Concept
Effects of the Single Publication Rule
Publication, republication, and the single publication rule
Effects of the Single Publication Rule
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A(4) lists what follows once a communication counts as a single publication, and its first words confine every consequence to that setting: the rules apply “as to any single publication.”1 Three consequences follow. Only one action for damages can be maintained; all damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in that action; and a judgment on the merits for or against the plaintiff bars any other action for damages between the same parties in all jurisdictions.2 The Supreme Court quoted the rule in these three parts in Keeton and called it an exception to the general rule that each communication of the same defamatory matter by the same defamer is a separate and distinct publication with its own cause of action.3 The counting rules therefore come first. A new edition or a rebroadcast is its own publication, and the three consequences operate within each publication separately.
Each consequence closes a different route by which one publication could become many lawsuits. The limit on actions stops repeated suits over the same edition or broadcast. Standing alone, it would be harsh, because a plaintiff confined to one suit would forfeit any harm that suit could not reach, so the second consequence lets the one action recover for harm in every jurisdiction. The third makes the result final. A merits judgment binds the parties in all jurisdictions, so a plaintiff who loses cannot refile in another state, a plaintiff who wins cannot return for more, and a defendant who prevails need not defend the same publication elsewhere. The plaintiff receives one forum and full recovery, and the defendant receives an end to the controversy.
Keeton states the purposes behind the arrangement. The rule lets states cooperate in providing a forum for efficiently litigating all issues and damages claims arising out of a libel in a single proceeding; it reduces the serious drain of libel cases on judicial resources and protects defendants from harassment by multiple suits.4 The rule also fixes the timing. The claim accrues at the original publication, and the limitation period runs from that date, not from the latest delivery of a copy.5 That result reverses the older common-law position, described below. The subsections take the three consequences in order, beginning with the limit on actions, which also shows how the limitation period works.
One Action Only
Section 577A(4)(a) takes the unit that the counting rules produced, whether one edition, one broadcast, or one utterance, and attaches a single cause of action to it: only one action for damages can be maintained as to that publication.6 Everything the plaintiff has to say about the harm from that edition, in one city or in fifty, belongs in one lawsuit. The doctrine is commonly summed up as one claim for each mass publication, not a claim for every book or issue in the run.7 A claim that exists once also begins once, so the limitation period has a single starting point. The practical question the rule answers is whether anything that happens after the first release can start the period running again.
Ogden v. Association of the United States Army answered that question for a libel claim over a book. The court called it the prevailing American doctrine that publication of a book, periodical, or newspaper containing defamatory matter gives rise to but one cause of action, which accrues at the time of the original publication, and that the statute of limitations runs from that date. It is no longer the law, the court said, that every sale or delivery of a copy creates a new cause of action. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.8
The rule Ogden displaced came from England. In The Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, decided in 1849, a single copy of a newspaper issue published in 1830 was sold seventeen years later, and the plaintiff sued for libel on that sale. The court overruled a limitations plea on the theory that each sale or delivery of a copy gave rise to a new and separate cause of action.9 Under that approach the date of printing told a defendant nothing about when exposure would end, since exposure lasted as long as any copy could change hands. Ogden replaced it with a fixed starting point: the first release starts the clock, and later sales leave it running.
The plaintiff keeps real protection under this arrangement. The court acknowledged that the number of copies supplied to the public is a factor in determining the amount of damages, and it reasoned that protecting the plaintiff in that respect does not require treating every sale of an additional copy as a new publication with a new cause of action.10 Wide circulation raises the recovery without multiplying the claims.
The one-action limit attaches to a publication, so it protects only the release already counted. Copies of the original remain part of the single publication, but republication in a new edition creates a new cause of action.11 The conflicts materials draw the same line: the rule applies to one broadcast or one edition of a book or magazine, and re-issuances or re-broadcasts can create new defamation claims, though only one substantive claim is recognized for the initial publication.12 The plaintiff's one action over the first edition therefore has no bearing on a later edition.
On an exam, find the date of the original publication first and measure the limitation period from it. A fact pattern that stresses a bookstore's sale of a copy only last week is offering the Ogden situation, and the claim is barred if the period has run from the first release. Only a genuinely new publication, such as a new edition, changes the result, and the next section of this chapter takes up republication. The next subsection turns from how many actions exist to what the one action can recover.
All Damages in One Action
Section 577A(4)(b) supplies the second consequence: all damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in the one action.14 The previous subsection established that a single publication supports only one action, and this clause says what that action contains. A plaintiff whose reputation suffered from one magazine issue circulated in thirty states brings one lawsuit and asks in it for the whole harm, wherever it was felt. The clause also burdens the plaintiff. The one action must claim all damages resulting from the publication, past and future, and no later suit will pick up whatever was left out.15
The first two clauses work as an exchange. Defamation injures reputation: a communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.16 When copies reach readers in many places, that harm is spread across many communities, and an action limited to harm in the forum state would leave most of it unremedied. Clause (b) makes the remedy as wide as the injury. Defendants and courts gain too, since a dispute over one edition is tried in one proceeding, which reduces the drain of libel cases on judicial resources and protects defendants from harassment by multiple suits.17
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. shows the damages rule working in a real dispute. Kathy Keeton claimed to have been libeled in five issues of a magazine, and only a small portion of the copies of those issues were distributed in New Hampshire.18 Her first suit, in Ohio, where the magazine was published, ended with her libel claim dismissed as barred by the Ohio statute of limitations, and she filed the present action in October 1980.19 The Court of Appeals observed that the single publication rule would ordinarily require it to award her damages caused in all states should she prevail, even though the bulk of her alleged injuries were sustained outside New Hampshire.20 The Supreme Court nonetheless concluded that the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit.21
The Court's reasoning ties the damages rule to the question whether the forum may hear the case at all. Because Keeton was seeking damages suffered in all states in this one suit, the publisher's contacts with New Hampshire had to be judged in light of that claim. The question was whether it was fair to compel the publisher to defend a multistate suit seeking nationwide damages for all copies of the five issues, even though only a small portion of those copies were distributed in New Hampshire.22 The Court answered that it was fair. That the bulk of the harm occurred outside the forum did not matter, because the same is true of almost every libel action brought somewhere other than the plaintiff's domicile, and there is no justification for restricting libel actions to the plaintiff's home forum.23
The jurisdictional holding is the secondary point in this section, and its limits matter. The Court concluded only that the District Court could entertain the multistate suit. It described the actual applicability of the single publication rule on the facts of that case as a matter of substantive law, not personal jurisdiction, and it said that permitting a plaintiff to seek multistate damages is not the same as holding that such damages should be awarded.24 Establishing jurisdiction therefore entitles the plaintiff to ask for nationwide damages, and the merits decide whether the rule applies and whether the damages are awarded.
Because the whole claim goes to one forum, the choice of forum carries weight. The victim of a libel may sue in any forum with which the defendant has minimum contacts and need not sue at home.25 Collecting all damages in one proceeding raises questions of venue, limitations, and choice of law whenever the publication is received in more than one state.26 A Georgia decision, McCandliss v. Cox Enterprises, applies the rule to internet postings. Because a post may be viewed by many persons over a wide area for an indefinite time, the plaintiff must collect all damages in one action, and the limitation period runs from the date of initial publication.27 The Supreme Court kept such concerns separate from jurisdiction. Whether a forum's limitation period applies to out-of-state damages arises only after jurisdiction over the defendant is established, and the Court did not want that choice-of-law question to complicate or distort the jurisdictional inquiry.28
The conflicts rule follows the same logic. The Restatement's most-significant-relationship approach (§ 150) singles out the plaintiff's domicile at the time of the defamation, at least where the defamatory words reached into that state among others. The theory is that the plaintiff usually sustains the primary injury at home, where reputation is presumably strongest.29 Because an injury to an intangible value such as reputation cannot be localized in a single place, the place of injury carries less weight in these conflicts.30
Judgment Bars Later Suits
Section 577A(4)(c) supplies the last consequence: a judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the merits of any action for damages bars any other action for damages between the same parties in all jurisdictions.32 The clause attaches to a decision that resolves the dispute over the publication, and it applies whichever side wins. It also reaches across state lines. A plaintiff who loses in one state cannot refile in another, and a plaintiff who wins cannot go to a different forum for a second recovery.
The two preceding clauses show why the bar must be this broad. Because the plaintiff must put all damages from every jurisdiction into one action, the judgment in that action has to settle the whole claim. If a merits judgment bound the parties only in the state that rendered it, the single action would be a first attempt and nothing more. A plaintiff who lost on the question of truth in one state could carry the same issue of the same magazine to a second state, and a defendant who won would face the same claim wherever the issue circulated. That would restore the multiplicity of suits the rule exists to prevent, and a judgment binding everywhere is what lets the one action actually be the only action.
The words upon the merits mark the limit of the bar. A merits judgment resolves the substance of the claim: whether the statement was defamatory, whether it was false, and, where the plaintiff is a government official, whether the official carried the burden of proving falsity and of alleging and proving “malice.”33 A dismissal because the plaintiff sued too late decides none of that. It says only that the claim came after the forum's time limit expired, and time limits vary from state to state. A ruling that one state's period has run says nothing about whether the plaintiff has a good claim in a state that allows more time.
Keeton shows what the clause does not reach. Kathy Keeton's first suit, in Ohio, ended with her libel claim dismissed as barred by the Ohio statute of limitations, and she then filed in New Hampshire in October 1980.34 That dismissal decided only that the claim came too late in Ohio. It did not decide whether the magazine had libeled her, so it was not a judgment upon the merits, and the terms of § 577A(4)(c) do not reach it. The Supreme Court went on to hold that the District Court could entertain her multistate suit, and it left the applicability of the single publication rule on those facts to substantive law.35
On an exam, a fact pattern that mentions an earlier suit over the same publication calls for one sorting question: how did that suit end? A verdict, or a judgment resting on truth or privilege, decided the merits and bars the later suit in every jurisdiction. A dismissal for lateness decided nothing about the claim itself, and the plaintiff may still sue in a forum whose limitations period has not run. This subsection covers only the bar that § 577A(4)(c) creates, and the broader law of preclusion lies outside it.