Concept
Nuisance Versus Trespass
Private nuisance: elements, protected interest, and significant harm
Nuisance Versus Trespass
A neighbor who walks his dogs across your lawn commits a trespass and owes at least nominal damages. The same neighbor who lets the dogs bark all night has entered nothing, and he is liable only if the barking substantially and unreasonably interferes with your use and enjoyment of your land.1 That contrast is the point of this section. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D defines a private nuisance as a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the word "nontrespassory" assumes a neighboring tort you must be able to tell apart from it.2
Trespass protects the possessor's right of possession, which includes the right to exclude others from occupying or using the land, and it is actionable without proof of actual damage. The defendant need not have meant to trespass; it is enough that he meant to be on, or to interfere with the possession of, property that turns out to belong to the plaintiff.3 Nuisance protects a different interest, the plaintiff's use and enjoyment, and it requires that an act or condition on the defendant's land substantially and unreasonably interfere with that enjoyment. Both are actions to protect possession, but trespass is the more easily proven.4
Trespass needs no proof of damage because the law treats the entry itself as the harm. In Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc. the court explained that, because a legal right is involved, the law recognizes actual harm in every trespass and infers some damage from every direct entry upon another's land. The action for intentional trespass vindicates the right itself, and a nominal damage award records that actual harm occurred even though no dollar figure measures it.5
Nuisance has no counterpart to that inference. The Restatement draws the contrast in a comment to § 821D: "For an intentional trespass, there is liability without harm; for a private nuisance, there is no liability without significant harm." The same comment adds that in private nuisance an intentional interference with the plaintiff's use or enjoyment is not of itself a tort, and that unreasonableness of the interference is necessary for liability. It also describes each tort as a field of liability in which an intentional or an unintentional invasion may be actionable, so the label does not turn on whether the defendant acted on purpose.6
Intent matters most when the invasion is deliberate. For unintentional invasions, liability in trespass is virtually identical to liability in nuisance. For intentional ones, trespass is treated like the other intentional torts, with liability regardless of the amount of harm or the reasonableness of the conduct, while nuisance is usually subjected to inquiries about both. A plaintiff who cannot show a physical invasion by a tangible thing therefore faces a defense of reasonableness or slight harm that would be irrelevant if there had been one.7 The asymmetry departs from the general pattern, since courts have not generally adopted strict liability across the board and fault remains the most common basis of tort liability.8
Facts tend to sort along three lines, each a tendency and not a rule.9
- A physical entry points toward trespass, while smells, light, sounds, vibrations, dust, and pollution of air and water point toward nuisance.10
- Trespass classically involves an unauthorized direct or immediate intrusion of a physical, tangible object, while an interference that accumulates over time looks like nuisance.11
- A defendant who enters, or sends an object onto, the plaintiff's land commits trespass, while one whose act or condition on his own land affects the neighbor only through its effects is in nuisance territory.12
Nora's repair shop shows the third line and the difference in what each plaintiff must prove. She works on cars on her own property. If she drives a car onto her neighbor's land, she is liable for at least nominal damages regardless of harm. If her work merely makes noise, the neighbor recovers in nuisance only by showing that the noise unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of his land, and he has no claim at all if his land is vacant or his house sits far from the noise.13
A plaintiff who cannot show a physical entry still has a route to relief, because nuisance reaches intangible invasions. That route carries the requirements trespass lacks: a protected interest in land, significant harm, and conduct that is intentional and unreasonable, negligent or reckless, or abnormally dangerous. The remaining sections of this chapter take those requirements in turn.
Fumes and Microscopic Particles
Invisible matter strains all three lines at once. Suppose a smelter's emissions leave deposits of microscopic particles on a neighboring farm. The particles are physical deposits on the land, which resembles trespass, but they arrive imperceptibly and do their damage only as they accumulate, which resembles nuisance.15 Traditionally the intrusion would probably have been treated as a nuisance, because the particles were too small to be seen as they arrived. Modern courts may treat such invisible intrusions as trespass, and those that do are likely to require proof of actual damage.16
The damage requirement departs from ordinary trespass, which is actionable for at least nominal damages without proof of harm. Borland v. Sanders Lead Co. held that the size of the particles did not defeat the possessory interest but that actual damages had to be proven, and Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co. required actual and substantial damages.17 The Bradley court gave its reason: "no useful purpose would be served by sanctioning actions in trespass by every landowner within a hundred miles of a manufacturing plant."18 A damage requirement keeps the trespass label from reaching every owner downwind of a factory. Stevenson v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. went the other way and held that deposit of airborne particulates would be a trespass without proof of substantial damages.19
Other courts keep the traditional line. Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. declined to follow the trend toward trespass in pollution cases. It retained the distinction between trespass, which requires "an unauthorized direct or immediate intrusion of a physical, tangible object on land," and nuisance, which lies if the plaintiff proves "significant harm resulting from the defendant's unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of property."20 Not all courts are comfortable with blurring the line between trespass and nuisance. Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Co-op Oil Co. rejected a trespass claim based on pesticide drift particles.21 Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co. held that excessive noise alone will not support a trespass action absent some physical invasion or physical damage, and that intangible intrusions must be approached on a nuisance theory.22
A third approach keeps the trespass label and imports nuisance's reasoning. In Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., cattle ranchers alleged that fumes from an aluminum plant poisoned their herds. The Oregon court defined trespass to include intrusion by invisible matter or measurable energy, then applied a balancing test of reasonableness to decide liability, so that trespass and nuisance were harmonized by subjecting both to the calculus of intentional nuisance.23 Martin shows that a court can keep the trespass label while borrowing the nuisance inquiry.
The label has practical consequences. Limitations periods may differ between the two torts, with trespass usually longer. A short-lived intrusion may not support a nuisance claim at all, and under nuisance a court may find some level of interference reasonable and therefore not actionable.24 Because no single national rule governs, an answer to a fumes or particles problem should state the traditional view, identify the jurisdiction's approach if the facts reveal it, and address nuisance as well, since plaintiffs typically rely on nuisance for claims of environmental injury.25