Concept
Falsity
Defamation prima facie case: defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff
Falsity
A statement can have a defamatory meaning and still fail as the basis for a claim, because § 558(a) requires a false and defamatory statement concerning another.1 The earlier sections of this chapter covered most of that phrase: what makes words defamatory, how recipients fix their meaning, whether the words refer to this plaintiff, and whether they assert or imply a fact that evidence could test. Falsity is the remaining word, and it asks a different question from defamatory meaning. A communication is defamatory if it tends to lower the plaintiff in the community's esteem or to deter others from dealing with the plaintiff;2 falsity asks whether what the communication asserts or implies matches what actually happened. An accusation of embezzlement is defamatory in meaning whether or not anyone took any money, and falsity is the inquiry into whether the accusation is correct. That inquiry reaches implied facts as well as stated ones, so an opinion that implies undisclosed defamatory facts is false when those facts are false.3
The tort needs a separate falsity requirement because a person whose conduct or character was what the defendant said it was should not have an action.4 A claim can therefore satisfy every requirement taught so far, with a defamatory meaning, a reference to the plaintiff, and a statement of fact, and still fail because the statement was true. The allocation of the burden of proof carries constitutional weight for a related reason: a speaker who must prove truth may stay silent about facts the speaker believes but doubts being able to establish, so the burden deters true speech along with false.5
Two questions organize what follows. The first is who must establish falsity. Section 558(a) lists falsity among the requirements of the plaintiff's case, yet the common law began from the opposite assumption, and the constitutional decisions then moved the burden according to who the plaintiff is, who the defendant is, and whether the speech touches public concern. The first subsection develops the presumption of falsity, truth as a defense, and the change that Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps brought. The second question is how far a statement may stray from literal accuracy before it counts as false, and the second subsection takes it up.
Burden of Proving Falsity
The common law did not make the plaintiff prove falsity. Plaintiffs are typically expected to allege in their pleadings that the defamatory meaning was false, but alleging a fact differs from carrying the burden of proving it, and defamation law has not traditionally required the plaintiff to prove falsity as an element of the cause of action.6 A defamatory publication was instead presumed false, and truth worked as a defense, traditionally called justification, that the defendant had to plead and prove.7
That allocation has a practical logic. When the evidence about truth is thin or conflicting, the loss falls on the speaker, who chose to publish the accusation and is likelier than the person accused to know the facts behind it. The rule never made true statements actionable, however. At common law there has been general agreement that an action lies only if the statement is both defamatory and false;8 the presumption fixed only who must establish truth.
The First Amendment decisions turned on who the plaintiff is and what the speech concerns. A public official who sues over a defamatory falsehood about official conduct must prove actual malice, meaning knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard of whether it was, and must prove it with convincing clarity.9 A private figure who sues over speech of exclusively private concern may find that the constitutional requirements do not necessarily force any change in at least some features of the common-law landscape.10 Hepps settled the remaining combination, a private figure suing over speech of public concern.
In Hepps the plaintiff was a private figure and the newspaper articles were of public concern, so the Court asked whether the presumption of falsity should fall the way the common-law rules had fallen in Gertz. It held that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern, and that the plaintiff must bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages.11
The Court's reasoning explains why the burden matters at all. Because the burden of proof is the deciding factor only when the evidence is ambiguous, a factfinder who can tell that a statement was true or false needs no tiebreaker. In the ambiguous cases, though, every allocation makes mistakes. If the plaintiff carries the burden, some plaintiffs lose even though the speech was false, because falsity cannot be shown; if the defendant carries it, some defendants lose even though the speech was true, because truth cannot be shown. No one can know how much of the affected speech is true and how much is false, so the Court tipped the scales toward protecting true speech on matters of public concern.12
The Court also noted that the rule adds only marginally to what the plaintiff already carries. The plaintiff must show fault, and a jury is more likely to accept that the defendant was at fault if convinced that the statements were false, so evidence of the publisher's inadequate investigation will generally encompass evidence of falsity.13
Public officials and public figures never needed Hepps on this point. The Court read New York Times to require a public-figure plaintiff to show the falsity of the statements at issue, citing Garrison v. Louisiana for the proposition that a public official may use the civil defamation remedy only by establishing that the utterance was false.14 The actual-malice standard itself points the same way, because recovery requires proof that the defendant knew the statement was false or recklessly disregarded whether it was, and that showing presupposes a falsehood.15
The constitutional rule has edges. Hepps speaks of a media defendant, and it remains unclear how far the rule reaches defendants outside the media. The Constitution also sets only a floor: some states put the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff in every case, even where the First Amendment does not require it.16
Whichever party carries the burden, it decides the case only when the evidence on truth is evenly balanced. What must then be shown true or false is the gist of the statement and not each detail, a limit that the next subsection takes up.
Substantial Truth and Sting
A publication need not be literally accurate to be true. It is protected when its substance, the “sting” of the defamation, is true, even if small details are wrong.22 The sting is the discrediting message recipients take from the words, so falsity is judged against that message, and the working question in every case is what the statement told its audience about the plaintiff and whether that message is correct.
The sting is the right measure because a misstatement that leaves the audience's belief unchanged adds nothing to the injury. A report that gets the day of the week wrong but says truthfully that the plaintiff was fined for code violations leaves readers thinking exactly what they would have thought had it been accurate. A rule demanding literal accuracy would let plaintiffs win on trivia while the damaging charge stood proved, and it would push speakers to hedge or drop stories whose core they knew to be true, the same deterrence of true speech that drove the constitutional shift described above.23
Courts apply the test by asking whether an error changes what the audience believes about the plaintiff. In Hamilton v. Lake Charles American Press, Inc., a statement that the plaintiff had been disbarred was substantially true even though a motion for rehearing was pending and the judgment was not yet final; the pending rehearing touched only the judgment's finality, and readers still learned that the plaintiff had lost the right to practice through a disciplinary judgment.24 An error that does change the audience's belief defeats the defense. In St. Surin v. V.I. Daily News, an article implied, through references to a “prosecutor” in the headline and to the U.S. Attorney's office in its body, that the plaintiff was under criminal investigation. The truth was that he was being investigated by the Environmental Protection Agency, and the sting of the article was found to be untrue.25
Substantial truth also has a limit that bars a defendant from proving different misconduct in place of the charge made. A specific charge of crime was not justified by proof of another and more serious crime in Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Schenck, and a charge that the plaintiff was a “whore” was not shown by evidence that she had worked for a short time as a dance hall girl or percentage girl in Crellin v. Thomas.26 The classic statement comes from Crane v. New York World Telegram Corp.: “A plea of truth as justification must be as broad as the alleged libel and must establish the truth of the precise charge therein made.”27 Read together with the sting test, the precise charge is the imputation the audience took from the words, and incidental details the defendant happened to use are no part of it.
What the defendant must show therefore depends on the meaning the statement conveyed, which ties this inquiry to the earlier discussion of how recipients fix meaning. If the meaning is a specific act of misconduct, truth is the plaintiff's commission of that act or of one substantially the same. If the meaning is a general pattern of bad conduct, proof of a single instance does not show truth, which is why one instance of libel did not justify calling a person a “libellous journalist” in Wakley v. Cooke.28 A word such as thief can carry either meaning, since it may describe someone who committed an act or someone who commits such acts repeatedly, and it may describe a present condition or a past one. The trier of fact therefore decides which meaning the statement conveyed and then asks whether that meaning is true, as in Hughes v. Hughes.29
The sting test also works for plaintiffs, because a statement can be accurate in every word and still false in what it conveys. Three standard forms show how:
- “John told me that Pat robbed the bank on Friday” is true that John said it and false that Pat robbed the bank.
- “In my opinion, Linda is an embezzler” is true that the speaker holds the opinion and false that Linda embezzled.
- “Either I added incorrectly or the cashier stole $10” is true that one of the two must be so and false that the cashier stole the money.31
In each form the defamatory portion does its work even though the harmless portion is accurate, so a defense of truth must go to the defamatory sting. If it were enough that the defendant accurately quoted someone's accusation, the rule that a person who repeats a defamatory statement is liable for it would disappear, because every repeater could show that the source said it.32 The second form applies the implied-facts rule from the opinion section, because an opinion label leaves the accusation of undisclosed facts in place.33
Accurate attribution can matter, but it works through a different doctrine. A publisher who truthfully attributes a defamatory statement to others does not thereby raise the truth defense, although in some circumstances the publisher may be privileged to pass along information gleaned from others, a question the privilege sections take up.34 Truth and privilege are separate questions, and an answer that treats the accuracy of the quotation as if it were a privilege has merged them.
A publisher can also create a false message by what it leaves out. A publication can be defamatory if it creates a false impression by omitting material facts, and the plaintiff must show that the communication “left a false impression that would be contradicted by the inclusion of omitted facts,” as the Washington Supreme Court put it in Mohr v. Grant.35 That requirement keeps the doctrine from swallowing ordinary editing, and a Louisiana appellate court accordingly held in Mbarika v. Board of Supervisors that a claim resting only on a speaker's failure to mention some of the plaintiff's accomplishments cannot support defamation liability.36
The employment setting shows the same inquiry at work. An employer could say that an employee was discharged for stealing and argue that this was the true reason for the discharge, whether or not the employee actually stole anything. Courts have not necessarily focused on the literal words, however, but on their implication. As one court put it: “Requiring that truth as a defense go to the underlying implication of the statement, at least where the statement involves more than a simple allegation, appears to be the better view.”37 The usual error on an exam is to test each sentence for literal accuracy when the question is whether the message the audience took away is true.
The discharged employee also raises a question about publication that the next section takes up. When the only person who hears the charge from the employer is the employee, a few cases hold the employer liable where it can foresee that the employee will feel compelled to repeat the charge to prospective employers, but the large majority reject the idea, reasoning that the employer is not a publisher at all.38