Concept
Of and Concerning the Plaintiff
Defamation prima facie case: defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff
Of and Concerning the Plaintiff
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558(a) requires “a false and defamatory statement concerning another,” and those last two words tie the statement to the particular person who sues.1 The earlier sections of this chapter asked what makes words defamatory and how a recipient's understanding fixes their meaning. This section asks whether the words are about the plaintiff at all. That question is separate from truth, because whether a statement is defamatory does not depend on whether it is true.2 Defamatory force also depends on who the plaintiff is: a communication conveying that someone cannot repay debts is generally defamatory of a person who conducts a business and generally not of one who does not.3 A plaintiff whom no recipient connected with the words therefore has nothing to repair, however harsh the words were about whomever the audience had in mind.
The plaintiff bears the burden on this requirement. Under § 613(1), when the issue is properly raised, the plaintiff must prove the communication's application to the plaintiff and the recipient's understanding of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff.4 The second matter follows the logic of defamatory meaning. Reputation changes only when an audience forms an impression, so what recipients reasonably take the words to be pointing at decides whether this plaintiff was injured. The extrinsic facts discussed in the last section return here, because facts known to recipients can be what link a statement to the plaintiff.
The first subsection below asks how recipients come to connect a statement with one individual, named or not, and how the common-law and constitutional treatments of that connection differ. The second takes up statements aimed at a group, where the plaintiff is one member among many and the size of the group and the share of it accused decide whether any member can claim the words.
Identifying the Plaintiff
The governing rule is § 564, under which the communication must have been understood by the recipient, correctly or mistakenly but reasonably, as intended to refer to the plaintiff.5 The rule asks about the audience's understanding and says nothing of the plaintiff's name. A plaintiff who is never named can therefore satisfy it, and the writer's own account of whom the words were meant to describe does not decide the matter.
Whether the defamatory matter applies to the plaintiff may depend on extrinsic facts or circumstances known to the recipient. At common law the complaint had to set out those facts and the manner in which they connect the defamatory matter to the plaintiff, and that portion of the complaint is called the colloquium.6
Peck v. Tribune Co. makes the same point with a picture in place of a description. An advertisement in the defendant's newspaper used the photograph of the plaintiff, a nurse in real life, over the name of a different woman who had extolled the virtues of the malt whiskey being promoted. Justice Holmes held that the advertisement referred to the plaintiff despite the incorrect name below the picture.7 The medium also affects how readers read. A daily newspaper is read loosely, so factual variations in a story may not prevent a reasonable reader from identifying the plaintiff.8 In Stanton v. Metro Corp., an article about teen sexuality ran with a photograph of various young people, including the plaintiff, and was held susceptible of defamatory meaning even though it stated that “the individuals pictured are unrelated to the people or events described in this story.”9
The common law pushed the audience-centered test to its limit in E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones. During argument in the House of Lords, defendant's counsel said, “The question is who was meant,” and Lord Loreburn asked, “Is it not rather who was hit?”10 The reasoning in the case treats reference the way it treats malice. A defendant could not excuse himself from malice by proving that he wrote in the most benevolent spirit, and so he cannot show that the libel was not of and concerning the plaintiff by proving that he never heard of the plaintiff. His intention in both respects is inferred from what he did.11 The rule places the risk of coincidence on the publisher, who controls what is printed and whose remedy, as the case puts it, is to abstain from defamatory words.12
Fiction tests the same rule at larger scale. Suppose a novel tells of the widow of an assassinated president who marries a Greek shipping magnate. Readers may reasonably understand it to be “of and concerning” her even though the character has a dissimilar name and the work purports to be fiction. The test is whether a reasonable person reading the text would understand that a fictional character was, in actual fact, the plaintiff acting as described.13 Film adaptations raise the same question. The Seventh Circuit confronted a movie, Hardball, based on a nonfiction book that referred to the plaintiff by name throughout.14 A plaintiff who sues over a film character with a different name, as in Greene v. Paramount Pictures Corp., must show instead that viewers would take the character to be the plaintiff.
Results vary with the strength of the resemblance. In Geisler v. Petrocelli, the plaintiff, who was known to the author, shared an identical name with the major character of a novel and recovered. In Springer v. Viking Press, the plaintiff, a former girlfriend of the author, matched a minor character only in name and physical characteristics and did not recover, because the basis for identifying her was insufficient.15 The difference lies in how much plaintiff-specific detail the work carries and how strongly it signals invention. A disclaimer is one fact among others and does not by itself defeat the claim, as Stanton shows.
A statement about one person can sometimes be read as about another. A report that a man was being held in a county jail without legal authority was not treated as defaming the sheriff, who bore some responsibility for the jail, in Boone v. Herald News Co. By contrast, in Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., a caption announcing Mr. Corrigan's engagement to another woman was held capable of defaming Mrs. Corrigan, because readers who knew she was his wife would take it to say that she lived with him unmarried. The caption carried a message about her own status, whereas the jail report said nothing about the sheriff.
The same concern takes constitutional form in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Sullivan, the official in overall charge of a police department, sued over an advertisement that criticized police conduct. The witnesses who connected the advertisement to him offered no basis for believing he himself was attacked beyond the bare fact that he was in overall charge of the Police Department and thus bore official responsibility for police conduct. To the extent they thought he had ordered or approved the conduct, they rested that notion solely on the unsupported assumption that, because of his position, he must have been involved.16 The Alabama Supreme Court made that reliance explicit. It reasoned that the average person knows municipal agents such as police and firemen are under the direction and control of a single commissioner, so that “praise or criticism is usually attached to the official in complete control of the body.”17 The Supreme Court found that common-law standard, which turns on a reasonable reader's assumptions to identify the plaintiff, constitutionally insufficient. Reference would have to be made to the plaintiff as an individual, lest criticism of government be crimped.18
If position alone sufficed, every attack on an agency would be an attack on its head, and criticism of government would be crimped. Hulton and Sullivan therefore draw different lines on the same element. In Hulton the law credited the reasonable understanding of recipients even though the writer meant no one in particular. In Sullivan the Constitution refused to credit an inference drawn from position alone. The commentary on the Restatement adds that the constitutional fault standard is probably applicable to the identification issue as well, and it asks what result Hulton would have reached under the Gertz test.19 The common-law rule that a publisher's ignorance of the plaintiff is no defense should be read with that constitutional overlay in mind, and a later section develops the fault requirements.
The usual exam error is to ask whom the writer meant. The common-law question is whom reasonable recipients took the words to concern, and for a public official the added question is whether the words pointed past the office to the person.
Group Defamation
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564A governs when a member of a group may sue over a statement about the group. One who publishes defamatory matter about a group or class is liable to an individual member only if the group or class is so small that the matter can reasonably be understood to refer to the member, or the circumstances of publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is particular reference to the member.26 The rule applies the requirement from the last subsection, that recipients reasonably understand the statement as intended to refer to the plaintiff.27 Group cases need their own treatment because the words describe a collection of people, so the plaintiff must show that the audience would single out the plaintiff from within it. Section 564A offers two routes: a group small enough that the reference reaches each member, and circumstances that point at the member in particular.
Size controls the first route. As a general rule, no action lies for defamatory words about a large group or class, because the words cannot reasonably be understood as applying to any one individual. The standard example is “all the doctors in this town are quacks,” where the town has several dozen doctors. A member of a small group may recover when the statement may reasonably be understood to apply to him, as with “that jury was bribed” or “most of the players on that football team are on drugs.”28 The mechanism is the listener's. A listener lowers an opinion of a person only after connecting the words to that person. A charge against a large class attaches to the class as a whole, while a charge against a small group leaves each member under suspicion because the listener cannot tell who is excluded.
A second reason for barring suits over the largest groups concerns public debate. In Al Talal v. Fanning, a plaintiff sued on behalf of some 600 million Muslims over a film depicting the public execution of a Saudi princess for adultery. The court rejected the claim because permitting an action over so multitudinous a group would render meaningless the First Amendment's protection for exploring issues of public import.29 Courts reached the same result for a statement calling over 800 dealers pirates and for a television portrayal of more than a million hunters.30 If every member of such a group could sue, any speaker who commented on a religion, a profession, or a pastime would face an enormous number of potential plaintiffs, and discussion of public issues would be chilled.
Size is not the only variable. The share of the group that the statement accuses matters too, and the two interact. As the group grows, an accusation against some of its members spreads suspicion more thinly, until a listener can fix on no one. The comment to § 564A observes that the groups generally successful in these suits number 25 or fewer.31 Results at the margin differ. A New York court denied recovery when the defendant, addressing three men, said “One of you is a crook.”32 In Blaser v. Krattiger, by contrast, an action may lie where the statement means that one of three persons committed a theft, but not where it means that some person in a group of twenty did.
Neiman-Marcus v. Lait puts both variables in one dispute. A book charged that some of a department store's saleswomen were call girls and that most of its male salesmen were homosexual. Of the store's 382 saleswomen, 30 sued, and of its 25 salesmen, 15 sued.33 The court dismissed the saleswomen's claims because the group was large and the charge reached only some of them, so that no reasonable reader would take the publication to refer to any individual saleswoman. It let the salesmen proceed because their group was small and the charge reached most of them.34
Twenty-five is a rough guide and not a ceiling. In Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC, a magazine article about an alleged gang rape at a University of Virginia fraternity house implied that members of the fraternity took part in the attack or knowingly tolerated it. The article named none of the alleged attackers. The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the article was of and concerning them, as members of a fraternity of only 53, because a reader could plausibly conclude that each member was implicated directly or indirectly.35 What separates Elias from the Neiman-Marcus saleswomen is how the charge fell on the group. A cohesive body of 53 accused of participating in or tolerating a crime left no member whom a reader could clear, while an accusation against some among 382 saleswomen gave readers no reason to suspect any one of them.
The second route in § 564A is separate and can help a member of a group of any size. A member of any size group may recover if the circumstances indicate that the statement was intended to apply to him.36 This is ordinary identification by another path: the words speak of a class, and something in the setting of publication points at a single person.
Some courts depart from a strictly numerical approach and ask how intensely the statement casts suspicion on the plaintiff. In Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., a police officer sued over an article claiming that unidentified members of the 53-person Newburgh police department had aided and abetted police corruption. The court rejected the numerical rule and adopted an “intensity of suspicion” test. It held that the specificity of the charge, the high degree of organization within the department, and its prominence in the community outweighed the problems of a group defamation of that size.37 In McCullough v. Cities Service Co., an osteopath could not sue over an attack on osteopathy generally, since there were 19,686 osteopathic physicians nationwide, and the court called size an important factor though not a determinative one.38 A police department of 53 can thus support a claim where a profession of nearly twenty thousand cannot.
The usual exam errors run in opposite directions. Some students treat 25 as a cutoff that decides the case, and others conclude that accusing only some members of a small group ends the claim, but each misreads how suspicion falls on individuals. A plaintiff who passes the group-reference analysis still has to prove the remaining elements of the claim.