Concept
Privacy as Four Torts
Invasion of privacy torts
Invasion of Privacy Torts
Privacy as Four Torts
The Restatement (Second) of Torts opens its treatment of privacy with a rule that sounds complete: one who invades another’s right of privacy is liable for the resulting harm to the other’s interests.1 The rule is only a label, because it says what follows from an invasion and never says what counts as one. The next subsection supplies the definition in four parts: unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, and publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.2 A plaintiff who claims only that privacy was invaded has stated a conclusion, and a pleading or an exam answer must name the branch the facts fit.
Privacy law has four torts instead of one because the branches protect different interests and therefore ask different questions of the facts. A test built around prying has nothing to say about a true story told to a wide audience, and a test built around falsity has nothing to say about a defendant who published nothing. The point has been repeated so often that it has become a cliché: invasion of privacy is not one tort but four.3
This unit traces how the right arose, shows how to tell the four torts apart, and then takes up three questions that cut across all of them: who may sue, what the defendant must have intended, and which defenses apply. Later sections take each branch in turn.
Origins of the Right
Privacy entered American tort law by way of scholarship. English common law never recognized invasion of privacy as a tort, but some invasions have been actionable in the United States since early in the twentieth century, and the principal credit goes to an 1890 law-review article, “The Right to Privacy,” by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.4 Their primary concern was the press: the publication of personal information and photographs that they thought should stay unpublished.5 Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise, they wrote, had invaded “the sacred precincts of private and domestic life,” and the next step in protecting the person was to secure to the individual what Judge Cooley called the right “to be let alone.”6
To ground the new right, Warren and Brandeis reached for the common law of copyright, which gives the owner control over access to unpublished materials: “the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given to the public.”7 Because the better rule protects even writing of no literary value as long as it is unpublished, they concluded that the principle at work was “not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality.”8
The article left much open. A later commentator observed that it specified limits on the new right but made no effort to say what makes out a prima facie case, how damages would be measured, or what the basis of liability would be, and that it projected a generous set of privileges without asking whether they would engulf the cause of action. Those ambiguities, the commentator added, still haunt the tort.9
The first major test of whether courts would accept the new tort involved a different infringement from the press publicity that worried Warren and Brandeis: use of a person’s picture in commercial advertising without consent.10 In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., the majority refused to recognize the right. A right of privacy, it reasoned, could not be confined to restraining the publication of a likeness once it became legal doctrine. It would embrace as well the publication of a word-picture or a comment on one’s looks, conduct, domestic relations, or habits, and it would reach the spoken word as readily as the printed one. The result, the majority predicted, would be a vast amount of litigation “bordering upon the absurd.”11
Judge Gray dissented and cited the Warren and Brandeis article. He argued that a court of equity should act on the basis of either analogy to established common-law principle or natural justice, and he drew his main analogies from the protection against invasion of person or property and from common-law copyright.12
One response was legislative. A statute of the kind quoted in the sources lets any person whose name, portrait, or picture is used in the state for advertising or trade purposes without written consent sue to restrain the use and to recover damages, and a jury may award exemplary damages when the defendant knowingly made the forbidden use.13 In New York and Virginia, liability for the use of a person’s name or picture under a statute of this kind is still the only privacy liability.14
Another court reached the opposite result. Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. endorsed Judge Gray’s dissent, found a right of privacy grounded in natural law and in personal liberty, held that violating it was a tort actionable without special damages, and ruled that the complaint stated a cause of action.15 Its picture of the harm explains the holding: a person whose likeness is used in advertisements is, for the time being, “under the control of another” and “in reality a slave without hope of freedom.”16
The two decisions part ways on a single choice. Roberson treated the impossibility of confining the right as a reason to refuse it. Pavesich held that difficulty in determining the line between liability and non-liability was no reason to reject the right. It also named the conflict that would matter most, which was claims of free speech and free press raised against privacy claims, and it saw no such conflict when a likeness is used in advertising.17 That conflict returns in the torts built on publication, where newsworthiness and First Amendment arguments press against the plaintiff.
Decisions accumulated, and the field sorted itself into four torts. All four emerged clearly only in the twentieth century.18 The Restatement (Second) of Torts, for which William Prosser served as Reporter, specified liability for the four types in §§ 652A through 652E.19 It is now well established, though not without criticism, that no general tort of invasion of privacy exists. There are four distinct torts, each with its own rules of liability, and some states have not accepted all four.20 What ties them together is less the umbrella term “privacy” than a concern for the protection of personal dignity, and none of the four requires proof of out-of-pocket damages to be actionable.21
The history explains the shape of the doctrine. Appropriation is the longest recognized privacy tort,22 and the advertising cases above supply its facts. The other branches arrived later and separately, which is why they carry different elements and why a state may accept some and refuse others.
Identifying the Four Torts
Household Finance Corp. v. Bridge states the structure bluntly. Privacy law, the opinion explains, is “not one tort, but a complex of four”: four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests, tied together by a common name but, apart from each interfering with the plaintiff’s right “to be let alone,” with almost nothing in common.24 Each tort addresses a different form of invasion and, to some extent, a different form of loss, and the link among them is a concern for personal dignity.25
Because each branch protects a different interest, each is defined by different facts. Intrusion asks whether the defendant intruded upon the plaintiff’s seclusion. Appropriation asks whether the defendant used the plaintiff’s name or likeness for the defendant’s own use or benefit.26 Disclosure asks whether the defendant gave publicity to a matter in the plaintiff’s private life that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the public.27 False light asks whether the defendant gave publicity to a matter that places the plaintiff in a false light highly offensive to a reasonable person, with knowledge of or reckless disregard as to the falsity.28
Set side by side, the definitions differ on four variables. Only intrusion and disclosure concern something private. Only disclosure and false light speak of publicity.29 Only false light requires falsity, and only appropriation turns on the defendant’s own use or benefit. Each variable marks a place where one branch’s requirement would be wrong for another. A student who carries the privacy requirement into false light will reject a plaintiff who was falsely portrayed to the public merely because the plaintiff’s life was an open book, and a student who carries the publicity requirement into intrusion will reject a plaintiff watched through a hidden lens by someone who told no one. Both errors come from treating four torts as one.
Within a branch, the elements carry the rest of the load. Appropriation shows how they get itemized. The Colorado Civil Jury Instructions divide it into five: the defendant used the plaintiff’s name or likeness; the defendant sought to take advantage of the plaintiff’s reputation, prestige, social or commercial standing, or any other value attached to the plaintiff’s name, likeness, or identity; the use served the defendant’s own purposes or benefit, commercially or otherwise; damages; and causation.30 Few cases require the plaintiff to prove the value of her identity before she may recover for mental suffering, because a plaintiff whose identity has no commercial value may still suffer anguish from an unauthorized use.31
To a lay observer the two scenes look alike, since each leaves the plaintiff humiliated, but the elements that matter run in opposite directions. The camera scene has prying and no publicity, while the newspaper scene has publicity among its elements and no prying. The newspaper’s accuracy gives it no defense, because the private-facts tort covers true, nondefamatory information that is publicized in an objectionable way.36
The fourth branch brings falsity back in. A newspaper photographer took a dramatic photograph of a child who had nearly been hit by a car, and the paper ran it the next day. Twenty months later a magazine used the photograph to illustrate an article on pedestrian carelessness titled “They Ask To Be Killed,” and the magazine’s publisher was held liable to the child.37 The newspaper’s original publication was privileged, because the child’s interest in being left alone was outweighed by the public interest in being informed.38 The accident was a public event, so no secret was at stake, and what changed was the use, which cast the child as one of the careless pedestrians the article condemned. Those facts resemble false light more than any other branch.
The four-branch map is the Restatement’s, and jurisdictions do not all draw it the same way. In New York and Virginia the only liability is the statutory claim for using a person’s name or picture, and a few decisions elsewhere reject false light or liability for publishing true private facts, although privacy claims are typically addressed under the Second Restatement’s rules.39 The four categories are the conventional analysis and not a closed list, so other forms may develop, and one episode can fit more than one branch.40 Two further claims sit next to the four. The right of publicity emerged from liability for commercial appropriation, and breach of confidence can provide a remedy for disclosure of sensitive personal information.41 The working method is to treat the label “invasion of privacy” as the start of the analysis. The answer names the branch the facts fit and then runs that branch’s own elements, since an argument made under the wrong branch imports requirements and defenses that do not belong to it.
Who May Sue
Section 652I of the Restatement (Second) of Torts limits who may bring a privacy claim. Except for appropriation, only a living individual whose own privacy was invaded can maintain the action, unless a statute provides otherwise.43 The right is limited to natural persons: legal entities such as corporations cannot sue, and no action lies for violating the privacy of a deceased person.44 The limit follows from what the torts protect. Each one compensates an injury to personal dignity,45 and only a living human being can suffer that injury.
A living individual is the plaintiff the rule expects. The child whose photograph a magazine reused beside an article on pedestrian carelessness recovered from the publisher.46 A corporation stands differently. Because privacy is a right pertaining only to natural persons, a legal entity cannot maintain an action for false light publicity, as Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick applied the rule.47 The same limit defeats an entity’s claim under any other branch,48 and a company hurt by a false story must look beyond privacy law for its remedy, since the privacy torts protect personal dignity.49
Death raises two questions with different answers. The first is whether anyone can sue for invading the privacy of a person who has already died, and the answer is no.50 The second is whether a claim the victim acquired while alive continues after death, and that depends on the local survival statute.51 Relatives who object to a post-death publication about a family member therefore have no privacy claim of their own, while the estate of a living plaintiff who was wronged must look to the survival statute.
Appropriation is the carve-out from the living-individual limit,52 and it is also the branch from which the right of publicity grew.53 Appropriation protects two things at once. It prevents unjust enrichment from the theft of goodwill attached to a person’s identity, and it prevents the psychological discomfort of unexpectedly becoming an object of public attention.54 The first aim is economic, and the right of publicity is the doctrine built around it. The right of privacy is a personal right that is neither assignable nor enforceable after a person’s death. The right of publicity can be assigned in whole or in part and enforced by the assignee, and the prevailing position is that it attaches to deceased as well as living persons. Damages for publicity violations reach economic losses and the commercial value the defendant gained by wrongful use of the plaintiff’s identity.55
An exam stem that makes a company or a dead person the plaintiff is testing this limit, and the answer should start with the plaintiff’s identity before it reaches the branch of the tort. A living person is the proper plaintiff under each of the four branches. An entity or an estate has to find its claim elsewhere: in a survival statute for a claim that arose during life, or in the right of publicity for the commercial value of an identity.
Intent and Defenses
Neither the appropriation definition nor the disclosure definition makes the defendant’s purpose to invade privacy part of the test. Section 652C imposes liability on one who appropriates another’s name or likeness to the appropriator’s own use or benefit,57 and § 652D imposes liability on one who gives publicity to a highly offensive private matter that is not of legitimate concern to the public.58 The pattern holds across the family. The defendant’s intent is usually not an issue, and the privacy torts other than intrusion do not require an intent to invade the plaintiff’s privacy.59 A defendant may be liable without having meant to put a name or likeness in an advertisement without consent or to disclose sensitive private facts that were not already known.60 The harm explains the rule: a plaintiff whose face appears in an advertisement is no less exposed because the mistake was innocent.
Two decisions illustrate liability without intent. In Flake v. Greensboro News Co., the plaintiff’s photograph was used in an advertisement by mistake, and in Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach a television broadcast distorted the plaintiff’s image inadequately.61 Two branches carry their own mental-state rules. Intrusion is the exception to the no-intent statement, because the wrong it names is an act of prying. False light has a separate fault requirement about falsity: the actor must have known of the falsity, or acted in reckless disregard as to it, both as to the publicized matter and as to the false light in which the plaintiff would be placed.62 That requirement concerns what the defendant knew about the truth of the publication, and not whether the defendant meant to invade privacy.
A defendant who has committed every element of a privacy tort may still avoid liability, but the law of defenses here is thin. There is no well-developed law of defenses to liability for invasion of privacy, and the defenses that apply to tort actions generally, such as immunity and consent, are valid.63 Consent matters most when the defendant is an employer. The employer can defend by showing consent, or by showing that its conduct was reasonably necessary to its business operation, and the cited illustration of consent is Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., which involved the use of an employee’s photograph.64
Consent and intent answer different questions. A defendant’s innocence says what the defendant meant and says nothing about whether the plaintiff agreed. A newspaper that ran a photograph by mistake may still be liable, while an advertiser who obtained the plaintiff’s consent can rely on it.
Defamation law protects certain occasions of speech even when a statement harms someone, and those protections carry into privacy cases. The circumstances that give an absolute privilege against defamation liability, such as a statement made in judicial proceedings, appear also to give an absolute privilege against privacy liability, and the qualified privileges of defamation law may apply as well under §§ 652F and 652G.65 An employer sued for invasion of privacy may invoke the same conditional privileges that are available in a defamation action.66 Without the carryover, a witness shielded in defamation could be sued over the same true testimony under a privacy label, because the disclosure tort reaches true information.67
The word “newsworthiness” appears in many privacy opinions as though it named a defense, but much of what has been called a defense actually goes to the elements of liability. In the disclosure tort, the plaintiff must show that the matter publicized is not of legitimate concern to the public, so a newsworthiness argument asserts that an element is missing.68 The inquiry also moves with time. A criminal’s conduct is of legitimate public interest for a period after it brings the person to public attention, but once the person has returned to the life of a law-abiding citizen, the conduct no longer deserves public attention and may count as a private matter.69 Later sections show how newsworthiness operates in each tort.
Federal law adds one more bar, and it depends on the kind of defendant. The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), bars actions against computer services that transmit or fail to remove content created by others.70 Applications include Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., which involved a fake profile and advertisements for the plaintiff on sex websites, and Doe v. America Online, Inc., which involved a computer service used to sell pornographic photographs and videotapes of a minor.71 The statute protects the service that carries the material, so a plaintiff injured by user-created content must look to the person who created it. One further argument remains open: the First Amendment may bar liability for publishing true facts about a person, but the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question directly.72
The usual exam error sits at the second step, where a defendant’s innocent mistake is treated as a defense to appropriation or disclosure. Intent matters only to the branches whose own elements ask for it, and the defendant’s real answers lie in consent, privilege, and the statutory bar.