Concept
Libel Versus Slander
Libel versus slander and when special harm is required
Libel, Slander, and Special Harm
Libel Versus Slander
Two plaintiffs can suffer the same false accusation and face different burdens at trial, depending on how the accusation reached its audience. Defamation law kept two forms of action, libel for what was originally written or printed and slander for what was originally oral, and the prime significance of the distinction lies in the proof of damages.1 A person who publishes defamatory matter in a way that makes it libel is liable although no special harm results.2 A person who publishes a slander that is not actionable per se is liable only if the slander is the legal cause of special harm.3 Special harm means pecuniary loss, and the slander plaintiff must prove it.4
The rule bites because defamation often injures reputation without producing a pecuniary loss, and the loss is often impossible to prove when it does exist. For many types of slander, no relief may be available.5 Classification therefore comes first in any defamation problem, since the form of the publication tells you whether the plaintiff must prove a money loss.
In most cases the form is obvious.6 The Restatement supplies tests for the rest, and this section applies them in order: the definition of libel, the definition of slander, the factors that decide close cases, and the special rule for broadcasts.
Libel Defined
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 568(1) defines libel as the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical form, or by any other form of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words.7 The first two clauses name categories, and the third states a standard. A court facing an unfamiliar medium therefore needs no rule written for that medium. It asks whether the medium shares the qualities that make writing harmful, and if it does, the publication is libel.
Those qualities come down to permanence. Libel began with written and printed words, but it was soon extended to defamatory pictures, signs, statues, and motion pictures, and even to conduct carrying a defamatory implication, such as hanging the plaintiff in effigy or erecting a gallows before the plaintiff's door.8 That growth led some authorities to conclude that the distinction turns on embodiment of the defamation in some more or less permanent physical form.9 Film shows the idea at work. It is libel even when the defamation is in the sound, because film, like writing, is permanently recorded and has a visual component, and other sound recordings are probably libel too.10 At the opposite pole, a mere transitory gesture, such as a nod of the head or a wave of the hand, is slander.11
Electronic text follows the same logic. In Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, the defendants urged the court to treat their Internet messages as slander, the supposed lesser wrong, because online communication is the modern equivalent of a speech on the village green. The California court held instead that written defamatory communications published over the Internet are libel.12 The messages were composed and transmitted as written words, like newspapers, handbills, or notes tacked to a bulletin board, and they are representations to the eye. They may be deleted or modified, but in contrast with the spoken word they are certainly fixed, and a message is as easily preserved by printing as it is deleted or altered.13 A New Jersey appellate court said the same of computer communications in Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale.14
The village-green argument also confused two questions. The balance between the defendant's free-speech interest and the plaintiff's interest in a good name is struck by weighing factors such as the plaintiff's status as a public or private figure and the subject of the speech. The Varian court called the libel-slander label an arbitrary and, some would say, archaic distinction that in California has little to do with that analysis.15 Keep the classification question and the constitutional question apart.
Spoken words can also be libel, in two situations. When a speaker reads a defamatory writing aloud, the reading publishes libel, as in Bander v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. When a speaker's words are expected to be written down, and in fact are, the speaker publishes libel as well. Dictation to a stenographer in Ostrowe v. Lee and a statement to a newspaper reporter in Valentine v. Gonzalez are the standard illustrations.16 In each case the words end up fixed in a lasting form, and the speaker either supplied the writing or counted on it.
The accusation and the accuser stayed the same across the two scenes. Only the form of the words changed.
The libel label also carries a practical reward for the plaintiff. Under the traditional rule, once a libel plaintiff showed publication of defamatory material of and concerning the plaintiff to a third person, courts presumed malice, falsity, and damages, and the plaintiff could recover substantial damages on those three elements alone.17 It was enough that the publication was defamatory in nature, even if no actual harm was demonstrable.18 Constitutional decisions have since limited that rule. In cases now subject to constitutional limits, presumed damages are not permitted without a showing of actual malice, although states may keep strict liability, and apparently presumed damages, in cases that do not involve matters of public interest.19 The damages sections take up those limits.
Slander Defined
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 568(2) defines slander as the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, by transitory gestures, or by any form of communication other than those that § 568(1) classifies as libel.21 The definition works by subtraction. Libel is the medium with the qualities of writing, and slander is every other medium, so no defamatory communication falls outside both categories.
Ordinary speech is the paradigm, and gestures belong beside it. Defamatory gestures and sign language, formal and informal, are slander because they are transitory communications similar to the spoken word.22 The storekeeper in Bennett v. Norban was treated this way when he publicly stopped a woman and searched her shopping bag.23 Other conduct that conveys a defamatory meaning may be classified as either slander or libel, and hanging the plaintiff in effigy falls on the libel side.24
Two changes would turn the same accusation into libel. If the guest read it aloud from a written memo, the reading would publish libel, as in Bander. If the guest made the statement to a newspaper reporter and the paper printed it, the statement would be libel, as in Valentine.25 In both variations the guest still speaks, so the mode of delivery does not settle the branch. The lasting form does.
Slander is the branch where special harm matters. A plaintiff who proves only that the defendant published a slander has not yet established liability: unless the slander is actionable per se, the plaintiff must also prove that it was the legal cause of special harm.26 The dinner-party accusation shows how the exceptions interact with classification. It likely imputes a crime of the kind that Restatement § 571 makes actionable without proof of special harm, one punishable by imprisonment in a state or federal institution or regarded by public opinion as involving moral turpitude.27 Calling the remark slander therefore opens the damages inquiry without finishing it. The sections that follow define special harm and list the categories of slander that escape the requirement.
Close Cases and Dissemination Factors
Some publications fit neither the writing description nor the ordinary-speech description comfortably. For those, Restatement § 568(3) directs a court to consider the area of dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated character of the publication, and the persistence of the defamation in deciding whether the publication is libel rather than slander.29 The Restatement calls these factors to be considered, so a court weighs them together. See also Spence v. Funk.
The factors converge on the permanence that some authorities treat as the line between the two torts.30 A publication that reaches a wide area, was deliberately prepared, and keeps circulating resembles writing. A remark that reached a few people, was blurted out, and ended when the conversation did resembles speech.
Dissemination is the factor most easily overread. The number of people who hear or read a defamatory communication is usually irrelevant to whether it is libel or slander. A defamatory oral statement to a large crowd is slander, and a defamatory letter sent to one person is libel.31 The letter has a permanent physical form, and the speech does not. Treat audience size as one weight on the scale, not as a trigger.
Persistence does not require that the publisher be unable to take the statement down. In Varian, the court found Internet messages fixed even though they may be deleted or modified, because they are as easily preserved as they are deleted.32 The question is whether the publication lingers in a form others can capture, and the author's power to remove it does not answer that.
In the first scene every factor points the same way: a handful of listeners, an outburst with no planning behind it, and a remark that dies in the room. That is slander. In the second scene wide reach, deliberate preparation, and a video that stays available all point toward libel, which fits the rule that film is libel even when the defamation is in the sound.33
Mixed cases remain unsettled. The broad rule treats anything written, when published, as libel, but impulsive tweets may fit the kind of reaction that attracted the slander label, and some commentators argue they belong there.34 Courts and casebooks also ask whether a social media post should be libel or slander, and whether it matters that the user can limit who sees it.35 Whether a defamatory oral communication sent over the Internet to a small audience counts as a broadcast is likewise open.36 On an exam, name the competing factors and weigh them. Do not announce a rule that the Restatement has not adopted.
Broadcasts Are Libel
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 568A resolves a medium that the general definitions leave awkward: broadcasting defamatory matter by radio or television is libel, whether or not it is read from a manuscript.38 That is the prevailing view, and Matherson v. Marchello, a 1984 New York decision, is an example of it.39 The English Defamation Act of 1952 adopts the same rule.40
The rule needed stating because a live radio program is purely oral, and the number of people who hear a defamatory communication is usually irrelevant to its classification.41 A defamatory oral statement to a large crowd is slander, so a radio broadcast could have been classified as slander too.42 The usual explanation for choosing libel is that radio and television broadcasts take a permanent form.43
The phrase whether or not it is read from a manuscript does the decisive work. Outside broadcasting, reading a defamatory writing aloud publishes libel, so a script could have mattered: the announcer reading prepared text would commit libel, while the host who ad-libbed the identical accusation would commit slander. The Restatement removes that distinction. The medium decides the classification, and a plaintiff need not learn whether anyone wrote the words down first.44
The libel label matters because it removes the special-harm requirement. A person who publishes a defamatory broadcast in a way that makes it libel is liable although no special harm results.45
In both scenes the broadcast carries the classification, and the script drops out of the analysis. A broadcast plaintiff stands in the position of any libel plaintiff, while the face-to-face plaintiff must go on to ask whether special harm is required or a per se category applies.
The Restatement rule is the prevailing view, and it yields to local law. Under some state statutes, defamation by broadcast is slander.46 A statute controls in the state that enacted it, and in such a state the broadcast plaintiff must meet the slander rules on special harm. An exam answer should state the Restatement rule and then flag any contrary statute in the jurisdiction.
Newer media are only partly settled. The text of § 568A names radio and television. Written Internet communication is libel under Varian, and a recorded video resembles the film that the cases already treat as libel.47 Whether a defamatory oral communication transmitted through the Internet is a broadcast, even if it reaches only a small audience, remains an open question.48 For a live audio stream with a handful of listeners, argue from the factors in § 568(3), and say that the broadcast rule does not clearly reach it.
A working order for a classification problem follows from these tests. Ask first whether the statement was broadcast by radio or television, which makes it libel under the Restatement unless a state statute says otherwise.50 Next ask whether it is written, printed, physically embodied, or otherwise has the harmful qualities of writing, and if so, it is libel.51 A spoken statement or transitory gesture is slander unless a defamatory writing was read aloud or the words were intended to be, and were, written down.52 Only when the facts fit none of these comfortably do you weigh dissemination, premeditation, and persistence.53