Concept
Restatement Rules on Plaintiff Conduct
Defenses to strict liability claims
Defenses to Strict Liability
Restatement Rules on Plaintiff Conduct
The Restatement (Second) of Torts treats plaintiff conduct in strict liability with one two-part structure. It states a general rule for animals and abnormally dangerous activities together: except as Subsection (2) provides, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence is not a defense to the strict liability of the possessor of an animal or of one who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity.1 It then repeats the rule separately for animals and for activities, each time with its own Subsection (2) exception.2 Once you can read one version, you can read all three.
The general rule follows from what strict liability asks. The question is whether the defendant’s conduct of the activity caused the harm, however carefully the defendant performed it.3 A defense built on the plaintiff’s ordinary carelessness would bring back the comparison of fault that strict liability sets aside.
Plaintiff conduct of a different kind receives different treatment. A plaintiff who knows of the danger and chooses to meet it has decided, with open eyes, to stand inside the risk. The exception makes that choice a defense when the plaintiff acts knowingly and unreasonably (in the combined version, voluntarily and unreasonably).4 For animals the Restatement adds a separate defense: the plaintiff’s assumption of the risk of harm from the animal.5
The subsections below take the three rules in that order: ordinary carelessness, which is no defense; knowing and unreasonable exposure, which is; and assumption of risk, which rests on consent. This unit covers the animal and activity rules. The Second Restatement’s separate strict liability rule for sellers of defective products, § 402A, lies outside it.6 Throughout, the Second Restatement works in all-or-nothing terms: ordinary carelessness is ignored, and a proven defense defeats the claim. Later sections show how the Third Restatement approaches plaintiff conduct.
Ordinary Contributory Negligence
A plaintiff’s ordinary carelessness therefore costs the plaintiff nothing, a result that surprises students who arrive from negligence law. There, the traditional rule of contributory negligence bars a plaintiff who failed to exercise reasonable care for her own safety, even when the defendant was far more negligent.7 Strict liability reverses that expectation because it never asked how carefully the defendant behaved, so the plaintiff’s care cannot offset the defendant’s. The carelessness the rule disregards is the ordinary kind: failing to discover a danger, or failing to guard against it, without knowing of the danger and choosing to face it.
Sandy v. Bushey applies the same logic to animals. A keeper who knows that an animal is accustomed to attack mankind assumes the obligation of an insurer, and no measure of care in keeping the animal excuses him. Because he is held to so rigorous a rule, the Maine court explained, he should not be relieved of it by the injured person’s slight negligence or want of ordinary care.8 Something more is required, and the court located it in conduct by which an injured person, with notice of the animal’s character, voluntarily brings the calamity on himself. That is the exception previewed above and developed in the next subsection.
Blasting near a highway shows the same line from the plaintiff’s side. A driver who negligently fails to see a warning sign, drives past it, and is hurt by the blast may recover. A driver who sees the sign, or a flagman who warns him not to proceed, and insists on going ahead cannot.9 The road, the blast, and the warning are identical for both drivers; only what each driver actually knew differs.
Everything so far assumes a plaintiff who did not know of the danger. Once the plaintiff knew and chose to meet it, the analysis moves to the exception, and the result changes completely.
Knowing and Unreasonable Exposure
The exception begins where the previous subsection stopped, with a plaintiff who knows. The plaintiff’s contributory negligence in voluntarily and unreasonably subjecting himself to the risk of harm from the animal or the activity is a defense to the strict liability.11 The separate animal and activity versions say the same thing but describe a plaintiff who acts “knowingly and unreasonably.”12 The two adverbs describe one plaintiff, because no one can freely choose to meet a danger he does not know exists. A later section examines what knowledge and voluntariness each demand; this subsection concentrates on the structure of the defense.
The animal version carries a built-in limit. It speaks of the risk that a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal will harm the plaintiff’s person, land, or chattels,13 and those are the two classes of animal for which strict liability exists in the first place. The possessor of a wild animal answers for its harm even after using the utmost care to confine it,14 and a keeper who knows that a domestic animal is accustomed to attack mankind assumes the obligation of an insurer.15 The defense therefore matches the liability it answers. It does not arise against an ordinary domestic animal whose keeper is liable, if at all, only for negligence.
Knowledge carries the most weight because it changes what produced the injury. Muller v. McKesson, whose reasoning the Maine court quoted in Sandy v. Bushey, put the point in causal terms: when a person who fully knows an animal’s evil propensities wantonly excites it, or voluntarily and unnecessarily puts himself in its way, it cannot be said in a legal sense that the keeping of the animal produced the injury. The passage also insists on proof of acts with notice of the animal’s character, which is why a plaintiff’s failure to notice does not qualify.16
The defendant bears the burden on this exception and must establish every element. The defendant must prove not only that the plaintiff appreciated the risk and willingly chose to encounter it, but also that the choice was objectively unreasonable in view of safer alternatives available to the plaintiff.17 Those elements translate into four questions.
Reasonableness is judged objectively, and it looks to the decision to encounter the risk. That decision may be reasonable or unreasonable. Driving a car with bad brakes to get a heart attack victim to the hospital is reasonable, while driving it to a poker game on time is not, and a rescuer who enters a fire to save a child knowingly accepts a risk while acting with good reason.18
The salesman knew the danger, chose to meet it, and had no reason beyond a sale, so every element is present and the defense defeats his claim. The neighbor knew the danger too, but she had no safer alternative, so her choice to stay was not unreasonable and the third element fails. The third visitor did not know, so at most he was ordinarily careless, and ordinary carelessness is no defense. All three stood within range of the same blast; the exception sorts them by what each knew and by whether the choice to be there was reasonable.
The same sorting works on exam facts. Language that the plaintiff should have noticed a warning or could have avoided the risk describes ordinary carelessness, which the Second Restatement ignores. Language about what the plaintiff actually understood, such as reading the warning or being told to stop, moves the case into the exception.
Animal cases show the exception at work on the defendant’s own land. In Irvine v. Rare Feline Breeding Ctr., Inc., a wild-animal case, the court explained that strict liability extends to persons who come onto the possessor’s land with the possessor’s consent. An invitee or licensee who knows that the dangerous animal runs at large or has escaped may be barred from recovery if he nevertheless acts on the possessor’s consent and exposes himself to the animal, which is where the contributory negligence exception takes over.19
When every element is proved, the plaintiff’s conduct is a defense to the strict liability, and it defeats the claim.20 The two halves of the scheme therefore sit at opposite ends: ordinary carelessness leaves recovery untouched, and knowing and unreasonable exposure ends it. A later section takes up how the Third Restatement approaches that contrast.
Assumption of Risk
The Second Restatement gives the keeper of an animal a defense beyond the exception just covered: the plaintiff’s assumption of the risk of harm from the animal is a defense to the strict liability.22 Set beside the contributory negligence exception, which asks whether the plaintiff knowingly and unreasonably exposed himself to a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal,23 the assumption-of-risk defense differs in one telling way: it says nothing about reasonableness.
The difference follows from what each defense rests on. The contributory negligence exception is a fault defense, asking whether the plaintiff acted carelessly in meeting a danger already known to him, which is why it carries the word unreasonably. Assumption of risk asks whether the plaintiff consented. Consent is a defense to virtually any tort, because the law ordinarily has no interest in compensating one who validly, knowingly, and freely consents in advance to the invasion of an interest the law would otherwise protect, and in negligence and strict liability that consent goes by the name assumption of risk.24 A plaintiff who fully comprehends a risk and voluntarily chooses to incur it implicitly accepts responsibility for the harm and relieves the person who created the risk, which is what the maxim volenti non fit injuria expresses.25
Because consent rests on the plaintiff’s own choice, the defense needs no showing that the choice was unwise. The unreasonableness element is an added requirement that qualifies the subjectivity of the classic assumption-of-risk defense.26 A plaintiff can have sound reasons for accepting a risk and still have accepted it.
Knowledge alone is not consent, however. Courts that treated the plaintiff’s knowledge as an agreement to relieve the defendant sometimes let a negligent defendant escape all responsibility even though the plaintiff acted reasonably and never signaled any intent to excuse him. The Second Restatement therefore added that a risk is assumed only if the plaintiff’s conduct in encountering it manifests a willingness to accept responsibility for it.27 An answer that leaps from the plaintiff’s awareness that the tiger was dangerous to assumption of risk skips the step that matters, which is what the plaintiff’s words or conduct communicated about who would bear the loss.
Consent comes in two forms, and the first is express. Express assumption of risk is oral or written consent to a dangerous activity or condition.28 Two conditions keep the rule from catching the unwary. The consent must be freely given, since a consent extracted from a party with little bargaining power is inconsistent with the free-choice principle and courts will not honor it.29 And the terms must in fact be brought home to the plaintiff and understood by him, which fine print on the back of a lift ticket, where most people would not read it, does not accomplish.30
The participant made a free, informed choice to bear the attack risk, so the agreement supports the defense. The ticket holder never had the risk brought home to him, so the fine print shows no acceptance, and his claim is judged by the rules of the preceding subsections.
The second form is consent implied from conduct, which is where most disputes arise. Voluntarily entering a relationship with the defendant, knowing of its inherent risks, can manifest acceptance, and taking hazardous employment is a standard example.31 A professional who accepts a job training the keeper’s wild animals confronts the very hazard that makes the keeper strictly liable, so taking the job communicates a willingness to bear it. Courts have applied the same idea to abnormally dangerous activities, as in Peneschi v. National Steel Corp., where the plaintiff’s acceptance of such work was treated as assumption of the risk. The visitor who foolishly tries to pet the keeper’s tiger communicates only poor judgment. His foolishness may bring him within the contributory negligence exception if he knew the danger and chose unreasonably to face it, but it does not by itself show that he agreed to bear the loss.
Because the defense turns on what the plaintiff understood and accepted, courts treat it as a question of proof. In Irvine, the plaintiff had visited the tenant on the farm about thirty times before the incident, and the court held that strict liability applies to wild animals and that whether the defendant had proved assumption of risk was a question of fact for the jury.32 A customer at a service station who reached into an unlocked box of snakes kept for public display and was bitten by a rattlesnake stood in a similar position. In Keyser v. Phillips Petroleum Co., the appellate court reversed the dismissal on demurrer so that he could try to prove he did not know the dangers.33
The Third Restatement does not recognize assumption of the risk as a separate defense, and a later section explains how it handles these questions instead.34