Concept
Applying the Rules to Dangerous Activities
Defenses to strict liability claims
Applying the Rules to Dangerous Activities
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 524 sorts plaintiff conduct in abnormally dangerous activity cases in the pattern of the animal rules just covered. Subsection (1) says the plaintiff's contributory negligence is not a defense to the strict liability of one who carries on such an activity. Subsection (2) makes one exception: contributory negligence is a defense when the plaintiff knowingly and unreasonably subjects himself to the risk of harm from the activity.1 Assumption of risk supplies a further route to the same result, as it does for animals.2 Blasting beside a highway shows all three at work. Assume throughout that the claim is otherwise sound, so that the activity is abnormally dangerous and the harm came from what makes it so. The only question is then what the plaintiff's own conduct does to the claim.
Blasting fits strict liability because the blaster alone creates the danger. Many ordinary activities entail risk, driving among them, but drivers and accident victims typically share in creating it. The unusual activities that support strict liability involve a large risk created solely by the defendant, and the victim typically is a passive, uninvolved third party.3 Where an activity is neither especially dangerous nor uncommon in an area, by contrast, potential injurers have no edge over potential victims in controlling the risk, and many potential victims engage in the activity themselves.4 The passive-victim picture helps locate the line in § 524. A plaintiff who merely fails to notice the danger resembles the passive victim, while a plaintiff who sees the danger and walks into it does not.
A driver who negligently misses a warning sign, drives past it, and is hurt by a blast may still recover, because a plaintiff's failure to discover the danger is not a defense.5 A blaster who investigated carefully and proceeded only when satisfied it was safe fares no better. Liability does not turn on negligence, and the plaintiff recovers by showing that the defendant's conduct of the activity caused the injury, however carefully it was done.6 The sign matters only when it reaches the plaintiff's understanding. If the driver sees the sign, or a flagman warns him not to proceed, and he insists on proceeding, he cannot recover.7 Knowledge of the danger satisfies the first element of § 524(2). The second element, unreasonableness, is hard to resist for a driver whose only reason for going ahead is to save time.
The word 'knowingly' limits that result. The plaintiff must have known the danger the activity actually presents, so a plaintiff who brushes past a warning without grasping what it signals has been careless and nothing more. Suppose a tanker of gasoline overturns and a trooper waves traffic down. A hurried driver, taking the scene for an ordinary wreck, ignores the trooper and is hurt when the gasoline explodes. He disregarded a warning, but he probably did not knowingly expose himself to the risk of an explosion, and ordinary carelessness leaves his claim intact.8
Consent offers a separate way to lose. Express assumption of risk is oral or written consent to a dangerous activity or condition.9 A plaintiff who has agreed to bear the danger has taken the risk on himself. The same idea makes assumption of risk a defense to strict liability for animals,10 and it may affect the recovery of a plaintiff who deliberately proceeds into a known danger created by a blaster.11 The inquiry turns on what the plaintiff agreed to, not on whether a careful person would have agreed.
The cyclist stands where the inattentive driver stood: a passive victim of a risk the quarry alone created, who neither knew of the danger nor agreed to bear it. The hauler's written consent is what separates the two. The quarry's careful packing counts for nothing against either plaintiff, because strict liability does not depend on how carefully the activity was conducted.12
These steps describe the Second Restatement. The Third Restatement § 25 would compare the plaintiff's negligence with the defendant's strict liability in cases involving animals and abnormally dangerous activities.13 The inattentive driver, who recovers in full under § 524(1), would then have his carelessness weighed against the blaster's liability. In Andrade v. Shiers, an animal case, a court allocated 80% of the fault to a plaintiff who tried to move a newborn calf while its mother stood unsecured a few feet away.14 A later section develops that approach.