Concept
Analyzing a Claim
Public nuisance and who may sue
Analyzing a Claim
A public nuisance problem puts two questions, and the Restatement answers them in two sections. Section 821B asks whether the defendant's conduct is a public nuisance at all: an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.1 Section 821C asks who may sue, and it answers by remedy. A plaintiff who wants damages in an individual action must have suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public exercising the right that was interfered with.2 A plaintiff who wants to enjoin or abate must have that damages right, must hold authority as a public official or agency to represent the state or a political subdivision, or must have standing as a representative of the general public in a citizen's action or a class action.3
Take the questions in that order, because they test different things. The first concerns the defendant's conduct and the community's right. The second concerns who the plaintiff is and what relief the plaintiff wants. One public wrong can support suits by an official, by a representative of the public, and by an individual, each on a different showing, so blurring the questions produces two predictable errors. The first reasons from a vivid injury back to the conclusion that a public nuisance exists, though a plaintiff's loss, however severe, says nothing about whether a public right was invaded. The second treats an established public nuisance as a claim for every injured plaintiff, though the same nuisance may entitle one plaintiff to sue and bar another.
Step one begins with the right. Ask whether the defendant interfered with something the community holds collectively, such as use of a navigable river, a public road, or clean air, and not an individual interest that many people happen to share. The number of people affected is evidence on that point; it is not the test. Then test the interference against the circumstances in § 821B(2): a significant interference with the public health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience; conduct proscribed by a statute, ordinance, or regulation; or conduct of a continuing nature or lasting effect that, as the actor knows or has reason to know, significantly affects the public right.4 Any one of these may sustain a finding that the interference is unreasonable, and because the Restatement introduces the list with the word include, a court may rely on circumstances beyond it.5
Step two turns on two facts about the plaintiff: the plaintiff's identity and the remedy the plaintiff seeks. A public official needs no special harm to seek an injunction or abatement, because the official sues as the community's representative. A private plaintiff who wants damages needs harm different in kind from the public's, not merely greater in degree, suffered while exercising the public right that was interfered with. That same showing opens the injunction route under § 821C(2)(a). A private plaintiff who lacks it may still reach an injunction or abatement through a citizen's action or a class action, but representative standing speaks only to those two remedies and never produces damages.
Because each question has more than one part, it helps to run the analysis as five moves. The first two answer step one, and the last three answer step two.
Hold the defendant's conduct constant and vary the plaintiff, and step two shows how much of the outcome it controls.
Step one comes out the same for every plaintiff, because it looks only at the defendant. The river's water and fish belong to the whole community. At least two of the § 821B(2) circumstances are plainly present, a significant interference with the public's use of the river and a violation of a regulation, and the nightly repetition points toward a third. The conduct is a public nuisance.6 Everything that separates the plaintiffs belongs to step two.
The attorney general sues in the capacity the Restatement preserves for public officials, so § 821C(2)(b) admits the office without any showing of special harm.7 Imani stands on the other side of the line. Her lost outings are what every other boater on the river lost, which makes her harm the public's own however many outings she lost, and § 821C(1) denies her damages.8 Her remedy matters too. Had Imani asked for an injunction, § 821C(2)(a) would still be closed to her, because it admits only a plaintiff who holds the damages right.9 She would need representative standing under § 821C(2)(c), and if the jurisdiction authorizes citizen's actions, that standing would win her the injunction while leaving her damages claim exactly where it was.10
Dmitri clears § 821C(1). As the earlier discussion of special harm explained, a commercial user who loses an established livelihood built on the public right to fish suffers a loss different in kind from the community's, and he suffered it while exercising that very right.11 Because § 821C(2)(a) extends the injunction route to anyone who holds the damages right, he may also seek to enjoin the discharge.12 The riverfront owner has a different path available. If the effluent substantially and unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of the land, the owner may sue in private nuisance without showing harm different in kind from the public's, so the special-harm requirement never arises. One nuisance therefore produced four different answers, and the plaintiff's identity and requested remedy fixed each one.