Concept
Common Law and Constitutional Rules
Defamation prima facie case: defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff
Common Law and Constitutional Rules
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 gives every defamation claim four requirements: a false and defamatory statement concerning another; an unprivileged publication to a third party; fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and either actionability irrespective of special harm or special harm caused by the publication.1 The First Amendment reshapes that common-law landscape without replacing it, and two facts decide how much it reshapes. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, the Court named them: whether the plaintiff is a public official or figure or a private figure, and whether the speech is of public concern.2 Earlier sections noted where the Constitution changes each element. This section puts those changes in one order of analysis and adds no new rule.
When both facts point toward public debate, the Constitution clearly requires a plaintiff to clear a much higher barrier than the common law raises before recovering from a media defendant.3 The burden of proof explains why. It decides a case only when the evidence is ambiguous, so no one can know how much of the speech it affects is true and how much false. Where the scales balance that uncertainly, the Court tipped them toward protecting true speech, and it held that the common-law presumption of falsity cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern.4 Where both facts point the other way, with a private figure and speech of exclusively private concern, the constitutional requirements do not necessarily change at least some features of the common law.5
Together the two facts sort cases into three regimes.
- A public official or public figure suing over speech of public concern faces the highest barrier. The plaintiff must prove actual malice, and against a media defendant must also prove falsity. Once actual malice is shown, the bar on presumed damages no longer applies.6
- A private person suing over speech of public concern must prove at least negligence, because Gertz held that the Constitution forbids strict liability there while leaving the states free to choose any standard that requires at least that much. Without proof of actual malice, the plaintiff recovers for proved actual injury, which may be emotional rather than only out-of-pocket loss, and cannot recover presumed damages. Against a media defendant, the plaintiff must also prove falsity.7
- A case that involves neither a public official or figure nor a matter of public interest leaves the common law largely in place. A state may keep strict liability and, apparently, presumed damages.8
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. is the authority for the third regime. The Court ruled there that the states may continue to impose strict liability in cases that do not involve matters of public interest, and apparently may continue to award presumed damages as well. The rule clearly covers a private plaintiff who sues a non-media defendant. How far it reaches when a private plaintiff sues a media defendant is unclear, because what the media publish is likely, almost by definition, to carry more public interest than a purely private statement. Many states have moved away from strict liability in these cases anyway, often requiring negligence.9
In all, the constitutional decisions added four limits to the common law: a minimum standard of fault (actual malice for officials and figures, negligence for private plaintiffs on matters of public interest); a bar on presumed damages when the plaintiff has proved at least negligence but not actual malice; a new allocation of the burden of proving falsity; and a heightened scope of review when the 'of and concerning' the plaintiff issue is raised.10 Outside those limits, the § 558 requirements run on common-law rules, and those rules differ from state to state.
Publication shows the variation. A defendant who communicates a defamation only to the plaintiff has ordinarily not published it. A few courts nonetheless treat the defendant as a publisher when the defendant can foresee that the plaintiff will feel compelled to pass the defamation on, as a discharged employee seeking work elsewhere must.11 By the usual account, the large majority of cases reject that idea, at least in employment cases where the plaintiff knows the defamatory content, on the theory that the employer is not a publisher. The policies they invoke (open and honest communication, avoiding a culture of silence in the workplace, the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages) support a privilege rather than a no-publication rule.12 A complete answer therefore states the common-law rule first and then asks what the First Amendment displaces.
Classification leads the sequence because it supplies the content of steps three through five. The common-law requirements come in step two because the sources record only one constitutional addition there, the closer review of 'of and concerning' findings.18
An exam stem that makes a chief justice the plaintiff tests this sequence.
The two outcomes differ in one fact, the speaker's knowledge, and the plaintiff's status makes that fact decisive. A private plaintiff who proved the same negligence over a matter of public concern would clear the fault requirement and reach the damages stage.
The usual exam error is to treat the press as the trigger. A newspaper defendant does not by itself bring in actual malice. The plaintiff's status and the subject of the speech decide the fault standard, so an official needs actual malice while a private plaintiff on a public-concern story needs only negligence.19 Media status matters at the margins. The holding that strips the common-law presumption of falsity is framed for media defendants, and how far the common-law rules survive when a private plaintiff sues a media defendant over a private matter is unsettled.20 When a stem tells you which rule the jurisdiction applies, follow it. When it does not, name the uncertainty and carry the analysis through both ways.