Concept
Actionability and Special Harm
Defamation prima facie case: defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff
Actionability and Special Harm
The fourth element of a defamation claim asks whether the plaintiff must prove an injury beyond the publication itself. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558(d) answers in the alternative: the statement must be actionable irrespective of special harm, or special harm caused by the publication must exist.1 A statement in the first group lets the plaintiff recover without proving a particular loss. Every other statement requires proof of special harm, and § 613(1)(f) places that proof on the plaintiff when the issue is properly raised.2
The form of the publication sorts statements into the two groups. Because written statements have a greater degree of permanence, libel is actionable without a showing of special harm, and the harm is presumed. Slander requires evidence of special harm unless the statement involves one of the subjects that constitute slander per se.3 The first two subsections below follow that division and ask whether a claim may proceed without proof of a specific loss. The third asks how much the plaintiff may collect once the claim proceeds, and it shows that constitutional limits can strip away the presumption of damages the common law allowed.4 Keeping the two questions apart prevents a common error: a libel can be actionable without special harm and still support only the damages the plaintiff proves. The per se slander categories receive their own section later in the chapter.
Libel and Presumed Harm
Libel needs no proof of special harm. Written statements last, so libel is actionable without a showing of special harm to the plaintiff, and the law presumes the harm.5 When the drafters of the Restatement (Second) surveyed the cases in the mid-1960s, they found that all courts except Virginia agreed that a libel defamatory on its face is actionable without proof of damage.6
The presumption also has an evidentiary justification. Reputational harm consists of other people’s changed attitudes and conduct: a defamatory communication tends to lower the plaintiff in the esteem of a substantial and respectable minority in the community or to deter people from associating or dealing with her.7 Those changes seldom announce themselves. Courts allowed recovery without special proof because the content of the publication was so likely to cause injury, and because “in many cases the effect of defamatory statements is so subtle and indirect that it is impossible directly to trace the effects thereof in loss to the person defamed.”8 A customer who quietly shops elsewhere does not call to explain, and an employer who sets an application aside does not say why. If libel plaintiffs had to find those people and tie a loss to each one, many real injuries would go unremedied, so the presumption lets the content of the writing stand in for proof of its effects.
The Alabama courts in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan applied the presumption at full strength. The state supreme court held that words tending to injure a person in his reputation, profession, trade, or business, or charging him with an indictable offense, or tending to bring him into public contempt, are “libelous per se.” If published of and concerning the plaintiff, such words were actionable without “proof of pecuniary injury . . . , such injury being implied.”9 Constitutional decisions have since restricted what a presumption of injury can yield, as the last subsection explains.
In some jurisdictions the presumption has an exception, tied to the difference between defamation per se and defamation per quod. Defamation per se is a statement defamatory in itself and incapable of an innocent meaning. Defamation per quod either is not apparent until extrinsic evidence shows its injurious meaning, or is apparent but is not actionable per se.10 Courts divided over a libel that is defamatory only through extrinsic facts, meaning facts that readers know and bring to the words. In the mid-1960s survey, ten jurisdictions followed the old rule that such a libel is actionable without proof of damage even though the same words spoken would not be. Twenty-four treated it like slander and required proof of damage wherever slander would.11 The second approach is the libel per quod rule. Some courts have since abandoned it, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court did in Storms v. Action Wisconsin, Inc., so a complete answer asks which approach the jurisdiction follows.
The per quod rule should not be confused with the fault requirement, because the two ask different questions. The per quod rule asks whether the plaintiff can show a concrete loss. Fault asks what the publisher knew, and § 613(1)(g) lists the defendant’s negligence, reckless disregard, or knowledge regarding both the truth or falsity and the defamatory character of the communication as a separate matter for the plaintiff to prove.12 A paper with no reason to know that readers would take Stonebridge as a reference to a jail sentence would be answering the second question, not the first.
A libel that is actionable without special harm does not always support presumed damages. In cases governed by the constitutional limits, a plaintiff who proves only negligence cannot recover presumed damages without a showing of actual malice, and must prove actual loss, which may be emotional and need not be out-of-pocket economic loss.13
Slander and Special Harm
Slander is actionable only if the plaintiff pleads and proves special harm, unless the statement falls within one of four categories of slander per se.20 The plaintiff carries that burden when the issue is properly raised, so a plaintiff who proves a false, defamatory, unprivileged, and faulty spoken publication has not yet stated a complete claim.21 The contrast with libel explains the rule. The law presumes harm from writing because writing endures, and it does not extend that presumption to ordinary speech.22
The harm that counts must be pecuniary. The requirement carried over from the old jurisdictional conflict with the ecclesiastical courts, under which the King’s court could take jurisdiction only where the harm was “temporal” rather than “spiritual.”23 Special damages therefore require pecuniary loss, which is narrower than the actual damages the Constitution requires in some cases.24
The old treatise writer Starkie’s list shows what qualifies: the loss of a marriage, the loss of hospitable gratuitous entertainment, the loss of a place for a servant or bailiff, and a tradesman’s loss of customers. In general, whenever the slander prevents the plaintiff from receiving what would otherwise have been conferred, even gratuitously, the loss suffices.25 Those losses are the economic side of the reputational harm defamation protects against, because people who think less of the plaintiff or deal less with her stop offering jobs, orders, and invitations.26
Terwilliger v. Wands states the rule from both sides. Where the words are not actionable of themselves, the plaintiff must prove special damages that were the natural, immediate, and legal consequence of the words. Where they are actionable per se, the law adjudges them injurious from their natural and immediate tendency to produce injury, though no special loss can be proved.27 Distress and illness do not take the place of a pecuniary loss. If no pecuniary loss is shown, it is not enough that the plaintiff has suffered acute mental distress and serious physical illness as a result of the defamation.28
A few kinds of spoken accusation escape the requirement. Statements imputing criminal activity, loathsome disease, serious sexual misconduct, or misconduct in the plaintiff’s business, trade, profession, or office are slander per se, actionable without proof of special harm.29 Courts have long explained the categories by the natural and immediate tendency of such words to injure.30 A modern treatise grants that the categories may be viewed as types especially likely to cause harm to reputation, but warns that “that is not the rationale for their existence.”31 The later section on slander per se takes up each category. For now, remember the order of analysis: a slander problem asks about the per se categories before it asks about proof of loss.
Special harm opens the door to recovery without setting a ceiling on it. Once the plaintiff makes out the cause of action, whether as libel or slander per se or by proof of special damages of a pecuniary character, the plaintiff may recover additional damages for mental distress, wounded feelings, and humiliation.32 The furniture maker’s lost order would therefore support compensation for the humiliation as well. Treating the pecuniary loss as the limit of the award confuses a condition of liability with a measure of damages.
The special-harm requirement cannot repair a defect in publication. A defamatory statement communicated only to the plaintiff is ordinarily not published at all.33 The exception covers a defendant who can foresee that the plaintiff will feel compelled to pass the statement on, as when the defendant hands a written defamation to an unsighted person who will have others read it.34 A few cases extend the exception to a discharged employee seeking work elsewhere. The large majority reject it in employment cases where the plaintiff knows the defamatory content, reasoning that the employer is not a publisher at all.35 A leading treatise observes that the policies behind the majority view, open and honest workplace communication and the plaintiff’s duty to mitigate damages, support a privilege rather than a no-publication rule.36
Damages After Gertz
An actionable claim may still be limited by the First Amendment in what it can recover. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. produced two rules. First, the Constitution does not permit strict liability for defamation in cases involving matters of public interest, but the states may adopt any other standard as long as the plaintiff must show at least negligence. Second, in cases now subject to constitutional limits, presumed damages are not permissible without a showing of actual malice.44 The Court’s own formulation links the two. The state interest in compensating defamed private individuals “extends no further than compensation for actual injury,” and the states may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.45
The reasoning is that the state interest is compensation, so remedies for defamatory falsehood should reach no farther than necessary to protect it. Plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard are therefore restricted to compensation for actual injury.46 Presumed damages dispense with proof of loss, and that is what the rule cuts off. A plaintiff who proves only negligence must prove actual loss, though the loss may be emotional.47
Actual injury is broader than most students expect. It is not limited to out-of-pocket loss, and the more customary types of actual harm include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Two limits keep the category from turning back into presumption: juries must be limited by appropriate instructions, and every award must rest on competent evidence of the injury, although no evidence need assign an actual dollar value to it.48
Actual injury should not be confused with special harm, because the two concepts do different jobs. Special damages require pecuniary loss. Actual damages may include injury to reputation or emotional distress without any showing of pecuniary loss, but the injury must be proved.49 The proof requirement was meant to give trial and appellate courts greater control over the size of jury awards, though that opportunity has not been used.50 A plaintiff whose only proof is anguish and lost standing has shown no special harm, yet may still recover for actual injury where the claim does not require special harm. The usual exam error is to import the pecuniary requirement into the constitutional rule and conclude that a plaintiff with no financial loss collects nothing.
Proof of actual malice changes the result. The limit applies at least when liability is not based on knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, and presumed damages are barred in the constitutionally governed cases only in the absence of a showing of actual malice.51 A plaintiff who proves only negligence is confined to actual injury, and a plaintiff who proves knowing or reckless falsehood stands outside the restriction. Public officials and public figures face the actual malice requirement as a condition of liability under the rules covered in the section on fault.
The limit also has an outer edge. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the Court ruled that the states may continue to impose strict liability, and apparently to award presumed damages, in cases that do not involve matters of public interest. That rule clearly covers a private plaintiff suing a non-media defendant. Many states have nonetheless moved away from strict liability and require negligence even where the Constitution does not.52 Placing the speech and the plaintiff on the map therefore comes before any question about damages.