Concept
Working Through Animal Problems
Strict liability for harm done by animals
Working Through Animal Problems
An animal problem looks like a pile of separate rules, but it resolves as a sequence in which each answer removes rules from play. The sequence starts with land. The Restatement's fault rule for ordinary domestic animals opens with the words "Except for animal trespass," so the first question is whether the harm resulted from the animal's intrusion onto another's land.1 Only when it did not does classification begin. A domestic animal is one whose class is by custom devoted to the service of mankind at the time and in the place where it is kept, and a wild animal is one whose class is not.2
The order matters because early answers decide which later questions are worth asking. A gentle cow that wanders into a neighbor's field puts its keeper under the trespass rule whatever the cow's temperament, and treating her as an ordinary domestic animal would send the neighbor off to prove negligence the rule does not require. Knowledge follows classification for the same reason: it does different work in each category. The possessor of a wild animal answers for harm from a propensity characteristic of the class, whether or not he knew of it, while the possessor of a domestic animal reaches strict liability only through knowledge. A student who asks first what the keeper knew may spend the answer on a question the species has already settled.
Steps one through five decide which rule of liability applies, step six decides who answers under it, and step seven decides how much of the loss the plaintiff keeps, which is why the last two come last. A failure at the knowledge or propensity screen ends only the strict-liability theory, because the fault routes in step five remain open. A single changed fact usually moves a problem from one step's answer to another, and the facts that do it most often are the species, the keeper's knowledge, and the place where the harm occurred.
The two scenes differ in species alone, and that one fact decides whether the keeper's ignorance and care count at all. The beagle's owner would face the bobcat keeper's liability only if she knew of an abnormal propensity in the dog. When a stem gives a domestic animal a history, two questions decide the result: what the owner knew, and whether the injury came from the thing she knew.
Remove the two earlier bites and the delivery worker's claim looks like the beagle neighbor's: the owner would have no reason to know of any propensity, and the worker would have to prove negligence. The cyclist's claim shows the second limit. Even a keeper plainly on notice answers strictly only for the kind of harm the notice covered.
Stems about cattle invite the questions that decided the dog cases, namely how dangerous the animals were and what the farmer knew, and those are the wrong questions to ask first. The trespass rule never asks about the herd's temperament; it asks where the animals went.
A fencing statute adds a check inside step one, and jurisdictions differ on how it works. In a fencing-out state, the landowner must have fenced against the animals before their keeper answers for the intrusion; in a fencing-in state, the keeper must confine them. Steps six and seven then apply to whichever category the earlier steps selected. A plaintiff who knew of the danger and unreasonably courted it may lose a strict-liability claim under the traditional rule or see the award reduced under comparative fault, so a complete answer names the rule it applies and flags the other.