier checks on reliance asked what the plaintiff believed and did. This one asks what the statement was about.
Reliance has two halves, belief and action, and materiality governs the second. A plaintiff may be justified in believing a representation and still not be justified in acting on it, unless the matter is important enough that a reasonable person’s conduct would ordinarily be influenced by it in the transaction in question.2 Justifiable reliance therefore carries materiality inside it, and the Third Restatement’s fraud section (§ 9) states the point directly: liability for fraud attaches only to material misrepresentations.3 The logic is straightforward. A misrepresentation that does not touch an important aspect of the transaction is less likely to have induced the party to enter it, and it presents a less compelling case for relief.4
Two alternative tests mark the line. A matter is material if a reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in deciding what to do in the transaction in question.5 It is also material if the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important, although a reasonable person would not.6 Either test suffices. The first is the objective default; the second turns on what the defendant knew about this plaintiff.
The Reasonable-Person Test
The default test asks what a reasonable person would do. Under § 538(2)(a), a matter is material if a reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question.7 The measure is objective. A plaintiff’s testimony that the point mattered a great deal does not settle the question, because the misrepresentation must relate to a fact important or central enough to the bargain that it is reasonably likely to have had a significant influence on the decision to assent.8
The Third Restatement identifies where the requirement does its work: when one party makes false statements to the other about a matter collateral to the immediate subject of the bargain. It also excludes liability for puffery, a seller’s broad and predictably exaggerated statements about quality, as distinct from particular claims of fact.9 Puffery has its own section below.
The closing words of the test, “in the transaction in question,” tie the inquiry to the particular deal.10 The same kind of fact can matter in one transaction and not in another. A salesman’s false claim that a car was previously owned by a federal judge, when a law professor in fact owned it, ordinarily is not material enough to justify relying on it as a substantial factor in the decision to buy the car.11
The car and the canvas involve the same form of falsehood, a claim about a former owner, and they fall on opposite sides of the line because of what each buyer was deciding. A former owner is almost beside the point for someone choosing a car, and provenance goes to authenticity and price for someone choosing a painting.
A decided case shows the test running on real facts. In Griffith v. Byers Construction Co. of Kansas, Inc., homesite buyers alleged that the developer had advertised an addition as a choice residential area when it sat on an abandoned oil field containing salt water disposal areas, whose saline soil would not sustain vegetation. They alleged that the developer graded the tract so that purchasers could not discover those areas, and each plaintiff had chosen a lot within one.12 The claim rested on fraudulent concealment, and the court tested the hidden fact with § 538: a matter is material if a reasonable man would attach importance to it in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question. A prospective purchaser of a residential building site would consider the soil condition a material factor in choosing a lot, since it materially affected the value and acceptability of the homesite.13
The same question arises when the falsity lies in what a speaker leaves out. A half-truth can itself be a misrepresentation. In one case a resident of the Philippines was offered a job in Oregon without being told that the position was under review, and the nondisclosure was deemed fraudulent when the position was canceled.14 In either setting, the court asks whether the withheld matter would have mattered to a reasonable person making that decision.
The tort test also surfaces outside common-law fraud. In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., the Supreme Court noted that panels of the Second and Fifth Circuits had opted for the conventional tort test of materiality, whether a reasonable man would attach importance to the fact misrepresented or omitted in determining his course of action, and it cited § 538(2)(a) for that test.15
The fourth step is the exception to the default, and the next section develops it. Until a plaintiff reaches that exception, the reasonable person is the measure.
Known Idiosyncrasies of the Plaintiff
Section 538(2)(b) supplies the second test. A matter is material if the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.18 The reasonable-person test asks what a person of ordinary judgment would weigh. This test asks what the defendant knew about the particular person addressed. A plaintiff whose priorities would strike the community as odd therefore keeps a path to materiality, provided the defendant was on notice of them.
The standard illustration involves astrology. When a misrepresentation is fraudulent and its maker knows that the recipient is specially, even peculiarly, disposed to regard it as important, the representation may be found material as to that recipient even though it would not be as to the average person. If D knows that P believes in astrology and falsely represents that the astrological signs strongly favor the transaction in question, the representation may be deemed material.19 An ordinary person would give horoscopes no weight, and D knows that P does.
The Third Restatement reaches the same result. A misrepresentation is material if a reasonable person would give significant weight to it, or if the defendant knew that the plaintiff would give it such weight, whether reasonably or not, so the question is whether the defendant knew or should have known that the misrepresentation would matter to the plaintiff.20
The defendant’s knowledge is what justifies the rule. The comment to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 162 puts it bluntly: one who preys upon another’s known idiosyncrasies cannot complain if the contract is held voidable when he succeeds in what he is endeavoring to accomplish.21 The fraud setting sharpens the point. Nearly everywhere, people expect that one party will not lie to another, even though business people probably do not expect each other to take reasonable care that what they say is true.22 A defendant who deliberately lies to someone whose special concern he knows has broken the expectation that holds almost everywhere.
The wording of the rule sets the notice threshold. The maker need only have reason to know the recipient’s priority, and the Third Restatement says the same thing as should have known, so an admission by the defendant is not required. Notice remains essential, though. A plaintiff’s private priority, unknown to the defendant and with no reason for the defendant to know it, does not make a matter material.
The customer’s devotion to Tuesday furniture is as sincere as P’s devotion to horoscopes, so notice is the only fact separating the two cases. Had she opened by announcing that she buys only Tuesday-built furniture, the same false words would satisfy § 538(2)(b), and the dealer would answer for speaking to a priority he had been told about. The usual error is to treat the plaintiff’s private priority as enough by itself, when the defendant’s knowledge or reason to know is the hinge.
Satisfying this test settles materiality and nothing more. The plaintiff must still show belief and action in response, because reliance includes both.23 The astrology example also shows why justifiable reliance and reasonable reliance are not the same thing: a plaintiff may justifiably rely on a statement that a reasonable person would shrug off.24 Section 540 marks another departure, since an investigation need not be performed even where a reasonable person would have investigated because it would be simple and worthwhile in light of the magnitude of the transaction.25 That rule gets its own section below.
The same Contracts comment adds a limit worth remembering. A nonfraudulent misrepresentation that is not material does not make a contract voidable under the rules of that chapter, although the recipient may have a claim to relief under other rules, such as those relating to breach of warranty.26 Immateriality removes one remedy, then, and does not necessarily leave the recipient with none.