Concept
Scienter
Fraudulent misrepresentation: false statement, scienter, and intent to induce
Scienter
Scienter is the state of mind that separates a lie from a mistake. A misrepresentation is an affirmative communication of false or misleading information to another,1 but a false statement supports a claim in deceit only if the speaker also spoke with a culpable mind. Treatises accordingly treat fraudulent, negligent, and innocent misrepresentation under separate headings.2
Section 526 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts locates the culpable mind in three situations. A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker:3
- knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be;4
- does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or implies; or5
- knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he states or implies.6
The first situation is the deliberate lie. The second and third reach the speaker who professes more certainty, or more knowledge, than he has. Derry v. Peek put the same test in three limbs: a false representation made “knowingly,” “without belief in its truth,” or “recklessly, careless whether it be true or false”; compare R.3d Liability for Economic Harm § 10 for the modern statement.7
All three situations ask about the speaker’s mind, and none asks whether a careful person would have checked the facts. Because knowledge exists only inside the speaker’s head, plaintiffs usually prove it circumstantially, and the trier of fact decides whether the defendant’s claimed belief was real. A defendant who persuades the trier that he actually believed his statement, however unreasonably, has made at most a negligent misrepresentation.8
Scienter is also only one part of the intent that deceit requires. The defendant must intend to make the representation, to direct it to a particular person or class, to convey a certain meaning, to be believed, and to be acted on in a certain way; in the ordinary case these matters are clearly present or easily inferred.9 The subsections below take up the three situations in turn, then the ambiguous statement, then the boundary where fraud ends and negligence begins.
Knowledge of Falsity
Section 526(a) describes the deliberate lie: the maker knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be.10 The rule reaches belief as well as knowledge, so a speaker who is convinced but has never confirmed a fact is covered along with one who is certain. A seller who has watched water drip through the ceiling in every storm believes the roof leaks, and telling a buyer that the roof has never had a problem contradicts that belief at the moment of speaking. The prong matches the first limb of the Derry formulation, a representation made knowingly.11
Florida lists four elements for fraudulent misrepresentation: a false statement concerning a material fact; the representor’s knowledge that the representation is false; an intention that it induce another to act on it; and consequent injury to the party who acts in reliance.12 The list shows where scienter sits. Falsity and knowledge of falsity are separate items, so a plaintiff who proves only that the statement was false has proved one element and not two. In Johnson v. Davis, the court agreed that the Johnsons’ statements to the Davises about the condition of the roof were a fraudulent misrepresentation entitling the Davises to the return of their $26,000 deposit payment.13 Because knowledge of falsity is an element in Florida, that holding rests on a finding that the Johnsons knew their statements about the roof were untrue.
Set beside the Johnsons’ case, the hypothetical shows what the element measures. A false statement about a roof supports deceit when the speaker knew it was false, and supports no claim in deceit when the speaker honestly repeated what a qualified source reported.
Plaintiffs rarely have a confession, so the ordinary rules of circumstantial evidence fill the gap. If the plaintiff shows that it would have been unlikely or unreasonable for the defendant to believe the statement, the trier of fact may infer that the defendant knew it was false.14 The inference rests on how belief works. One classic formulation holds that the ground on which an alleged belief was founded is “a most important test of its reality,” and that a belief “destitute of all reasonable foundation” may of itself convince a court that it was not really entertained.15 A seller who patched the same ceiling after every storm for years, then told a buyer the roof had never given trouble, would struggle to persuade anyone that the statement matched his belief. The inference is permissive, and the defendant may rebut it: if the trier finds that he actually believed the statement, however unreasonably, scienter fails and the misrepresentation was at most negligent.16
The speaker’s reason for lying does not matter. In Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, the court said that a plaintiff in deceit must prove a false statement made either with knowledge of its falsity or without caring whether it was true, and that it is “wholly immaterial with what object the lie is told,” though the defendant must have intended the statement to be relied on.17 The same principle appears in a second classic statement: if fraud is proved, the motive of the person guilty of it is immaterial, and it makes no difference that he had no intention to cheat or injure the person to whom the statement was made.18 Deceit protects the integrity of the listener’s decision, and a false statement corrupts that decision whether the speaker lied for gain or out of sympathy. Motive keeps one limited role: it may bear on punitive damages.19
Lack of Confidence
Section 526(b) reaches the speaker who thinks his statement may well be true but presents it with more certainty than he has.21 Under the first situation the speaker believes the statement false. Under this one he may expect, even hope, that it is true, and he still misrepresents fraudulently if it proves false, because the form of his statement claimed a confidence he lacked. The wrong lies in the gap between the certainty his words convey and the doubt in his own mind.
A flat assertion carries two messages: that the matter is so, and that the speaker is sure enough to say it without a hedge. Listeners cannot see inside the speaker’s head, so they read the form of the statement as a signal of how far to rely and whether to check for themselves. Courts accordingly treat a statement made as of the speaker’s own knowledge, without knowing whether it is true or false, as falsely implying that the speaker has reason to believe it. Some courts classify that state of mind as intent and others as recklessness, and either way it is adequate scienter.22 The court in Edgington made the same point about the reckless speaker: to make a statement recklessly, for the purpose of influencing another person, is dishonest.23
Opinions fall within the same logic, because an opinion implies that the speaker holds it. Rodi sued a school over accreditation, and the court of appeals reversed the dismissal of his claim and permitted a fraudulent misrepresentation theory to go to trial. The school knew it had substantial problems in obtaining accreditation, and Rodi had made a credible preliminary showing that the opinions expressed by school officials were not honest, given their knowledge of the ABA’s criteria and the school’s prospects of satisfying them.24
The prong measures the confidence the speaker’s words state or imply, so a speaker who does not know a fact escapes it by claiming no more than he has.25 He states his belief, or says where his knowledge ends. A statement of belief also tells the listener how much weight to give it, so the listener can discount it, ask for proof, or commission a survey before committing money.
Statements of acreage in land sales are a familiar setting for this prong; see Cabot v. Christie. A categorical assertion of paternity, of the kind at issue in Jordan v. Knafel, raises the same problem in a settlement negotiation. A woman who tells a man he is certainly the father, while knowing that another man might be, asserts the fact with more confidence than she has. She need not have known that he was not the father to satisfy the prong.
Lack of Basis
Section 526(c) completes the list: a misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he states or implies.27 The first two situations concern what the speaker believed and how sure he was. This one concerns his grounds. An ordinary unqualified assertion tells the listener not only that the matter is so but that the speaker has a reason for saying so, whether firsthand observation, a record he has read, or training in the field. Courts describe the same idea when they say that a speaker who states something as of his own knowledge falsely implies that he has reason to believe it.28 A speaker who knows that no such reason exists has misstated the very thing that made the statement worth acting on.
Judge Cardozo captured the idea in one sentence: “Fraud includes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is none.”29 The pretense is easiest to see in a professional whose work is vouching for facts. In Skowronski v. Sachs, a jeweler certified an inferior diamond as a stone of a higher grade although he had no knowledge of the procedures required of an expert in that area. The court found the misrepresentations reckless, and hence fraudulent, because he did not disclose his want of expertise.30 The certificate implied a competence he knew he lacked. He could have avoided liability by saying what the certificate rested on, because a speaker who names his actual basis claims no more than he has.
Subsection (b) compares how sure the speaker felt with how sure his words sounded; subsection (c) compares what he had to go on with what his words implied he had. The two can come apart. A speaker may feel entirely sure, from habit or wishful thinking, and still know that nothing has been seen or checked that would support the statement.
A speaker cannot manufacture an honest belief by looking away. One classic statement holds that, although means of knowledge are a very different thing from knowledge, a person who has shut his eyes to the facts, or purposely abstained from inquiring into them, lacks honest belief and is just as fraudulent as one who knowingly stated what was false.31 The same reasoning applies to a party who disregards information available to it; see also Waste Management of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Carver.
Plaintiffs prove a missing basis circumstantially. If it would have been unlikely or unreasonable for the speaker to believe that adequate grounds existed, the trier of fact may infer that he knew they did not.32 The inference yields to an honest belief. A belief, even if unreasonable, that a representation is true and that the speaker has information to justify it does not amount to an intent to deceive, and a “dumb but honest” defendant does not have scienter.33
The second question alone shows carelessness at most; the third separates fraud from negligence. A fact pattern in which an accountant, appraiser, or inspector vouches for something he never checked is a fraud problem only if the facts show that he knew the checking had not been done.
Ambiguous Statements
Section 527 asks what a speaker knew about the readings his words allow. A representation that the maker knows to be capable of two interpretations, one of which he knows to be false and the other true, is fraudulent if he makes it with the intention that it be understood in the sense in which it is false,35 without any belief or expectation as to how it will be understood,36 or with reckless indifference as to how it will be understood.37 The question is not whether the words were false on every reading.
Ambiguity offers a deceiver a hiding place. He can choose words that are true on one reading, let the listener supply the false one, and answer any complaint by pointing to the true meaning. If deceit required falsity on every reading, that strategy would always succeed. Section 527 closes the hiding place by moving the inquiry from the words to the speaker’s mind. The first alternative is the deliberate lie carried over to ambiguous words: a speaker who intends the false sense wants the listener to hold a belief the speaker knows is untrue, which is the state of mind § 526(a) describes.38 The other two alternatives replace intent with indifference.
The rule has a threshold: the maker must know that the statement can be taken both ways. A mechanic who tells a customer that a truck “has a new transmission,” meaning a rebuilt unit he installed himself, and who never considers that the phrase might be taken to mean a factory-new unit, has no state of mind about the false reading at all. If the customer takes the false reading, the statement is at most a negligent misrepresentation, because a statement believed true but falsely expressed through negligence is negligent but not fraudulent.39 Ambiguity also differs from the half-truth of § 529. In a half-truth the words have one meaning and the falsity lies in what they omit; here the words themselves support two meanings.40
The true reading gives this seller no refuge, because the section looks to the sense he meant the buyer to adopt. A plaintiff will rarely have an admission of that purpose and usually proves it from circumstances, such as the seller’s awareness of the buyer’s background or his silence when the buyer restated the figure as collected rent.
A listener’s misreading therefore does not by itself establish fraud, and the existence of a true reading does not by itself excuse it. The usual exam error runs in both directions.
The first alternative requires proof that the speaker wanted the false reading. The other two relieve the plaintiff of that proof, because they reach the speaker who treated the listener’s understanding as the listener’s problem.
The reasoning parallels the pretense of knowledge under § 526. A speaker who knows his words can mislead, and speaks without caring which way they will be taken, gambles with the listener’s money and keeps the benefit of any ambiguity for himself. Alternative (b) describes a maker with no belief or expectation at all about how listeners will read the words; alternative (c) describes one who is aware of the risk and indifferent to it. Facts like the broker’s can fit either, so an answer should name the alternative that matches the facts and show that all three rest on the speaker’s mind.
Negligence Is Not Fraud
Section 528 draws the boundary from the other side: a representation that is believed to state the truth but that, because of negligent expression, states what is false is a negligent but not a fraudulent misrepresentation.42 The three situations in § 526 and the rule of § 527 each describe a culpable state of mind; § 528 describes a speaker who has none. He means to say something true, believes it, and says something false through careless wording or careless checking. The statement is still a misrepresentation, because an assertion need not be fraudulent to be one: a statement intended to be truthful becomes a misrepresentation through ignorance or carelessness, as when the word “not” is inadvertently omitted.43 What it lacks is the mental element that turns a misrepresentation into deceit.
The classic authority is Derry v. Peek, the source of the three-limbed definition of scienter. In that case the order of the Court of Appeal was reversed and the trial judge’s order restored.44 The rule that survives from that line of authority is that honest belief defeats scienter: if the defendant convinces the trier of fact that he actually believed his statement, however unreasonably, the misrepresentation was at most negligent.45 A modern formulation adds the limits. An intent to deceive may be inferred from “reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement combined with the sheer magnitude of the resultant misrepresentation,” but an honest belief, even if unreasonable, that a representation is true and that the speaker has information to justify it is not an intent to deceive, and a “dumb but honest” defendant does not have scienter.46 The usual exam error is to find fraud because a careful speaker would have caught the mistake. Carelessness is exactly what § 528 classifies as negligence.
The line matters because the claims differ in what the plaintiff must prove and in how far the defendant’s liability reaches. Deceit is a tort action that requires some degree of culpability on the misrepresenter’s part, and that requirement distinguishes it from a claim for rescission.47 Liability for negligent misrepresentation has expanded in most jurisdictions beyond known third persons, but not so far as liability for fraud; the typical defendant is a professional or skilled tradesman who furnishes information others customarily rely on, such as an accountant, surveyor, abstractor, or attorney.48 If carelessness alone amounted to fraud, those limits would disappear, because any plaintiff hurt by a careless error would plead it as a dishonest one.
Two safety valves keep the honest-belief rule from swallowing fraud. The first is evidentiary. Belief is a fact about the speaker’s mind, so a claimed belief can be tested against the circumstances: if it would have been unlikely or unreasonable for the defendant to believe the statement, the trier of fact may infer that he knew it was false, or knew that he lacked the knowledge the statement asserted or implied.49 A belief destitute of all reasonable foundation may of itself persuade a court that it was not really entertained.50 The inference is permissive, so unreasonableness is evidence of dishonesty and not a substitute for the element.
The second valve is that a speaker who knows his grounds are missing is not honest. Section 526(c) makes a misrepresentation fraudulent when the maker knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he states or implies.51 The jeweler in Skowronski differs from an honest blunderer in what he knew about his own grounds: he knew his certificate implied a competence he lacked, and recklessness can be found where a defendant holds himself out as possessing expertise he in fact lacks.52
The seller’s protection lasts only as long as she is unaware of the slip. A seller who rereads the sheet, sees that it now claims a newer roof, and lets it circulate knows that the matter is not as the sheet represents it, which is the first situation in § 526.53
Defendants often answer a fraud claim by calling the problem a mistake. In one dispute over a written release, a note for $4,000 was signed by the plaintiff rather than the defendants, and the defendants’ manager testified that this was “all a mistake” and that the studio was to pay.54 Testimony of that kind raises a question of mistake that the trier of fact must resolve, and an accepted account of honest error leaves at most negligence.55
Three labels sort misrepresentations by the speaker’s mind. A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker knew the assertion was false and meant to induce the other party’s agreement. It is negligent if the maker did not know it was untrue but violated a duty of reasonable care by failing to check the facts. It is innocent if the maker is accountable for the misrepresentation even without intentional deceit or negligence.56 In the products setting, a separate theory of strict liability reaches public misrepresentations, such as those made in advertising, on labels, or in leaflets, without asking about the speaker’s state of mind.57 Reliance, the line between fact and opinion, and defenses are treated as separate major issues in the same body of law.58