Concept
Ordinary Domestic Animals
Strict liability for harm done by animals
Ordinary Domestic Animals
The keeper of a domestic animal that he neither knows nor has reason to know is abnormally dangerous answers for the harm it does only under a fault rule. Section 518 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the rule: except for animal trespass, one who possesses or harbors such an animal is liable for harm the animal does if, but only if, he intentionally causes the animal to do the harm or is negligent in failing to prevent it.1 Intent is the first route2 and negligence the second.3 A claim lands here whenever the animal is domestic and the possessor lacks the knowledge that would make it abnormally dangerous under § 509.
The words if, but only if close every other door. Owning or keeping the animal proves neither intent nor negligence, so a plaintiff who proves neither recovers nothing, however serious the injury. Harbors carries over from the harborer rule discussed earlier, so a keeper who does not own the animal is held to the same fault standard.
Animal trespass is the one exception, and it has its own rule. Liability for the mere escape of livestock began as a deliberate extension of the law to fill a gap, and because it arrived before the action on the case had fully developed, it was identified with trespass even though the invasion was indirect.4 Later sections take up that rule, including how highway cases and fencing statutes shape it.5
Fault governs this category because an ordinary domestic animal carries ordinary risks. A dog, a horse, or a cow belongs to a class that people keep and tolerate, and a keeper with no notice of an abnormal tendency has received no signal to confine the animal or give it up. Strict liability would charge that keeper with whatever the animal happens to do, so the law asks the questions it asks about other everyday risks. The rest of this section takes the two routes in turn, then reckless disregard, then the dog-bite statutes that have replaced this rule for dogs in many states.
Intentionally Causing Harm
A keeper who sends a domestic animal at another person is liable for the harm it does, however gentle the animal. Under § 518(a), the possessor of an animal not known to be abnormally dangerous is liable when he intentionally causes the animal to do the harm.6 The rule contains no knowledge element. The plaintiff need not prove that the animal was vicious, that anyone had warned the keeper, or that the keeper took too few precautions. The plaintiff proves that the keeper sent the animal at the victim, as by ordering a dog to bite.
The animal's nature stops mattering once the keeper's act causes the harm. In the ordinary gentle-animal case, the harm comes from something the animal did on its own, and the law asks whether the keeper should have foreseen and prevented it. When the keeper directs the animal, the harm comes from the keeper's decision, and the animal serves as his instrument, as a thrown stone or a swung club would. No one defends a blow with a club by pointing out that the club was ordinary, and a keeper who sets a dog on someone cannot defend by pointing out that the dog was ordinary. Temperament, history, and the keeper's knowledge all drop out because the keeper's purpose supplied the danger.
The facts of Moore v. Myers show the pattern. A 15-year-old stood on the front steps of an unfenced yard with an unleashed pit bull terrier as three girls walked by on the sidewalk. One girl argued with the boys, who threatened to “sic” the dog on the girls. The son said something to the dog, the dog ran toward the girls, and the 12-year-old plaintiff fled into the path of a car.7 The source asks a different question about these facts, whether the plaintiff is within the protected class, so treat them as a picture of a threat, a word to the animal, and the animal's rush, not as an application of § 518(a).
Exam stems that stress a gentle animal (“never bit anyone,” “beloved family pet”) invite a fault analysis, and the first question is whether the keeper told, urged, or released the animal against the plaintiff. If he did, liability follows from his own act and the gentle history is irrelevant. If the animal acted on its own, this route closes and the claim turns to negligent failure to prevent harm, discussed next.
A keeper who uses a dog to guard property is privileged to do so only if, and only to the extent that, he would be privileged to use a mechanical protection device.8 The dog is a means of protecting property and takes the limits of any such device: a keeper may not inflict through an animal harm that the law would not let him inflict through a device set for the same purpose. A keeper whose guard dog injures someone can claim the privilege only within those limits.
Negligent Failure to Prevent Harm
A plaintiff hurt by an animal that gave no earlier warning can still recover if the keeper negligently failed to prevent the harm. Section 518(b) says so,10 and the Restatement approach reaches even the owner who does not know or have reason to know that the animal is more dangerous than others of its class; approximately twenty states follow it.11 The intent route required the keeper to have sent the animal at the victim. This route requires only that the keeper fell short of the care the situation demanded. The claim is ordinary negligence, and the doctrine's contribution is to say how a reasonable keeper behaves: the animal's class sets the precautions, and the plaintiff must show that the harm was foreseeable.
The care required is measured against the animal's class. Restatement commentary, quoted by one court, makes the comparison directly: the keeper of a bull or stallion must take greater precautions to confine it to the land where it is kept, and to control it when it is taken off the land, than the keeper of a cow or gelding.12 What animals of a given class do when loose fixes the probability and gravity of harm, so the class sets how much confinement a reasonable keeper provides. Because the commentary charges the keeper with knowing what animals of the class do, the class's ordinary tendencies count as foreseeable even when this individual animal has never shown them.
A gentle individual does not end the inquiry. The commentary's own illustrations make the point. The keeper of even a gentle bull must take into account the tendency of bulls as a class to attack moving objects, and so must use greater precautions to keep the bull under complete control on a public highway. The keeper of an ordinarily gentle bitch or cat is required to know that, while caring for puppies or kittens, she is likely to attack other animals and human beings.13 Suppose a keeper leads such a bull down a public road on a loose rope and it charges a passing car, injuring the driver. The keeper did not use the care that the class and the setting called for, so he is negligent although the bull had never shown aggression. Gentleness describes the individual animal, while the commentary asks what the class does in the circumstances the keeper created. A stem that stresses a gentle animal that never bit anyone therefore disposes of the strict-liability claim without touching this one.
Foreseeability carries the claim. Courts that recognize both a strict-liability and a negligence cause of action for domestic-animal attacks observe that the knowledge analysis and the foreseeability analysis often overlap, because what a keeper knew about an animal's behavior bears on what he should have anticipated; one court called its two-pronged approach similar, if not identical, to the Restatement's.14 The overlap does not merge the claims. A negligence plaintiff must still show that a reasonable keeper would have anticipated the harm and taken precautions against it, a showing that strict liability never demands. A plaintiff who fails on knowledge may therefore keep a negligence theory alive. The plaintiff in Bushnell v. Mott pressed negligence in failing to stop dogs after an attack began, and Dawson v. Woodson is a negligence claim arising from an escaped horse.
The usual proof of knowledge is a prior attack, and Gehrts v. Batteen states the burden. Before the keeper's breach of duty attaches, the plaintiff must establish that the keeper knew or should have known of the animal's dangerous propensities, and that knowledge is generally imputed to the keeper when there is evidence of at least one attack by the animal.15 Compare the knowledge inquiry under strict liability, which looks to the same kind of evidence.16
The plaintiff in Gehrts lost for want of foreseeability. Attacked by a dog named Wilbur, the plaintiff offered an expert's affidavit that the keeper, Nielsen, acted unreasonably in not restraining the dog properly. The affidavit rested largely on the fact that the plaintiff's family kept a dog, so its scent would be on him, and that Nielsen should have known the smell of a strange dog would make Wilbur act aggressively. But nothing in the record showed that Nielsen knew the plaintiff owned a dog or that its scent would be on him, and beyond the affidavit's assertions there was no evidence or reason to believe that Nielsen knew, or as a prudent person should have known, that the scent of a strange dog would cause Wilbur to attack.17 Set beside the highway bull, the case marks the line. Bulls as a class attack moving objects, a tendency the keeper is charged with knowing, while nothing in the Gehrts record tied the plaintiff's own scent to what this keeper knew or should have known.
Two points of scope close out the claim. First, a motorist injured in colliding with a cow has no trespass to land and so no strict-liability claim; in most instances the owner of an animal that strays onto the highway is liable for negligence and only for negligence.18 Some courts impose that negligence liability even when the owner may graze animals on open range.19 Others hold that open-range rules, perhaps combined with statutory regulation, relieve the owner of any duty of reasonable care to keep livestock off the roads,20 and some say the owner owes no duty at all to those on the highway, so that even negligence is no basis for liability.21 Second, because the claim sounds in negligence, the plaintiff's own conduct is weighed under the rules covered later in this chapter.
Steps two and three do the real work. They turn a gentle animal's clean record into a question about foreseeability and keep the case from ending at the absence of a prior bite.
Reckless Disregard
Recklessness enters the analysis through § 501(1), which provides that, except as stated in subsection (2) and in § 503, the rules that determine liability for reckless disregard of another's safety are the same as those that determine liability for negligent misconduct.23 For the keeper of an ordinary domestic animal, a plaintiff who proves recklessness has therefore not entered a fourth category beside intent, negligence, and strict liability. The claim remains a failure-to-prevent claim under § 518(b),24 judged with the same attention to the animal's class, its circumstances, and the foreseeability of harm. Recklessness measures how culpable the failure was.
The law reuses the negligence rules because negligence and recklessness sit on one scale of unreasonable risk-taking. Courts distinguish negligence, which consists of inattention or inadvertence, from wantonness, where the danger is realized but so recklessly disregarded that there is a conscious indifference to the wrong.25 Every showing the plaintiff must make against a negligent keeper therefore remains necessary against a reckless one. The awareness involved also differs from the knowledge element of strict liability. Knowledge under § 509 concerns an abnormal propensity of this particular animal, while recklessness concerns the keeper's attitude toward the risk his own conduct creates.
Recklessness changes the analysis in two places. The first is causation. Under § 501(2), the fact that misconduct is in reckless disregard of another's safety rather than merely negligent is taken into account in deciding whether a jury may reasonably find that the conduct bears a sufficient causal relation to the harm.26 A causal link that looks thin against a careless keeper may therefore reach the jury against a reckless one.
The second is the plaintiff's own conduct. Contributory negligence is no defense to an intentional tort, and almost every jurisdiction has extended that rule to wanton, willful, or reckless conduct, on the reasoning that such conduct differs from negligence in kind as well as in degree.27 Under the traditional approach, a plaintiff's ordinary carelessness is generally no answer to a reckless keeper, in contrast to the plain negligence route above. A later section takes up comparative fault.
A keeper's conscious disregard of an obvious danger from an animal not known to be abnormally dangerous calls for no new theory. Run the failure-to-prevent analysis, treat recklessness as the more culpable form of the same fault, and then add its effects on causation and on the plaintiff's defenses.
Dog-Bite Statutes
Where no statute applies, a person bitten by a dog with no history of aggression must prove the owner's negligence. At common law, if the animal is neither wild nor a domesticated animal known to have dangerous propensities, the injured victim must prove that the owner was negligent.29 The rule was once summed up as “every dog gets one bite”: the owner escaped liability until the dog had bitten someone, because until then the dog was not known to be dangerous.30 Legislative pressure built in cases where a child is bitten and the parents cannot prove negligence.31
Many states have now replaced the common-law rule, holding the dog's owner, or a person who “harbors” the dog, responsible for the injuries it causes.32 The statutes aim to protect people who are in no position to control a dog, and they typically impose liability regardless of the dog's former viciousness or the owner's knowledge of it, repealing the notion that every dog gets one bite.33 Because the statutes differ, an answer should begin by finding the rule the jurisdiction has adopted. This section teaches the categories and not any one state's text.
The trigger for liability varies. Minnesota's statute, for example, holds a dog owner strictly liable for a bite so long as the dog was not provoked and the person bitten was peaceably at a place where he had a lawful right to be.34 The statute also decides who answers. It commonly names the owner and anyone who harbors the dog,35 and courts have not stretched those labels to fit every connection with the animal. One court held that a church was not the “keeper” of a dog belonging to an employee who lived on church grounds with his family and dog, and a Wisconsin court held that mere ownership of the property on which a dog resides does not make a person the dog's owner.36 The earlier discussion of control and harboring therefore remains a useful guide.
A statute that removes scienter does not remove every defense, and the exceptions it keeps track its purpose. The protection is aimed at people who cannot control the dog, so the statutes commonly make room for the plaintiff who entered uninvited or provoked the animal. The usual limits include these:
- A statute may except trespassers outright, as Massachusetts does, or may incorporate a rule that a bitten trespasser can sue only in negligence, as California's does.37
- A statute may reach a bite only if the dog was not provoked, as Minnesota's does, and Massachusetts's also excepts persons tormenting or abusing the biting dog.38 On what counts as provocation, see Stroop v. Day; on the effect of a posted warning, see Noble v. Yorke.
- A statute may include a working-dog exception, as Colorado's does for a bite that occurs while the dog is on its owner's property or working under its owner's control, a limit that matters in agriculture; see Robinson v. Legro.39
Breed-specific liability shows how unsettled the field remains. The Maryland Court of Appeals first held that strict liability applied to pit bulls or mixed-breed pit bulls without a showing of dangerous propensity in the particular dog, then reconsidered and limited the rule to pure-bred pit bulls in Tracey v. Solesky. The Legislature then acted, eliminating the “breed or heritage of the dog” as a factor affecting liability, effective April 8, 2014.40
The statute replaces the common-law rule only for the persons and harms its terms describe. A plaintiff who falls outside them, such as the trespasser above, returns to the common-law routes of intent and negligence.