Concept
Analyzing a Statement Step by Step
Libel versus slander and when special harm is required
Analyzing a Statement Step by Step
Every defamation problem begins with one sorting question: is the statement libel or slander? Libel is defamatory matter published in written or printed words, in physical form, or in any other communication with the potentially harmful qualities of writing. Slander is defamatory matter published in spoken words, in transitory gestures, or in any form of communication outside the libel definition.1 Broadcasts are the easy case: defamation by radio or television is libel, whether or not the speaker reads from a manuscript.2
The label comes first because every later question depends on it. A libel plaintiff owes no proof of pecuniary loss. A slander plaintiff must either fit one of four per se categories or prove special harm. Damages then follow whichever route established liability. A student who asks about lost money before classifying the statement may demand proof from a plaintiff who owes none, and a student who computes damages before deciding that a claim exists measures a remedy for a wrong that may not be actionable. The checklist below keeps the questions in an order that avoids both mistakes.
Run the checklist against the words actually published; each step either ends the inquiry or sends it to the next.
A statement classified as libel clears the hardest hurdle at once. One who falsely publishes defamatory matter in a manner that makes the publication libel is liable although no special harm results, so the plaintiff's proof stops at publication, falsity, and defamatory character.3 The only wrinkle is the minority per quod rule, under which libel that is defamatory only through extrinsic facts is treated like slander that is not actionable per se. An answer that cannot tell which rule the jurisdiction follows should state the result under both.
Slander takes steps three and four. A slander is actionable without proof of special harm if it imputes a criminal offense, a loathsome disease, matter incompatible with the plaintiff's business, trade, profession, or office, or serious sexual misconduct.4 Slander outside those four categories supports liability only if it is the legal cause of special harm.5 Special harm in this setting means a pecuniary loss that follows from damage to reputation, so humiliation and distress do not count. The loss must also run through other people: listeners who believed the slander and changed how they dealt with the plaintiff. A plaintiff who cannot prove such a loss has no claim, and therefore no recovery of any size, not even nominal damages.6
The classification came out the same for both remarks, so the content of each remark moved the result. The crime category covers an offense that, if committed in the place of publication, would be punishable by imprisonment in a state or federal institution or would be regarded by public opinion as involving moral turpitude.7 Shoplifting is theft, which public opinion regards as involving moral turpitude, and either alternative suffices. A complaint about borrowed tools has no comparable feature.
The broadcast rule makes the medium the test, so the absence of a script and the size of the audience drop out of the analysis, and a plaintiff defamed on the air stands where any libel plaintiff stands.8 A close case that is neither a clear broadcast nor a clear writing is resolved by weighing three factors: the area of dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated character of the publication, and the persistence of the defamation.9
Step five asks what the plaintiff recovers, and the answer depends on how liability was established. A defendant liable for a libel, or for a slander actionable per se, is liable for at least nominal damages, so a plaintiff who establishes liability but shows no loss still obtains a judgment.10 The same defendant answers for the proved, actual harm to the plaintiff's reputation,11 and for any special harm that the publication legally caused.12 In the lunch scene, the shoplifting accusation carries Priya at least to nominal damages, while the tools remark carries her nowhere, because there is no liability for damages to attach to. In the radio version, the tools remark reaches the same nominal floor. Constitutional limits on presumed and punitive damages come last, because they trim a recovery that has already been established. They matter chiefly when the statement concerns a matter of public concern and the plaintiff cannot show a knowing or reckless falsehood.
Four errors recur in answers to defamation problems, and each comes from skipping or reordering a step:
- Treating a broadcast as slander because the words were spoken overlooks that radio and television defamation is libel, so the plaintiff needs no per se category and no pecuniary loss.13
- Applying the special-harm requirement to libel demands proof that a libel plaintiff does not owe, since libel is actionable although no special harm results, subject only to the per quod minority rule.14
- Counting emotional distress or injured reputation as special harm confuses an item of damages with the gatekeeping element, because special harm is a pecuniary loss, and distress can be compensated only after liability is established.15
- Forgetting the per se categories strands a spoken accusation of crime, loathsome disease, unfitness for a calling, or serious sexual misconduct without a remedy, when it is actionable without proof of any loss.16