Concept
Intent to Induce Reliance
Fraudulent misrepresentation: false statement, scienter, and intent to induce
Intent to Induce Reliance
Deceit punishes a lie that is used to steer another person’s decision. A false statement, a speaker who knew better, and a listener who lost money are therefore not enough; the speaker must also have aimed the statement at the listener’s choice. Section 525 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts says so directly: the maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is liable only if he made it for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance on it.1 Fraud is the intentional branch of the misrepresentation torts, which also reach negligent and, in limited circumstances, innocent misrepresentation, and most of the litigation arises from economic dealings.2
Two questions follow, and they are easier to answer apart. The first concerns purpose: what must the speaker have meant the listener to do, and how does that purpose relate to a wish to deceive or to injure? The second concerns audience: once the statement leaves the speaker’s hands, to whom does he answer? Section 531 gives the answer. The maker is liable to the persons or class of persons whom he intends or has reason to expect to rely, and only for reliance in the type of transaction in which he intends or has reason to expect their conduct to be influenced.3 The deceiver chooses what to say and to whom, so liability follows the audience he chose or had reason to anticipate; a stranger whom no one could have expected to act on the statement falls outside it.
The sections after § 531 apply that test to the routes a statement can take: repetition by an intermediary (§ 533), a statement meant for many persons or many transactions (§ 534), a lie built into an article or commercial document (§ 532), an earlier statement exploited in a later deal (§ 535), and information that a statute requires to be filed (§ 536).4 Each plaintiff must still prove justifiable reliance and pecuniary loss. Those issues, the line between fact and opinion, and the defenses belong to other parts of the misrepresentation materials,5 and this part stays on the speaker’s side of the transaction.
Purpose of Inducing Action
A fraudulent speaker answers in deceit only for a statement made to move the listener. Section 525 puts the requirement in the maker’s purpose: he must have misrepresented for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance.6 Three consequences follow, and this subsection takes them in turn. The speaker must have meant the listener to respond. The response he wanted need not have been harmful. And the purpose that counts is one of influencing the listener’s decision, which is why many courts treat a separate intent to deceive as unnecessary.
The requirement follows from what deceit protects. The tort guards a person’s decision against being steered by false information, and a statement steers a decision only when someone aims it at one. Scienter shows that the speaker was dishonest; purpose shows that the dishonesty was put to work on a choice. A falsehood tossed into a conversation with no thought that anyone would act on it has not been used as a lever on anyone’s decision. Requiring both makes a speaker answer for the decision that followed only when he was trying to produce it.
Johnson v. Davis shows the element met. Florida lists the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation as a false statement concerning a material fact, the speaker’s knowledge that it is false, an intention that the representation induce another to act on it, and consequent injury to the party who acted in reliance.7 The Florida Supreme Court held that the Johnsons’ statements to the Davises about the condition of the roof satisfied that test and entitled the Davises to the return of their $26,000 deposit.8 A seller who vouches for a roof ordinarily speaks so that the buyers will go forward with the purchase, and that is the purpose the third element asks about.
Reliance by the listener does not prove that the speaker wanted it. The facts below describe a statement that is false, known to be false, and acted upon, yet outside the tort.
A lie can steer a decision in either direction. The Restatement’s wording covers both acting and refraining, so an assurance may be aimed at getting a buyer to sign or at getting him to skip the inspection; either way the buyer’s decision is the target.9 Nor does the requirement confine recovery to the one person the speaker had in mind. Section 531 reaches the persons or class whom the speaker intends or has reason to expect to rely, a rule the next subsection takes up.10
The purpose that counts is a purpose of influencing the listener’s decision, so the speaker need not have intended any injury. A classic English opinion on deceit, Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, states that it is “wholly immaterial with what object the lie is told,” but material that the defendant intended it to be relied on by the person to whom he made it.11 Modern doctrine agrees. Once scienter exists, the speaker is liable even though he did not mean to hurt the listener and in fact thought he was helping him; motive matters, if at all, only to punitive damages.12 The loss flows from the listener’s reliance, and the wish behind the lie does not alter that sequence. A speaker who wants a listener to commit on false information has done what the tort punishes, whether his aim was profit or kindness.
Some courts add a requirement that the plaintiff prove an intent to deceive, and others reject it. Florida’s list asks for scienter and an intention to induce action and names no separate intent to deceive, and in Nielsen v. Adams the Nebraska Supreme Court eliminated the requirement of intent to deceive in an action for fraudulent misrepresentation.13 The separate requirement causes trouble because scienter is broader than conscious deception. A speaker who states or implies a basis for his assertion, knowing that he lacks it, has the scienter that § 526(c) describes,14 yet he may believe the statement is true and so lack any purpose to deceive in the narrow sense. If intent to deceive were a free-standing element, he could escape by showing that he believed what he said, though he knew he had nothing behind it. Asking instead whether he had scienter and meant the statement to induce reliance closes that gap.
An answer that denies liability because the speaker meant no harm, or because he did not mean to deceive, therefore misframes the element. The question is whether he aimed the statement at the listener’s decision.
Persons Intended or Expected
Section 531 answers the question that purpose leaves open: who may sue when the statement reaches someone other than its first listener? The maker is liable to the persons or class of persons whom he intends or has reason to expect to act or refrain from acting in reliance, for pecuniary loss suffered through justifiable reliance in the type of transaction in which he intends or has reason to expect their conduct to be influenced.16 Three limits sit inside that sentence. The plaintiff must belong to the audience the speaker intended or expected. The reliance must have occurred in the type of transaction the speaker had in view. And the speaker’s expectation is judged by a reason-to-expect standard that is narrower than ordinary foreseeability.
The older rule shows what the modern one corrects. Liability for fraud was at first limited to the person or class of persons for whose guidance the information was furnished, and to the same or a substantially identical transaction.17 Peek v. Gurney is the classic illustration. Directors issued a prospectus to induce the public to subscribe for new shares, and a person who bought shares from an existing stockholder could not recover, though he may have lost just as much on the strength of the same document.18 He stood outside the transaction the directors had set out to induce. Even the narrow rule reached a speaker who meant to influence a class, as by a newspaper advertisement or a report furnished to a credit-reporting agency; he answered to any member of the class to whom the statement was directed.19 The strictness reflected a worry about unlimited exposure: a statement, once released, may be relied on by unknown numbers of third persons, with losses out of proportion to the speaker’s fault.20
The modern rule keeps that worry in view and moves the boundary outward. Courts came to extend liability to persons whom the defendant did not consciously set out to influence but whose reliance he had special reason to anticipate, meaning reliance that was highly foreseeable and not merely foreseeable.21 The extension began with representations embodied in things that travel, such as stock certificates, negotiable instruments, and product labels, and with reports that a statute requires to be filed or published for a protected class. Those have become specific applications of § 531, and later subsections take them up.22 Two considerations support a wider line for fraud than for negligence. A deliberate wrongdoer has less claim to protection from remote victims than a careless speaker does, and the courts have in fact expanded liability for negligent misrepresentation, though not so far as for fraud.23 The narrow rule also made recovery turn on the accident of how the lie traveled: the used-share buyer lost a claim that a subscriber holding the identical prospectus would have kept.
The phrase reason to expect keeps the wider rule from collapsing into a general foreseeability test. Foreseeability alone is not enough. The speaker must have information that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that there is an especial likelihood the statement will influence persons in the plaintiff’s position.24 Nearly any statement made in commerce can be imagined reaching a stranger, so a foreseeability test would leave the circle of plaintiffs without an edge. The usual exam error is to find liability because the plaintiff’s reliance was easy to picture. The information requirement ties liability instead to the audience the speaker chose or had cause to anticipate, which covers those he actually foresaw and those whose reliance was highly foreseeable, and no more.
The plaintiff need not have dealt with the defendant, and Griffith v. Byers Construction Co. of Kansas, Inc. makes the point. The court held that there was no lack of privity that would prevent causes of action based on fraud, and it reversed the summary judgments entered for the defendant, Byers.25 What matters is whether the plaintiff stands within the audience the defendant intended or had reason to expect, and the absence of a direct dealing does not decide that.
Under § 531 the used-share buyer of the older cases is no longer excluded automatically. The question becomes whether the directors had reason to expect the prospectus to influence buyers of that class in that type of transaction, and the buyer must make that showing.26 The type-of-transaction limit works beside the class limit, because a statement made to influence one kind of dealing does not follow the speaker into every later dealing in which someone happens to use it.
Class and transaction type are separate filters, and a plaintiff must pass both before § 531 reaches the claim.
The sections that follow § 531 apply the same expectation test to particular routes a statement can travel. The first is the route that runs through an intermediary, the subject of § 533.27
Repetition to Third Persons
A lie often reaches the plaintiff secondhand, and § 533 covers that route. The maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is liable for pecuniary loss to another who acts in justifiable reliance on it if the misrepresentation, though not made directly to the other, is made to a third person and the maker intends or has reason to expect that its terms will be repeated or its substance communicated to the other, and that it will influence his conduct in the transaction or type of transaction involved.29 The section applies the reason-to-expect idea of § 531 to the route that runs through an intermediary, a person who receives the statement and carries it to someone else.30
The rule has two parts that do separate work. The first concerns the path: the maker must intend or have reason to expect that the statement will be repeated, or its substance communicated, to the plaintiff. Because the rule speaks of substance as well as terms, an intermediary who paraphrases the statement, summarizes it, or builds it into a report has not broken the chain. The second concerns effect: the maker must also intend or have reason to expect that the communication will influence the plaintiff’s conduct in the transaction or type of transaction involved. A speaker who expected gossip but could not have expected anyone to buy or lend because of it meets the first part and fails the second. Both expectations are measured when the maker speaks, by what he then knew, and the plaintiff must still show justifiable reliance and pecuniary loss.
The rule rests on who controls the route. A speaker decides what to say and to whom, so a speaker who wants a lie to reach a buyer can choose the intermediary best placed to carry it. If liability required the maker to address the plaintiff personally, a dishonest seller could keep every benefit of the lie and avoid its cost by telling it to a broker and letting the broker deliver it. A statement received secondhand steers the plaintiff’s decision as thoroughly as one received directly, so the law follows the path the speaker expected the statement to take. The two expectation requirements keep that logic from running too far. Without them, a speaker would answer to every stranger who happened to hear of a remark, and tying liability to the path and the influence he anticipated lets him see his exposure before he speaks.
The standard picture is a seller who misrepresents the condition of his house to A, who passes the information on to B, who then buys the house in reliance. Whether B can recover depends on what the seller expected when he spoke to A. If A is the broker hired to market the house, and the seller knows that brokers relay property details to prospective buyers, the seller has reason to expect that the substance will reach buyers and shape their offers, and a buyer who relies on the relayed statement may recover as though the seller had spoken to him face to face. The same reasoning appears outside real estate. The issuer of a letter of credit intended to be acted on by a third party may be liable to that party for a fraudulent misrepresentation in it, a result the Fourth Circuit reached, applying Maryland law, in Banca del Sempione v. Provident Bank of Md.31 The document exists to be acted on by someone other than the person who first receives it, so the issuer’s own purpose supplies the expectation § 533 requires.
The same false words can fall on either side of the line, depending on where the speaker expected them to go.
A homeowner who lists the house for sale and tells his broker the same false thing, knowing the broker will repeat it to prospective buyers, has built the route himself, and a buyer who acts on the broker’s account has a claim. The words and the falsity are identical in the two scenes. Only the speaker’s reason to expect communication and influence has moved.
As under § 531, reason to expect is more than foreseeability. The maker must have had information, when he spoke, that made it especially likely the statement would reach and influence persons in the plaintiff’s position.32 The usual error is to find liability because it is easy to imagine a statement spreading, when the question is what the maker’s information at the time of speaking made likely.
The intermediary route also appears in securities litigation. In Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc., a shareholder suing under § 10(b) alleged that companies dealing with the issuer, Charter, had engaged in fraudulent transactions that affected Charter’s reported results. The majority rejected the shareholder’s theory of reliance. A dissenting opinion called that view unduly stringent and invoked § 533 for the proposition that a maker is liable when a misrepresentation is made to a third person and he intends or has reason to expect that its substance will be communicated to the plaintiff. On the dissent’s account, the counterparties never addressed investors, yet they were alleged to have known that the outcome of their transactions would be communicated to investors.33 That argument is the dissent’s view of how the rule would apply to those allegations, not a holding of the Court, and because the claim arose under the federal securities statute, the Restatement served only as an analogy. The case still shows where an intermediary dispute gets fought: over what the maker knew about where the information would go. The next subsection takes up the speaker who intends a statement to reach many persons at once.
Many Persons, Many Transactions
Section 534 extends the audience rule of § 531 to a speaker who aims one lie at a crowd or at a series of dealings. One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation intending, or with reason to expect, that more than one person or class of persons will be induced to rely on it, or that there will be action or inaction in more than one transaction or type of transaction, is liable for pecuniary loss to any one of those persons who justifiably relies on it in any one or more of those transactions.35 Section 531 asked whom the speaker meant or expected to reach and in what kind of dealing.36 Section 534 applies the same test where the answer is plural. His intention or reason to expect covers several persons, several transactions, or both, and each person inside that circle stands where a lone listener would stand.
The rule has two parts, and each has its own logic. The persons part follows from how a lie to a crowd works. A speaker who publishes a falsehood to a class has chosen a wide audience because the lie pays by moving many decisions at once, and if liability ran only to the first listener, he would keep the gain from every other persuaded reader and bear the cost of only one. Even the narrower older rule, which confined liability to persons the speaker actually meant to influence, held a speaker who intended to influence a class answerable to any member of that class to whom the statement was directed, as with a newspaper advertisement or a report furnished to a credit-reporting agency.37 The transactions part rests on the same reasoning about choice. A statement may be meant to support an opening sale, later orders, and loans made on the strength of the buyer’s apparent success, and a speaker who intends or expects that reach has picked the whole range. The plaintiff need show justifiable reliance in only one of those transactions, because the section speaks of any one or more of them.38
The circle has an edge, and it is the edge § 531 draws. The plaintiff must belong to a person or class the speaker intended or had reason to expect would rely, and must have acted in a transaction of the kind the speaker had in view. Reason to expect is measured by what the speaker knew when he spoke, and foreseeability alone does not satisfy it.39 Pecuniary loss and justifiable reliance remain part of every plaintiff’s case, so membership in the class opens the door without proving the claim.
Two opposite errors recur on exams. One limits recovery to the person who first heard the statement, which ignores that a speaker who addresses a class answers to the class. The other extends recovery to everyone who read the statement and lost money, which ignores that the class and the transaction must be ones the speaker intended or had reason to expect. A problem involving an advertisement, a credit report, or a similar broadcast statement therefore turns on two questions: whether the plaintiff belongs to the audience the speaker aimed at, and whether the plaintiff acted in a transaction of the kind the speaker had in view. The next subsection applies the same idea to a misrepresentation built into an article of commerce or a commercial document, which carries the falsehood to buyers the maker never met.40
Articles and Commercial Documents
Section 532 reaches a lie that has been built into a thing. One who embodies a fraudulent misrepresentation in an article of commerce, a muniment of title, a negotiable instrument, or a similar commercial document is liable for pecuniary loss to another who deals with him or with a third person regarding the article or document in justifiable reliance on the truth of the representation.42 Every item on that list is made to change hands. An article of commerce is a product sold in trade, with the falsehood printed on its label or stamped on its body. A muniment of title is a document that evidences ownership, such as a certificate of title. A negotiable instrument is a paper, such as a note or check, that passes from one holder to the next. The closing phrase covers other papers that circulate in the same way, such as a stock certificate.43
The section marks the place where the law of deceit first moved off a narrow older rule. Liability for fraud was once confined to the specific persons the defendant actually meant to influence, so remote purchasers and investors could not recover. The first departures came in cases involving a representation contained in a transferable document that represents a property interest, or affixed to an article of commerce such as a product label. Those results have since become specific applications of the general rule in § 531.44 Section 532 is therefore best read as the first and clearest instance of the reason-to-expect idea, the instance in which the maker’s expectation is hardest to deny.
The rule has two working parts, and each has its own reason. The first is embodiment: the falsehood must be part of the article or document itself. The reason lies in how a statement travels. A spoken statement ends with the conversation unless someone chooses to repeat it, which is why § 533 asks whether the maker expected a repetition. A label or a certificate carries the statement with it. A maker who puts a lie into an item built to circulate can predict from the outset that the item will pass from hand to hand and that each later holder will read the paper or the label before deciding what to pay. The second part is the open class of plaintiffs, since the section covers anyone who deals with the maker or with a third person regarding the article or document. That breadth follows from the first part. Each later dealer is exactly the person the lie was likely to reach, so the maker has reason to expect that dealer’s reliance without having addressed anyone, and the plaintiff need not show that the maker had heard of him.
Embodiment widens the circle of plaintiffs and leaves the rest of the tort in place. The maker must still have made a fraudulent misrepresentation, so the scienter requirements of § 526 apply. A label the maker believed accurate, but which through careless wording says something false, is a negligent misrepresentation and not a fraudulent one.45 The later dealer must also have acted in justifiable reliance on the truth of the representation and suffered pecuniary loss, as in any deceit claim. A later buyer who never looked at the certificate, or who bought on price alone, was not steered by it, and the embodied lie then caused nothing.
The exam question is what changes when the same lie travels by word of mouth instead of by label or paper.
Both dealers told the same lie, and both later buyers lost the same money. The difference is the vehicle. Where the lie rides on the item or the paper, the later buyer qualifies by dealing in the article or document and relying on its truth. Where the lie was only spoken, the later buyer must prove what the maker expected. Two opposite errors follow from missing that line. One treats any lie that eventually reached a remote buyer as embodied, which ignores the need for the misrepresentation to be part of the article or document. The other denies recovery to a later buyer because he never dealt with the maker, which ignores that § 532 expressly covers dealings with a third person.
Reliance on Earlier Statements
Section 535 reaches a defendant who made a fraudulent statement for one purpose and later exploits the belief it created for another. One who deals with another, or induces another to deal with a third person, knowing that the other is relying on the maker’s misrepresentation previously made to induce a different and earlier transaction, is liable for pecuniary loss as though the maker had repeated the representation to influence the later transaction.48 The preceding subsections asked who receives a statement and by what route it travels. This one asks about time. The statement has done its first job and the first transaction is over, but the belief it planted remains in the listener’s mind, and the maker uses that belief to bring about a second transaction.
The rule is needed because the other requirements of the claim look forward from the moment of speaking. Section 525 asks whether the statement was made for the purpose of inducing action in reliance on it, and § 531 limits liability to the type of transaction the maker intended or expected to influence.49 A statement made to obtain a loan was not made for the purpose of a later bond purchase, so a plaintiff who acts on the old statement in the later deal seems to fall outside both requirements. Section 535 closes that gap by treating the maker’s knowing exploitation of the lingering belief as the equivalent of a fresh repetition.
The reason for treating exploitation as repetition lies in how a lie operates. A false statement leaves a belief behind, and that belief keeps steering the listener’s choices for as long as he holds it. A maker who knows the listener still holds the belief, and who then deals with him directly or sends him to a third party, is using the lie exactly as a repetition would. A rule requiring a formal second utterance would reward the maker who stays quiet, since he would collect the benefit of the lie twice and answer for it once. The section reaches both routes: the maker may deal with the listener personally, or may induce him to deal with someone else. Because liability is measured as though the maker had repeated the representation, the earlier statement must itself have been a fraudulent misrepresentation.
The knowledge element carries the weight of the rule. The maker must know, when he deals with the other or induces the other to deal with a third person, that the other is still relying on the earlier misrepresentation. Without that requirement, liability would spread to everyone downstream of an old lie, including makers who had forgotten what they said and listeners who had since discounted it or checked the facts themselves. A maker with no reason to think the old statement still operates has chosen to exploit nothing. Knowledge confines the rule to deliberate use of a lie that is still working, which is the conduct that makes a second false word unnecessary to the wrong.
A defendant who made one false statement, to obtain a loan, seems to have nothing to answer for in a bond sale months afterward. The following facts show why that instinct fails.
The lack of a new statement does not change the analysis, because the section substitutes the maker’s knowledge of continuing reliance for the repetition. Remove that knowledge, and the result reverses.
Both promoters told the same original lie, and both friends lost money in a later purchase. Only the first promoter knew the lie was still at work when the later deal was made. Section 535 also supplies only the missing purpose. The plaintiff must still show justifiable reliance on the earlier statement in the later transaction and pecuniary loss from it, as in any deceit claim. The usual exam errors run in two directions: excusing the maker because the later deal involved no new false statement, and holding him liable for any later loss without asking whether he knew the earlier lie was still being relied on. The next subsection turns to a different source of audience, information that a statute requires to be filed or published.
Statutorily Required Filings
Section 536 applies the audience rules to a setting in which the legislature has already decided who will read the document. If a statute requires information to be furnished, filed, recorded, or published for the protection of a particular class of persons, one who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation in doing so is liable to those persons for pecuniary loss suffered through their justifiable reliance on it in a transaction of the kind in which the statute is intended to protect them.51 The earlier subsections asked how a statement reaches a plaintiff whom the maker never addressed, whether through an intermediary, a broadcast, a label, or a belief that outlived the first deal. The route here is a filing, and the plaintiff’s place in the case comes from the statute’s terms and not from an inference about what the maker expected.
Required filings belong to the oldest group of departures from the narrow rule that fraud liability runs only to the persons the defendant consciously meant to influence. The first departures involved a representation contained in a transferable document such as a stock certificate or certificate of title, a representation affixed to an article of commerce such as a product label, and a representation contained in a report that the law required to be made and filed or published for the benefit of a certain class, with liability in that last group limited to members of the class the law meant to protect.52 Those results have since become specific applications of the general rule in § 531.53 The first two groups correspond to § 532, covered above, and § 536 is the third. It differs from the other two in where the maker’s expectation comes from. An embodied lie travels with the thing it is written on, while the audience for a filing is named in a statute.
A plaintiff proceeding under the general audience rule must show that the maker had reason to expect his reliance, and that showing depends on what the maker knew about who would read the statement. A required filing largely removes that uncertainty. The statute announces whom the information is for, so a person who falsifies the filing knows, when he does it, that the document exists to be read and acted on by those people in dealings of that sort. The legislature has done the work of identifying the audience, and the common-law rule borrows its answer.
The two limits that follow from the statute’s purpose each have their own reason. The class limit exists because a filing that sits in a public record can be read by anyone. If every reader could sue, the filer would face the open-ended exposure, to an unbounded class and for an unbounded amount, that led courts to confine fraud liability in the first place.54 Tying recovery to the protected class gives the filer a defined group of potential plaintiffs, and the legislature chose that group. The transaction limit does subtler work. A statute is written with particular dealings in mind, such as the extension of credit, and the filer’s reason to expect reliance exists only for those dealings. A member of the protected class who relies on the filing in some other kind of dealing has stepped outside the purpose that made the filer’s expectation reasonable.
Whether a reader of a falsified filing may sue turns on what the statute was written to protect, and the reader’s reliance, however real, does not answer that question.
The section speaks of a fraudulent misrepresentation, so the statute that supplies the audience does not supply the other elements of deceit. The officers who prepared the filing must have acted with one of the states of mind in § 526, and a filing that is wrong through honest or careless error is at most a negligent misrepresentation.55 The plaintiff must also prove justifiable reliance and pecuniary loss, which the section’s own text requires.56
Steps two and three are the ones the facts will test, since an exam writer can place a plaintiff inside the class and outside the transaction, or the reverse. The usual error is to treat public availability as enough, so that anyone who read the filing and lost money recovers, when § 536 gives recovery only to the class and the kind of dealing the statute was meant to protect. With this subsection the chapter has traced every route by which a fraudulent statement can reach a plaintiff who was not its first listener, and the next section puts the elements together as one analysis.