Concept
The Third Restatement Approach
Defenses to strict liability claims
The Third Restatement Approach
The Second Restatement settles every question about plaintiff conduct in a strict liability case on an all-or-nothing basis. Under §§ 484(1), 515(1), and 524(1), the plaintiff's contributory negligence is no defense to the strict liability of the possessor of an animal or of one who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity.1 Sections 484(2), 515(2), and 524(2) make one exception: contributory negligence is a defense when the plaintiff voluntarily or knowingly, and unreasonably, subjects himself to the risk of harm from the animal or the activity.2 Section 515(3) adds a separate defense for the keeper of an animal: the plaintiff's assumption of the risk of harm from the animal.3 The careless plaintiff therefore recovers in full, and the plaintiff who knowingly and unreasonably faced the danger, or who assumed the risk of an animal's harm, recovers nothing.
Fault changes the outcome only at those two extremes, and the Third Restatement and many courts rejected that design. A driver who carelessly misses a blasting sign, without knowing the danger, still collects every dollar. A driver who understands the danger and drives on collects nothing, even though the quarry alone introduced the risk. Comparative responsibility replaces both results with one question: what share of the loss belongs to each party?
Two changes follow, and each has its own subsection. The first concerns what a plaintiff's fault does to recovery in a strict liability claim for physical harm, and what becomes of assumption of risk once it stops working as a separate complete defense. The second is a distinct rule that withdraws strict liability from plaintiffs who come near an animal to obtain a benefit for themselves, and it reaches cases the Second Restatement resolved through its consent defenses. Because exam questions on animals and blasting seldom say which Restatement controls, a complete answer states the Second Restatement rule first and then shows how the comparative approach changes the result.
Comparative Fault Reductions
Section 25 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm makes a plaintiff's negligence reduce damages in a strict liability case, where the Second Restatement either ignored it or treated it as a complete bar. A plaintiff who was contributorily negligent in failing to take reasonable precautions still recovers for physical harm, but her recovery falls in proportion to her comparative fault.4 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability points the same way. It lets the trier of fact apportion damages between parties liable in negligence and parties liable in strict liability, and it speaks of “comparative responsibility” instead of “comparative negligence” or “comparative fault.”5 The label fits, because the jury sets a plaintiff's negligence against a defendant's liability that may involve no fault at all.6
The new rule reaches both halves of the Second Restatement scheme. Ordinary carelessness, which §§ 484(1), 515(1), and 524(1) ignored, now counts: the jury assigns the plaintiff a percentage, and damages fall by that percentage.7 Knowing and unreasonable exposure, which §§ 484(2), 515(2), and 524(2) treated as a complete bar, now reduces damages instead.8 The Third Restatement recognizes no separate assumption-of-risk defense,9 and most courts reasoned that an unreasonable assumption of risk is simply negligence that the jury can count in the comparison.10 Courts define express assumption of risk as oral or written consent to a dangerous activity or condition, but under the Third Restatement that consent no longer works as a free-standing defense.11
The Second Restatement results follow from § 524(2), which bars the first driver because he knowingly and unreasonably exposed himself to the risk, and from § 524(1), which disregards the second driver's inattention because he never grasped the danger.12 The comparative results come from multiplying each driver's damages by the quarry's share of responsibility, the same arithmetic that leaves a plaintiff found 30 percent at fault with 70 percent of the damages.13 The jury had good reason to charge the first driver more, because the factors for assigning responsibility include the nature of a person's risk-creating conduct, with any awareness of the risk, and the strength of the causal connection between that conduct and the harm.14 Knowledge therefore keeps its importance, since it raises the share the jury assigns, but knowledge alone no longer ends the claim.
Animal cases divide the loss in the same way. In Andrade v. Shiers, a plaintiff who had been around cattle all his life tried to move a newborn calf away from a muddy river bank while its mother stood unsecured a few feet away, and the cow attacked as he set the calf down.15 The Louisiana court compared his unreasonable conduct with the owners' strict liability and allocated 80 percent of the fault to him.16 Under the Second Restatement the court would have had to choose between full recovery, if his conduct was mere carelessness, and no recovery, if it was knowing and unreasonable exposure. The comparison lets a court divide the loss instead, and in many states a plaintiff whose share reaches 50 or 51 percent is barred altogether.17
A reduction follows only from fault, and that limits how often it applies. A plaintiff who knowingly faces a danger for a good reason has made a reasonable choice, and some cases hold that such a choice should not reduce recovery at all, since damages shrink only for negligence.18 A rescuer who enters a burning building to save a child is the familiar illustration. Foolishness short of consent calls for a reduction without a bar: a person who foolishly tries to pet a keeper's tiger should probably see recovery reduced.19 A trainer hired to handle wild animals presents a different case, which the next subsection takes up.
Courts that replace the bar with a reduction rely on two arguments. The first is redundancy. The assumption-of-risk defense usually applies only when the plaintiff's assumption was unreasonable and therefore negligent, so a majority of courts concluded that an independent defense makes little sense once comparative negligence exists, because the jury can weigh the unreasonable assumption in the comparison.20 The second is consistency. In Daly v. General Motors Corp., a products case, the California Supreme Court observed that the same conduct that merely reduced recovery in a negligence action acted as a complete bar in a strict liability action. That result put the consumer in a worse position than a negligence claim would and rewarded adroit pleading.21 The court resolved the anomaly by treating the defenses alike, so that each, if established, reduces the claim and does not bar it.22 Daly involved a defective product, but its answer bears directly on animals and abnormally dangerous activities, where the same mismatch arises.
The first objection to a reduction comes from the defendant's side: a deduction might dull the incentive to make the activity safe. Daly answered that the defendant's liability, and with it the incentive to avoid and correct the danger, remains. Its exposure falls only to the extent the jury finds that the plaintiff's conduct contributed, and many injured plaintiffs are blameless and recover in full.23 Skeptics respond that the change adds a routine issue to every case. One opinion predicted that the pleading of affirmative defenses alleging contributory negligence, “or the currently approved substitute terminology,” would become boilerplate.24
The conceptual objection asks how a jury can compare a plaintiff's negligence with the liability of a defendant who need not have been negligent, the problem of comparing apples and oranges.25 Daly answered that the objection insists on fixed and precise definitions in an area where tort law has long overlapped and interwoven its concepts to attain substantial justice, and it was convinced that jurors can apportion liability fairly.26 The defendant's care is beside the point. In the Franklin and Prince example earlier in this chapter, Franklin ran its operation carefully, and Prince may still recover by showing that the defendant's conduct of the activity caused his injury, however carefully it was done.27 A strictly liable defendant is not found free of negligence; the question is simply irrelevant to its liability, and if the defendant was in fact negligent, that negligence can be compared with the plaintiff's.28 A second approach compares causal contribution. Fault cannot be compared with strict liability, but each party's tortious conduct proximately caused the injury, so the jury can apportion liability by each party's relative causal contribution, guided by the nature of the risk-creating conduct and the strength of its causal connection to the harm.29
The comparative approach is the modern default, but jurisdictions do not agree on every point. Virtually every state now has some form of comparative negligence, usually by legislation, so the open question for strict liability is whether the statute or precedent reaches it.30 Idaho in Boswell v. Steele applied comparative negligence principles to a dog-bite claim even though its statute by its terms mentioned only negligence. Missouri in Coble v. Taylor read its statute to cover strict liability claims arising from an escaped bull. Kentucky in Maupin v. Tankersley adopted comparative negligence for a dog-bite case despite having earlier rejected contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability.31 In products cases, most jurisdictions have followed Daly, though a few refuse to recognize comparative fault or limit it to plaintiffs who assumed the risk; Nebraska's decision in Shipler v. General Motors Corp. read its comparative negligence statute to preclude the defense in strict products liability actions.32 A few states also keep conscious assumption of risk as a complete defense in products cases while reducing damages for other negligence, so a plaintiff who recognized the danger recovers nothing and one who was merely negligent recovers less.33 A jurisdiction that refuses the reduction would return the second driver in the quarry example to full recovery, as § 524(1) provides.34
Products cases add a shield that the animal and activity rules above do not mention. Once most courts and legislatures abandoned the all-or-nothing effect of contributory negligence, one might have expected them to throw a user's simple carelessness into the apportionment. Almost every court to consider the point has instead held that a plaintiff's careless failure to discover that a product is defective lies outside damages apportionment.35 For tigers and blasting, ask first whether the plaintiff was negligent at all, and reserve the failure-to-discover shield for stems that involve a defective product.
Benefit-Seeking Plaintiffs
Section 24(a) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm denies strict liability to a plaintiff who suffers physical harm by making contact with, or coming into proximity to, the defendant's animal “for the purpose of securing some benefit from that contact or that proximity.”37 A plaintiff inside the rule recovers nothing on the strict liability theory, because the claim fails at the threshold, whereas the reduction rule of the previous subsection shrinks a claim that still exists. The rule matters because the Third Restatement gives assumption of risk no separate standing, so § 24(a) is where the plaintiff who goes looking for the animal now meets the consequences of that choice.38
The rule follows from the premise that justifies strict liability in the first place. Drivers and accident victims typically share in creating the risks of driving, but the unusual activities that support strict liability generally involve a large risk created solely by the defendant, and “typically, the victim is a passive, uninvolved third party” with little ability to avoid it.39 A plaintiff who seeks out the animal stands elsewhere. She chose the proximity and gains something from it, so the risk is not one imposed on a person who received nothing in return. The doctrine's origin points the same way. In Rylands v. Fletcher, Blackburn began from the premise that a plaintiff free from all blame must bear his loss unless he can show some default by the defendants, and he asked what obligation the law casts on a person who brings onto his land something harmless while it stays but certain to do mischief if it escapes.40
The same premise explains why the remedy is complete denial instead of a percentage. A comparative reduction prices fault, so it presupposes that the plaintiff acted negligently, and a person who takes a job handling the defendant's wild animals may act with complete reasonableness. A knowing choice to run a risk can be reasonable, and recovery is reduced only for negligence.41 The rule therefore turns on what the plaintiff came for, and its text carries no reasonableness qualifier. Section 515(3) likewise says nothing about reasonableness when it makes assumption of the risk a defense, while § 515(2) requires that the plaintiff act unreasonably.42
The paradigm plaintiff is the professional hired to train the keeper's wild animals. She comes near the animals to earn a wage, which is a benefit secured through the proximity, so § 24(a) takes strict liability off the table.43 Her case is weaker still if she expressly agreed, orally or in writing, to assume the risk, since courts define express assumption of risk as that kind of consent.44 The Second Restatement could reach the same result through the assumption-of-risk defense of § 515(3), and the Third Restatement reaches it by holding that strict liability does not apply. Only the label changes, from a consent defense to a limit on the scope of strict liability.45
What becomes of a plaintiff who wanted nothing from the animal at all?
The handler came near the leopard to earn wages, so § 24(a) removes strict liability from that claim, and neither her care nor her carelessness needs to be weighed. The neighbor sought no contact and took no part in keeping the animal, so the purpose element is missing and she stands where the passive victim of an abnormal risk has always stood. Her claim proceeds under the general rules of this chapter: the Second Restatement disregards ordinary carelessness on the part of a plaintiff like her,46 and the comparative responsibility rule would reduce her recovery only to the extent that she was in fact negligent.47
The words “some benefit” are broad on their face, so an exam answer should anchor the argument in facts showing that the plaintiff sought the contact for a gain, such as wages or a fee, and did not merely suffer it. Foolishness in meeting a known risk is ordinarily negligence, which reduces recovery under § 25 and does not end the claim.48 Complete relief for the defendant belongs to the plaintiff whose purpose was to secure a benefit.49 The person who foolishly tries to pet the keeper's tiger shows poor judgment that a jury can price, while the trainer hired to work with it shows consent through the job itself.
For abnormally dangerous activities, a narrower limit applies the same premise to a plaintiff who is part of the activity. The comments to § 20 of the Third Restatement describe the typical victim as a passive, uninvolved third party,50 and a plaintiff who helps carry on the activity is not that victim. A person who helps the defendant load and fire a fireworks display is a participant, while a driver passing on a nearby road is the passive victim the doctrine protects. Authority for this extension is thinner than for the benefit-seeking rule, which appears in the text of § 24,51 and the decision usually cited for it is Pullen v. West, a Kansas case. On an exam, treat the participant argument as an available second route, and lead with § 24(a) whenever the facts show that a plaintiff sought contact with an animal for a benefit.
The second step does the real work, because the same injury can end in a complete bar or in an unreduced claim depending on why the plaintiff stood where the harm occurred.