Concept
Applying the Rules to Animals
Defenses to strict liability claims
Applying the Rules to Animals
Section 515 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sorts plaintiff conduct in an animal case into three groups. Ordinary contributory negligence is no defense to the keeper's strict liability. Contributory negligence in knowingly and unreasonably subjecting oneself to the risk that a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal will do harm is a defense. And the plaintiff's assumption of the risk of harm from the animal is a defense.1 The clearest way to see where the lines fall is to follow one tiger exhibit and change, visitor by visitor, what each plaintiff knew and why each was there. The sequence runs from carelessness to knowing exposure to consent, and it ends with a caution about statutes.
Each defense operates against a keeper who is already liable. A possessor of a wild animal is liable for harm the animal does even though the possessor used the utmost care to confine it or otherwise prevent harm.2 The reason lies in what keeping a tiger involves. Those tempted to keep one will think hard about liability, and some will give it up. Those who cannot do without one will take every possible precaution to restrain it. And the tiger's victims will at least be compensated for injuries resulting from an arguably frivolous or even antisocial choice by the owner.3 The defenses follow from that purpose. A keeper who could escape by pointing to a victim's slight carelessness would feel little of the pressure the rule exists to create. An older formulation of the rule says as much: because the owner is held to a rigorous standard on account of the danger to human life and limb, "he ought not to be relieved from it by slight negligence or want of ordinary care."4 The owner must instead prove acts, done with notice of the animal's character, that show the injured person voluntarily brought the calamity upon himself.5
The first visitor has the plainest claim. She did not know of the escape, so the most the park can say is that she failed to discover the danger or to guard against it. That is ordinary carelessness, and § 515(1) makes it no defense, so the park owes her full damages however carefully it confined the tiger.6 An exam stem that says she should have checked the enclosure describes carelessness of exactly this kind, and carelessness leaves the keeper liable.
The second visitor falls on the other side of the line. He knew the tiger was loose, a shelter was available, and he went toward the animal anyway. Section 515(2) makes contributory negligence a defense when the plaintiff knowingly and unreasonably subjects himself to the risk that a wild animal will harm him, so the park can establish the defense and bar his claim entirely.7 His status as an invited visitor does not change the result. Strict liability ordinarily runs to people who come onto the keeper's land with the keeper's consent, but an invitee who knows that the dangerous animal has escaped may be barred if he nevertheless acts on that consent and exposes himself to the animal.8 The older formulation puts the logic in causal terms. A person who, with full knowledge of the animal's evil propensities, wantonly excites it or "voluntarily and unnecessarily puts himself in the way" of it brings the injury on himself, and in a legal sense the keeping of the animal no longer produced the harm.9 A treatise problem presents the same situation at a circus. The plaintiff crawls under the rope in front of a bear's cage and goes within six inches of the bars, and the bear slaps at him through them and puts out his eye. Ervin v. Woodruff points toward no liability, on the ground that the plaintiff brought the calamity upon himself.10
The third visitor knew everything the second one knew, and the defense still fails. Section 515(2) demands both knowledge and unreasonableness, and a prudent person could well decide to run onto a path to carry a child out of a tiger's reach.11 Knowing exposure that is reasonable leaves the contributory-negligence defense unproven, so the park remains liable. Nothing in the rescue shows a willingness to bear the park's tiger risk, either, which matters for the consent defense taken up next. The second and third visitors differ only in why each went onto the path, and that reason decides whether the knowing exposure was unreasonable.
Assumption of risk asks a different question from § 515(2). It asks whether the plaintiff accepted the risk, and the usual evidence is consent. Express assumption of risk is oral or written consent to a dangerous activity or condition.12 Courts treat the defense as something the keeper must prove. In Heidemann v. Rare Feline Breeding Center, an Indiana court held that strict liability applies to wild animals and that whether the defendant had proved assumption of the risk was a question of fact for the jury.13 The question goes to a jury because the answer depends on what the plaintiff understood and accepted. Consent may also come from conduct. People who accept hazardous employment are a standard example of plaintiffs who enter a relationship knowing of its inherent risks.14 A professional hired to train the keeper's tigers therefore apparently consents to the abnormal risks that the work involves, and the case for barring her claim is strongest if she also contracts expressly to assume them.15 A visitor who foolishly reaches through a fence to pet a tiger is in a different position. He has made no agreement and has no tie to the animals, and foolishness is not consent.
That contrast explains why § 515(3) says nothing about unreasonableness, although § 515(2) uses the word.16 Section 515(2) is a fault-based defense that asks whether the plaintiff acted unreasonably. Section 515(3) asks whether the plaintiff accepted the risk, and a person can accept a risk for good reasons or bad ones and still have accepted it. Running a tiger claim through the defenses therefore takes five questions in a fixed order.
The second step reflects a limit that lies outside the Restatement. Legislatures regulate some animal claims directly, and when a statute spells out the defenses, the statute controls. Dog-bite statutes are the usual example. Some impose liability for certain damage without requiring scienter.17 In Donner v. Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co., a Florida decision, it was error to instruct on assumed risk in a dog-bite case because only the statutory provocation defense was available.18 The result follows from who has made the choice. When a legislature has decided which plaintiff conduct relieves the keeper, a court that adds common-law assumption of risk supplies a defense the legislature did not provide. A keeper in a provocation-only state therefore cannot defeat a claim by showing that the visitor knew the dog was dangerous and approached it anyway, unless that conduct amounts to the statutory provocation.
The Second Restatement's three-part structure is not the only approach. The Restatement Third does not recognize assumption of the risk as a separate defense, and it limits the scope of strict liability instead, as the Third Restatement section below explains.19