Concept
Who May Sue
Private nuisance: elements, protected interest, and significant harm
Who May Sue
A private nuisance plaintiff must hold a right in the land that was affected. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821E limits liability to those who have property rights and privileges in respect to the use and enjoyment of that land.1 The limit follows from the definition: a private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, so the person entitled to complain is the person who holds that interest.2 A plaintiff with no right in the affected land has lost nothing the tort protects, however unpleasant the interference was to live through.
The rule works as a threshold. It looks to the plaintiff's relationship to the land, it applies before any question about the defendant's conduct, and the severity of the plaintiff's discomfort plays no part in it. Section 821E names three kinds of qualifying interest: possessors of the land, owners of easements and profits in the land, and owners of nonpossessory estates that the interference detrimentally affects.3 Each has its own subsection below.
Possessors of Land
The first category, and the core of the rule, is “possessors of the land.”5 A possessor is the person who actually occupies and controls the land. The tort protects that person because occupancy is how use and enjoyment gets lived: when smoke, noise, or fumes cross a lot line, the people who cannot open the windows, use the yard, or run a business in peace are the people on the premises. The claim therefore follows occupancy and ignores the form of title.
A possessor need not hold a fee simple. An owner living on the land qualifies, and so does a tenant with only a leasehold, because the tenant in possession is the one who lives with the interference. The decided cases show ordinary neighbors and occupants in this role. In one kennel case, the evidence supported a finding that 69 or more dogs kenneled on Wiggins's property caused an unreasonable noise invasion that interfered with the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their nearby land, and the appellate court affirmed the finding of private nuisance.6 Neighboring occupants also brought a noise claim in Howard Opera House Association v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., which involved loud music from a retail store, and a lessee's claim appears in Nichols v. Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co.
A lender shows most clearly how a stake in land differs from possession. A bank that holds a mortgage on a house next to a foul-smelling factory has a security interest, which is a right to be repaid out of the property if the borrower defaults. The bank does not live in the house, work on it, or use it, so the odor takes nothing from the bank's use and enjoyment. The person who lives with the smell is the borrower in possession, and that person holds the claim.
Exam answers go wrong here in two ways. Some treat suffering as the test, so that anyone harmed by the interference seems to qualify; the question is whether the plaintiff occupies the land that was affected, and the diner on the smoky patio, the motorist on the highway, and the lender worried about collateral all fail it. Others equate possession with title. A landlord who has leased the premises holds a nonpossessory interest and belongs to the third category, taken up below, while the tenant in possession qualifies here.
Easements and Profits
The second category extends the nuisance claim to “owners of easements and profits in the land.”8 An easement is a right to use land that someone else possesses for a limited purpose, such as driving across it to reach a road or running a pipe beneath it. A profit is a right to enter that land and take something from it, such as timber or gravel. The holder of either uses the land without possessing it.
This category looks like an exception to the occupancy rule of the first, but it follows from the same idea. Nuisance protects use and enjoyment, and occupancy is only the commonest way to have them. An interference with an easement is an interference with use and enjoyment, since there is no possessory interest in easement rights, and it may be regarded as a nuisance.9
The familiar illustration is an express easement of light and air over a neighbor's lot. In Prah v. Maretti, the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that American courts honor express easements to sunlight. It added that American courts later repudiated the English doctrine of ancient lights as inconsistent with the needs of a developing country, and that the court had held such an easement cannot be acquired by prescription and had been unwilling to recognize one by implication.10 In England, long enjoyment of light and air could ripen into a right. In the United States no such right arises, however long the enjoyment continues, although a structure placed solely to deprive an owner of light and air may be actionable as a spite fence.11 A neighbor who has simply enjoyed the sun for thirty years therefore holds no easement. If he possesses land, he may still sue as a possessor, but he must satisfy the harm and liability elements without a property right in the lot next door.
Two opposite errors recur on exams. One reasons that a person with no possessory estate cannot be a proper plaintiff, which overlooks that an easement or profit is itself a property right in the use of the land. The other treats a long history of using a route, a view, or a stream of light as if it were an easement. The question for this category is whether the plaintiff holds a right to use the affected land, and informal permission and habit do not supply one.
Nonpossessory Estate Owners
The third category covers “owners of nonpossessory estates in the land that are detrimentally affected by interferences with its use and enjoyment.”13 A nonpossessory estate is an ownership interest in land that does not presently carry the right to occupy it. The standard example is a landlord who has leased the premises: the tenant possesses during the lease, and the landlord keeps a reversion, the right to retake possession when the lease ends. A remainder works the same way for the person waiting behind a life tenant, who owns the interest now but will not possess until later. This category therefore differs from the possessor, who is the person living on or using the land today.14
The words detrimentally affected do the limiting work. The possessor's claim rests on occupancy, since the person on the premises is the one who breathes the smoke, hears the noise, and loses the yard. A landlord who has handed over possession feels none of that, so ordinary annoyance touches no interest the landlord holds. What a nonpossessory owner holds is a stake in the estate itself, meaning what the land will be and be worth when the estate becomes possessory. An interference reaches that stake when it leaves lasting damage on the land, because the damage will still be there when possession returns. The limit also keeps the claims separate: the occupant's discomfort is the occupant's injury, and letting the landlord sue over it would put a second plaintiff behind a harm that someone else suffered.
The two scenes show that ownership alone does not decide who may sue. The landlord owned both buildings and held the same reversion in each, yet only the foundation damage detrimentally affected that reversion. A possessor qualifies by occupying the land and being disturbed in that occupancy, while the owner of a future interest qualifies only by showing injury to the estate. The usual exam error treats the landlord's title as enough, as if an owner could sue over anything that bothers the building's occupants. The opposite error assumes that someone who is not in possession can never sue, which overlooks that lasting damage to the land can injure the owner of a future interest.
Qualifying under any of the three categories settles only who may bring the claim. The harm and liability elements, covered in the sections that follow, still have to be met. Many states, for example, judge unreasonableness by a multifactor test, though the factors vary widely; typical ones are the character of the neighborhood, the nature of the conduct, its proximity to the plaintiff's property, its frequency, continuity, and duration, and the extent of the plaintiff's injury.15 And fault remains the most common basis for tort liability, with strict liability confined to certain kinds of cases.16