Concept
False Light Publicity
Invasion of privacy torts
False Light Publicity
Section 652E of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the fourth privacy tort. One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is liable for invasion of privacy if two further conditions are met: the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and the actor knew of, or acted in reckless disregard as to, the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.1 The Restatement lists this branch last among the four ways of invading the right of privacy, as publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.2 That one sentence therefore asks for three things at once: publicity that casts the plaintiff in a false light, a false light serious enough to be highly offensive, and a defendant who knew of or recklessly disregarded the falsity.
The earlier torts in this chapter each changed one variable, and false light changes two. Public disclosure of private facts required publicity of a private matter, and the matter was true. False light keeps the publicity and brings falsity back in, and it drops the requirement of privacy, because § 652E asks whether the portrayal is false and highly offensive and never asks whether the matter was private. A public figure too well known to have lost any real privacy can therefore sue, as the plaintiff in Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. did.3 The injury also differs from the injury of exposure: the plaintiff is shown to the public otherwise than as he is.4
That feature makes the tort resemble defamation, since both address false statements published about a person. Section 652E, however, asks for a false light that is highly offensive to a reasonable person and does not ask for a defamatory meaning, so a portrayal that damages no one's reputation may still qualify.5 The resemblance and the difference together explain why courts have handled the tort with caution. The subsections that follow take the elements in order: what the defendant published and whether it portrayed the plaintiff falsely, then offensiveness, then the fault standard, which has a constitutional source, and finally the overlap with defamation that has led some states to reject the tort.
False Portrayal and Publicity
Three requirements sit inside the opening clause of § 652E, and any one of them can defeat a claim: the defendant must have given the matter publicity, the portrayal must be materially false, and it must be a portrayal of this plaintiff.6 Offensiveness and fault are separate elements that the next two subsections take up. This one asks what the publication communicated, to whom, and about whom.
Publicity is the audience requirement, and it is stricter than the publication that completes a libel. The communication must go to the public at large, or to enough people that it is virtually certain to reach the public at large, so mere publication to a third person does not complete this tort.7 The reason lies in the injury. False light compensates a person for being shown to the public in a distorted form, and a false remark to a single listener, however damaging to reputation, has not put the plaintiff before the public at all.
Falsity separates this tort from the disclosure tort. Comment b describes the essence of false light as a portrayal of the plaintiff that is materially false, an attribution to the plaintiff of characteristics, conduct, or beliefs that are false.8 The falsity must be material, because relatively minor inaccuracies or fictions in an otherwise accurate and favorable story are not actionable.9 Defendants seldom argue that what the plaintiff claims was portrayed is true. The fight is over what the publication actually portrayed. The plaintiff must allege a highly offensive meaning, and a plaintiff may allege a meaning that the people who read the publication never took from it.10
Courts handle that fight by first asking whether the publication can reasonably carry the meaning the plaintiff alleges. In Martin v. Municipal Publications and Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., plaintiffs claimed that a published photograph and the words around it portrayed them falsely, and the claims went forward. Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc. came out differently. A sociology textbook showed a white policeman prodding a black man with his nightstick. The caption said that the social status of the offender was the most significant determinant of arrest, conviction, and penalty, and it asked whether the officer would have acted the same way if the offender were a white male. The officer said the textbook portrayed him as racially prejudiced, but the court held that the picture and caption were not reasonably capable of conveying that meaning and dismissed the complaint.11 The caption used the scene to pose a question about the treatment of offenders and never said that this officer acted from prejudice.
Byrd v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. shows the same inquiry in a pornographic magazine. The court rejected a false light claim over an altered photograph of the plaintiff because the caption made clear that the plaintiff had not posed for the magazine and had not made an obscene gesture when the photograph was taken.12 Words around a picture can create a false meaning and can also dispel one, so the analysis reads the whole publication together.
The false meaning need not damage the plaintiff's reputation. If the statement is also defamatory, an action for libel or slander may be an alternative remedy, but it is not necessary that the plaintiff be defamed. It is enough that the plaintiff receives unreasonable and highly objectionable publicity that attributes characteristics, conduct, or beliefs that are false, as when a photograph of an honest taxi driver illustrates an article on drivers who cheat the public.13 The tort focuses not on the truth or falsity of a statement as such but on whether the statement leads the public to believe something false about the plaintiff, although at least one federal court has required that the elements of defamation be met in a false light action.14
Photographs reused to illustrate an article about something the pictured person had no part in are the classic setting for the tort. In Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., a photograph of a Washington taxi driver illustrated a magazine article depicting the city's taxi drivers as ill-mannered, contemptuous of patrons, and dishonest. Presumably the plaintiff denied that she fit the description, and the court held that she had stated a sufficient claim for invasion of privacy.15 Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co. belongs to the same family of illustration cases.
A second group of decisions goes the other way. In accord with Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co. are decisions on a picture of a Hindu illusionist illustrating an article on the Indian rope trick, a picture of a boxer illustrating an article on boxing, and a picture of a strike breaker in a book on strike-breaking, and the treatise asks how the two groups are to be distinguished.16 The answer comes from asking what each illustration says about the person pictured. In the second group the person pictured is an example of what the text discusses, so a reader learns nothing untrue. In Peay the pictured driver was honest, and the article told readers that drivers like her cheat.17
Magazine photographs raise the same inquiry, and the surrounding presentation usually decides it. In Douglass, the plaintiff had allowed Playboy to run a nude picture of her, but Hustler ran it without permission, and the false light lay in implying that she would allow that magazine to carry the picture.18 Solano v. Playgirl, Inc. is another decision weighing what a magazine's presentation told readers about the person pictured.
The false light must also be cast on the individual plaintiff. In Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, individual Michigan hunters had no action for a television documentary's offensive portrayal of hunters in Michigan generally.19 The limit keeps one broadcast about a class from producing a separate claim for every member of the class. The plaintiff must also be a natural person, because privacy is a right pertaining only to natural persons, and a corporation cannot maintain an action for false light publicity.20
Step two is where most false light claims are contested, and the defendant's best answer there is that the publication did not say what the plaintiff claims. Step three does not ask whether the statement would damage reputation, so an answer that rejects the claim because the portrayal was flattering, or because no one thought less of the plaintiff, has skipped ahead to the offensiveness element, which has its own subsection.
Highly Offensive Falsehood
Section 652E(a) sets a threshold: the false light in which the plaintiff was placed must be highly offensive to a reasonable person.22 A plaintiff who has shown a materially false portrayal has shown only that the public was told something untrue, and this element asks how serious the untruth is. It screens out the many falsehoods that are embarrassing, annoying, or offensive but not highly offensive or egregious.23 The standard has two parts. The words highly offensive set the level of injury, and the words reasonable person supply an objective yardstick, so a plaintiff's unusual sensitivity does not lower the bar.
In practice the element rarely decides a case, because plaintiffs typically allege a meaning that can be considered highly offensive.24 Many defamatory meanings satisfy it, including imputations of criminality, immorality, and unprofessional conduct, which is why plaintiffs so often sue on both defamation and false light.25 Uhl v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. supplies a clean example, in which a portrayal created the appearance that a hunter had committed the very unsportsmanlike and unethical act of shooting a goose on the ground.26
The element also reaches meanings that are not defamatory, and that is what makes false light broader than libel. Conveying the false impression that the plaintiff was the victim of a crime, or was suffering from a disease, may be highly offensive, and so may a false association of the plaintiff with controversial beliefs or business activities.27 None of these meanings accuses the plaintiff of wrongdoing or lowers anyone's opinion of the plaintiff. An ordinary person would still object strongly to being presented to the public in that way, and the tort protects that interest.
The decided cases that fall short show where the line lies. Relatively minor inaccuracies or fictions in an otherwise accurate and favorable story are not actionable.28 The treatise's examples of falsehoods that stayed on the near side of the line include identifying plaintiffs as card counters in casinos in Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp. and saying that a hospital administrator was adversarial and unhelpful.29 Thomason v. Times-Journal, Inc. and Morganroth v. Whitall likewise found the false light not highly offensive. A surprising or irritating error, or an unflattering remark, can follow a person into public view without crossing the line. The subject matter of the falsehood does not decide these cases, so a strong answer sets the alleged meaning beside the decided examples and asks how an ordinary person would react to it.
Two mistakes recur on this element. The first is to answer that the plaintiff was upset, which describes the plaintiff's reaction and ignores the objective question the element asks. The second is to demand that the meaning damage reputation, which imports defamation's requirement into a tort that asks only whether the false light is highly offensive. Fault, meaning the defendant's knowledge of or reckless disregard for the falsity, is a separate element under § 652E(b) and is taken up next.
Fault and Actual Malice
Section 652E(b) adds a state-of-mind element: the plaintiff must show that the actor knew of, or acted in reckless disregard as to, the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.31 Two features of that clause carry the analysis. First, it names two things the defendant must have been aware of, the falsity of what was published and the false light the publication would cast on the plaintiff, so a defendant who knew a detail was untrue has not necessarily known that the detail would portray the plaintiff in a damaging way. Second, it sets the level of awareness at knowledge or reckless disregard. Ordinary carelessness in checking facts is a lower grade of fault, and the black-letter rule does not reach it.
The requirement comes from the First Amendment, not from the tort's own logic. False light punishes publication, and a rule that reached innocent or negligent inaccuracies in reports on matters of public interest would force publishers to verify every detail or drop the story. Justice Brennan carried that concern about self-censorship from New York Times into false light. He characterized exposure of the self as a concomitant of life in a civilized community and held that privacy had to yield in a society that places a primary value on freedom of speech and the press.32
The decision that imported the standard is Time, Inc. v. Hill. New York's statute gave even a newsworthy person little protection for his privacy, but it gave him a right of action when his name, picture, or portrait was the subject of a fictitious report or article.33 The Supreme Court held that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press preclude applying the statute to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. The Times rule applies to false light actions because, like defamation actions, they involve the publication of matters of public interest and the same tension between the values of privacy and the values of free expression.34 The Hills were private figures, and that was of no moment to Justice Brennan, because the public interest in the subject matter was controlling.35
In defamation law, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. later changed the framework. A public official or public figure must prove knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity by clear and convincing evidence, while a private plaintiff need show only fault, usually assumed to mean negligence, and the Court rejected the argument that a statement on a matter of public interest required proof of knowing or reckless falsehood.36 Hill set the standard by the subject of the publication, while Gertz sets it by the status of the plaintiff.37 Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., decided after Gertz, applied the standard of knowing or reckless falsity in upholding a judgment for the plaintiffs in a false light action.38 A reporter and a photographer had returned to the family's home to write a follow-up feature and spent 60 to 90 minutes there while Mrs. Cantrell was away, and the feature stressed the family's abject poverty. The jury returned compensatory verdicts for Mrs. Cantrell and her oldest son.39
The Supreme Court has not reconciled the two approaches for false light. The Second Restatement responded to the uncertainty by making knowledge or reckless disregard black-letter law in § 652E, with a caveat leaving open that a negligence standard might apply to false light actions by private figures under Gertz, and in the absence of Supreme Court guidance state courts and lower federal courts have divided.40 False light closely resembles defamation, since both arise from communicating alleged falsehoods about the plaintiff to third parties, so it is generally accepted that the First Amendment limits on defamation liability apply to false light as well. A public official or public figure must show knowledge or reckless disregard, and a private figure must show at least negligence.41 Federal courts applying state law, as in Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., have faced the same choice. Three positions result:
- Hill governs, or knowledge or reckless disregard is kept as a state-law requirement. Some courts have decided or assumed that Hill continues to provide the rule for all false light cases, as in Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., and others have kept the requirement because § 652E states it and it is thought to be a desirable limit on liability.42
- Negligence suffices for a private plaintiff. This is the false light counterpart of the generally accepted defamation rule.43
- The subject of the publication decides. If the false light publicity did not pertain to a matter of public interest, Hill can be distinguished and liability based on negligence allowed, as in West v. Media General Convergence, Inc.44
The third position follows the reason for the rule. The breathing-space justification is strongest when a publication concerns public affairs, and a report on a purely private matter gives much less reason to shield the publisher.
The usual exam error is to treat negligence as enough because the plaintiff is a private person. Under the Restatement's black letter, and in states that follow Hill, a careless error fails. The opposite error is to announce actual malice as settled constitutional law for every private plaintiff, when Cantrell and Gertz leave that question open and the answer should say so.
Defamation Overlap and Rejection
Section 652E does not require that the false light be defamatory, and that omission is meant to make the tort more than a second name for libel and slander. The overlap is nonetheless heavy. Most false light claims are actionable as defamation claims, and because of the overlap with defamation and the other privacy torts, a case has rarely succeeded squarely on a false light claim.46 Many false light claims are also defamation, emotional distress, appropriation, or intrusion claims in other dress, and the harm of being placed in a false light can often be compensated under one of those torts.47 That closeness explains why many courts distrust the tort. This subsection sets out the objection, the answer to it, and how to treat the tort in each kind of jurisdiction.
The objection with the most force is that false light covers the same ground as defamation without defamation's limits.48 Defamation law surrounds liability for false statements with rules that protect speakers, and a plaintiff who sues in false light can try to avoid each of them:
- the requirement that the publication convey a defamatory meaning, which false light replaces with the looser question whether the false light is highly offensive;
- the special damage requirement for some defamation;
- privileges, such as those for public meetings;49
- short statutes of limitations;
- procedural requirements; and
- state laws that apply to defamation, including retraction statutes.50
Plaintiffs have pleaded false light with, or instead of, defamation to escape those rules, with mixed success. Fellows v. National Enquirer, Inc. (special damage requirement) and Colbert v. World Publishing Co. (statute of limitations) illustrate the attempts.51 The mechanism is simple. When a safeguard governs one claim for a falsehood and not the other, a plaintiff pleads whichever label carries fewer limits, and the safeguard protects speakers only as far as the plaintiff's drafting allows.
Most states have accepted the tort, but the supreme courts of Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Texas have rejected it.52 Colorado's rejection came in Denver Publishing Co. v. Bueno, Florida's in Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, Minnesota's in Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and North Carolina's in Renwick v. News and Observer Publishing Co. Texas supplied the fullest account of the reasons in Cain v. Hearst Corp. A majority there was persuaded by the overlap with other torts, not only defamation but also other privacy torts and infliction of emotional distress, and by the chilling effect that false light liability would have on speech and publication.53 The court reasoned that defamation encompasses most false light claims and that false light “lacks many of the procedural limitations that accompany actions for defamation, thus unacceptably increasing the tension that already exists between free speech constitutional guarantees and tort law.” Texas statutory and common law supply privileges for public meetings, good faith, and mitigation, and the court treated those restrictions as safeguards of speech that a false light plaintiff would bypass. It also declined the compromise some jurisdictions use, which applies defamation's restrictions to false light, because any benefit of protecting non-defamatory false speech was outweighed by the chilling effect on speech.54
Legislatures have removed the tort in some states without any judicial judgment about policy, because in some states the tort is barred by statute.55 New York is the leading example. Its privacy statute reaches only the use of a name, portrait, or picture for advertising or trade, and the Court of Appeals in Howell v. New York Post Co. read the statute to exclude a common-law false light claim.56
Courts that keep the tort answer that the two torts protect different interests. Defamation protects reputation, and false light supplies a remedy for serious falsehoods that need not be defamatory and so might otherwise go unredressed.57 In Welling v. Weinfeld, the Ohio court expressed the dominant view when it held that liability for a false light claim maintains the integrity of the right to privacy as a complement to the other privacy torts.58 Arizona's decision in Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. held that a plaintiff whose claim was also defamation was not confined to a defamation action. Critics reply that under § 652E false light resembles defamation, since liability depends on the truth of what is communicated, the primary harm is injury to reputation, and the plaintiff need not show any impairment of privacy, which is why the well-known plaintiff in Douglass could sue.59
A middle course keeps the tort and applies defamation's limits to it. Some courts, while recognizing the tort, apply common law or statutory defamation defenses and limitations to false light actions.60 Yeung v. Maric and Wilson v. Freitas show courts carrying defamation doctrines over to false light claims.61 Importing the limits answers the evasion concern directly, because a plaintiff gains nothing by choosing the privacy label.
The usual exam error is to announce a false light claim without asking whether the state allows it. The opposite error is to reject the claim in a recognizing state because the statement was also defamatory. Overlap is the reason some courts reject the tort and is no reason to deny it where it is recognized, and a plaintiff who can prove both torts may sue on both.