Concept
Special Harm in Slander
Libel versus slander and when special harm is required
Special Harm in Slander
A plaintiff who proves that the defendant spoke defamatory words about the plaintiff to others has not yet stated a claim for slander. Unless the words fall within one of four per se categories, the plaintiff must also plead and prove “special damage,” a pecuniary loss that the slander caused, and the court does not reach the question of damages until that proof is in.1
Libel starts from the opposite premise. Under the traditional rule, once the plaintiff showed publication of defamatory material, courts presumed damages, and the plaintiff recovered substantial damages on proof of three elements: publication of defamatory material, of and concerning the plaintiff, to a third person.2 The older formula states the contrast in one sentence: libel is in all cases actionable per se, while slander is, save in special cases, actionable only on proof of actual damage.3 The special cases are the four per se categories taken up in the next section.4 This unit covers the default rule for every other slander, first as a requirement of liability and then as a definition of the loss that satisfies it.
The Special Harm Requirement
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 575 states the rule: one who publishes a slander that, although not actionable per se, is the legal cause of special harm to the person defamed is subject to liability to that person.5 The converse matters as much. A slander outside the per se categories that caused no special harm gives the plaintiff no claim. A slander plaintiff therefore has two routes to liability, which are to bring the words within a per se category or to prove special harm, and a plaintiff with neither recovers nothing.6
The traditional label says the same thing. Slander outside the per se categories is called slander per quod, and in common law pleading “per quod” introduced specifications of damage.7
Special harm plays a different role here than it does elsewhere in defamation. A defendant liable for libel or for slander per se owes at least nominal damages and also owes for any special harm the publication legally caused, so special harm there is an item of recovery added to a liability that already exists.8 In slander per quod, special harm is the element that creates liability. The plaintiff who cannot prove it loses at the threshold, with no nominal award to fall back on, because the rule on nominal damages reaches only libel and slander actionable per se.9 The plaintiff who does prove it opens the door to more: general damages for injury to reputation follow without further proof, and damages for mental distress, wounded feelings, and humiliation become recoverable as well.10
The phrase “legal cause” carries weight. The loss must result from the damage the words did to the plaintiff’s reputation, so the path from slander to loss runs through other people’s reactions.11
Kessler’s loss ran through the landlord’s belief. A landlord who dismissed the remark and rented on the usual terms would have left Kessler nothing to prove, and a landlord who refused for reasons unrelated to the remark would have cut the link between the slander and the loss. The element therefore asks two questions at once: did the plaintiff lose money or something of economic value, and did that loss come from hearers who believed the slander and acted on it?
The demand for pecuniary loss is a historical inheritance. The common law rule that special damages must be of a pecuniary character carries over from the old jurisdictional conflict with the ecclesiastical courts, when the King’s court could take jurisdiction only for “temporal” harm and not for “spiritual” harm.12 The per se categories have a similar history. They are the results of the evolution of slander centuries ago, and although they can be viewed as types of slander especially likely to harm reputation, that is not the rationale for their existence.13
The rule leaves some injured plaintiffs without a remedy. Defamatory communications often produce no pecuniary loss, and the loss is often impossible to prove when it does exist, so for many types of slander no relief is available.14 Critics have called the libel-slander distinction productive of great injustice.15 The criticism does not alter the elements. On an exam, state the requirement as written, apply it, and mention the criticism in a clause at most.
What Counts as Special Harm
The definition of special harm has two parts. The plaintiff must lose something having economic or pecuniary value, and the loss must result from the harm to the plaintiff’s reputation.17 Each part screens out a different kind of claim. The pecuniary part excludes injuries that cannot be priced, and the reputational part ties the loss to what slander injures, which is the opinion other people hold of the plaintiff. Emotional distress and resulting bodily harm therefore do not count as special harm, although they may be recovered as parasitic to other recoverable damages.18
The traditional examples show how much the definition covers. They include the loss of a marriage, of hospitable gratuitous entertainment, of a place a servant or bailiff would otherwise have obtained, and of customers by a tradesman. The general test is that whenever the slander prevents the plaintiff from receiving what would otherwise have been conferred, even gratuitously, the loss suffices.19 The gratuity point shows what the rule asks. The plaintiff need not have lost a contract or a legal right; the question is whether the slander cost something of economic value through the reaction of people who believed it.
The friend’s belief alone would not have produced a claim. Had the friend believed the story and still kept the invitation open, the slander would have changed one person’s opinion of Okonkwo and cost Okonkwo nothing in money. Reputational injury as such does not satisfy the requirement, and neither does the cooling of friendships, because the definition asks for the economic consequence of lowered esteem and not for the lowered esteem itself.20
Terwilliger v. Wands shows how strictly courts apply the second part of the definition. The court assumed that the words were defamatory and that they had actually produced the plaintiff’s illness and physical prostration. It still held that the illness was not special damage. Illness was not, in a legal view, a natural, ordinary consequence of the slander, because it does not prove that the plaintiff’s character was injured. The slander may never have been credited by anyone or changed how anyone treated the plaintiff. Without proof that character suffered, the court attributed the sickness to the plaintiff’s own apprehension of losing character, and it held that such fear, with its resulting illness, cannot be the special damage the law requires, since the loss of character must be a substantive loss that has actually taken place.21 The harm ran from the words straight to the plaintiff’s own anxiety, with no one else’s reaction in between, and that break in the chain is the lesson of the case.
Courts continue to hold that special damages must be pecuniary, and a plaintiff with acute mental distress and serious physical illness but no pecuniary loss recovers nothing. In Baugh v. Baugh, a Mississippi court dismissed a claim because the plaintiff could not suggest any damages of a pecuniary character caused by what the defendant said.22
Because the plaintiff must plead and prove special damage, a drop in income does not carry the claim by itself.23 The loss has to be traced to people who heard the words, believed them, and acted on that belief. A baker whose sales fell after a false remark, but who cannot connect the fall to anyone who credited it, has shown a coincidence and not special harm. A baker who shows that regular customers stopped buying after hearing and believing the remark has shown the loss of customers that the traditional catalog counts as special damage.
The narrowness of the definition applies at the threshold and nowhere else. Once the cause of action is made out, whether as libel, as slander per se, or by proof of special damages of a pecuniary character, the plaintiff may recover additional damages for mental distress, wounded feelings, and humiliation.24 The distress that could not open the door can therefore be compensated once another route has opened it. On an exam, ask first whether the plaintiff lost something of economic value because someone believed the slander, and turn to damages for everything else only after the answer is yes.