Concept
Interlocutory Injunctions
Remedies: damages and injunction
Interlocutory Injunctions
Section 936(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts governs the injunction a court issues while the lawsuit is still pending. It provides that the appropriateness of an interlocutory injunction against a tort is determined in light of the factors listed in subsection (1), as presented prior to final hearing, but depends primarily upon a set of special factors.1 An interlocutory injunction, usually called a preliminary injunction, is an order entered before the case is decided that restrains the defendant until the court rules on the merits. The provision makes two moves. It keeps the subsection (1) factors in play (the nature of the interest, the adequacy of other remedies, delay, misconduct, hardship, third persons and the public, and practicability), though the court now sees them on an incomplete record. It then shifts primary weight to four special factors: the extent of the threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if interim relief is denied, the consequences the relief may have upon the defendant, the probability that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits, and the public interest.2
The special factors exist because interim relief asks a court to act before it knows who is right. A court that grants the order may restrain a defendant who would have won at trial, and a court that denies it may leave a plaintiff who would have won exposed in the meantime. A final judgment cannot fully repair either mistake. Each special factor answers part of that risk. The threat of irreparable harm measures what waiting would cost the plaintiff, the consequences for the defendant measure what a wrongly issued order would cost, the probability of success measures how likely the order is to be right, and the public interest brings in people whom neither party represents. Interim relief is justified, then, only when waiting would cause serious harm and the claim is strong enough to warrant the risk of error.
The leading federal statement of the standard comes from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., where plaintiffs who study and observe marine mammals sought to restrict Navy sonar training exercises off Southern California. The Supreme Court required a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction to establish that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, is likely to suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff's favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.3 Winter is a federal case and not a nuisance case, so it supplies a parallel to the Restatement's four special factors and does not replace them. The subsections below take the special factors one at a time and use Winter wherever its reasoning sharpens the Restatement's wording. The first concerns the plaintiff's side of the scale: the harm the plaintiff faces if made to wait for trial.
Threatened Irreparable Harm
The first special factor is the extent of the threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the interlocutory injunction is not granted.4 Irreparable harm is harm that a later judgment cannot undo. It means some irreversible, harmful prospective change in circumstances that money damages will not be able to compensate, such as the imminent tearing down of a house the plaintiff seeks to preserve.5 The word extent adds a second dimension, since a court asks how likely the harm is and how grave it would be before it counts this factor in the plaintiff's favor.
This factor sits on the plaintiff's side of the scale because only the cost of waiting can justify interim relief. The plaintiff is asking the court to restrain a defendant who may turn out to be in the right, so the plaintiff must show that something real will be lost before the merits are decided.6 Harm that would arrive only after trial can be prevented by the final judgment, and harm that a damages award will fully repay leaves nothing for an interim order to protect. That logic reflects the tradition that interim injunctive relief is unavailable where the plaintiff merely seeks money damages.7
Winter shows how much proof the factor demands. The lower courts had held that a plaintiff who shows a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits may obtain a preliminary injunction on only a possibility of irreparable harm.8 The Supreme Court called that standard too lenient and required plaintiffs to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.9 An injunction is an extraordinary remedy, awarded only on a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to it, and an order resting on a bare possibility of harm cannot meet that showing.10 A strong case on the merits therefore cannot excuse a thin showing of harm. After Winter, a court must find some irreparable harm to the movant before it issues a preliminary injunction, even when the movant raises a strong likelihood of success.11
The Navy pressed the point that harm must be more than conceivable. In the forty years its training program had run, it said, there had been no documented case of sonar-related injury to marine mammals in the training area, so the plaintiffs' injuries were too speculative.12 The Court rejected the possibility standard and then held that even if the plaintiffs had shown irreparable injury, the public interest and the Navy's interest in effective, realistic training outweighed it.13 The decision teaches two things. Harm that is merely possible or remote does not satisfy this factor, and harm that does satisfy it can still lose to the other special factors, which the next subsections take up.
Irreparable harm also reaches beyond dollars. In one appellate decision, a special-skills teacher was reassigned, without monetary loss, from a small class of hearing-impaired children to administrative work, and the trial court found no irreparable harm for that reason. The appellate court held that the lack of monetary loss was only one aspect of irreparable harm and that the trial court should also have focused on the nature of the alternative work. The teacher took great personal satisfaction from working closely with his class, while the new job meant writing grant proposals for which he had neither special training nor interest.14 A paycheck does not replace work the plaintiff values, and a later damages award cannot restore the months of that work lost during the wait. The same measure applies in a nuisance case, where damage to health or to the use of a home may be irreparable even though no dollar loss can be shown.
A harm that is certain and ongoing still has to pass one more question, which is whether a money judgment at trial would put the plaintiff back where the plaintiff stood.
Both hypotheticals involve harm that is happening now, so the difference lies in what a later judgment can repair. The children's health injury cannot be repaired afterward, while the landlord's lost rent can be. Because the factor turns on those questions, it is best applied as a short checklist.
This factor measures only the plaintiff's side of the risk, so a strong showing here leaves open what the order would do to the defendant, which is the next subsection's question.
Consequences for the Defendant
The second special factor in § 936(2) directs a court deciding whether to grant interim relief to weigh the consequences that the interlocutory relief may have upon the defendant.20 The first special factor measured what waiting for trial would cost the plaintiff, and this one measures what the order itself would cost the other side, so the two together put both halves of the risk of error on the scale. A defendant restrained before trial carries the restraint for the life of the lawsuit, and if that defendant then wins on the merits, the final judgment cannot return the lost time. The factor therefore asks the court to picture the order in operation and to count what it would take from a party that may turn out to have done nothing wrong. The policy against judicial restraints before the merits are decided becomes more significant as the decree becomes more burdensome, which is why this factor can carry real weight.21
Winter shows the factor at work. The Navy had already agreed to graduated measures for its sonar: reduced power at 1,000 yards and 500 yards, and a complete shutdown only at 200 yards. The district court's injunction instead required a total shutdown of the sonar whenever a marine mammal was detected within 2,200 yards of a sonar-emitting vessel. Because area grows with the square of the radius, raising the shutdown radius from 200 to 2,200 yards expanded the shutdown zone by a factor of more than one hundred.22 A court measuring the burden of an order has to look at what the order commands each time it applies, and the numbers on the face of the decree are where that measurement starts.
The lower courts had called the Navy's concerns speculative because the Navy had never operated under similar procedures. The Supreme Court answered that this is almost always true when a plaintiff seeks an injunction to alter a defendant's conduct, and it held that the lower courts failed to defer to senior Navy officers' specific, predictive judgments about how the injunction would reduce the effectiveness of the training exercises.23 That answer follows from the structure of interim relief. The consequences of an order that has not yet taken effect can only be predicted, so a rule requiring a defendant to prove them from experience under the order would make the factor useless. Courts therefore turn to the people who run the operation and know what each restriction would disable. A detailed declaration explaining which functions an order would stop, and why, earns far more weight than a general claim that compliance would be costly.
The Court then set the Navy's burden against the plaintiffs' interests. It did not question the seriousness of those interests, but it concluded that the balance of equities and the overall public interest tipped strongly in the Navy's favor.24 The consequence that counted for the Navy was the loss of effective, realistic training for its sailors.25
A defendant must also understand what an order demands, and the specific-performance setting shows the same concern for clarity. There the contract terms must be definite and certain, because certainty aids the court in framing the decree and ensures that the party enjoined understands with appropriate clarity the nature of the obligations expected.26
In federal practice the consequences factor has a companion tool. A preliminary injunction must be accompanied by security posted by the plaintiff, in an amount the court considers proper, to compensate the defendant for any harm that might result from a wrongful injunction.27 Security protects a defendant whose loss is financial, because a defendant who prevails at trial can recover what the restraint cost. It cannot restore what money cannot buy back, such as lost training time or readiness, so burdens of that kind still count in full on the defendant's side of the scale.
The bar and the Navy are both told to change how they operate, so what separates them is what remains of the activity afterward. The bar's order leaves its business intact in substance, while the Navy's proposed shutdown zone would have disabled the very training that gave its exercises their point. A stem that describes burdens in the specific, expert-supported way of the Navy case, naming which operations would stop and how the order's radius or hours multiply the restricted activity, supports heavy weight on this factor. A stem offering only a general complaint of hardship, or an order that a small adjustment can satisfy, supports little. Either way the factor is one of four, and a heavy burden on the defendant can still lose to a strong showing of irreparable harm and likely success on the merits, the subject of the next subsection.
Probability of Success
The third special factor in § 936(2) is the probability that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits.29 The first two factors measured what waiting would cost the plaintiff and what an order would cost the defendant, and this one measures the chance that the order is right. A court asked for interim relief is deciding before it has heard the whole case, and a defendant restrained in the meantime carries the restraint even if that defendant later wins. The probability of success is the court's estimate of how often that mistake would occur. A plaintiff who is very likely to win asks the court to risk little, because the final judgment would probably impose the same restraint. A plaintiff with a doubtful claim asks the court to impose a certain burden in exchange for a benefit that may never be owed.
In a nuisance case the probability in question is the likelihood that the plaintiff will establish liability, a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land, on the evidence the court has at the hearing. That evidence is partial, usually affidavits, measurements, photographs, and brief testimony, so the plaintiff is showing a probability and is not yet proving the case. The final hearing remains the place where the nuisance is conclusively decided. What the plaintiff must bring is evidence concrete enough for the court to say that a finding of liability is likely.
The federal formulation of the same factor requires a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction to establish that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, in addition to the other three showings.30 The word likely tracks the Restatement's word probability. Winter also shows what a court may do when the merits are contested. The lower courts had held that the plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the merits. The Supreme Court held that even if the plaintiffs had shown irreparable injury, it was outweighed by the public interest and the Navy's interest in realistic training, that those considerations alone required denial of the injunction, and that for the same reason it would not address the lower courts' finding of likely success.31
The Court could skip the merits because the plaintiff must establish each of the four showings, so a failure on any one defeats the motion and the court may rest its ruling on whichever showing is clearest. Deciding the merits early would then add nothing to the result and could prejudge the question the trial exists to answer. The Restatement frames the factors as items weighed together, but a court applying it can likewise let a decisive burden or a decisive public interest resolve the request without a close look at the claim.
A request that rests on a debatable claim shows the weak end of the factor, and it is the pole an exam stem is most likely to offer.
Both plaintiffs allege an interference from a neighbor's operation, so the allegation does not separate them. The difference lies in the record at the hearing. The rock-crusher exhibits make liability likely, while the shop owner's statement meets a contrary measurement.
One question remains open. Winter rejected a rule that let a plaintiff with a strong case on the merits obtain a preliminary injunction on only a possibility of irreparable harm, and courts must find some irreparable harm even when the movant shows a strong likelihood of success.32 Whether the trade can also run the other way, so that a serious question on the merits suffices when the harm would be grave and the equities tip heavily toward the plaintiff, has divided the circuits. The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have kept the flexible test, and the Fourth Circuit has held that Winter precludes it and requires a likelihood of success.33 An answer should state the likelihood requirement, note the split in a sentence, and avoid treating either side as settled.
The public interest, the last of the four special factors, is the one that decided Winter, and the next subsection takes it up.
Public Interest
The Restatement (Second) of Torts names the public interest as the fourth special factor on which an interlocutory injunction depends primarily.39 The three factors before it all concern the two sides of the lawsuit, so this one widens the inquiry to people who are not in the courtroom. The interests of third persons and of the public also sit on the subsection (1) list that continues to apply before final hearing, and § 936(2) lifts the public interest into the group that carries primary weight at the interim stage.40 The factor asks what an order entered before trial would do to people who have no say in the case.
The reason for a separate factor lies in how interim relief is decided. The court acts before it knows who is right, and it acts on the arguments of two parties, each of whom presses only its own side. Neighbors who are not plaintiffs, customers who depend on the defendant's service, and communities that rely on a facility cannot be heard in the dispute, yet an order closing the activity falls on them as surely as on the defendant, and a refusal to act leaves them exposed to the same harm the plaintiff describes. A final judgment between the two parties cannot give those people back what the interim period took from them. The factor has no uniform formulation. Public interest may be shown by reference to statutes, to the nature of the subject matter in dispute, or to a judicial determination that certain topics, like protecting the environment or civil rights, are traditionally seen in a favorable light.41
Winter shows the factor defeating a request for interim relief. The Supreme Court did not question the seriousness of the plaintiffs' interests, but it found that the balance of equities and the overall public interest tipped strongly in the Navy's favor. For the plaintiffs, the most serious possible injury was harm to an unknown number of the marine mammals they study and observe, while the public interest in conducting training exercises with active sonar under realistic conditions plainly outweighed the interests the plaintiffs advanced.42 The Court added that the proper determination of where the public interest lay did not strike it as a close question.43 The interest that prevailed belonged to the whole country, and the people it protected took no part in the suit.
Winter does not make a government defendant's claim of importance decisive. The Court said that military interests do not always trump other considerations and that it had never held that they do.44 The district court had also disposed of the balance of hardships and the public interest in a single lengthy sentence, which the Supreme Court treated as cursory given the importance of assessing those considerations.45 A court that treats the public interest as an afterthought has left out part of the analysis.
The factor can just as easily favor the plaintiff. In League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Connaughton, the court granted the injunction because a countervailing public interest in preserving an elk habitat in the forest outweighed the other considerations.46 In Alliance for Wild Rockies v. United States Forest Service, a district court denied injunctive relief to environmental organizations against logging operations and a road construction proposal, finding a strong public interest in increased economic and recreational benefits to the local citizenry, watershed restoration, and reduced wildfire risks.47 The two decisions do not conflict. Each court found public interests on both sides and decided which was stronger on its own record. Courts traditionally view environmental protection favorably, and the second court still denied relief, which shows that the tradition enters the balance without deciding it.
An exam stem built on a nuisance and a request for interim relief calls for two questions about this factor. The first is who besides the parties would be helped or hurt by the order, and the second is whether the facts show what those people would actually gain or lose. A defendant's bare claim to be important says little, while facts showing that a community would lose a service it depends on carry real weight. Non-parties can also stand on the plaintiff's side, as the elk habitat did, so the factor can cut for or against the plaintiff depending on whose interests the record shows the order would protect or burden.