Concept
Public Nuisance Defined
Public nuisance and who may sue
Public Nuisance and Who May Sue
Public Nuisance Defined
A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.1 The definition names the harm and says nothing about what the defendant did. That omission is deliberate. “Nuisance” describes neither a kind of conduct nor a condition the defendant creates; it refers to the kind of interest invaded, and it marks out a field of liability rather than a single tort.2 Fouling a river, blocking a highway, or running a cattle feedlot can each be a public nuisance, but only when the interference reaches an interest that belongs to the community at large.
Public nuisance began as a criminal wrong. The earliest cases involved purprestures, encroachments upon the royal domain or the public highway, and an obstructed highway is still a typical public nuisance.3 The remedy spread to other invasions of the public right, but it was exclusively criminal until the sixteenth century, when courts first recognized that a private individual who had suffered special injury could maintain a tort action.4 The criminal ancestry still shows, for a public nuisance closely resembles a misdemeanor.5 A private plaintiff today usually must still show an injury different in kind from the one the rest of the public suffers.6
Nuisance in fact covers two fields of liability, public and private, and they protect distinct interests. They share a name by historical accident, and the shared name has led courts to apply much the same rules to both.7 The sorting question in every case is therefore the same: which interest did the defendant’s conduct invade? The first subsection below asks what makes a right common to the public, and the second draws the line against private nuisance.
A Right Common to the Public
The Restatement’s definition has two halves: the interference must be unreasonable, and the right interfered with must be common to the general public.8 One court breaks the same idea into three elements: an unreasonable interference, with a right common to the general public, by a person or people with control over the instrumentality alleged to have created the nuisance when the damage occurred.9 This subsection takes up the second half of the definition.
The court in re Lead Paint Litigation stressed that although the tort is stated in general terms, the terms have content. The right must be a public right, in the sense of a right “common to all members of the general public,” and not one merely enjoyed by a number, even a large number, of people.10 It must be common to the public as a class, and not merely the interest of one person or even a group of citizens.11 A defendant can therefore act carelessly and injure many people and still fall outside public nuisance, because the right invaded belongs to individuals.
A polluted stream shows where the line falls, because one discharge can injure two different interests. Pollution that merely deprives fifty or a hundred lower riparian owners of the use of the water for purposes connected with their land does not for that reason alone become a public nuisance. Pollution that prevents the use of a public bathing beach, or kills the fish in a navigable stream and so deprives every member of the community of the right to fish, does.12 The riparian owners are not left without a remedy. Insofar as the pollution interferes with their use of the water it is a private nuisance, and the same discharge is a public nuisance to the extent it kills the fish or impairs a public water supply.13 The difference lies in what was lost. A hundred owners each lose an interest tied to their own land, while the community loses one interest that all of its members hold together.
Counting heads therefore cannot settle the question. A few states do accept, by statute, interference with the rights of a substantial number of persons even though no public right as such is involved, so local law matters on that point.14 Elsewhere, the Restatement definition asks about the character of the right. Nor should the meaning of “public” be imported from other contexts. A statutory immunity, for example, was deemed inapplicable to highly developed recreational areas, and in one case it applied to a lake but not to the dam that created it.15
Suits by governments against whole industries show how contested this boundary is. The lead paint litigation has gone poorly for plaintiffs. Early suits by Philadelphia and New Orleans ran into statute of limitations problems, New York’s action had more success, and later municipal claims have mostly been dismissed. A Rhode Island jury found that lead paint is a public nuisance requiring abatement, but the holding was reversed on appeal. A Milwaukee jury declined to find liability, and an Ohio statute prohibits public nuisance suits seeking recovery of clean-up costs for lead paint contamination.16 Oklahoma’s opioid case ended the same way, after a bigger win at trial. Following a 33-day bench trial, the state prevailed in 2019 against Johnson & Johnson under Oklahoma’s public nuisance statute, and the judge ordered a $465 million abatement program. In 2021 the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the trial court had broadened public nuisance law into an unbounded cause of action that infringed on the authority of the executive and legislative branches to use public policy to remedy public health and social problems.17
Other claims press the doctrine in other directions. Climate-change plaintiffs have pleaded public nuisance, and a federal district court in northern California took up such a claim in 2018; its opinion opens with a long account of how scientists came to understand that carbon dioxide traps heat in the atmosphere.18 Those plaintiffs face hurdles beyond the public-right question: finding plaintiffs whose harm is distinct from the general harm to the community, proving causation, and overcoming arguments that federal or state law preempts the claim.19 Individual defendants have faced the theory as well. In Jupin v. Kask, the court rejected nuisance and strict liability claims against a homeowner whose stored firearm was stolen and used to shoot a police officer.
Public Versus Private Nuisance
A private nuisance protects a different interest from a public one. It is a thing or activity that substantially and unreasonably interferes with the possessor’s use and enjoyment of land or an interest in land.21 The interference must reach that interest in land. Similar interferences that affect the plaintiff only personally, without touching the use and enjoyment of land, may be some other tort but are not a private nuisance.22 A public nuisance, by contrast, is an interference with a right common to the general public.23 A court sorting a case therefore asks which of the two interests the defendant invaded.
Private nuisance is at bottom a dispute between neighbors over how land is used. Suppose Kelly has long run a childcare center for navy families, and XXX, Inc. opens a store selling adult movies and magazines on neighboring land. The two uses are incompatible, and no public right need be involved.24 Once one use is more than modestly incompatible with another, the courts must make a judgment call, which they express by saying they “balance the equities.” Whether an interference is substantial depends on all the circumstances, including the nature of the neighborhood in which the properties sit.25
The feedlot in Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co. shows the two fields overlapping. A developer sued over a feeding operation that held between 20,000 and 30,000 cattle, whose flies and odor were drifting on the prevailing wind over the southern part of Sun City, and the evidence amply supported the trial court’s finding that the pens had become a nuisance to the residents there.26 The court held that, as to the citizens of Sun City, the feedlot was both a public and a private nuisance, and that they could have successfully maintained an action to abate it.27 Each label fits for its own reason. The flies and odor interfered with the residents’ use of their own land, which is the private nuisance. The court also quoted a provision reaching any condition or place in populous areas that breeds flies and other insects capable of carrying disease-causing organisms, which points to the health of the community as a whole.28 Most courts reason the same way: interference with the use and enjoyment of land, as in Spur, is a private nuisance no matter how many landowners are involved, and it is also a public nuisance if it interferes with a general public right.29
The same act can therefore be both. A polluting factory that interferes with the public comfort and also with the use or enjoyment of neighboring land is a public nuisance and a private one.30 A claim can also be private alone. A factory spewing clouds of noxious fumes is a public nuisance, but playing drums at three in the morning is a private nuisance that bothers only the neighbors.31 The drummer reaches fewer people, but the claim stays private because of the interest touched: only each neighbor’s enjoyment of his or her own home is affected, and nothing the community holds in common is.
The feedlot opinion’s own statement of the distinction can mislead. The court called it generally one of degree. A private nuisance, it said, affects a single individual or a definite small number of persons in the enjoyment of private rights not common to the public, while a public nuisance affects rights enjoyed by citizens as a part of the public and must affect a considerable number of people or an entire community or neighborhood.32 Read alone, that sounds like a headcount test. Even in that formulation, though, the key phrases speak of rights “not common to the public” and rights enjoyed “as a part of the public.” A right that belongs to the whole community will ordinarily injure many people, so numbers and public rights tend to travel together, and a court that speaks of numbers is using shorthand. One standard definition concedes that no one knows how many people it takes to make a public.33 When the headcount and the right diverge, the right controls.
The road and the lower riparian owners of the previous subsection mark both ends of the headcount problem. A handful of drivers can hold a public right, while a hundred landowners may each hold only private ones. The classification matters because the same facts can support both claims, and the claims differ in who may sue. Only owners of interests in land can bring a private nuisance action. Because a public nuisance arises from interference with public rights, any member of the affected public can sue, but usually only on a showing of special injury, meaning injury of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public.34 Later sections develop that requirement.