Concept
Compensation-Based Alternatives
Unreasonableness: intentional invasion and balancing gravity of harm against utility of conduct
Compensation-Based Alternatives
The balancing test of Section 826(a) asks whether an activity is worth more than the harm it causes: courts weigh the nature and gravity of the harm against the burden of preventing it and the utility of the conduct.1 Two other provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts drop that weighing and ask a different question, which is whether a neighbor who suffers serious harm should be left to absorb it unpaid. Section 826(b) makes an intentional invasion unreasonable when the harm is serious and the financial burden of compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make continuing the conduct infeasible.2 Section 829A makes an intentional invasion unreasonable when the harm is severe and greater than the other should be required to bear without compensation.3 Neither provision mentions the utility of the defendant's conduct.
The balance cannot answer that question, because a valuable activity can win the comparison and still leave its harm on a few adjoining owners. The benefits of such an activity reach many people, but its smoke, vibration, or dust lands on whoever owns the neighboring land. A rule that lets the activity continue and makes it pay for serious harm answers the question without closing anything down.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. shows the problem and one response to it. Neighboring landowners sued the operator of a large cement plant near Albany for an injunction and damages, alleging injury to their property from dirt, smoke, and vibration. The trial produced a finding of nuisance and an award of temporary damages, but the injunction was denied.4 Boomer thus gives the plaintiff damages but not an injunction, except one that will be vacated on payment of damages.5 The case also shows that a nuisance dispute always raises two questions: who is entitled to engage in a use or to be free from the harm another's use causes, and what remedy follows.6 The two tests in this unit bear on the first question. They say when an invasion is unreasonable and leave the choice of remedy to a separate analysis.
The first subsection takes up Section 826(b), which turns on the seriousness of the harm and the defendant's capacity to pay for it. The second takes up Section 829A, which asks how much harm the plaintiff should have to bear unpaid, and it then sets the two tests side by side.
Serious Harm and Feasibility
Section 826(b) gives an intentional invasion of another's use and enjoyment of land a second route to unreasonableness. Call the balance in Section 826(a) clause (a) and this alternative clause (b). The invasion is unreasonable under clause (b) if the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make the continuation of the conduct not feasible.7 The Restatement (Second) added the alternative in 1977, and under it the utility of the defendant's conduct is irrelevant.8 A plaintiff who satisfies either clause has therefore shown unreasonableness. Clause (b) has two conditions, one about the plaintiff's loss and one about the defendant's finances.
The finance condition is written as a double negative, and it must be unpacked before it can be applied. The clause asks whether the burden of compensation “would not make the continuation of the conduct not feasible,” and the two negatives cancel.9 Stated affirmatively, the defendant must be able to keep operating after it pays. A yes satisfies the condition, and a no defeats it. The reference to similar harm to others widens the inquiry beyond the plaintiff in court. A defendant that could afford one judgment but not the combined cost of compensating every neighbor harmed in the same way cannot say that continuation remains feasible, because that combined cost is what it would actually have to pay.
The structure of the clause carries its logic. The balance in clause (a) decides whether an activity is valuable enough to go on, and a defendant that wins it leaves its neighbors with the whole loss. Clause (b) takes up the second question, which is who should pay. When the defendant can compensate and keep operating, requiring payment costs the community nothing it values, because the activity continues, and the loss moves from the few owners beside the activity to the enterprise itself. When compensation would end the operation, the clause stops short, because payment would destroy the activity whose continuation the test assumes. The same assumption explains why utility has no place in the clause: a test that takes continuation for granted never asks whether the activity deserves to continue.
The standard illustration is a steel factory whose noxious fumes reach a nearby farm and kill the farmer's entire corn crop. The harm is severe enough to trigger the alternative test, so the farmer is entitled to relief if the other nuisance elements are established, as long as the factory can bear the cost while remaining in business.10 Nothing in that analysis asks what the factory produces, how many people it employs, or whether the region needs its output. The loss is the physical destruction of what the farm was growing, and the defendant's finances decide the rest.
The clause's silence about utility made it controversial. When the Restatement (Second) added it in 1977, it seemed to turn the law back toward the traditional gravity-of-harm approach, and it generated extensive controversy.11 The tension shows on a single set of facts: a defendant that proves its activity is worth more than the harm it causes wins under clause (a), yet it can still lose under clause (b) if it can pay and keep running. The clause also moves intentional nuisance in the doctrinal direction of intentional trespass, though differences remain.12 The overlap is plain for smoke and similar pollution, which physically invades land as particles but has usually been classed as nuisance rather than trespass, and courts have sometimes drawn on nuisance principles to decide whether an injunction is appropriate for repeated, low-grade trespasses.13 The traffic also runs the other way, since a court at times treats an intentional trespass like an intentional nuisance.14 Courts have disagreed about whether to accept clause (b), and two decisions show the disagreement.
Crest Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. v. Willemsen applies clause (b) without a utility analysis. The plaintiff, Crest, complained of a surface water invasion caused by the defendant's property development and relied on clause (b) rather than the balance. The developer argued that a correct application of the clause must include an analysis of the social utility of its conduct. The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed: clause (b) makes no express reference to social utility, and the court found nothing inherent in the test that requires the fact finder to undertake such an analysis.15 For the first condition, whether the harm is serious, the fact finder considers the quality of the harm Crest sustained, and the court looked to the Section 827 factors that bear on the gravity of harm.16 Those factors look to the harm and the invaded use, not to the value of the defendant's conduct, so measuring seriousness through them keeps utility out of the first condition, as the clause's text does.
Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co. reached the opposite result on whether clause (b) is law at all. Neighbors of a cattle feedlot sued the operator in nuisance, and the trial court had listed the utility of the conduct and other factors among the criteria for deciding whether a nuisance existed. The homeowners argued on appeal that those factors should be eliminated from the criteria.17 The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, set aside the Court of Appeals decision, which had tried to modernize the state's nuisance law, and explicitly rejected clause (b).18 The majority reasoned that Idaho is sparsely populated and its economy depends largely on agriculture, lumber, mining, and industrial development, so removing utility from the inquiry would place an unreasonable burden on those industries, and it saw no policy reason to depart from existing law.19
Justice Bistline, dissenting, applauded the Court of Appeals' effort to modernize the law of nuisance and was not persuaded by the majority's narrow view.20 In his view, clause (b) lets the feedlot continue while compensating the neighbors who feel its direct impact, and he treated the homeowners' loss as an external cost of running a feedlot, one that the business and those who benefit from its product should carry instead of a few neighbors.21
Crest and Carpenter therefore do not describe a single national rule. Wisconsin's court read clause (b) as a test that calls for no utility analysis, while Idaho's majority refused to adopt it and kept utility in the inquiry. Each side has a coherent view of what utility is for. Courts that accept the clause treat who should pay as a question separate from whether the activity is worthwhile, and courts that reject it treat the activity's value as part of what makes an interference reasonable in the first place.
The fourth step does the real work, and it is where the temptation to add a utility comparison is strongest. That comparison belongs to clause (a) and to states like Idaho, and importing it into clause (b) erases what distinguishes the clause. The clause presupposes that the defendant can pay and keep operating.
Clause (b) and Section 829A share the idea that a neighbor harmed by a valuable activity should not always go unpaid, but they ask different questions. Clause (b) turns on the defendant's ability to pay, and Section 829A turns on the harm to the plaintiff.22 The two can pull apart, and the next subsection takes up that contrast.
Harm Beyond a Fair Burden
Section 829A supplies a further route to unreasonableness, and its text mentions neither the utility of the defendant's conduct nor the defendant's finances. An intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if the harm resulting from the invasion is severe and greater than the other should be required to bear without compensation.24 The provision has two parts. The first is a threshold of severity, which asks how bad the harm is, and the second is a judgment about fairness, which asks whether this plaintiff should absorb the harm without payment. Both parts look to the plaintiff's side of the dispute, and that orientation separates the section from the balance in Section 826(a) and the compensation clause in Section 826(b).
The severity requirement keeps the section away from ordinary friction between neighbors. Neighbors constantly send small burdens across the boundary line and receive small ones in return, and a rule that required payment for each would make every owner both plaintiff and defendant. A person mowing a lawn knows that noise and some dust will pass over the property line and that the mower's exhaust will pollute the air above the neighbor's land, so the invasion is intentional in the Restatement's sense. Yet the person probably regards these effects as the normal, acceptable consequences of mowing, and the interference is probably not even substantial, let alone severe.25 The inquiry centers on the impact on the plaintiff: whether the defendant's conduct creates consequences that a typical landowner should not be expected to bear, and whether those consequences exceed a reasonable threshold.26 Courts also deny liability for complaints of a lesser kind. In Ken Cowden Chevrolet, Inc. v. Corts, land in its natural condition blocked a view and caused erosion, and the court found no nuisance liability.27
The fairness part addresses a different problem, which arises when an activity is worth having and its costs fall unevenly. The benefits of a productive enterprise reach many people, while its smoke, vibration, or dust lands on whoever owns the adjoining land. Section 829A asks whether that owner should have to absorb the loss unpaid, and the phrase “without compensation” marks its target, since payment removes the objection. The section does not say that the activity must stop, and it does not ask whether the activity is valuable.
Boomer came before the Restatement (Second) added an alternative test in 1977, but its facts show what the section describes. The landowners complained of dirt, smoke, and vibration from a cement plant, and the trial produced a finding of nuisance and temporary damages without an injunction.28 The injury was heavier than the opinion suggests. Blasting at the company's quarry, about half a mile from the plant, frightened neighborhood children, cracked the walls, ceilings, and exteriors of nearby homes, and filled the air with fine dust that covered everything.29 Both parts of Section 829A are visible in those facts. The damage to the homes was severe, and the remaining question is whether the owners should be left to absorb it unpaid.
Section 829A answers only whether the invasion is unreasonable. A nuisance case always raises a second question, the choice of remedy,30 and a finding of unreasonableness leaves that choice open. Boomer gives the plaintiff damages but not an injunction, except one that will be vacated on payment of damages, while Spur gives the plaintiff an injunction and awards the defendant damages. The two cases are often put side by side to ask whether they can be reconciled.31
Section 826(b) and Section 829A both respond to the idea that a neighbor hurt by a valuable activity should not always go unpaid, but they ask different questions:
- Section 826(b) makes an invasion unreasonable when the harm is serious and the financial burden of compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make continuing the conduct infeasible, so the decisive facts concern the defendant's finances.32
- Section 829A makes an invasion unreasonable when the harm is severe and greater than the other should be required to bear without compensation, so the decisive facts concern the plaintiff's loss and the fairness of leaving it with the plaintiff.33
Because one test focuses on the defendant's ability to pay and the other on the harm to the plaintiff, they separate on exactly the cases where payment and survival cannot coexist. The drafters also chose different threshold words, serious in Section 826(b) and severe in Section 829A, so an answer should use the word that belongs to the provision it applies. Because the text of Section 829A mentions neither utility nor ability to pay, the safe method on an exam is to run its two parts, severity and fairness of the burden, and to leave the defendant's finances to Section 826(b).
What should follow in that situation is a question the text does not settle. Section 826(b) assumes that the activity goes on after compensation, and Section 829A carries no such assumption, so it can find an invasion unreasonable where compensation and continuation cannot coexist. A court that reaches that point must still choose a remedy, and each choice costs something: an injunction ends the operation, and damages beyond what the defendant can pay either end it anyway or leave the owners with less than their loss. A careful answer says that Section 829A is satisfied on its own terms, that Section 826(b) is not, and that the remedy is a separate question.
Whether a court applies these provisions at all depends on the jurisdiction, because not all courts adopt the Restatement's view. Some limit unreasonableness to the balancing situation and deny relief on the other routes, and a few look only at the severity of the interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment without considering the social utility of the defendant's activities.34 Idaho explicitly rejected the companion compensation clause of Section 826(b) in Carpenter.35 In a state that limits unreasonableness to the balance, a plaintiff with severe, concentrated harm must succeed, if at all, within the balance. When a problem is silent about the jurisdiction, run the balance in Section 826(a) first, because it is the primary test, and turn to Section 829A when the defendant's utility carries the balance but the plaintiff's harm is severe and concentrated.