Concept
Assumption of Risk
Defenses and limits on nuisance liability
Assumption of Risk
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840C makes the plaintiff's assumption of risk a defense in a nuisance action to the same extent as in other tort actions.1 The rule supplies no nuisance test. It sends the court to the general law of torts, where assumption of risk means that the plaintiff knew of a danger and chose to accept it, so that the resulting harm stays with the plaintiff. This section therefore treats nuisance as one more setting for a familiar defense. It asks what the defense requires and how comparative fault has reshaped it.
The defense is easy to confuse with the one taught just before it. Contributory negligence asks whether the plaintiff failed to act as a reasonable person would for his own protection. Assumption of risk asks what the plaintiff actually knew and what the plaintiff chose to do about it. The line already appeared in the abnormally dangerous nuisance rule, under which contributory negligence is a defense only if the plaintiff has voluntarily and unreasonably subjected himself to the risk of harm.2 A plaintiff who simply missed the danger is outside that rule, while one who saw it and walked in may fall within it.
One nuisance fact pattern regularly invites an assumption argument: the plaintiff acquired or improved the land after the interference began. Section 840D says that fact does not by itself bar the action, though it is a factor in deciding whether the nuisance is actionable.3 A later part of this chapter takes up that rule. The first subsection below states what the defendant must prove before the defense applies, and the second shows how comparative fault has changed the defense.
Knowing, Voluntary Exposure
Because § 840C borrows the general law, the defendant's proof comes from that law and not from any nuisance-specific test.4 Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense, so the defendant carries the burden of pleading, production, and proof.5 When the defense rests on the plaintiff's conduct it is called implied assumption of risk, and it has three requirements. The conduct must manifest consent, the plaintiff must have known and appreciated the danger, and the plaintiff must have encountered it voluntarily.6 A limit on scope runs through all three, because the assumption reaches only the particular risk that the plaintiff freely and knowingly encountered.7
Each requirement protects the same idea, that the defense rests on consent. The law has little reason to make a defendant compensate someone who accepted a danger in advance, but consent counts only when it is genuine, and each element tests a different way it can fail. Knowledge asks whether the plaintiff was informed, since a person cannot agree to bear a risk of which he is unaware. Voluntariness asks whether the plaintiff was free, since a choice made under compulsion is a choice in name only. The scope limit asks whether the consent matches the harm, since accepting one risk gives the defendant no claim on a different one.
Consent can also be given by agreement, which is express assumption of risk. The law does not favor contract provisions that relieve a party of responsibility for his own negligence, and the agreement must be knowingly and voluntarily made. An unclear or ambiguous agreement is strictly construed against the defendant, the risk that caused the injury must fall within its scope, and most courts will not enforce it as to willful and wanton misconduct or intentional torts.8 Other law can control as well. New York, for example, declares void exculpatory clauses in the rental of real property, so an attorney must research regulatory law alongside tort law whenever an express agreement is in play.9
Where no agreement exists, the defendant has only the plaintiff's conduct to work with, and the conduct must first show knowledge. The test looks at what the plaintiff actually knew and appreciated about the risk, including its magnitude, and not at what a careful person would have discovered.10 That is where the defense separates from contributory negligence. A plaintiff who missed a danger that careful attention would have revealed may be contributorily negligent but cannot have assumed a risk he never perceived.11 Knowing that a plant sometimes smells is a different matter from understanding that it vents harmful fumes every afternoon. Knowledge can nonetheless be proved circumstantially, and a plaintiff will have trouble denying what he saw or what ordinary observation of his surroundings would have shown, or what is common knowledge.12
Actual knowledge still leaves open whether the plaintiff's conduct manifests consent to bear the risk, and knowing exposure does not always do so. A pedestrian who dashes in front of a speeding car, fully aware of the danger, expects the driver to take care, which is the opposite of agreeing to bear the harm. He may be contributorily negligent, but he does not assume the risk.13 The same reasoning explains why courts have generally not accepted "coming to the nuisance" as a defense, at least where the plaintiff bought the land in good faith and not for purposes of litigation. A purchaser is entitled to the reasonable use and enjoyment of his property the same as anyone else, and without a prescriptive right the defendant cannot require surrounding land to endure his nuisance, at least not without compensation. The timing of the purchase can still be one factor in judging the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, and in judging whether the plaintiff was damaged, since the purchase price may have reflected the nuisance.14 Section 840D, noted above, speaks to the same point.15
Voluntariness turns on the plaintiff's real alternatives. Evidence that the plaintiff met the risk under duress or compulsion negates the element, because a plaintiff with no real or effective choice, or no better or safer alternative, has not consented to anything. A tenant therefore does not assume the risk of a landlord's negligently kept common stairway that is the only way into the apartment, and a person is not required to give up a valuable legal right the defendant had no power to take away in order to stay out of harm's way.16 The inquiry resembles the one contributory negligence makes about reasonableness, since in both a plaintiff pressed by circumstances is judged differently from one who had a safe alternative.
Two decisions show how much work this element does. In Marshall v. Ranne a landowner knew that his neighbor's boar was vicious and went out of his house anyway, yet the court found the exposure involuntary because his only alternatives were to remain a prisoner in his own home or to try to reach his pickup past the animal.17 Morgan State University v. Walker presents both poles in one set of facts. A visitor crossed an unplowed dormitory parking lot to reach her car, and the court upheld summary judgment against her on assumption of risk, while noting that a student who lived in the dormitory and had no other way out would have raised a jury question on voluntariness.18 The visitor could have stayed away, and the resident could not.
The nuisance setting sharpens this limit because the interest invaded is the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's own land, which the plaintiff has a legal right to use and which the operator has no power to take away. An owner who stays on the land in the face of a known interference therefore resembles the landowner in Marshall more than a spectator who wanders into a danger zone for a better view. A plaintiff who complains and is promised a fix stands on similar ground. Courts have held in cases usually involving employees that consent is vitiated until enough time has passed that reliance on the promise is no longer reasonable.19
The last limit is scope. The assumption extends only to the particular risk the plaintiff freely and knowingly encountered. In Hawthorne v. Gunn a passenger who sat on a man's lap in a moving car was held to have assumed certain risks of that arrangement but not the risk of a collision.20 The same narrowing governs nuisance claims, because consent is defined by what the plaintiff actually understood and accepted.
Facts that satisfy these steps will often show carelessness as well as consent, because a plaintiff who knowingly meets an unreasonable risk is frequently contributorily negligent too. The two defenses therefore overlap heavily, and many jurisdictions have stopped treating implied assumption of risk as a separate doctrine, a development the next subsection takes up.21
Assumption and Comparative Fault
Section 840C makes assumption of risk a defense in a nuisance action to the same extent as in other tort actions,23 so nuisance law has no assumption-of-risk doctrine of its own to develop. When general tort law reshapes the defense, the nuisance version changes with it. The preceding subsection gave the traditional form of the defense. This one follows what comparative fault has done to it, beginning with the relationship between consent and carelessness, because the whole development grows out of how closely the two overlap.
Assumption of risk asks about consent, and contributory negligence asks about unreasonable conduct. The same facts can support either defense or both. A pedestrian who dashes in front of a speeding car is arguably careless but consents to nothing, because he expects the driver to take care.24 A plaintiff who never perceived a danger likewise consented to nothing, even if a careful person would have noticed it.25 In the other direction, a plaintiff may reasonably choose to take a known chance and accept the consequences.26 Even so, the overlap between implied assumption of risk and contributory negligence is substantial, and perhaps complete.27
The two defenses collapse into each other for a structural reason. The voluntariness requirement of implied assumption is analogous to the reasonableness inquiry of contributory negligence, so a plaintiff who knowingly meets an unreasonable risk is typically careless as well.28 The only difference that remains lies in cases where the plaintiff's decision to take the known risk was reasonable and therefore not negligent. Some commentators argue that a negligent defendant should not be excused in that situation. Others point out that a plaintiff may reasonably elect to take a chance and accept the consequences, so that courts may need to keep a limited form of the defense.29
Once comparative fault arrived, many courts concluded that implied secondary assumption of risk, in which the plaintiff acts voluntarily but unreasonably to encounter a known risk, no longer stands as an affirmative defense apart from contributory negligence. Blackburn v. Dorta reached that result after Florida adopted pure comparative negligence.30 Many jurisdictions simply refuse to recognize the doctrine separately from contributory negligence, and others refuse to apply it in certain classes of cases. To the extent it survives at all, it is now a distinctly minority view.31
The reason for the merger comes from what each system is built to do. If implied assumption of risk is a form of fault, it has no justification as a complete bar in a jurisdiction that has adopted comparative negligence. Comparative fault exists so that the factfinder can weigh a plaintiff's unreasonableness as a percentage and reduce recovery to match, in place of an all-or-nothing result. A plaintiff who knowingly and unreasonably encounters a risk is a plaintiff whose unreasonableness can be weighed in exactly that way. If the label assumption of risk still carried a complete bar for that conduct, a defendant could recover the all-or-nothing result for the same behavior just by pleading a different name, and the apportionment rule would lose most of its effect. The plaintiff's knowledge and choice remain relevant, since they become evidence of how large a share of fault belongs to the plaintiff.
The merger concerns implied assumption, and express assumption is a different matter. An agreement to accept a risk is governed by contract principles. It must be knowingly and voluntarily made, it is strictly construed against the defendant if unclear, and the risk that caused the injury must fall within its scope.32 The agreement allocates the risk before any harm occurs and does not depend on whether the plaintiff later behaved reasonably. No plaintiff fault needs apportioning, so there is nothing for the merger to absorb, and the agreement continues to operate as a defense to the extent it covers the interference.
Jurisdictions differ on all of this, so an exam answer should say which approach the facts suggest, or address both when the facts are silent. The usual error is treating a plaintiff's knowing choice as an automatic complete bar in a comparative-fault state. Facts showing knowledge and an unreasonable choice in such a state call for a percentage reduction, and only an express agreement supports a complete bar. The setting in which assumption arguments most often arise is the plaintiff who bought or improved land after the nuisance began. Section 840D treats that fact as insufficient by itself to bar the action but relevant to whether the nuisance is actionable, and the next section takes up that rule.33