Concept
Classifying a Defamation Claim
Constitutional limits: public officials, public figures, and private plaintiffs
Classifying a Defamation Claim
Two questions sort every defamation claim in this chapter, and the sort comes first because it fixes what the plaintiff must prove. The first asks whether the plaintiff is a public official or public figure or is instead a private figure. The second asks whether the speech at issue is of public concern.1 The answers place the claim in one of three situations. A public plaintiff suing over speech of public concern must surmount a much higher barrier against a media defendant than the common law raises. A private plaintiff suing over speech of public concern still finds the common-law standards displaced, though by requirements that are less forbidding in at least some of their range. A private plaintiff suing over speech of exclusively private concern meets constitutional requirements that need not change the common-law landscape at all.2 Sources that count public officials and public figures separately describe the same ground as four categories.3
The scale has a reason, and the reason lets you place facts that no case has reached. Where public debate is at stake, a rule that forced speakers to prove every public statement true would invite self-censorship, so the Constitution loads the burden onto the plaintiff.4 Where the plaintiff is private, the pull toward compensation grows, because private figures have less access to media channels for answering a falsehood and have not voluntarily placed themselves in the public eye.5 Where the speech is also of purely private concern, a plurality of the Court saw the speech itself as having reduced constitutional value.6 Each step down the scale relaxes some part of the plaintiff's burden, and throughout the Court is balancing reputation against expression, which tort liability can chill.7
Three results move along the scale: the fault the plaintiff must prove, who must prove falsity, and which damages are available. Public officials and public figures share the first row because they carry the same burden.
- A public official or public figure must prove that the defendant published a knowing or reckless falsehood, which for a statement about the plaintiff's conduct, fitness, or public role is the actual malice standard. Sullivan measured the proof against a standard of convincing clarity, and states remain free to allow presumed damages.8
- A private plaintiff on speech of public concern must prove falsity, at least against a media defendant, together with some fault, usually negligence, and actual injury. Without proof of actual malice, the plaintiff recovers no punitive damages and only compensation for actual injury.9
- A private plaintiff on speech of purely private concern proves only what state law requires, and presumed and punitive damages do not require actual malice. The Court's only decision in this setting concerned damages.10
The two questions have to be asked separately because they control different outcomes. The plaintiff's status, together with the role the statement concerns, fixes the fault standard. The Restatement (Second) of Torts reserves the knowing-or-reckless requirement for a false and defamatory statement about a public official's or public figure's conduct, fitness, or role in that capacity.11 It treats a public plaintiff's claim about a purely private matter like a private person's claim, so that negligence in failing to ascertain the truth is enough.12 The subject of the speech then decides how far the Constitution reaches into a private plaintiff's case. A story on a public matter brings the falsity burden and the limit on damages, while a purely private matter leaves state law largely free.13 A student who treats public concern as another name for public figure collapses the two questions and demands actual malice from a private person because the story was newsworthy.
The first two steps carry the most weight, because a mistaken sort cascades through everything after it. A plaintiff wrongly placed with the public figures carries a burden the Constitution does not impose on a private person, and a plaintiff wrongly placed with private persons escapes the burden it does impose. Once the sort is right, the remaining steps mostly read off consequences.
Two traps hide in the first row, and they look alike until you read the standard closely. Actual malice measures what the publisher believed about the truth: it means knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.21 An editor who despises an official but believes the story has therefore not acted with actual malice, and spite without a knowing or reckless falsehood falls short. Negligence falls short too. The Restatement reaches a public plaintiff's claim about public conduct only when the publisher knows the statement is false and that it defames the plaintiff, or acts in reckless disregard of those matters.22 The rule for private persons adds a third path, acting negligently in failing to ascertain them.23 One careless check of a single source can therefore defeat a claim in the first row and sustain one in the second.
The commissioner and the bookkeeper differ only in status, and the editor's state of mind is identical. What changes is what the Constitution requires the plaintiff to show about that state of mind. Gertz fixes the bookkeeper's side of the grid: a private figure need not meet the New York Times standard, a state may not impose liability without fault, and damages are limited to compensation for actual injury, with no punitive or presumed damages, unless knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity is proved.24
The third variation turns on the subject of the speech alone. In Dun & Bradstreet, a private plaintiff sued over speech of purely private concern, and a plurality held that, given the reduced constitutional value of such speech, the state interest in preserving private reputation adequately supports presumed and punitive damages even absent actual malice.25 The limit on damages from Gertz does not apply when the defamatory statement did not involve a matter of public concern.26 Treat the decision with care, because it is the only case to consider a private figure and speech not of public concern, and it speaks to damages.27
Falsity follows the same grid. Hepps held that, at least where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements are false.28 The Court explained that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern, so that true speech is not deterred.29 The state court in that case had put the burden of proving truth on the defendant because the plaintiff was neither an official nor a public figure, and the Court rejected that allocation.30 Public figures already carried the burden, so the holding changes the private plaintiff's case on a public matter.31 For a private plaintiff on a private matter, the sources leave falsity to state law.32
The fault floor is easy to overstate in either direction. Gertz treats negligence as the minimum for private plaintiffs and lets states demand more. More than forty states and the District of Columbia follow negligence for private figures suing media defendants on matters of public concern, only Alaska, Colorado, Indiana, and New Jersey require actual malice, and New York asks whether the publisher acted in a grossly irresponsible manner.33 Strict liability is closed to the states on a public matter, because they may define the standard for a private plaintiff only if they do not impose liability without fault.34 Whether a nonmedia defendant may claim these protections is unsettled: Hepps limited its holding to media defendants, five Justices in Dun & Bradstreet rejected any media and nonmedia distinction in separate opinions, and courts have divided almost evenly on the Gertz standard.35
Three overlay questions then test whether the publication gives the classified situation anything to operate on, and each can defeat a claim that has cleared the status, fault, and damages steps.
- A statement of opinion is actionable only if it includes or implies a false, defamatory fact, and a claim cannot prevail unless the statement can reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts. A column calling an official a disgrace to the office is hard to read as stating actual facts, a column reporting that the official took kickbacks asserts a checkable one, and prefacing that charge with “in my opinion” changes nothing.36
- Quotation marks add a test of their own, which the section on altered quotations supplies, and you apply it after the plaintiff and the speech are sorted.
- A public figure who sues for intentional infliction of emotional distress rather than defamation meets the same standard. In Hustler, a nasty parody of a well-known televangelist and his mother was not actionable, because no reasonable person could read the labeled parody as asserting a fact, and recovery could rest only on proof of falsity and actual malice.37
These rules inhibit most libel suits but not all of them. Some prominent businesses and persons sue anyway, expecting the expense of defending to force their critics to retract or settle.38