Concept
Unreasonable Interference
Public nuisance and who may sue
Unreasonable Interference
A plaintiff who has identified a right common to the general public has cleared only the first hurdle. A public nuisance is “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public,” so the plaintiff must also prove the unreasonableness.1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B(2) guides that proof. It lists circumstances that “may sustain a holding that an interference with a public right is unreasonable,”2 and there are three: a significant interference with the public health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience; conduct proscribed by a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation; and conduct of a continuing nature, or with a permanent or long-lasting effect, that the actor knows or has reason to know significantly affects the public right.3 The Restatement labels them (a), (b), and (c), and each has its own subsection below.
The three are alternatives. The Restatement joins them with “or,” so any one may suffice, and it introduces them as circumstances that “may sustain” a holding and that “include” these three, so the list illustrates the category without closing it.4 Independent routes to the same conclusion suit a tort that grew out of “a large, miscellaneous and diversified group of minor criminal offenses.”5
Courts measure unreasonableness from the community’s standpoint, not the plaintiff’s. In Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, the court described the standard as objective: the question “is not whether the particular plaintiff found the invasion unreasonable, but ‘whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would consider it unreasonable.’”6 What decides the question is a comparison of the social utility of the defendant’s activity with the gravity of the harm it inflicts.7 Public nuisance borrows that weighing from private nuisance, because the underlying bases of liability are the same: substantial harm caused by intentional and unreasonable conduct, or by conduct that is negligent, reckless, or abnormally dangerous.8 An early public nuisance case is said to have stated the utility side bluntly: “Le utility del chose excusera le noisomeness del stink,” or, roughly, the usefulness of the thing excuses the foulness of the stink.9
The remedy the plaintiff seeks can change the answer. In an action for damages, the court asks whether it is unreasonable to engage in the conduct without paying for the harm done, so even a highly useful activity may be unreasonable to carry on uncompensated. In an action for an injunction, the court asks whether the activity itself is so unreasonable that it must be stopped.10 An important activity may therefore continue if it pays for the harm it causes, a distinction this chapter takes up again when it turns to damages and injunctions. The first circumstance names the community interests at stake, so it is the natural place to begin.
Significant Public Harm
The first circumstance asks whether the conduct “involves a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience.”11 Five community interests share one qualifier. The interests cover what people need in order to live together: freedom from disease, protection from physical danger, quiet, tolerable air, and passage from place to place. The qualifier, “significant,” sets how much interference is enough. Other sources speak of “substantial” harm,12 and the Restatement formulates that requirement as proof of “significant harm.”13
The common-law roots show what the five interests cover. Public nuisance grew into “a large, miscellaneous and diversified group of minor criminal offenses,” each involving some interference with the interests of the community at large, and the traditional examples sort under the five headings:14
- Public health: keeping diseased animals, or maintaining a pond that breeds malarial mosquitoes.
- Public safety: storing explosives in the midst of a city, or shooting fireworks in the public streets.
- Public peace: loud and disturbing noises.
- Public comfort: widely disseminated bad odors, dust, and smoke.
- Public convenience: obstructing a public highway or a navigable stream.
The older list also reached public morals, such as houses of prostitution and indecent exhibitions. The first circumstance does not name morals, but § 821B(2) offers its circumstances as examples, so the omission need not exclude those cases.15
Courts still apply these categories to modern problems. Late twentieth-century litigation brought public nuisance claims against liquor stores that sold liquor to minors, theaters or stores that showed or sold pornographic materials, and motels used for prostitution.16 Disputes of this kind often arise between neighbors whose uses are incompatible, as when a store selling adult movies and magazines opens beside a long-established childcare center that serves service families.17 Noise supplies another steady source of nuisance claims; courts have heard them over noise from a saloon and from wind turbines.18 When the Rhode Island Supreme Court defined public nuisance in State v. Lead Industries Ass’n, it described “behavior that unreasonably interferes with the health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the general community.”19
The word “significant” screens out ordinary friction, because a plaintiff must show more than that someone was bothered. Monks drew on the Restatement’s comments to define significant harm as a “real and appreciable invasion” of the plaintiff’s interests, one that is “definitely offensive, seriously annoying or intolerable.” The measure is objective: “If normal persons in that locality would not be substantially annoyed or disturbed by the situation, then the invasion is not a significant one.”20 That standard protects defendants from a hypersensitive complainant who could otherwise turn harmless conduct into a nuisance. It also protects the community from a defendant who points to a few unusually tolerant neighbors while the typical resident finds the conduct intolerable.
Significance does not depend on offending the senses. Storing explosives in the midst of a city sits on the traditional list as an interference with public safety, and it qualifies because of the danger it creates for everyone nearby, not because it irritates anyone.21
Significance measures the size of the interference; the broader judgment of unreasonableness weighs that interference against what the defendant’s activity is worth. The factors a court considers include the extent and duration of the interference22 and the character of the harm, since courts treat aesthetic harms as less serious than health or safety concerns.23 A useful activity earns credit on the utility side, but credit is not immunity: an activity of great utility may still be unreasonable to carry on without compensating for the harm it does.24 A plant that employs half the town therefore cannot rest on its payroll when its fumes foul the air of the whole community, because the harm to every resident weighs on the other side of the scale. Where a statute already fixes the standard of conduct, the weighing may be unnecessary, as the next subsection explains.25
Violation of Law
The second circumstance asks whether the defendant’s conduct is “proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation.”27 To proscribe is to forbid, so the circumstance applies whenever a legislature or agency has prohibited what the defendant did, whether by state statute, city ordinance, or agency regulation. Like the other entries on the list, a violation is a circumstance that “may sustain” a finding of unreasonableness; it supports the claim without deciding it.28
When a statute establishes the standard of conduct, making something a nuisance per se, it precludes further inquiry into the reasonableness of the defendant’s activity.29 In effect, the legislature has answered the gravity-and-utility question in advance. Zoning ordinances supply the familiar land-use example. They typically let uses already in place continue as legal nonconforming uses, but they require some uses, such as junkyards, unsightly billboards, and particularly noxious activities, to end immediately or within a short period. The difference between a nuisance per se and a nuisance per accidens shows up in that contrast.30
The Arizona fly-breeding statute in the Spur Industries litigation shows a legislature naming the condition itself. It reaches “[a]ny condition or place in populous areas which constitutes a breeding place for flies, rodents, mosquitoes and other insects which are capable of carrying and transmitting disease-causing organisms to any person or persons,” and the court agreed that Spur’s operation was an enjoinable public nuisance as far as the people in the southern portion of Del Webb’s Sun City were concerned.31
A violation of law is not a prerequisite, however. In Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Community Services, the Arizona Supreme Court held that “conduct which unreasonably and significantly interferes with the public health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience is a public nuisance within the concept of tort law, even if that conduct is not specifically prohibited by the criminal law.”32 The structure of § 821B points the same way. Because the three circumstances are alternatives, a violation of law is one route to unreasonableness and significant harm to the community is another.
The same decision settles that a lawful business can be a public nuisance. Armory Park recalled the court’s earlier statement in Spur that Spur “is required to move not because of any wrongdoing on the part of Spur, but because of a proper and legitimate regard of the courts for the rights and interests of the public,” and it called the rule widely accepted.33 The inquiry looks at what the activity does to the public, not at whether the defendant broke a rule.
A statute tied to a place applies only where its terms are met there. The Arizona statute reaches conditions “in populous areas,” so the same breeding conditions fall outside it when no community lies within their reach.34
Statutes can also help the defendant. Courts applying a statutory immunity read it by its terms, feature by feature; in Stone v. York Haven Power Co., an immunity deemed inapplicable to highly developed recreational areas applied to a lake but not to the dam that created it.35 A statute’s own terms mark its reach, whether it condemns the conduct or shelters it. A violation therefore supports a finding of unreasonableness without settling the claim, and the plaintiff must still show an interference with a right common to the general public.36
Continuing or Lasting Effect
The third circumstance asks “whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.”38 Two parts must work together. The first is persistence: the conduct goes on over time, or it leaves damage that lasts. The second is knowledge: the actor knows or has reason to know that the conduct significantly affects the public right. Students most often drop the knowledge part, but persistence alone does not satisfy the circumstance. “Has reason to know” reaches an actor who lacks actual awareness but holds information from which a reasonable person would infer the effect.
Persistence matters because duration is among the factors a court weighs. Conduct that continues, or whose damage lingers, adds to the gravity side of the balance in a way a brief episode does not.39
The two parts of the circumstance can fail separately. A long-running activity whose effect on the public water supply nobody could have detected does not satisfy it until the actor knows or has reason to know of that effect, however long the activity has run. Continuity is also not a precondition to every public nuisance. An older view held that a nuisance did not exist unless the interference continued or recurred, but there is no such requirement. Some interferences are substantial or unreasonable only because they continue or recur, and for those the persistence is the whole case.40 A plaintiff may rely on the first or second circumstance and never reach the third.
Continuity also bears on remedy. Equity will not enjoin a completed act, but it may halt a clearly continuous invasion of an important interest where the remedy at law is inadequate.41 Where a plaintiff seeks an injunction, there must be a threat of future harm, and ongoing conduct or a lasting effect supplies one.42