Concept
Publication to a Third Person
Defamation prima facie case: defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff
Publication to a Third Person
Reputation lives in other people's minds, so a defamatory statement injures no one until someone other than the plaintiff receives it. That is why an unprivileged publication to a third party is a required element of a defamation claim,1 and why the plaintiff's case includes the defendant's publication of the communication.2 In everyday speech, to publish is to print and distribute. In defamation law the word reaches any communication of the matter to a person other than the plaintiff, so a remark to one neighbor can be a publication.
Three questions organize this section. The first asks what counts as a communication to a third person, and when a defendant answers for an audience the defendant did not intend. The second asks whether the defendant publishes when the only audience is the plaintiff, who then carries the statement to others. The third asks who answers when other people repeat or host a statement, including on online platforms. The qualifier unprivileged has its own section after this one, so the only issue here is whether, and through whom, the statement reached a third person.
Communication to Third Persons
Traditionally, a defamatory statement had to be communicated directly to a third person to be published. A statement made only to the person defamed was not published, even if that person later repeated it to someone else.3 One recipient is enough, however: a defamatory letter sent to a single person is libel.4
The size of the audience does not decide whether a publication is libel or slander. A defamatory oral statement to a large crowd is slander, and a live radio broadcast, being purely oral, could be classified as slander too.5 The classification matters because an action for slander requires the plaintiff to plead and prove special damage unless the statement falls into one of four categories of slander per se.6 Whether a defamatory oral communication transmitted through the Internet would be treated as a broadcast, even if it reached no large audience, is an open question.7
The hard cases involve an audience the defendant did not aim at. When the defendant deliberately delivers the statement to someone other than the plaintiff, publication is not in doubt. When a third person sees or hears a statement the defendant meant for the plaintiff alone, or for no one, the cases ask whether the defendant knew or should have known that a third person would read or hear it. A defendant is liable if he knows or should know that the plaintiff's spouse or secretary habitually reads the plaintiff's mail, or in the circumstances would likely read it, and that person in fact reads the words; Rumney v. Worthley supports the rule.8 The same inquiry explains why a sender who mails a sealed letter to the plaintiff's home, with no reason to expect anyone else to open it, has not published it when a third person does, as in Weidman v. Ketcham and Barnes v. Clayton House Motel. What separates that sender from the one in Rumney is not the letter's contents but what the sender had reason to expect about who would handle the plaintiff's mail.
Conversations raise the same question. A defendant who was unaware that the plaintiff's children were listening on another telephone line did not publish the statement in Smith v. Jones.9 In Hill v. Balkind, a speaker who addressed the plaintiff directly, with no reason to suppose anyone else could hear, was held not to have published even though a concealed listener caught every word. By the same logic, a speaker who talks loudly enough that others can be expected to overhear has reason to anticipate listeners and bears the risk.
Stored and deleted material applies the standard to newer technology. A defendant who mistakenly believed he had deleted a file from his hard drive, which third parties later accessed, was held not to have published it in Morrow v. II Morrow, Inc..10 Silence after notice can have the opposite effect. In Hellar v. Bianco, a bar owner was held liable for failing to remove defamatory writing from a restroom wall after learning of it, though the owner had not written it.
The recipient's state of mind raises one further question. A New Mexico decision, Silverman v. Progressive Broadcasting, Inc., treats a recipient who knows the statement is false as defeating publication, so an answer in a jurisdiction that follows it should say so.
Throughout, the cases look to what the defendant did and what it made foreseeable. Older authority on the separate requirement that a statement be of and concerning the plaintiff says the defendant's intention is inferred from what he did, and that he cannot disprove the element by showing he never heard of the plaintiff.11 Publication cases show a similar emphasis on conduct over private intention.
Employment disputes produce much of the litigation over who counts as a third person, because the people who handle a defamatory message are often coworkers, supervisors, and clerical staff. The courts have not settled the answer, and the main positions are these:
- Most courts hold that dictating defamatory matter to a secretary or stenographer is publication, though the publication is often held privileged. Some courts hold it is not publication at all.12
- Some courts hold that communication among supervisory and managerial personnel is not publication. Others find publication and rely on a qualified privilege.13 Many courts decline to treat communication within the same employment relationship as publication where a clear need to know exists.14
- Most courts hold that simply placing material in an individual's personnel file is not publication.15
- Communicating with the plaintiff's agent is treated as communicating with the plaintiff, and so is not publication.16
The split on internal communications has a structural consequence. A court that holds an officer's report to another officer of the same organization is not a publication, as in Perez v. Boatmen's National Bank, ends the claim at the publication element. A court that finds publication, as in Jerolamon v. Fairleigh Dickinson University, where security guards reported to a campus safety director and a provost, moves the dispute to the qualified privilege. That route lets the plaintiff try to defeat the privilege, and Hagebak v. Stone holds that intra-corporate communications are subject only to a qualified privilege that the plaintiff can rebut.17 One court even held that an employer did not publish a defamatory reference because the employee who gave it had no authority to make the statement.18
The question often surfaces on summary judgment. In a 1952 Fifth Circuit appeal, a branch manager with some thirty-two years of service was discharged and sued his employer corporation for libel. The trial court entered summary judgment for the employer on the ground, among others, that there was no publication.19
The third step decides the close cases. The usual exam error is to stop at the first step and conclude that publication occurred because a third person read the letter or heard the remark. The answer depends on whether the defendant meant the matter to reach that person or should have expected that it would.
Compelled Self-Publication
The ordinary publication case has the defendant speak or write to someone other than the plaintiff. A stranger pattern appears when the defendant directs the matter only to the plaintiff, and a third person learns of it because the plaintiff passes it on. Courts call this self-publication, a label that describes what the plaintiff did. The question is whether the plaintiff's telling counts as the defendant's publication.25 The answer depends on how much choice the plaintiff had and whether the defendant could see the telling coming.
The traditional rule says no. When the defendant communicates defamatory matter only to the plaintiff, that is ordinarily not publication, even if the plaintiff later repeats it to another person.26 The rule follows from what publication is, namely the defendant's own communication of the matter to an audience. A plaintiff who knows what the words say and chooses to repeat them creates the audience, and counting that as the defendant's act would let a plaintiff supply a missing element simply by talking.
A defendant is a publisher, however, when the defendant can foresee that the plaintiff will feel compelled to pass the matter on. If the defendant hands a written defamation to an unsighted person, the defendant can expect that the recipient will have others read it.27 The Restatement Second adds that the defendant is a publisher in these cases only because the plaintiff was unaware of the defamatory character of what she passed along.28 Two facts carry the exception. The defendant knows the words can reach the plaintiff only through a third person, and the plaintiff, ignorant of the content, makes no choice to spread an accusation.
In some cases the doctrine has been expanded.29 In Hedgpeth v. Coleman, a letter accusing a fourteen-year-old boy of a break-in and theft was held actionable on the theory that the sender must have foreseen that fear would force the boy to show it to a family member. The extension strains the rationale of the blind-recipient cases, because the boy understood the accusation. What carries the result is foreseeable necessity: the defendant created a situation in which telling someone was close to unavoidable for the plaintiff.
Discharge cases push the necessity argument furthest. An employer tells a fired employee the reason, usually alleged misconduct, and a prospective employer later asks why the job ended. A truthful applicant repeats the stated reason. A few cases hold that when the defendant can foresee publication by the plaintiff under compelling circumstances, as with a discharged employee seeking employment elsewhere, the defendant is liable for defamation.30 The compelled publication doctrine is critically important in the context of a termination,31 and Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States is a leading decision accepting it. The harm claimed in these cases, lost job opportunities, fits the pecuniary loss that slander requires when special damage must be pleaded and proved. The older authorities list preventing a servant from getting a place among special damages.32
A former employer in a jurisdiction that accepts the doctrine may answer that the stated reason, such as theft, was the true reason for the discharge whatever the employee actually did. Courts have looked to the implication of the words rather than their literal meaning in judging truth.33
Other cases, said to be the large majority, reject the idea, at least in employment cases and where the plaintiff is aware of the defamatory content. They hold that the defaming employer is simply not a publisher.34 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones is an example. A tempting exam answer treats the employee's need to answer the interview question as enough to make the employer a publisher, and that answer gets the majority rule backward.
The majority gives three policy reasons. Open and honest communication is important in conducting business. A culture of silence in the workplace would harm both employer and employee. And liability would undermine the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages.35 The first two concern what employers will say: if telling a fired worker the reason creates tort exposure whenever the worker repeats it, the safest course is to give no reason at all. The third concerns who controls the repetition. The plaintiff decides whether the accusation reaches a prospective employer, and an injured person is expected to limit the harm rather than spread it.
These policies, however, do not support a conclusion of no publication. They support a privilege.36 The difference matters. A privilege lets a court ask whether the employer spoke on a proper occasion and whether the occasion was abused, while a holding of no publication ends the claim without reaching either question. The next section takes up those questions.
Republication and Online Platforms
A person who delivers a statement to a new audience publishes it, whoever said it first. A retweet directed to a new audience is a new publication, and when a hundred newspapers each run a wire-service report in their own editions, a hundred publications result, each separately actionable.42 Repeaters gain nothing by naming their source or announcing disbelief. Courts have held repeaters liable even though they identified the original speaker, as in Haines v. Campbell, and even though they said they did not believe the charge, as in Morse v. Times-Republican Printing Co. Each repetition reaches readers who had not heard the accusation, and a note of attribution or doubt does not erase it from their minds. Becoming a publisher satisfies only the publication requirement, so the repeater can still contest falsity, privilege, and fault.
The harder question concerns the speaker who spoke first. A defendant is liable for another person's republication of the defendant's statement in three situations:43
- The third person was privileged to repeat the statement.
- The defendant authorized or intended the repetition.
- The repetition was reasonably foreseeable.
The first ground can seem odd, since a privileged repeater escapes liability. But the repeater's privilege protects the repeater's own act and leaves the original speaker answerable for the harm that follows from the first publication. Ordinarily a defendant is not liable for the plaintiff's own repetition, but may be if the repetition was foreseeable because the plaintiff would be required to reveal it, as in a job or insurance application.44 The previous subsection showed how divided the courts are on the job-application setting. Courts also differ on how generously to read the foreseeability ground, with Geraci v. Probst reading it strictly and Tunca v. Painter reading it to reach any foreseeable repetition.
Online sharing applies the same rules. The original tweeter is not liable for a retweet unless she reasonably foresees that the tweet will be republished, which is the general test applied in Hickey v. St. Martin's Press, Inc.45 The retweeter's liability and the original poster's therefore rest on different grounds: the first on having republished, the second on having reasonably foreseen the spread.
Not everyone who handles another's words is a publisher. A communications carrier that only provides the means for transmitting messages is not liable for delivering defamatory messages over its system, as with the telephone company in Anderson v. New York Telephone Co. Federal statute now governs much of the Internet side of that line. A service that hosts posts by others might ordinarily be deemed a distributor, but Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act is interpreted as insulating it from liability even if it has been notified of the defamatory content and negligently fails to remove it promptly.47 Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC is an appellate decision applying the provision to a website operator.48
The protection has a limit. A provider who promises the plaintiff, or otherwise undertakes, to remove the content immediately but fails to do so may be liable on another theory that Section 230 does not protect.49 That theory does not treat the provider as the publisher of the user's words.
The last question is how many publications a single defamatory item creates, which matters for the limitations period and for the number of claims. Each edition of a newspaper, magazine, or book is one separate publication, as is each broadcast or rebroadcast and each exhibition of a motion picture.51 Christoff v. Nestle USA, Inc., 213 P.3d 132 (Cal. 2009), reviews the history of the single publication rule and the reasons for rejecting the older common-law approach. The logic tracks what publication means. Each outlet decides for itself whether to run the report and delivers it to its own audience, so each makes its own communication, while the many copies of one edition reach one audience in one act.
The Internet raised the question whether continued availability or later changes count as new publications. Courts have refused to treat each website modification as a new publication. One court reasoned that, unlike a book or magazine with specific publication runs, a website's constant modification, if counted as publication, could create a morass of litigation and defeat the statute of limitations for Internet defamation. It also held that merely adding information to a website does not republish defamatory material already posted there. The Fifth Circuit applied the single publication rule to a website under Texas law in Nationwide Bi-Weekly Administration, Inc. v. Belo Corp., 512 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 2007).52 That result does not conflict with the rule on retweets. The website cases concern the same publisher's continued availability of the same posting, whereas a retweet or a new edition is a different delivery to a new audience.
Two errors recur on exams. One is to conclude that a repeater who attributes the statement to someone else has avoided publication, when attribution never stops a repeater from being a publisher. The other is to assume that Section 230 shields every online defendant, when it covers only content supplied by another and leaves the provider answerable for its own words and its own promises.