Concept
Public Versus Private Concern
Constitutional limits: public officials, public figures, and private plaintiffs
Public Versus Private Concern
Two questions sort a libel claim under the First Amendment, and the earlier sections answered only the first: who is the plaintiff? The second asks what the speech is about. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. turned on that second question. A plurality of the Court concluded there that, when a defamatory statement involves no matter of public concern, a state may permit a private plaintiff to recover presumed and punitive damages without proof of actual malice.
The plaintiff's status fixes the fault the plaintiff must prove. A public official or public figure suing over conduct, fitness, or role in that capacity prevails only by showing that the defendant knew the statement was false and defamatory or acted in reckless disregard of those matters, the actual malice standard that protects authors and journalists who write about public figures.1 A private plaintiff may establish fault by showing that the defendant acted negligently in failing to ascertain them.2 Few plaintiffs escape the private category: truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare, because those who attain that status have, for the most part, assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society.3
The subject of the speech adds a second variable. The Court's decisions point to two forces that may reshape the common-law landscape: whether the plaintiff is a public official, a public figure, or a private figure, and whether the speech is of public concern.4 Taken together, they produce three configurations:
- A public official or public figure suing over speech of public concern must surmount a much higher barrier than the common law raises before recovering damages from a media defendant.5
- A private figure suing over speech of public concern, as in Gertz, still finds the common-law standards supplanted, but the constitutional requirements are, in at least some of their range, less forbidding.6
- A private figure suing over speech of exclusively private concern, as in Dun & Bradstreet, does not necessarily find that the Constitution forces any change in at least some features of the common-law landscape.7
None of this depends on the government being a party. A civil suit between private parties raises the First Amendment when the court applies a state rule of libel law, because the test is whether state power has in fact been exercised, whatever the form in which it was applied.8 Sullivan itself reshaped a common-law rule that most states shared: about three-quarters of the courts to consider the question held that the common-law privilege was limited to the expression of opinion and did not include misstatements of fact, the position Alabama's highest court took before the Supreme Court reversed it.9
Presumed damages are where the second variable bites. A jury that presumes damage compensates reputational injury without proof of loss: the Alabama jury in Sullivan was told that “general damages need not be alleged or proved but are presumed,” and that punitive damages could be awarded “even though the amount of actual damages is neither found nor shown.”10 Gertz limited that power for private plaintiffs. It held that a showing of simple fault sufficed to recover actual damages, but that even a private-figure plaintiff had to show actual malice to recover presumed or punitive damages.11 What Gertz left open was whether that limit applies when the speech has nothing to do with public affairs. Dun & Bradstreet answers that it does not. The next subsection examines that answer, and the one after it asks how courts tell public concern from private.
The Dun & Bradstreet Exception
Greenmoss Builders, a construction contractor, sued a credit reporting agency over a confidential report, sent to five subscribers, that falsely stated Greenmoss had filed for bankruptcy.12 The jury awarded presumed and punitive damages although actual malice had not been proven. The trial court granted a new trial, but the Vermont Supreme Court reversed that ruling and held that the media protections established in Gertz do not apply to nonmedia defendants.13 A rule of that kind would have significantly limited the reach of the constitutional law of libel.14
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed, “although for reasons different from those relied on by the Vermont Supreme Court.”15 Justice Powell announced the judgment in an opinion that only Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined.16 The plurality stressed that, in sharp contrast to New York Times, the case involved both a private-figure plaintiff and speech of purely private concern, and it held that in that configuration the actual malice showing required for punitive damages under either Sullivan or Gertz was unnecessary: “In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest [in preserving private reputation] adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages—even absent a showing of ‘actual malice.’”17
The classification of the speech carried the case. A five-Justice majority found that the credit report did not involve a matter of public concern, primarily because it was provided for profit and made available to only five subscribers.18
Set beside Gertz, the case isolates the subject of the speech as the deciding variable. In Gertz, a private plaintiff had to show actual malice to recover presumed or punitive damages.19 Greenmoss was also a private plaintiff, and no actual malice had been proven, yet the award stood, because in the category of private figures and speech not of public concern, presumed and punitive damages do not require proof of actual malice.20 A plaintiff who can prove actual malice has no need of the exception, so the classification matters only to a plaintiff who cannot.
Vermont's ground, the defendant's nonmedia status, did not carry the day. Five Justices, though in separate opinions, expressly rejected any distinction between media and nonmedia defendants for purposes of defamation liability, and Justice White, concurring in the judgment, agreed with the four dissenters that the First Amendment gives no more protection to the press in defamation suits than it gives others exercising their freedom of speech.21 The exception therefore turns on what the speech is about, and the speaker's identity matters only as evidence on that question. Defamatory reports in the mass media are generally assumed or held to be on a matter of public concern, while statements addressed to one or a few people may well be found not to involve one.22
The exception also revives an idea the Court had set aside. Dun & Bradstreet brings back into defamation law the “matters of public concern” standard that Rosenbloom had introduced and that Gertz seemingly rejected.23 Public concern once triggered the actual malice requirement in false-light law as well: Time, Inc. v. Hill required actual malice in false-light cases involving matters of public concern, but the Court later limited that requirement to public figures and held that negligence suffices for private individuals.24
The holding is narrow, and it covers damages only. Dun & Bradstreet has so far been the only case to consider private figures and speech not of public concern.25 It did not say whether the fault requirement also falls away for such speech. Some read Justice White's concurrence as implying that it does, and some lower courts have agreed, but state defamation law has not generally returned to liability without fault, and a number of decisions expressly retain the fault requirement.26
The exception lifts a constitutional barrier without creating a right to presumed or punitive damages, which remain a matter of state law. The Constitution has modified the common law piece by piece: a defamatory statement of opinion, for example, was actionable at common law just as a statement of fact was, a rule that recent constitutional interpretations have modified.27
A common error on this material is to resolve a Greenmoss-type problem by asking whether the defendant is a newspaper. The sound order runs the other way. First ask whether the statement involves a matter of public concern. Then ask whether the plaintiff, who must be a private figure for the exception to apply, has proved actual malice.
Identifying Public Concern
Because the exception turns on public concern, courts must draw a line the Court itself calls poorly defined. Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,” or when it “is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.”28 Courts apply that definition by looking to the speech's content, form, and context as revealed by the whole record, the approach the Court took from Connick v. Myers and used in Dun & Bradstreet. The Court restated the definition in Snyder v. Phelps, a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress, so Snyder illustrates the method without deciding any defamation question.
Each element of the inquiry does a job. Content shows whether the community has a stake in the subject. Form and context show who received the message and why it was sent, which is where a court can judge whether liability would chill speech the public needs. The three together resist labels: a speaker cannot make a private attack public by attaching a public slogan, and a plaintiff cannot make public speech private by pointing to a private occasion.
The credit report in Dun & Bradstreet fell on the private side on all three counts. Its content was one company's finances, reported in confidence;29 its form was a report available to only five subscribers; and its context was a credit service operating for profit.30
Snyder came out the other way on the same inquiries. Church members picketed on public land near a military funeral with signs that addressed broad public issues, and the Court held that the signs involved matters of public concern. The link to a private funeral did not by itself change the nature of speech whose overall thrust and dominant theme were public, because no single factor controls and the setting counts as one circumstance among several. Both speakers injured a particular person, and what separates the cases is the audience and the subject: the credit agency spoke privately to paying clients about one firm's solvency, while the picketers spoke publicly to the community about national questions.
Offensiveness plays no role in the classification. The potential offensiveness of the speech does not decide whether it involves a matter of public concern,31 and the arguably inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to that question.32 The rule echoes a broader refusal to let liability follow jurors' reactions. “Outrageousness” in political and social discourse is inherently subjective and would let a jury impose liability on the basis of its tastes or views, or its dislike of a particular expression,33 which runs afoul of the Court's longstanding refusal to award damages because speech may have an adverse emotional impact on its audience.34 The Court applied the same reasoning to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress: public figures and public officials may not recover on that tort over publications like the one before it without also showing a false statement of fact made with actual malice.35
The steps were the same for both signs, and the subject moved the answer. A complaint about the handling of a business transaction is the kind of statement a court may find private,36 and the setting cannot stand in for an examination of what the sign says.
Lower courts have added a rough pattern to the three-part reading. Reports in the mass media are generally assumed to concern public matters, while statements addressed to one or a few people may be private, as with a criticism of an employee's job performance or an accusation of misconduct that has no public repercussions.37 Allegations of crime tend to fall on the public side, because public allegations that someone is involved in crime are generally speech on a matter of public concern. On that reasoning, the Ninth Circuit held in Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox that a blog post alleging that a court-appointed trustee committed tax fraud while administering a company's Chapter 11 reorganization qualified, even assuming Gertz is limited to statements on matters of public concern.38
A wide audience does not guarantee the answer, and neither does the defendant's identity. A court may consider that the defendant is or is not a member of the media, but the dispositive inquiry is whether the matter itself is one of public concern.39 The contents of a website might not be on a matter of public concern even if intended to inform or influence the general public.40 In Araya v. Deep Dive Media, LLC, a federal district court treated a gossip website's publication of a graduate's yearbook photograph as a private controversy, a case at the lurid-personal-matter end of a spectrum that runs from genuine public controversies to material that draws only voyeuristic attention.
The boundaries remain contested, as the Court has acknowledged: “the boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined.”41 The difficulty is built into the concept. If public concern means the public's actual interest, the media's decision to publish is likely strong, if not conclusive, evidence of it; if it is judged from an objective viewpoint, courts must decide what people, in their enlightened best interest, should want to know, a judgment troubling under the First Amendment.42 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, criticized public concern as an amorphous concept in Bartnicki v. Vopper, a wiretapping case. A borderline case is therefore best argued from the three inquiries applied to the whole record rather than from a label. The classification may also matter again for the burden of proving falsity, because Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps was limited to speech on a matter of public concern, a point the next section takes up.43