Concept
Republication and the Internet
Publication, republication, and the single publication rule
Republication and the Internet
Defamation law counts publications by communication. Except as subsections (2) and (3) of § 577A provide, each of several communications to a third person by the same defamer is a separate publication.1 The single publication rule is the main exception. Section 577A(3) treats any one edition of a book or newspaper, any one radio or television broadcast, any one exhibition of a motion picture, and any similar aggregate communication as one publication,2 and subsection (4) hangs the rule's consequences on that count by opening, "As to any single publication."3 Earlier sections of this chapter developed those consequences: one action, all damages in it, and a judgment that bars later suits.
The rule confines tort liability for a mass communication to one cause of action, which accrues when the matter is first published, and so prevents stale claims from a single publication.4 Everything therefore turns on what counts as the same publication. Copies of one edition are one publication, and a new edition is another.5
Two settings strain that count. A web page has no print run: it stays available indefinitely and can be edited, linked, discussed, and shared, so the question is which of those events is a new publication. A private communication reaches no mass audience, so the rule's concern with multiplied suits over one wide release may not describe it at all. The next two subsections take the settings in turn.
Websites and Online Posts
Courts have applied the single publication rule to Internet publications.6 A defamatory post therefore supports one claim, and the limitation period runs from initial publication, the date the matter was first posted or made generally available to the public.7 The Georgia Court of Appeals gave the reason in McCandliss v. Cox Enterprises: material on Internet sites may be viewed by many people, over a wide area, for an indefinite time, so the plaintiff must collect all damages in one action, and the limitation period runs from the initial publication.8 A later decision overruled McCandliss on other grounds.
The rule was drafted around editions, and a website has none. The plaintiff in Firth v. State argued that the State's modifications to its website, made while the defamatory statement stayed on it, were a second publication. The New York Court of Appeals disagreed. A book or magazine has specific publication runs, but a website can be modified constantly, and if each modification counted as a publication, the court reasoned, the result could be a morass of litigation that defeated the statute of limitations for Internet defamation. The court added that the mere addition of information to a website cannot republish defamatory material already there.9 A page that can be edited at any moment would have no limitation period at all if each edit restarted it.
Edits elsewhere on a site do not reach a statement left untouched. In Yeager v. Bowlin, the Ninth Circuit applied the single publication rule to a defamatory statement on a website that had not been modified since 2003, and held that modifying other material on the site did not restart the limitation period for the unaltered postings.10 The statement sat exactly as first posted, so it remained one publication, and the claim stayed dated from the first posting.
The result changes when the edit reaches the defamatory matter. For limitations purposes, a modification or addition to a website is a new publication when it relates to the substance of the defamatory material, and is not when it is unrelated to the defamation or leaves its substance unaltered. Petro-Lubricant Testing Laboratories, Inc. v. Adelman and Woodhull v. Meinel so hold.11 The test asks what the defendant did with the defamatory matter. A change aimed at that matter shows a fresh decision to put it before readers, much as a new edition does; an unrelated change shows nothing of the kind. Firth fits the test, because the modification there left the statement as it was.
The second step does the real work. The common error is to treat any edit as a republication, when only an edit that touches the defamatory content matters.
Two other Internet events resemble republication and are not. In Lokhova v. Halper, the court held that hypertext links do not constitute republication, and that a third party who posts new comments on defamatory material does not republish it in a way that makes the original publisher liable.12 Neither event changes what the original publisher said. Whether a commenter answers for the commenter's own words is a separate question.
A retweet differs because someone else performs it. A retweet is a new publication if it is directed to a new audience, and the original poster is not liable for it unless the poster reasonably foresees that the tweet will be republished; the general question is whether the republication was reasonably foreseeable, as Hickey v. St. Martin's Press frames it.13 Two earlier rules combine here. The retweeter repeats the statement to followers who had not seen it, so the retweeter is subject to liability as if the retweeter had originally published it (§ 578),14 and the original poster is responsible for harm from the repetition when it was reasonably to be expected (§ 576(c)).15
Non-Media Publications
The single publication rule takes its shape from mass-media examples: an edition, a broadcast, an exhibition of a film, or a similar aggregate communication.19 Despite the rule's wide adoption, the trend is not to apply it to non-media publications, meaning defamatory communications that do not go out as mass-media products, such as a report sent privately to a lender.20 Hukic v. Aurora Loan Services and Musto v. Bell South Telecommunications reflect that trend. The decisions are not uniform, so a bar answer should describe a trend, not a settled exception, and give the two reasons behind it.
The first reason is that the rule is not needed here. It guards against numerous suits over one mass release, and a private report reaches a few recipients at most. Nothing multiplies claims beyond what the defendant did, and the separate-publication default of § 577A(1) yields a count courts can manage.21
The second reason concerns the clock. The rule dates the claim from the original release, which is fair for a book or broadcast that is out in public, where the plaintiff or anyone close to the plaintiff may come across it. A private communication has no such audience, and its only witnesses are the speaker and the listener. If the limitation period began at that first communication, it could expire before the plaintiff learned of the defamation.22 Treating secrecy as a head start for the defendant would reward the very feature that makes private defamation hard to discover.
A court that declines the single publication rule leaves the default in place: each communication to a third person is a separate publication.23 The trend does not erase the plaintiff's claim. It declines to apply a rule that would date the claim from the first communication.
An exam stem that pairs a defamatory statement with a late discovery is asking what kind of communication carried the statement. If it was a mass-media edition or broadcast, apply the single publication rule. If it was a private report to one or a few recipients, say that courts have been reluctant to apply the rule, and give the two reasons. Do not describe the reluctance as uniform.