Concept
Private Plaintiffs
Constitutional limits: public officials, public figures, and private plaintiffs
Private Plaintiffs
The actual malice rule buys breathing room for speakers at the victim's expense. The standard administers “an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media self-censorship of the common-law rule of strict liability for libel and slander,” and it “exacts a correspondingly high price from the victims of defamatory falsehood.”1 A public official or public figure pays that price by proving that the defendant published a knowing or reckless falsehood.2 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. asks whether a private person must pay it too. The answer is no, with two limits: the private plaintiff must still prove fault, and a plaintiff who falls short of actual malice may recover only for proved injury.
When a publication addresses a matter of public concern, a private plaintiff must prove that it was false, that the defendant was at fault (usually negligent), and that the plaintiff suffered actual injury.3 Without that proof the plaintiff recovers nothing, and on that proof alone the plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages.4 Falsity belongs to the plaintiff's case: in Hepps, the trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving it, a point a later section develops.5
The two limits work as a pair, and the subsections that follow take them in turn. Fault comes first: it is the constitutional floor beneath every private plaintiff's claim, and the Restatement standard is the one most states use to meet it. Damages come second, where Gertz paired the lower fault threshold with a narrower remedy.
Gertz and the Fault Requirement
Elmer Gertz, a Chicago lawyer, represented a victim's family in a civil suit against a Chicago policeman who had been convicted of murder. He then sued the publisher of “American Opinion,” an outlet for the views of the John Birch Society, for libel.6 The Supreme Court held that the New York Times actual malice standard did not govern his case and that the trial court erred in entering judgment for the publisher.7 The ruling did not end the case, however. The jury had been allowed to impose liability without fault and to presume damages without proof of injury, so a new trial was necessary.8
The Court sorted plaintiffs by who they are, not publications by what they discuss. A subject test, which a plurality had favored in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, would extend actual malice to every publication on a matter of “general or public interest.” It would also force state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address such issues and which do not.9 A test keyed to the plaintiff avoids that burden, and it rests on a real difference between the two kinds of plaintiff.
A private individual “has not accepted public office or assumed an ‘influential role in ordering society.’” He “has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood.” Private individuals, the Court concluded, “are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.”10 Public figures differ in kind. Truly involuntary public figures “must be exceedingly rare,” and for the most part those who attain the status “have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society.”11
Justice White, dissenting, would have kept the common-law allocation of risk. The law had “put the risk of falsehood on the publisher where the victim is a private citizen,” and the Court “would now shift this risk to the victim, even though he has done nothing to invite the calumny, is wholly innocent of fault, and is helpless to avoid his injury.” He doubted that “jurisprudential resistance to liability without fault” justified using the First Amendment “to revolutionize the law of libel.”12
The majority's answer is a floor: no liability without fault. The Court did not define fault, but it is generally thought to have made negligence the threshold requirement of liability.13 Negligence here means failing to exercise sufficient care to ensure that what was published was accurate, and it may also lie in publishing a statement that could be read to carry a meaning the defendant did not intend. A publisher that relays an unverified report from a reputable wire service is ordinarily not negligent, because courts usually find no duty to verify such reports independently.14
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B states the standard in three alternatives. A publisher is liable if, but only if, it (a) knows that the statement is false and that it defames the plaintiff,15 (b) acts in reckless disregard of those matters,16 or (c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.17 Clauses (a) and (b) track actual malice. Clause (c) adds the negligent publisher who never knew or suspected the error, and it is the clause that sets the practical measure of fault. The section covers a private person, and it also covers a public official or public figure when the statement concerns a purely private matter that does not affect the plaintiff's conduct, fitness, or role in a public capacity.18
Mead Corp. v. Hicks shows how a court applies clause (c). The finder of fact asks whether the defendant acted as a reasonable, prudent person in publishing the communication. It may weigh the thoroughness of the check a reasonable person would have made before publishing, the nature of the interests the defendant sought to promote, and the extent of damage to which the statement exposed the plaintiff's reputation.19
States fill in “fault” differently. Over forty states and the District of Columbia follow Gertz's negligence standard for private plaintiffs suing media defendants over matters of public concern. Only Alaska, Colorado, Indiana, and New Jersey require actual malice, and New York asks whether “the publisher acted in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties.”20 The common denominator is some fault, usually negligence.21
The two papers printed the same falsehood about the same plaintiff, and the care each took before printing is the only difference between them. Two errors run in opposite directions. One demands actual malice of a private plaintiff because the story was newsworthy. The other treats the Constitution as requiring negligence everywhere, when it requires only some fault.
Two questions about the reach of the fault requirement remain contested. The first is whether it protects only the institutional media. Courts have divided almost evenly, and some Justices have indicated they would draw no distinction between media and other defendants, although Hepps phrased its holding only for media defendants.22 In Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, the court held that the Gertz negligence requirement is not limited to institutional media defendants. It reasoned that the line between the press and other commentators has blurred and that “the public-figure status of a plaintiff and the public importance of the statement at issue—not the identity of the speaker—provide the First Amendment touchstones.”23
The second question is whether the fault requirement survives when the statement does not involve a matter of public concern. Dun & Bradstreet limited the damages rule to matters of public concern, and Justice White's concurring opinion believed the principal opinion implied that the fault rule is confined in the same way. Some lower courts agreed, but state defamation law has seen no major resurgence of liability without fault, and a number of cases explicitly retain the fault requirement.24 The defendants in Obsidian pressed this point as a separate argument, contending they owed no showing of negligence because Gertz involved a matter of public concern and their case did not.25
Presumed and Punitive Damages
Gertz's second holding limits what a private plaintiff collects on a showing short of actual malice. The Court found it “necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury.”27 A private plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than actual malice therefore “may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.”28 That rule leaves no room for presumed or punitive damages. The Court applied it to Gertz himself when it ordered a new trial because the jury had been permitted to presume damages without proof of injury.29
The restriction displaces a common-law rule that let plaintiffs recover without proving loss. In most jurisdictions any libel is actionable per se, meaning the plaintiff need not prove special harm from the publication.30 Even if the plaintiff cannot or does not prove actual damages, the trier of fact may infer harm sufficient to support compensatory or nominal damages.31 The rationale was practical: “proof of actual damage will be impossible in a great many cases where, from the character of the defamatory words and the circumstances of publication, it is all but certain that serious harm has resulted in fact.”32
The trial in Sullivan shows the rule at full strength. Because the statements were libelous per se, the judge told the jury that “the law . . . implies legal injury from the bare fact of publication itself,” that “general damages need not be alleged or proved but are presumed,” and that “punitive damages may be awarded by the jury even though the amount of actual damages is neither found nor shown.”33 Gertz bars a jury from awarding presumed or punitive damages to a private plaintiff who has not proved actual malice.
The Court's governing principle is that state remedies for defamatory falsehood should “reach no farther than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved.”34 In a private plaintiff's case, that interest is compensation for injury to reputation. Presumed damages compensate for loss the plaintiff never had to prove. Punitive damages do not compensate at all, since they differ from general damages, which are “compensatory in nature.”35 Neither serves the interest that justified liability on a showing short of actual malice, so Gertz removes both.
What remains is compensation for actual injury, and the Court left the term undefined because “trial courts have wide experience in framing appropriate jury instructions in tort actions.” Juries must receive appropriate instructions, and every award must rest on competent evidence of the injury, although no evidence need assign a dollar value to it.36 Actual damages are broader than the special damages the common law required for slander not actionable per se. Special damages demand pecuniary loss. Actual damages may include injury to reputation or emotional distress without any showing of pecuniary loss, but the plaintiff must prove the injury.37
The breadth carries a risk. A generous definition of actual damages invites awards for embarrassment and humiliation, and presumed damages generally, to be made under the guise of compensation.38 The proof requirement answers that risk, and it initially appeared designed to give trial and appellate courts greater control over the amount a jury may award.39
The limit binds only the plaintiff who falls short of actual malice. Gertz restricts plaintiffs “who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth,”40 so a plaintiff who does prove it stands outside the restriction. Public officials and public figures must prove that level of fault to recover anything, and the Constitution leaves presumed damages to state law.41 The same allocation follows for a private plaintiff who proves actual malice: the First Amendment no longer blocks presumed or punitive damages, and state law decides whether the jury may award them.
Because actual malice unlocks the larger remedies, the meaning of knowledge of falsity matters. In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, a public figure sued an author who, “with full knowledge of the inaccuracy,” used quotation marks to attribute to him comments he had not made.42 The Court held that a deliberate alteration of a plaintiff's words does not equate with knowledge of falsity, for purposes of New York Times and Gertz alike, “unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement.”43 The work there purported to be nonfiction and gave readers no clue that the quotations were anything but actual conversations, so a trier of fact could find that readers would take them at face value.44
The damages restriction also depends on the subject of the speech. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the Court held that Gertz's limitation of damages does not apply “when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of public concern.” Plaintiffs in that setting may recover presumed and punitive damages without proving knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard.45 A later section takes up that exception and the line between public and private concern.
Both papers published the same kind of accusation about a private person on a subject of public concern, and the two owners' remedies differ because of what the editors knew. Two misreadings follow from missing that point. One leaves a negligence plaintiff with nothing unless a ledger of lost business can be produced, when actual injury includes reputational harm and emotional distress and requires no dollar proof. The other treats presumed and punitive damages as abolished from libel law, when they return on proof of knowing or reckless falsehood and, as the next section shows, remain available without it when the speech does not involve public concern.50